United States v. Luis Pineda-Diaz

Case: 16-10412 Date Filed: 02/02/2017 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-10412
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00337-ODE-CMS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LUIS PINEDA-DIAZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(February 2, 2017)
Before JULIE CARNES, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 16-10412 Date Filed: 02/02/2017 Page: 2 of 4
Luis Pineda-Diaz appeals his 57-month sentence, imposed at the bottom of
the Guidelines range, after pleading guilty to one count of reentry of a deported
alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). On appeal, Pineda-Diaz argues
that his sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of the factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). After review, 1 we affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
Pineda-Diaz bears the burden of showing his sentence is unreasonable in
light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d
1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). To that end, he contends that given his difficult
personal history, desire to escape gang violence in Honduras, and lone prior felony
conviction, the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable because it
is required to impose a sentence that is “sufficient but not greater than necessary”
to carry out the statutory goals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
We examine whether the sentence was substantively reasonable bearing in
mind the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A court abuses its
discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant
weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3)
1
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1188–89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
2
Case: 16-10412 Date Filed: 02/02/2017 Page: 3 of 4
commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably.
Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. The district court did not err in any of these respects.
While Pineda-Diaz argues the district court failed to give appropriate weight
to his background and criminal history, the court heard and considered these issues
during sentencing. See United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir.
2007) (holding a district court need not mention each § 3553(a) factor it has
considered, so long as the record reflects that it did, in fact, consider them).
Moreover, the court did not place undue emphasis on the need for deterrence;
rather, the record shows the court considered that concern as only one factor
among others in its sentencing determination. See United States v. Kuhlman, 711
F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[S]ignificant reliance on one factor does not
necessarily render a sentence unreasonable.”); see also United States v. Clay, 483
F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor
is committed to the sound discretion of the district court . . . .”) (quotation
omitted). Additionally, though we do not presume, we expect a sentence imposed
within the Guidelines range will be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d
739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). In sum, this record does not leave a “definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment” in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
3
Case: 16-10412 Date Filed: 02/02/2017 Page: 4 of 4
Finally, to the extent Pineda-Diaz invokes the “parsimony principle” in
contending his sentence should be “not greater than necessary” to achieve the
statutory goals, his argument fails. We have explicitly rejected such an approach,
finding it neglects to accord equal weight to the countervailing statutory command,
that the sentence be “sufficient . . . to comply with the purposes” of § 3553(a)(2).
Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196–97.
II. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we affirm Pineda-Diaz’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
4