United States v. Gustavo Dominguez

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 31, 2011
No. 07-13405
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 05-10009-CR-KMM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GUSTAVO DOMINGUEZ,
a.k.a. Gus,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(October 31, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, COX and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
COX, Circuit Judge:
Gustavo Dominguez, a professional sports agent, was convicted of smuggling
five Cuban baseball players into the United States, transporting the players from
Miami to Los Angeles, and harboring them there until they applied for asylum. See
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), (a)(1)(A)(ii), and (a)(1)(A)(iii) (criminalizing the bringing in,
transporting, and harboring of unauthorized aliens). The theory of prosecution was
that Dominguez, and several codefendants not parties to this appeal, conspired to
bring, unsuccessfully attempted to bring, and then successfully brought five Cuban
baseball players to the United States so that the players could pursue professional
baseball careers. And, the prosecution’s theory was that Dominguez had a role in
transporting and harboring the players after their arrival in the United States.
Dominguez anticipated that, after the players arrived, he would represent them as
their agent, negotiate any potential baseball contract, and collect a percentage of their
earnings as a fee. The indictment alleged, and the jury found, that Dominguez
smuggled the players for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial
gain. Based on this finding, the district court imposed a five-year mandatory
minimum sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Dominguez now appeals, challenging his convictions and sentences on various
grounds. He argues, among other things, that the evidence did not support any of his
convictions.
We conclude that the evidence does not support Dominguez’s convictions of
transporting and harboring aliens (Counts 44 through 53). We reverse these
convictions and vacate their sentences. We conclude the evidence supports
2
Dominguez’s convictions of conspiracy to smuggle, aiding and abetting an attempted
smuggle, and aiding and abetting a smuggle (Counts 1, 5, 6, 10, 13, 19, 28, 29, 33,
35, 40). We affirm these convictions and sentences. We find Dominguez’s other
assertions of error to be without merit.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
Gustavo Dominguez is a native of Cuba and a naturalized United States
citizen.1 He works as a sports agent, and through his company, Total Sports
International (“TSI”), he has represented over 100 baseball players, many of whom
played for Major League baseball teams. Some of these baseball players were Cuban
nationals who came to the United States without official documents authorizing their
presence in the United States. This criminal case involves Dominguez’s role in
helping five Cuban nationals come to the United States in order to pursue
professional baseball careers.
The smuggling venture at issue in this case began with Dominguez’s
relationship with Ysbel Medina-Santos (“Medina”). Medina has lived a life of crime;
he has numerous prior convictions for drug trafficking, smuggling, insurance fraud,
1
Because we must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support Dominguez’s
convictions, we state the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. United States
v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007).
3
and money laundering. When he faced a lengthy prison sentence for drug smuggling,
he agreed, in exchange for a potentially reduced sentence, to testify against
Dominguez about his role in the smuggling of these Cuban baseball players.
According to Medina, he and Dominguez agreed in November 2003 to smuggle
two Cuban players, Yuniesky Betancourt and Saydel Beltran, to the United States.2
In exchange for Medina’s assistance in smuggling the players into the United States,
Dominguez promised that the players would pay Medina 5% of any Major League
baseball contract that they might sign. Dominguez anticipated that he would
represent the players as their agent, negotiate any potential baseball contract, and
collect a percentage of their earnings as a fee. The smuggle was successful and, with
the help of Dominguez’s representation, Betancourt signed a Major League contract
for $2.8 million with the Seattle Mariners. Medina then asked Dominguez for 5% of
the contract ($140,000). After Betancourt failed to pay the $140,000, Medina held
Dominguez responsible for the money.
In July 2004, about eight months after the Betancourt-Beltran smuggle,
Dominguez contacted Medina about smuggling more Cuban players into the United
2
The indictment does not charge Dominguez with any crimes regarding the
Betancourt-Beltran smuggle. The district court admitted evidence of this prior smuggle under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), concluding that the evidence was relevant to establish
Dominguez’s intent to commit the smuggling offenses at issue in this case.
4
States. Dominguez and Medina agreed to bring five Cuban players to the United
States: Francisely Bueno-Trueba, Osbek Castillo-Perez, Allen Guevara-Perez,
Osmany Masso-Arredondo, and Yoankis Turino-Montalno. Medina told Dominguez,
however, that he would not attempt to bring these players to the United States until
he was paid at least $100,000 of the $140,000 that he was still owed for the
Betancourt-Beltran smuggle. Dominguez then made two $50,000 transfers from an
account he managed for another athlete client and wired the money to Medina,
without the client’s knowledge.
After Medina received the $100,000, he agreed to smuggle these five Cuban
players. One of Medina’s contacts called the players in Cuba, asked if they wanted
to leave, and told them when and where they should meet the “fast boat.” Medina
hired Geoffrey Rodrigues to drive the fast boat from Cuba to the United States.3
This July 2004 smuggling attempt failed. The United States Coast Guard
intercepted the fast boat about ten miles south of Key West, Florida. When
Rodrigues attempted to flee, the Coast Guard shot the engine of the boat to get it to
stop. The five players were detained and returned to Cuba.
After the first attempt failed, Dominguez asked Medina about a follow-up
smuggle. Medina agreed to the follow-up. Because Rodrigues had been caught,
3
Rodrigues pled guilty to a single smuggling conspiracy charge in this case.
5
Medina hired Roberto Yosvany Hernandez to bring the players to the United States
in exchange for $100,000.4 The smuggle was successful. The five players, along
with over a dozen other Cubans, were dropped off in the water off Deer Key, Florida
on August 22, 2004, around 5:00 a.m. All five players testified that they had no
papers authorizing their entry into the United States when they arrived.
In exchange for smuggling the five players into the United States, Medina
wanted $150,000. Dominguez had no problem sending the money, but he warned
Medina not to continue using his same bank account and instead to have the money
directed into a friend’s account. After the players arrived on August 22, 2004, and
continuing into September 2004, Dominguez transferred $125,000 into the accounts
of two of Medina’s friends, his father, and his sister. These individuals then paid
Medina. Dominguez still owed Medina $25,000.
After the players arrived in the Florida Keys, Medina brought them to the
Miami home of Andy Morales, who is a former Major League player and former
Dominguez client. The players were given clothes, food, and shelter. Medina
informed Dominguez that the players had arrived, and Dominguez asked Medina to
4
The jury acquitted Hernandez of all charges in this case. Despite Dominguez’s
suggestion to the contrary, this acquittal is irrelevant to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
Dominguez’s convictions. See United States v. Mitchell, 146 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (11th Cir.
1998) (stating that jury verdicts are “insulated from review” on the ground that they are
inconsistent (citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 68-69, 105 S. Ct. 471, 478-79 (1984))
(alterations omitted)).
6
drive the players to Los Angles with Ramon Batista.5 Medina, Batista, and the
players left Miami on August 23 and arrived in Los Angeles on August 26.
When the players arrived in Los Angeles, Dominguez met them at a restaurant.
He told them about his past successful representation of Cuban baseball players and
that he could represent the players in similar fashion. All five players signed agency
contracts with TSI. In addition to the contracts that the players signed with TSI,
Dominguez had the players sign contracts obligating them to pay Medina a
percentage of their baseball earnings. Dominguez and Medina intended for this
arrangement to pay off the $25,000 balance that Dominguez owed Medina for the
smuggle.
Shortly after the players arrived in Los Angeles, Dominguez arranged for
Humberto Gray, an experienced immigration attorney who has done immigration
work for TSI since the late 1990s, to process the players through immigration. By
October, Gray had interviewed the players and was doing whatever was necessary to
process them, including having them undergo examinations by physicians approved
by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Gray told
Dominguez that he had set up an “initial appointment” for the players at the USCIS
Los Angeles office sometime toward the end of October. Gray had the appointment
5
Batista pled guilty to a transporting charge in this case.
