United States v. David Menejia Manso

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-12426
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cr-10013-JEM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID MENEJIA MANSO,
a.k.a. David Menegia Manso,
a.k.a. David Meneiga Manzo,
a.k.a. David Menega Manso,
a.k.a. David Menejia-Manzo,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 29, 2019)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
David Manso appeals his 57-month sentence for convictions stemming from
his involvement in smuggling noncitizens into the United States. Manso argues the
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district court erred in applying the special-skill enhancement. See United States
Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.3. After careful consideration, we deem this
argument to be without merit, and we affirm.
I.
A grand jury indicted Manso on twenty-two counts related to his alleged
involvement in a conspiracy to bring noncitizens into the United States in violation
of federal law. Manso pled guilty to three of these charges.
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) set forth Manso’s offense
conduct. Relevant here, the PSR stated that an unknown person solicited a
confidential source (“CS”) to smuggle narcotics from the Bahamas to the United
States using a go-fast vessel. The unknown person introduced the CS to Manso
and told the CS that Manso would accompany him to the Bahamas to retrieve
contraband and bring it back to the United States. After some discussion, the three
decided the CS and Manso would drive a go-fast vessel from South Florida to
Bimini, Bahamas, where they would pick up a group of noncitizens and smuggle
them to South Florida on the go-fast vessel.
The CS and Manso left South Florida at nighttime in a go-fast vessel
destined for Bimini. When they arrived, Manso docked the boat. Over the next
few days, Manso and the CS negotiated with a Bahamian national about the terms
of the smuggling plan. They ultimately agreed that Manso and the CS would
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transport ten noncitizens at a rate of $4,000 per person. After receiving payment,
Manso, the CS, and the ten agreed-upon noncitizens boarded the go-fast vessel.
They departed from Bimini late in the evening. Manso and the CS took turns
driving the vessel towards Key Largo. Early the next morning, the United States
Coast Guard interdicted the vessel five miles off the coast of Key Largo and found
Manso, the CS, and ten noncitizens on board.
The PSR recommended that Manso’s offense level be increased by two
points because he “navigated the go-fast vessel to and from Bimini” and thus used
a special skill in a manner that significantly aided the commission of his offenses.
See USSG § 3B1.3. Manso objected to this recommendation. Manso argued that
the evidence in the PSR did not support the enhancement, because “the application
of this enhancement requires more than simply acting as captain of a small,
recreational fishing vessel.” Manso did not object to the PSR’s allegations that he:
navigated the go-fast vessel to Bimini at night and docked it upon arrival; made the
return trip with the CS in the late evening; navigated the go-fast vessel during the
return trip; and took turns driving the vessel with the CS during the return trip.
At sentencing, Manso again objected to the application of the special skill
enhancement. He conceded that “navigating the boat requires a special skill.” But
he argued that the enhancement requires “a little bit more than just a blanket
assertion that they took turns driving the boat” and that the PSR “does not give the
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Court sufficient facts to [find] that he . . . had that special skill other than just
momentarily taking control at the helm.” The district court disagreed with
Manso’s characterization of the PSR’s allegations, finding the allegation that
Manso and the CS took turns driving did not simply “mean [Manso] monetarily
took [the helm].” The court overruled Manso’s objection and ultimately sentenced
him to concurrent terms of 57 months in prison on each of the three counts.
II.
The special skill enhancement may apply if, in the commission of his
offense, a defendant used “a skill not possessed by members of the general public
and usually requiring substantial education, training, or licensing.” USSG § 3B1.3
& cmt. n.4; United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202, 1219 (11th Cir.
2010). This Court reviews de novo a district court’s legal interpretation of the term
“special skill,” but reviews for clear error a district court’s finding that a defendant
possessed a special skill. Id. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if we are “left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted). A sentencing court may base its factual findings on
“undisputed statements in the presentence report.” United States v. Wilson, 884
F.2d 1355, 1356 (11th Cir. 1989).
Manso argues the evidence was insufficient to support the special-skill
enhancement. However, the undisputed facts show that Manso navigated a go-fast
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vessel to Bimini at night, docked the vessel there, and navigated the vessel back to
South Florida at night with ten additional people aboard. The skills required to
perform these tasks “are not . . . possessed by the general public,” even if he and
the CS took turns driving. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d at 1219 (holding that
“navigat[ing] a boat at night in the Florida Keys with no lights” is not a “skill[]
possessed by the general public”); see also United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d
1314, 1339 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e are convinced that captaining a vessel on the
high seas is the type of activity that requires skills not possessed by members of the
general public, and, therefore, requires ‘special skills’ within the meaning of
section 3B1.3.”). The First Circuit cases Manso cites do not help his cause. See
United States v. Hilario-Hilario, 529 F.3d 65, 78 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that
“steering a simple sailing vessel along a course, as directed by another, does not
appear to be a special skill”); United States v. Montero-Montero, 370 F.3d 121,
124 (1st Cir. 2004) (remanding because “the record now lacks evidence that [the
defendant] was in fact navigating the boat,” but merely “reflects that [he] was a
member of a two-man crew” and “does not show whether [he] was piloting the
boat or otherwise employing special skills in connection with its navigation”).
This record shows Manso did more to navigate the boat than the actions of the
defendants described in the First Circuit cases. The district court did not clearly err
in finding that Manso employed a special skill.
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AFFIRMED.
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