United States v. Armando Marmol

Case: 14-15389 Date Filed: 05/12/2015 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15389
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:98-cr-00081-WPD-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARMANDO MARMOL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 12, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Armando Marmol appeals pro se the denial of his motion to reduce his
sentence based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. 18 U.S.C.
Case: 14-15389 Date Filed: 05/12/2015 Page: 2 of 3
§ 3582(c)(2). Marmol challenges the denial of his motion for appointed counsel
and the refusal to reduce his sentence of 293 months of imprisonment. We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Marmol’s
motion for appointed counsel. Marmol was not entitled to have counsel assist him
in seeking a reduction of his sentence, see United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789,
794–95 (11th Cir. 2009), and the district court reasonably denied his request as
premature when he filed it two months before the effective date of Amendment
782. Marmol later failed to renew his request for appointed counsel when he filed
his motion to reduce his sentence.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it denied Marmol’s
motion to reduce his sentence. The district court left undisturbed its original
determination that Marmol’s offense involved 28.2 kilograms of cocaine. See
United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th Cir. 2000). Based on the amended
drug table, the district court correctly assigned Marmol an offense level of 36,
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2), which resulted in a revised sentencing range between 188
and 235 months of imprisonment, id. Ch. 5, Pt. A. The district court next
considered the statutory sentencing factors and reasonably refused to reduce
Marmol’s sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Bravo, 203 F.3d at 781. Marmol
possessed and conspired to import and to distribute a significant amount of
cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 846, 841(a), and before being captured, he drove a
2
Case: 14-15389 Date Filed: 05/12/2015 Page: 3 of 3
vehicle on Biscayne Boulevard in Miami, Florida, against the flow of traffic at a
high rate of speed. Based on this record, the district court was entitled to find that
Marmol’s term of imprisonment remained necessary to serve the purposes of
sentencing.
Marmol challenges his sentence on three grounds, all of which are meritless.
First, Marmol argues that the district court sentenced him above the “statutory
limit,” but Marmol faced a maximum statutory sentence of imprisonment for life.
See id. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 960(b)(1)(B). Second, Marmol challenges the two-level
increase of his base offense level for recklessly endangering the public in the
course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, but in
determining eligibility for a reduction of sentence “all original sentencing
determinations remain unchanged,” see Bravo, 203 F.3d at 781. Third, Marmol
argues that the district court failed to consider his post-sentencing conduct, but the
district court was not obligated to do so. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(B)(iii);
United States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 927 (11th Cir. 2009).
We AFFIRM the denial of Marmol’s motion to reduce.
3