7
changed to November because Dominguez had a conflict and would be unable to
accompany the players to the USCIS office in October.
Meanwhile, TSI had the five players housed in an apartment complex. Every
weekday, and on some Saturdays, they trained and played games at the Pierce College
baseball facility in Woodland Hills. They were free to come and go as they pleased.
They went out with friends, to restaurants, and to watch professional baseball games.
The players were also featured in a documentary film that sought to portray the
progression of Cuban baseball players in the United States. On November 12, TSI
had the players tryout in front of scouts from almost all of the Major League clubs.
The tryout was successful, as three of the five players signed Minor League contracts.
On November 19, Gray and Dominguez accompanied the five Cubans to the
USCIS to apply for asylum and parole. They were paroled. Gray thereafter
represented them before the USCIS. Turino and Guevara stayed in the United States.
Bueno, Castillo, and Masso went to the Dominican Republic; Dominguez had
arranged for them to play baseball in the Dominican Republic where they could be
showcased before Major League scouts.
Dominguez testified at trial. “Dominguez’s defense was based on testimony
he was unaware the players were smuggled from Cuba and only found out they were
8
in Miami after their arrival.” (Appellant’s Brief at 55.) He denied having entered
into an agreement with Medina to have them brought from Cuba to the United States.
B. Procedural History
1. The Indictment
In October 2006, a Southern District of Florida grand jury returned a fifty-three
count indictment against Dominguez and others who are not parties to this appeal.
The Government dismissed most of these counts prior to trial. Dominguez proceeded
to trial on twenty-one counts: Count 1 charges Dominguez with conspiring to bring
aliens to the United States, transport aliens within the United States, and conceal,
harbor, and shield aliens within the United States, all for the purpose of commercial
advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) and
(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (a)(1)(B)(i), and 18 U.S.C. § 371. Counts 5, 6, 10, 13, and 19
charge Dominguez with aiding and abetting the attempt to bring in aliens to the
United States for the purpose of commercial advantage and private financial gain, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), (a)(2)(B)(ii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Counts 28, 29,
33, 35, and 40 charge Dominguez with aiding and abetting the bringing of aliens to
the United States for the purpose of commercial advantage and private financial gain,
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), (a)(2)(B)(ii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Counts 44
9
through 48 charge Dominguez with transporting aliens within the United States, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(ii). And Counts 49 through
53 charge Dominguez with concealing, harboring, and shielding aliens from
detection, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (a)(1)(B)(ii). Dominguez
pled not guilty to all counts.
For the sake of clarity and brevity, our opinion groups Dominguez’s
convictions into three categories based on the nature of the charges. We refer to his
convictions of conspiracy to smuggle (Count 1), the attempt to smuggle, (Counts 5,
6, 10, 13, 19), and smuggling (Counts 28, 29, 33, 35, 40) as the smuggling
convictions. We refer to his convictions of transporting aliens (Counts 44 through
48) as the transporting convictions. And, we refer to his convictions of concealing,
harboring, and shielding aliens from detection (Counts 49 through 53) as the
harboring convictions.
2. Motion in Limine
Prior to trial, the Government filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude
Dominguez from referring to “Legislative and Executive Branch immigration
policies” that apply specifically to Cubans–namely, the Cuban Adjustment Act
(“CAA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1255, and the “Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot” policy. In response,
Dominguez’s counsel argued that Dominguez reasonably believed the CAA and the
10
Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy gave the Cuban players eligibility to remain in the United
States. See Appellant’s Brief at 23 (“[Dominguez] understood [the players’] arrival
to and presence in the U.S. was lawful.”); id. at 35 (“The jury should have considered
whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe the Cubans were not illegally
in the U.S. . . . .”); R.1-176-1 at 9 (“[A] Cuban national who arrives on dry land is
eligible to remain in the United States, because that Cuban national’s status in the
United States is not in violation of the law.”). He thus contended that the CAA and
the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy were relevant to the issue of intent to violate the law.
The district court rejected this argument and granted the Government’s motion in
limine. The court found that Dominguez’s beliefs about the CAA and the Wet-Foot
/ Dry-Foot policy were irrelevant to his intent to commit the charged offenses. The
court therefore prohibited Dominguez from making any argument regarding the CAA
and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy at trial.
3. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
After the Government’s case-in-chief, Dominguez moved the district court for
a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). He argued,
among other things, that the Government had not established that he knew the five
Cuban players had not received “prior official authorization”; that he transported the
Cubans “in furtherance” of their illegal status; or that he concealed, harbored, and
11
shielded them to avoid detection. The court denied the motion. Dominguez renewed
the motion at the close of all the evidence. That motion was denied as well.
4. Sentencing
After a seven-day trial, the jury convicted Dominguez on all twenty-one counts.
The court sentenced Dominguez to a five-year mandatory minimum term for each of
the twenty-one counts of conviction, with each term to be served concurrently.
Dominguez received the five-year mandatory minimum under 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) because he was convicted of smuggling three or more aliens for
commercial advantage or private financial gain.6
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
Dominguez raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court
erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence does not
support any of his convictions; (2) whether the court erred in excluding evidence of
the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy and the Cuban Adjustment Act; (3) whether the court
erred in precluding the testimony of an expert immigration witness; (4) whether the
court erred in precluding evidence of the Major League baseball free agency rules;
6
Section 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) states that where a “[§ 1324(a)(2) smuggling] offense [is]
done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain” the defendant shall “be
fined under Title 18 and shall be imprisoned . . . in the case of a first or second violation of
subparagraph . . . (B)(ii), not less than 3 nor more than 10 years, and for any other violation, not
less than 5 nor more than 15 years.”
12
(5) whether the court erred in admitting evidence of the Betancourt-Beltran smuggle
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b); and (6) whether the court erred in denying
his requested jury instructions.7
III. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Dominguez contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his
convictions for smuggling, transporting, and harboring aliens. We review challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases de novo, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235,
1244 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “[E]vidence is sufficient to support a
conviction if a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt
7
Dominguez also raises other issues on appeal: (1) whether the court erred in granting
the Government’s motion for a continuance on the day of trial; (2) whether the court erred in
denying Dominguez’s request for specific voir dire questions; and (3) whether the cumulative
effect of multiple errors denied the defendant a fair trial.
As to issue one, we conclude that the court did not abuse its substantial discretion in
granting the Government’s motion for a continuance following the hospitalization of the
Government’s sole trial lawyer in this case. The record does not support Dominguez’s assertion
that the motion was a deliberate act designed to gain an advantage, and Dominguez has not
shown that he suffered significant prejudice as a result of the continuance. See United States v.
Key, 76 F.3d 350, 354 (11th Cir. 1996).
As to issue two, we conclude that the court did not abuse its wide discretion in limiting
voir dire of the prospective juror panel. The voir dire questioning as a whole complied with “the
essential demands of fairness” and “gave reasonable assurance to the parties that any prejudice of
the potential jurors would be discovered.” United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 753 (11th Cir.
1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As to issue three, to the extent any evidentiary or instructional errors occurred, the
cumulative effect of any such errors did not deny Dominguez a fair trial.
13
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“We assume that the jury made all credibility choices in support of the verdict” and
“accept all reasonable inferences that tend to support the government’s case.” Id.
(citation omitted).
1. Transporting (Counts 44-48)
Dominguez contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction
for transporting aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). That statute
punishes:
Any person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation
of law, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien
within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in
furtherance of such violation of law . . . .
Id.
14
Dominguez argues that the evidence failed to prove that he transported the
Cuban players within the United States to further the players’ unlawful presence.8
We agree.
The evidence at trial showed that Dominguez sent Ramon Batista to pick up
the five players in Miami and take them to Los Angeles. They arrived in Los Angeles
on August 26, 2004. Shortly after the players arrived, they were taken to Humberto
Gray, an experienced immigration attorney–who has done immigration work for TSI
players since the late 1990s–to process the players through immigration. By October,
Gray had interviewed the players and was doing whatever was necessary, including
having them undergo examinations by physicians approved by USCIS, to process
them. Gray told Dominguez that he had set up an “initial appointment” for the
players at the USCIS Los Angeles office sometime toward the end of October. Gray
had the appointment changed to November because Dominguez had a conflict and
8
Dominguez also argues that the evidence failed to prove that the Cuban players entered
or remained in the United States “in violation of law.” According to Dominguez, under the CAA
and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy, the Cuban players were legally present as soon as they
touched dry land. The Government’s position, which the district court accepted, is that a Cuban
who reaches United States soil remains “in violation of law” until they are inspected and
admitted or paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. In this case, the players arrived in Miami on August
23, 2004 and were not paroled until November 19, 2004. So, under the Government’s theory, the
players were present in violation of law from August 23, 2004 to November 19, 2004.
We need not address whether the Government’s legal interpretation is correct because the
transporting convictions must be reversed for reasons independent of whether the Cubans were
present “in violation of law” from August 23, 2004 to November 19, 2004.
15
would be unable to accompany the players to the USCIS office in October. On
November 19, 2004, Gray and Dominguez accompanied the five Cubans to the
USCIS to apply for asylum and parole. They were paroled.
The evidence further showed that, from the time the players arrived on August
23, 2004 to the time they were paroled on November 19, 2004, the players lived
freely and openly. They played baseball, went out with friends, ate at restaurants, and
watched professional baseball games. On November 12, 2004, the players were
“showcased” in front of scouts from almost every Major League team.
Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could not find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Dominguez transported the Cuban players from Miami to Los Angeles in
order to further their illegal status. To the contrary, the players were taken to an
experienced immigration attorney shortly after arriving in Los Angeles for the
purpose of processing the players through immigration, and the players were paroled
three months later. During that three month period, the players lived freely, openly,
and in no way acted in a manner suggesting they were avoiding immigration officials.
We therefore conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support Dominguez’s
conviction for transporting under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and the district court erred in
denying Dominguez’s motion for judgment of acquittal on these counts.
16
In arguing that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Dominguez acted to
further the illegal status of the Cuban players, the Government relies on the fact that
Dominguez waited about three months before taking the players to immigration
officials. The Government does not, however, point to any statute or regulation with
a specific time requirement for presenting Cubans to immigration officials.
Considering that the immigration process started shortly after the players arrived, as
well as the circumstances surrounding the purpose of the trip to Los Angeles, we
cannot say that the three-month delay in reporting to immigration authorities supports
the conclusion that Dominguez intended to transport the players in order to further
their illegal immigration status.9
2. Harboring (Counts 49-53)
Dominguez contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction
of harboring aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). That statute
punishes:
9
As the Tenth Circuit has noted, the relevant evidence in establishing that a defendant
acted in furtherance of an alien’s illegal status will vary from case to case. See United States v.
Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The circumstances of this case
are unique. Our reversal of Dominguez’s convictions for transporting aliens should not be read
as endorsing the idea that undocumented Cubans are free to wander indefinitely around the
United States, or that they should not report to immigration officials as soon as possible. We
simply hold that, under the facts of this case, the Government failed to prove that Dominguez
transported the aliens to further their purported illegal status.
17
Any person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation
of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to
conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place,
including any building or any means of transportation . . . .
Id.
Dominguez argues that the evidence did not establish that he “knowingly
concealed, harbored, or shielded from detection” the five Cuban players from United
States immigration officials.10 We agree.
The jury was given the following instruction defining the phrase “conceal,
harbor or shield from detection”: “To ‘conceal, harbor or shield from detection’
includes any knowing conduct by the defendant tending to substantially facilitate an
alien’s escaping detection thereby remaining in the United States illegally.” (R.14 at
1383; Dkt. 217 at 22.) The evidence does not support the conclusion that Dominguez
substantially facilitated the Cuban players’ escaping detection from immigration
officials. As noted in discussing the transporting convictions, Dominguez took the
players to experienced immigration counsel shortly after they arrived to process them
through immigration, and the players in no way engaged in conduct suggesting that
10
Dominguez also argues, as he does for the transporting convictions, that the evidence
failed to prove that the Cuban players entered or remained in the United States “in violation of
law.” We need not address this argument because the harboring convictions, like the
transporting convictions, are reversed on other grounds.
18
they were hiding from or otherwise avoiding immigration officials. We therefore
conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support Dominguez’s convictions
under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and the district court erred in denying Dominguez’s motion
for judgment of acquittal on these counts.
3. Smuggling Convictions: Conspiracy to Smuggle, Aiding and
Abetting the Attempt to Smuggle, and Aiding and Abetting an
Actual Smuggle
a. Conspiracy to Smuggle (Count 1)
Dominguez contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction of conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,11 to bring aliens to the
United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). That statute punishes:
Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or
reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United
States in any manner whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official
action which may later be taken with respect to such alien . . . .
Id.
Thus, the elements of smuggling aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) are (1)
that the defendant knowingly brought an alien to the United States; and (2) that the
11
18 U.S.C. § 371 states:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
19
defendant knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien had not received
prior official authorization to come to or enter the United States. To establish a
criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, “the Government must prove (1) that an
agreement existed between two or more persons to commit a crime; (2) that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined or participated in the conspiracy; and (3)
a conspirator performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” United States
v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The court also
instructed the jury that the Government had to prove Dominguez willfully joined the
conspiracy knowing its unlawful purpose. The crime of conspiracy is complete upon
the commission of an overt act. See United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1340 n.18
(11th Cir. 2005).
Dominguez argues that the evidence did not establish that he and Medina
conspired to bring the five Cuban players to the United States without prior official
authorization and that he knowingly participated in the conspiracy. Dominguez
points out that, while Medina testified that Dominguez requested the five Cuban
players, Medina did not testify that Dominguez knew they would arrive in the United
States without prior official authorization.
The evidence was sufficient to prove that Dominguez willfully conspired to
bring aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). The principle
20
is well-established that a conspiratorial agreement “may be proven by circumstantial
evidence, including ‘inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants or from
circumstantial evidence of a scheme.’” United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311,
1328 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, the totality of the circumstantial
evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Dominguez willfully conspired with
Medina to bring the five Cuban players to the United States and that Dominguez
knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the Cuban players did not have prior
official authorization to come to the United States.
Medina testified that he had an extensive and ongoing smuggling relationship
with Dominguez. The relationship started in 2003 when Medina and Dominguez
agreed to smuggle Betancourt and Beltran to the United States so they could pursue
professional baseball careers. This prior smuggle involved the same conduct as the
charged smuggling offenses and occurred less than a year prior to the charged
smuggling offenses. Further, Dominguez paid Medina $125,000 in order to fund the
smuggling of the five Cuban players. Dominguez sent the payments to the accounts
of Medina’s friends and family who then paid Medina. And, to pay off the $25,000
balance that Dominguez owed Medina for the smuggle, Dominguez had the players
sign contracts obligating them to pay a percentage of their baseball earnings to
Medina. Finally, the players arrived in the United States in a speed boat and were
21
dropped off in the water off Deer Key, Florida, around 5 a.m. Based on the totality
of the evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Dominguez knew or recklessly
disregarded the fact that the five Cuban players did not have prior official
authorization to come to the United States; that Dominguez willfully conspired with
Medina–that is, acted with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; and
that Medina knowingly brought the players to the United States in violation of
§ 1324(a)(2).
The conspiracy count in the indictment, Count 1, also charged a conspiracy to
transport aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), and a conspiracy to
harbor aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). “[W]here an indictment
alleges a conspiracy to commit several offenses against the United States, the charge
is sustained by adequate pleadings and proof of conspiracy to commit any one of the
offenses.” United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 633, 646 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation
omitted). The jury’s verdict form clearly indicates that they found that Dominguez
conspired to commit each of the substantive offenses: smuggling, transporting, and
harboring. (R.2-223.) Because the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction
for conspiracy to commit alien smuggling, we affirm the conspiracy conviction on
Count 1.
22
b. Aiding and Abetting the Attempt to Smuggle (Counts 5, 6,
10, 13, 19)
Dominguez contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions of aiding and abetting, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 2,12 the attempt to bring
aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). These convictions
were based on Dominguez’s conduct with respect to the unsuccessful smuggle of the
five Cuban players in July 2004, about a month prior to the successful smuggle.
Section 1324(a)(2), cited above, prohibits any person from knowingly bringing
or attempting to bring to the United States an alien who does not have prior official
authorization to enter the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). “To convict for
attempt, the government must prove: (1) the defendant was acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime for which he is
charged with attempting; and (2) the defendant was engaged in conduct that
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. United States v.
12
18 U.S.C. § 2 states:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as
a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
punishable as a principal.
23
Carothers, 121 F.3d 659, 661 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Mandujano,
499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974)).
To prove a substantive alien-smuggling offense under a theory of aiding and
abetting, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2, the evidence must establish that “(1) the
substantive offense was committed by someone; (2) the defendant committed an act
which contributed to and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid
in its commission.” United States v. Camacho, 233 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted).
The evidence was sufficient to prove that Dominguez aided and abetted the
attempt to bring aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
First, the attempted smuggling offense under § 1324(a)(2) was committed in July
2004 when Medina hired Geoffrey Rodrigues to bring the five Cuban baseball players
to the United States, and Rodrigues was caught bringing the players to the United
States. Second, Dominguez contributed to and furthered that offense by paying
Medina $100,000; Medina testified that he would not attempt the July 2004 smuggle
without the $100,000 payment for the previous Betancourt-Beltran smuggle. Third,
the amount of this payment and the irregular manner of payment support the jury’s
conclusion that Dominguez intended to aid the commission of the July 2004 smuggle.
See United States v. Lopez, 484 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“A
24
financier who organizes and funds a smuggling operation, . . . whether located in or
outside of the United States, may be said to have ‘associated himself with the venture,
participated in it as in something he wished to bring about, and sought by his action
to make it succeed.’” (alterations omitted) (citation omitted)). We therefore reject
Dominguez’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of aiding
and abetting the attempted smuggling of the five players in July 2004.
c. Alien Smuggling (Counts 28, 29, 33, 35, 40)
Dominguez contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction of aiding and abetting the bringing of aliens to the United States in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). These convictions were based on Dominguez’s
conduct with respect to the successful smuggle of the Cuban players in August 2004.
The evidence was sufficient to prove that Dominguez aided and abetted the
bringing of aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). As noted
in the context of the other convictions, Dominguez’s role in the prior
Betancourt-Beltran smuggle; the substantial amount of payment to Medina both
before and after the players’ arrival; the contracts that Dominguez had the players
sign with Medina to pay off the smuggling debt; and the time, location, and manner
in which the players arrived support the conclusion that Dominguez aided and abetted
the smuggling of the five Cuban players in August 2004.
25
d. Enhanced Sentence Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii)
Dominguez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the
jury’s finding that he participated in the smuggling operation, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(2), for the purpose of commercial advantage or financial gain. The
punishment under § 1324(a)(2) is enhanced if the smuggling offense is done “for the
purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).13 Dominguez argues that the evidence did not establish that he
smuggled the Cuban players “for the purpose of commercial advantage or private
financial gain” because he actually lost money after the players arrived in the United
States. He stresses that none of the five players signed Major League contracts, and
the three players who signed Minor League contracts did not sign for enough money
to trigger a substantial fee. We reject this argument. The enhanced punishment under
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not turn on the financial success of the smuggling venture.
As the Second and Ninth Circuits have pointed out, the statute “does not require
evidence of an ‘actual payment or even an agreement to pay’ but merely requires that
the defendant acted ‘for the purpose of financial gain.’” United States v. Kim, 435
13
The challenge to the financial-gain enhancement relates only to the smuggling
convictions. The counts of conviction for transporting aliens, under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii),
and harboring aliens, under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), did not allege that those offenses were
committed for commercial advantage or financial gain. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii).
26
F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Angwin, 271 F.3d 786, 805
(9th Cir. 2001)). The evidence at trial supported the jury’s conclusion that
Dominguez conspired to commit, and aided and abetted, the smuggling of the Cuban
players to the United States so that he could sign them up as clients and collect a fee
based on a percentage of their future earnings. Dominguez, moreover, paid a lot of
money, around $125,000, to finance the players’ smuggle, which supports the
inference that Dominguez expected a return on his investment. We therefore reject
Dominguez’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
financial-gain enhancement under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).14
e. Arguments Pertaining to the Cuban Adjustment Act and
the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot Policy
Dominguez contends that he reasonably believed the Cuban Adjustment Act
(“CAA”) and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy gave the players legal status in the
United States. Thus, he argues, he lacked the intent required to support his
convictions for smuggling under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).15 We reject this argument.
14
Our reversal of Dominguez’s convictions for transporting and harboring aliens does
not affect the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Dominguez’s conspiracy conviction (Count 1), five attempted smuggling convictions (Counts 5,
6, 10, 13, 19) and five smuggling convictions (Counts 28, 29, 33, 35, 40) support the five-year
statutory mandatory minimum sentence.
15
Dominguez also argues that the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy show that he
did not have the intent necessary to support his convictions for transporting and harboring aliens.
As we explain above, independent of the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy, the evidence
27
United States immigration law and policy afford special treatment to Cuban
nationals who come to the United States. Under the Cuban Adjustment Act, a native
or citizen of Cuba, who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United
States and has been physically present in the United States for at least two years, can
apply for permanent residency in the United States.16 By taking advantage of the
CAA, Cuban nationals, who have no documents authorizing their presence in the
United States, can remain in the United States without demonstrating that they
suffered persecution or proving refugee status.17 The benefits of the CAA, however,
can only apply to those Cubans who reach United States soil (those with “dry feet”)
while Cubans who are interdicted at sea (those with “wet feet”) are repatriated to
does not support these convictions and they must be reversed. We therefore need not address
whether the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy had any bearing on the transporting and
harboring convictions.
16
See Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)). The Act states:
[T]he status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been
inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States subsequent to January
1, 1959 and has been physically present in the United States for at least two
years, may be adjusted by the Attorney General . . . to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence if the alien makes an application for such
adjustment, and the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is
admissible to the United States for permanent residence.
Id.
17
For procedures governing asylum and proving refugee status, see generally 8 U.S.C. §
1158.
28
Cuba. This rule is commonly referred to as the “Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot” policy.18
Under the Department of Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Meissner
Memorandum, the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy applies to Cubans regardless of
whether they entered the United States at a designated port-of entry. Memorandum
from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Eligibility for
Permanent Residence Under the Cuban Adjustment Act Despite Having Arrived at
a Place Other than a Designated Port-of-Entry (Apr. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Meissner
Memorandum]. Dominguez claims that knowledge of this policy precludes a finding
he possessed an intent to violate the law. This obliges us to decide what level of
mental culpability 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) requires.
Section 1324(a)(2) requires proof of a defendant’s mental state in two ways.
First, the statute explicitly commands that a defendant know or recklessly disregard
“the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter,
or reside in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). Furthermore, a smuggling
offense occurs “regardless of any official action which may later be taken with
respect to such alien.” Id. Second, a defendant must knowingly bring or attempt to
18
The policy has its foundation in a bilateral migration agreement signed in 1994
between the United States and Cuba, often called the “Joint Communique.” See Cuba-United
States: Joint Statement on Normalization of Migration, Building on the Agreement of September
9, 1994, 35 I.L.M. 327, 329 (stating that “migrants rescued at sea attempting to enter the United
States will not be permitted to enter the United States, but instead will be taken to safe haven
facilities outside the United States”).
29
bring an alien to the United States. Id. Although the statutory language omits a
mens-rea requirement as to this second element, a presumption exists in favor of a
mens-rea requirement for each element of an offense. United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72, 115 S. Ct. 464, 469 (1994). Moreover, a court may treat
the mens rea Congress provided in the statute as modifying each element that follows
it. See id. at 79, 115 S. Ct. at 472 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, we decide a
defendant must knowingly bring an alien to the United States.
However, a specific intent to violate the law is not required. As an initial
matter, “courts obviously must follow Congress’ intent as to the required level of
mental culpability for any particular offense.” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
406, 100 S. Ct. 624, 632 (1980); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,
424, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 2087 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal
offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which
are solely creatures of statute.” (citation omitted)). The Supreme Court has also said
that “unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’
merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.” Bryan
v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946 (1998); see also Staples
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1805 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (“The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that
30
make the defendant’s conduct illegal . . . .” (citations omitted)); United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 1119 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“If
the ancient maxim that ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ has any residual validity,
it indicates that the ordinary intent requirement–mens rea–of the criminal law does
not require knowledge that an act is illegal, wrong, or blameworthy.”). When a
statute proscribes conduct done “willfully,” then the “jury must find that the
defendant acted . . . with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” Bryan, 524 U.S.
at 193, 118 S. Ct. at 1946.
Requiring willful conduct in this instance is contrary to the plain language of
the statute and its legislative history (discussed in more detail below), and would
functionally eliminate the “reckless disregard” language Congress included in the
statute. Congress was not silent as to mental culpability in § 1324(a)(2). The statute
explicitly prohibits conduct done “knowing[ly].” Had Congress desired to punish
only “willful” conduct, Congress could have drafted the statute to say as much. The
statute’s prohibition on bringing an alien in “reckless disregard” of the alien’s
unauthorized status furthers our conclusion that Congress has spoken clearly to the
mens-rea element of the § 1324(a)(2) offense. “Reckless disregard,” standing alone,
may satisfy the mens-rea element of an offense. See United States v. Mussaleen, 35
F.3d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1994). We decline to adopt a mens rea different than the one
31
chosen by Congress. We hold that willful conduct is not required to violate 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(2).
Our interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) is strongly supported by its
statutory history. That history, as pertinent to this case, begins with our decision in
United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982). Zayas-Morales
involved the criminal prosecution of over 300 American vessel owners, captains, and
crew members responsible for transporting over 125,000 undocumented Cubans from
Mariel Harbor, Cuba to Key West, Florida (a designated port-of-entry) in 1980, in
what has been called the “Freedom Flotilla.” Id. at 1273-74. The defendants were
indicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976), the predecessor to the version of the
statute, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(2), involved in this case. Id. at 1273. The government
charged the defendants with “bring[ing] into” the United States any alien “not duly
admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within
the United States.”19 See id. at 1274 & n.1 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976),
19
The statute at issue in Zayas-Morales, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1) (1976), stated in pertinent
part:
Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding
officer, agent, or consignee of any means of transportation who–(1) brings
into or lands in the United States, by any means of transportation or
otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to bring into or land
in the United States, by any means of transportation or otherwise;
....
any alien . . . not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully
entitled to enter or reside within the United States under the terms of this
32
amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) & 1324(a)(2) (1986)). For purposes of deciding
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictments, the government and the defendants
stipulated that the defendants presented the Cuban aliens to immigration officials at
Key West and that the defendants’ intention in doing so was to allow the aliens to
seek legal status in the United States. Id. at 1274, 1277. Based on these stipulated
facts, we affirmed the dismissal of the indictments. Id. at 1278. We held that where
the defendants were bringing in aliens with the intention of submitting those aliens
to the proper officials so that the aliens might seek legal status in the United States,
the defendants lacked the general intent necessary to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)
(1976). Id.
Following our decision in Zayas-Morales, in 1986, Congress substantially
rewrote 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a). Pertinent to this case, Congress added § 1324(a)(2).
Unlike the statute we interpreted in Zayas-Morales which did not contain a mental
state element, in the amended statute at § 1324(a)(2), Congress required that the
defendant act knowingly. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976), with 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(2). Section 1324(a)(2) now punishes any person who knowingly brings to
chapter or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens,
shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in respect to whom any
violation of this subsection occurs . . . .
33
the United States an alien while knowing or recklessly disregarding the fact that the
alien has not received “prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the
United States.” The statute explicitly states the offense occurs “regardless of any
official action which may later be taken with respect to such alien.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(2). The legislative history explains that Congress intended to “expand the
scope of activities proscribed by federal law to reach the conduct of those
participating in such operations as the Mariel boatlift.” United States v. Nguyen, 73
F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010)
(Korman, J., concurring) (noting that Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) to
punish the type of conduct at issue in the Mariel “Freedom Flotilla” cases). Given
that Congress’s goal in amending § 1324 was to expand the number of activities
prohibited by that section, and Congress redrafted the provision to dictate the mental
state necessary to violate the statute, we are not bound by our decision in Zayas-
Morales.
In United States v. Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d 947, 951-53 (9th Cir. 1999), the
Ninth Circuit held that specific “criminal intent is required for conviction of the
34
felony offenses of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B).”20 We do not find the Barajas-Montiel
opinion persuasive. The Barajas-Montiel court correctly recognized that the
language of the statute does not require that the defendant specifically intend to
violate the law. Id. at 951. It then decided the § 1324(a)(2)(B) felony offenses must
contain a specific criminal intent element lest the statute run afoul of the mens-rea
presumption of the criminal law. Id. at 952-53. But, as we have said, conduct done
knowingly or with reckless disregard is sufficient to satisfy the mens-rea
presumption. Under these circumstances, we decline to add a specific criminal intent
element when Congress has chosen not to do so.
Because willful behavior is not required, the special status afforded Cubans
under the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy is not relevant to the state of mind
required to commit smuggling in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). The CAA and
the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy do not provide “prior official authorization” for an
undocumented Cuban to come to the United States because an undocumented Cuban
must still be paroled, a process that “reclassif[ies] an alien from one who is illegally
remaining in the United States to one who is legally remaining in the United States
20
A number of circuits have interpreted 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) as requiring that the
defendant knowingly transport an alien to further a violation of the immigration law, or act
“willfully in furtherance of the alien’s violation of the law.” See, e.g., United States v. Parmelee,
42 F.3d 387, 390-91 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1994). That interpretation of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) does not
demand that § 1324(a)(2) contain a willful element.
35
regardless of how entry into the United States was effected.” United States v.
Medina-Garcia, 918 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Thus, the CAA and the Wet-Foot /
Dry-Foot policy instead pertain to “official action which may later be taken with
respect to” the five Cuban players. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). By the plain language
of the statute, the effect of the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy on the
players’ immigration status after they arrive in the United States is not relevant to a
conviction for smuggling Cubans into the United States under § 1324(a)(2). And
Dominguez’s knowledge of these policies (if he had such knowledge) does not make
the evidence supporting his smuggling convictions insufficient.
Two of these smuggling offenses–the conspiracy and attempt offenses–were
complete prior to the time the Cuban players arrived in the United States. And, the
smuggling offense was complete upon their arrival.
B. Jury Instructions
Dominguez argues that the district court erred in failing to give his requested
jury instructions. We review a district court’s refusal to submit a defendant’s
requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Morris, 20 F.3d
1111, 1114 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In determining whether the district
court abused its discretion by refusing to give a requested jury instruction, we
consider three factors: “(1) whether the requested instruction is a substantially correct
36
statement of the law; (2) whether the jury charge given addressed the requested
instruction; and (3) whether the failure to give the requested instruction seriously
impaired the defendant’s ability to present an effective defense.” United States v.
Chirinos, 112 F.3d 1089, 1101 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). In this case, we
reverse Dominguez’s counts of conviction for transporting aliens and harboring
aliens, so we need not address whether the refusal to give a jury instruction pertaining
to these counts was error. See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1177 n.26
(11th Cir. 2011) (declining to address challenge to jury instruction pertaining to a
count of conviction that has been reversed). We only address whether the refusal to
give certain instructions affected the smuggling convictions.
Dominguez argues that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that a
Cuban national arriving in the United States from Cuba is not required to arrive at a
designated port of entry, but is permitted to arrive at any place and thereafter be
processed by immigration authorities for inspection and adjustment. The instruction
relates to the special treatment afforded Cubans under the CAA, Meissner
Memorandum, and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy. As discussed above, this special
treatment has no bearing on the knowledge a defendant must have to commit the
smuggling offenses because those policies pertain to later official action taken with
37
respect to the alien. We therefore conclude that the denial of this instruction did not
impair Dominguez’s ability to defend against the smuggling charges.
Dominguez contends that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that he
is entitled to rely in good faith on the advice of counsel concerning the players’
immigration status. The timing and nature of Dominguez’s conversations with
counsel are not entirely clear from the record. To the extent Dominguez received
advice from counsel only after the players arrived in the United States, the
advice-of-counsel instruction has no relevance to Dominguez’s smuggling
convictions. Furthermore, no evidence suggested Dominguez fully disclosed the
nature of the smuggling plan to an attorney, an important component of the good faith
defense. The denial of this instruction did not impair Dominguez’s ability to defend
against the smuggling charges.
Dominguez argues that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that
specific intent–that the Dominguez acted willfully–is an element of the smuggling
charges. Similarly, he argues that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that
a mistake of fact is a complete defense to the smuggling charges. The jury
instructions regarding the § 1324(a)(2) smuggling offenses correctly addressed all
elements of the offenses.
38
The district court instructed the jury, in accord with a plain reading of the
statute, that in order to convict for alien smuggling the Government had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt:
First: That the defendant knowingly brought an alien to the
United States;
Second: That the defendant knew or was in reckless disregard of the
fact that the alien had not received prior official
authorization to come to or enter the United States; and
Third: That the offense was done for the purpose of commercial
advantage or private financial gain.
(R. 14 at 1380-81; Dkt. 217 at 19.)
The jury was instructed that “knowingly” means “that the act was done
voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident.” (R. 14 at 1384-
85; Dkt. 217 at 24.) As we have said, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) does not contain a
“willful” element. Because the instructions given by the district court were correct
statements of the law, we find no abuse of discretion in the refusal to give a separate
instruction on specific intent and mistake of fact.
Dominguez also contends that the court’s instruction should only include
“knowing” or “reckless disregard” but not both states of mind. This argument is
meritless. Section 1324(a)(2) includes both knowledge and reckless disregard as
alternative states of mind. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (“Any person who, knowing or
in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official
39
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States . . . .” (emphasis
added)). And, both states of mind were properly charged in the indictment and
supported by the evidence. We find no abuse of discretion in giving the reckless
disregard instruction.
The jury was also instructed that Dominguez had to willfully join the
conspiracy. (R. 14 at 1376; Dkt. 217 at 13.) The court also correctly defined
“willfully” as an act “committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent
to do something the law forbids; that is with bad purpose to either disobey or
disregard the law.” (R. 14 at 1385; Dkt. 217 at 24.) It is not clear from the
Appellant’s Brief that Dominguez objects to the conspiracy charge; if he does, we do
not know the substance of the objection. The objection is therefore waived. See
Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989).
The instructions also adequately covered Dominguez’s defense theory.
Dominguez appears to recast his proposed instructions regarding good faith reliance
on counsel, specific intent, mistake of fact, and the status of a Cuban national arriving
at other than a designated port of entry as theory of defense instructions. As we have
already stated, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give these
instructions. The court’s theory of defense instruction told the jurors it was
Dominguez’s theory of the case that he “never entered or intended to enter into any
40
conspiracy to bring aliens into the United States illegally, . . . nor did he knowingly
engage in illegal alien smuggling or attempt to illegally smuggle aliens.” (R. 14 at
1386; Dkt. 217 at 26.) This instruction adequately covered Dominguez’s theory of
defense–that he was unaware the players were smuggled from Cuba.
Dominguez argues that the court erred in refusing to revise its instruction on
prior-bad-acts evidence admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). This
challenge is vague and without merit. The district court gave the pattern instruction
on similar act evidence and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to revise this
instruction.
C. Evidentiary Issues
1. Admission of Evidence of Betancourt-Beltran Smuggle Under
Rule 404(b)
Dominguez argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
testimony regarding his involvement with the smuggling of Betancourt and Beltran,
two other baseball players. The district court permitted Medina to testify that, eight
months before the smuggling of the players in this case, he and Dominguez conspired
to smuggle Betancourt and Beltran to the United States. The district court admitted
the testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), concluding that the
Betancourt-Beltran smuggle was relevant to Dominguez’s intent to commit the
41
smuggling charges in the indictment. We review for abuse of discretion a district
court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence of uncharged conduct under Rule
404(b). United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
“Rule 404(b) permits the admission of prior-bad-acts evidence to show motive,
preparation, knowledge, and intent, as well as an ongoing scheme or plan.” Id. at 779
(citation omitted). We apply a three-part test to evaluate the admissibility of evidence
under Rule 404(b): “(1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the
defendant’s character; (2) there must be sufficient proof so that the factfinder could
find that the defendant committed the extrinsic act; and (3) the evidence must possess
probative value that is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.” Id. (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (outlining same test).
Applying this test, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting testimony of the Betancourt-Beltran smuggle. First, evidence
of the Betancourt-Beltran smuggle was relevant to establish Dominguez’s intent with
respect to the conspiracy smuggling offense and the substantive alien-smuggling
counts. By Dominguez’s argument–that he did not know or recklessly disregard the
fact that the Cuban players did not have prior authorization to enter the United
States–Dominguez made intent an issue in the case, making the evidence of the
42
Betancourt-Beltran smuggle relevant for non-propensity purposes. See Perez, 443
F.3d at 779-80. Second, Medina’s testimony provided a sufficient basis for the jury
to find that Dominguez conspired with Medina to commit the Betancourt-Beltran
smuggle. Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the
probative value of the Betancourt-Beltran smuggle, which involved the same conduct
as the charged conspiracy and substantive smuggling offenses and occurred less than
a year prior to the smuggle in this case, outweighed its prejudicial effect. See id. at
780. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of the Betancourt-Beltran smuggle as 404(b) evidence.
2. Exclusion of the CAA, Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot Policy, and Expert
Immigration Testimony
Dominguez contends that the district court erred in excluding evidence
pertaining to the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy, and in excluding the
testimony of an immigration judge regarding the status of Cuban nationals under
United States immigration law. He claims that this evidence was crucial in
determining whether he had the required intent to smuggle, transport, and harbor the
Cuban players. We review determinations of the admissibility of evidence for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted). We likewise review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decisions
43
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d
1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In section III.A, we discuss the sufficiency of the evidence for the smuggling
convictions and explain why the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy have no
relevance to the sufficiency of the evidence to support these smuggling convictions.
For the same reasons, they have no relevance to Dominguez’s defense to the
smuggling charges. In fact, Dominguez did not contend in the district court that the
immigration judge’s testimony about these policies would have assisted his defense
to the smuggling charges. While arguing for the admission of testimony by the
immigration judge, Dominguez’s counsel proffered that the expert would testify that
“[y]ou can’t put a foreign national on a boat and bring them to the United States
without permission. That’s just not allowed, doesn’t matter, Cuban national or
anybody else, you can’t do that.” (R.11 at 897.) Because the immigration judge’s
testimony on the smuggling counts would have been detrimental to Dominguez, the
immigration judge’s testimony could not have changed the jury’s verdict on the
smuggling counts. This excerpt regarding the immigration judge’s testimony
highlights that the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy are not relevant to the
smuggling convictions we are affirming in this case. As we have said, two of these
smuggling offenses–the conspiracy and attempt offenses–were complete prior to the
44
time the Cuban players arrived in the United States. At least as to these two offenses,
it is hard to imagine the relevance of policies that address Cubans’ immigration status
after their arrival in this country. The exclusion of evidence about them did not, as
to the smuggling convictions, affect Dominguez’s substantial rights. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 52(a).
To the extent evidence of the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy relate
to Dominguez’s convictions of transporting and harboring aliens, we need not address
these purported errors because we reverse those convictions for insufficiency of the
evidence. See United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining
to address evidentiary errors relating to counts of conviction reversed on other
grounds).
3. Exclusion of Major League Baseball Free Agency Rules
Dominguez contends that the district court erred in excluding evidence
pertaining to the Major League Baseball free agency rules. He argues the evidence
was necessary to respond to the Government’s theory that he delayed the players’
immigration processing in order to manipulate the free agency system.
To the extent the exclusion of the Major League baseball rules relates to
Dominguez’s convictions for transporting and harboring the players, we need not
45
address these purported errors because we reverse those convictions for insufficiency
of the evidence. Id.
To the extent the free agency rules are relevant to the smuggling convictions,
we conclude that any error in excluding this evidence, if there was error, was
harmless. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1266 n.20 (requiring reversal in a criminal case
only if erroneous evidentiary decision “[had] a ‘substantial influence’ on the outcome
of a case or [left] ‘grave doubt’ as to whether they affected the outcome of a case”
(citation omitted)). Dominguez argues that the free agency rules were necessary to
rebut the Government’s theory regarding the three-month delay in the players’
immigration processing. That delay has no relevance to whether Dominguez
conspired to smuggle and assisted in smuggling the Cuban players to the United
States. Thus we are not left with a grave doubt that the exclusion of the free agency
rules affected the smuggling convictions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Count 1 charges Dominguez with conspiring to bring aliens to the United
States for the purpose of commercial gain or financial advantage, in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), (a)(2)(B)(ii), and 18 U.S.C. § 371. We affirm Dominguez’s
conviction and sentence on this count.
46
Counts 5, 6, 10, 13, and 19 charge Dominguez with aiding and abetting the
attempt to bring in aliens to the United States for the purpose of commercial
advantage and private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2),
(a)(2)(B)(ii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We affirm Dominguez’s convictions and sentences
on these counts.
Counts 28, 29, 33, 35, and 40 charge Dominguez with aiding and abetting the
bringing of aliens to the United States for the purpose of commercial advantage and
private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), (a)(2)(B)(ii), and 18
U.S.C. § 2. We affirm Dominguez’s convictions and sentences on these counts.
We reverse Dominguez’s convictions on all other counts and vacate his
sentences on these other counts.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND VACATED IN PART.
47
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I concur in the court’s judgment reversing Dominguez’s convictions for the 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)1 transporting violations, Counts 44 through 48, and the 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)2 harboring violations, Counts 49 through 53. I dissent,
however, from court’s affirmance of Dominguez’s convictions for conspiring, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,3 to commit those offenses and the smuggling offense,
1
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) states, in relevant part:
(1)(A) Any person who—
....
(ii) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered,
or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports . . . such alien within
the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such
violation of law;
....
shall be punished as provided in subparagraph (B).
2
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) states, in relevant part:
(1)(A) Any person who—
....
(iii) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered,
or remains in the United States in violation of law, . . . harbors[] or shields from
detection . . . such alien in any place . . . ;
....
shall be punished as provided in subparagraph (B).
3
18 U.S.C. § 371 states:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
48
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), Count 1; for attempted smuggling, in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), Counts 5, 6, 10, 13, and 19; and for smuggling, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), Counts 28, 29, 33, 35, and 40.4
My disagreement with the court primarily rests on four grounds. First, because
I conclude that proof of general criminal intent is a required element of the §
1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) offenses, I would reverse Dominguez’s convictions for those
offenses and the conspiracy offense, and remand for a new trial. The district court
committed reversible error in excluding evidence of the federal immigration policy
governing the status Cuban refugees and in preventing Dominguez from contending
that he did not intend to do something the law forbids—to act with criminal
intent—when he arranged to bring the players to the United States so they could be
granted asylum. The court then compounded the error when it failed to instruct the
4
Both attempted smuggling and smuggling are violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2),
which states:
Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not
received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United
States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner
whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official action which may later be taken
with respect to such alien shall, for each alien in respect to whom a violation of
this paragraph occurs [be subjected to a fine or imprisonment, or both].
Section 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) states that “[if] an offense [is] done for the purpose of commercial
advantage or private financial gain,” the defendant shall “be fined under Title 18 and shall be
imprisoned, in the case of a first or second violation of subparagraph (B)(i) or (B)(ii), not less
than 3 nor more than 10 years, and for any other violation, not less than 5 nor more than 15
years.”
49
jury that it could not find Dominguez guilty of the § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) offense unless
it found that he acted “willfully.”5 Second, even if criminal intent is not required for
a § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) conviction, it was required for the Count 1 § 371 conviction,
because the indictment, the Government’s requested jury instructions, and the
instructions the court gave all required the jury to find that Dominguez acted
“willfully,” thereby placing Dominguez’s intent—his mens rea defense—at issue.
Third, if the first two grounds are without merit, the evidence Dominguez wanted to
introduce was necessary to consider whether he knew or acted in reckless disregard
of the aliens’ status; hence, its exclusion constituted reversible error. Fourth, and by
no means the least important, is that the today’s criminal intent holding creates a
circuit split.
In essence, the district court denied Dominguez a fair trial by depriving him of
the opportunity to present his mens rea defense to Counts 1, 5, 6, 10, 13, 19, 28, 29,
33, 35, and 406—that he brought the Cuban baseball players to the United States for
a lawful purpose, so they could be granted asylum and paroled in accordance with the
5
Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) at 35, Basic Offense Instruction
9.1A (defining “willfully” to mean an act with a general, not specific, criminal intent, or in other
words, requiring a finding that the defendant acted “purposely, with the intent to do something
the law forbids; that is, with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law.”).
6
The district court also denied Dominguez the opportunity to present the same mens rea
defense to the charges contained in Counts 44 through 53. The error is of no moment, however,
because we are reversing the convictions for those counts on other grounds.
50
federal immigration policy governing the status of Cuban refugees, as expressed in
the Cuban Adjustment Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255,7 the Meissner Memorandum,8 and the
Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy.9
To demonstrate these errors, I explain, in part I, the United States immigration
policy governing the treatment of Cuban refugees and how the Government
implemented that policy in this case. Part II sets out the court’s holding that all of
this is irrelevant. Part III explains why that holding is erroneous—that general
7
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) states:
[t]he status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United
States or the status of any other alien having an approved petition for
classification as a VAWA self-petitioner may be adjusted by the Attorney
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an
application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant
visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an
immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed.
8
See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, INS, to all Regional Directors, all
District Directors, all Chief Patrol Agents, and all Officers-in-Charge, file No. HQCOU 120/17-
1, Eligibility for Permanent Residence Under the Cuban Adjustment Act Despite Having Arrived
at a Place Other Than a Designated Port-of-Entry (April 19, 1999), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/CubanParole_4Mar08.pdf (“Attachment–A”) [hereinafter
the “Meissner Memorandum”]. The Meissner Memorandum instructs the officials of the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services, a component of the Department of Homeland
Security, which succeeded the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding Cuban refugee
applications for permanent residency. See 6 U.S.C. § 271 (describing new authority of the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services).
9
“The so-called ‘Wet-foot/Dry-Foot’ policy . . . applies to Cuban refugees who reach
United States land. If they reach land, they are allowed to stay, apply for political asylum and
eventually residency.” Movimiento Democracia Inc. v. Chertoff, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1344
(S.D. Fla. 2006). For a full explication of the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy see part I, infra.
51
criminal intent is the appropriate level of mens rea of the counts alleging a violation
of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii). Part IV explains that, regardless of whether criminal intent is
an element of the substantive offenses, Dominguez’s intent was relevant to his
conspiracy charge given that the indictment, the Government’s requested jury
instructions, and the district court’s instructions all required the jury to find that
Dominguez acted “willfully.” Part V sets out additional reasons why, even assuming
there is no criminal intent, the district court still erred. Part VI concludes.
I.
This part traces the origins of the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy in light of
established United States’ immigration policy toward Cubans.
A.
1.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163 (1952) (enacted as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), declares, as a
general rule, that an alien who arrives in the United States “at any time or place other
than as designated by the Attorney General,”10 or who lacks a “valid entry document,”
10
A place designated by the Attorney General is often referred to as a “Port-of-Entry.” 8
C.F.R. § 100.4; see also 3 C.J.S. Aliens § 546 (defining an “arriving alien”).
52
is inadmissible and immediately removable.11 In either case, a removable alien may
apply for asylum as a refugee, 8 U.S.C. § 1158,12 withholding of removal,13 protection
11
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006) (regarding admission and parole); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (regarding entry documents).
12
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2006) states, in pertinent part, “[a]ny alien who is physically
present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated
port of arrival . . . ), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum . . . .”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) states,
The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant asylum to
an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the requirements and
procedures established by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney
General under this section if the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney
General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section
1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
13
On applying for asylum, the alien may also apply for withholding of removal under 8
U.S.C. § 1231 (2006), which states in subsection (b)(3)(A), that “the Attorney General may not
remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
53
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture,14 and admission into the
United States. A refugee is:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). If the alien “does not have a credible fear of persecution,
the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further
hearing or review,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I), subject to the alien’s right under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) to “request . . . prompt review by an immigration
judge.” If the asylum officer or immigration judge grants the alien’s application for
asylum, the alien may be paroled pending final determination of his immigration
14
In addition to applying for withholding of removal, the alien may seek relief under the
Convention Against Torture, executed by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act,
which states in pertinent part that,
[i]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected
to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United
States.
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, § 2242(a),
112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note).
54
status for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(A).
Cuban aliens, however, occupy a unique position. A Cuban who arrives in the
United States is presumed to be a refugee, and therefore entitled to asylum.15 This
presumption is based on the political and economic repression Cuban citizens have
been suffering at the hands of the Castro government since it came to power in 1959.
In the early years after Castro took over, the United States government welcomed
Cuban refugees with open arms. Indeed, between 1965 and 1971, the United States
government itself airlifted approximately two hundred-sixty thousand refugees out
of Cuba and into the United States under the so-called “Freedom Flights” program.16
Political favor for Cuban refugees achieved official status in 1966, with the
passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act (the “CAA”). That act granted special status
to Cubans coming to the United States. It provided, in pertinent part,
the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has
been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States
subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically present in the
United States for at least two years, may be adjusted by the Attorney
15
A Cuban, like other applicants for asylum, may be denied asylum under certain
extraordinary circumstances, including where “there are serious reasons for believing that the
[Cuban] has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival
of the [Cuban] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii).
16
Cuba: Migration, U.S. Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/migration.html (last visited September 12, 2011).
55
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may
prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence
if the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is
eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United
States for permanent residence.
Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161, 1161 (1966).17
As explained by the House Judiciary Committee, in order to grant Cubans this
special status, Congress had to except them from the prohibition then present within
§ 245(c) of the INA, which provided that “natives of any country of the Western
Hemisphere, or of any adjacent island named in section 101(b)(5) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act” were ordinarily “precluded from applying for adjustment to
permanent resident status while in the United States.” H.R. Rep. No. 89-1978, at 1
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3793. Congress separated Cubans
from other natives of the Western Hemisphere because, as the House Judiciary
Committee explained,
[t]he only recourse available to a refugee from Cuba under existing law
in order to change to immigrant status is the awkward procedure of
leaving the United States for an indefinite period of time in order to
secure an immigrant visa at a U.S. consular office abroad and then
reentering as a permanent resident.
17
The Attorney General subsequently prescribed a regulation authorizing an alien
meeting the eligibility requirements of the CAA to apply for adjustment of status to that of a
lawful permanent resident to the [INS, now United States Citizenship and Immigration Services]
director having jurisdiction over the alien’s place of residence. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2. This
provision was amended in 2006, after the events involved in this case.
56
H.R. Rep. No. 89-1978, at 2, 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N at 3794.
In addition to avoiding this awkward procedure, the CAA would “aid in
[Cuban refugees’] resettlement by enhancing their opportunity to qualify for
employment in all areas of the Nation.” Id. Moreover, it would afford Cubans the
same sort of opportunities that other immigrants might have: “The fact should not be
overlooked that the beneficiaries of this legislation could have come to the United
States as immigrants had diplomatic relations been maintained between the United
States and Cuba.” Id.
Despite the existence of the CAA, the days of clear political preference for
Cuban refugees would come to an end. The massive 1980 “boatlift” from the port of
Mariel, Cuba, marked a new crisis point in the United States’s expressed policy of
“open heart, open arms” towards Cuban refugees.18 In the aftermath of a riot at the
Peruvian Embassy in Havana, Castro announced that the port of Mariel was “open”
to all who wanted to leave Cuba. Soon, American vessels were picking up refugees
from Mariel and transporting them to United States shores. According to United
18
Time magazine quoted President Jimmy Carter as stating that:
Ours is a country of refugees. We’ll continue to provide an open heart and open
arms to refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination and from the
economic deprivation brought about by Fidel Castro and his government.
Nation: Open Heart, Open Arms, Time, May 19, 1980, at 14.
57
States Coast Guard statistics, nearly one hundred twenty-five thousand Cubans fled
to the United States in what became known as the “Freedom Flotilla.”19
2.
This set the stage for this court’s decision in United States v. Zayas-Morales,
685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982). Zayas-Morales involved the prosecution of the
owners and captains of American vessels, and those assisting them, who, as part of
the Freedom Flotilla, picked up thousands of refugees from Mariel Harbor and
brought them to Key West, Florida over the strong objection of the United States
government. Id. at 1274. The Zayas-Morales court described the Government’s
objection:
The first group of aliens arrived in the United States on April 21, 1980.
Two days later, the United States Coast Guard initiated warnings by
means of radio broadcasts alerting all listeners to the possibility of
arrests and seizure of vessels for transporting undocumented aliens to
the United States. By that time many of the vessels had left the United
States for Mariel Harbor. At approximately the same time, the United
States Customs Service began issuing written notices requiring customs
clearance prior to departure from United States ports and warning that
transportation of undocumented aliens was illegal. Dissatisfied with the
results of the initial efforts to halt the mass influx of aliens, on May 14,
1980, the President imposed an embargo on boats attempting to leave
19
Mariel Boatlift, U.S. Coast Guard Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Off. of L.
Enforcement, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/mariel.asp (last visited September 12,
2011) (describing U.S. Coast Guard activity during the so-called Mariel Boatlift, a.k.a. the
Freedom Flotilla).
58
our territorial waters and ordered a return of United States vessels from
Mariel Harbor. So ended the Freedom Flotilla.
685 F.2d at 1274 (citation omitted).
To indicate how condemnable it considered the defendants’ conduct, the
Government indicted 336 of those involved in the Freedom Flotilla under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1), the predecessor to the version of the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2),
involved in this case. Id. at 1274. Section 1324(a)(1) stated, in pertinent part:
Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding officer,
agent, or consignee of any means of transportation who—
(1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means of
transportation or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or though another,
to bring into or land in the United States, by any means of transportation
or otherwise;
....
any alien . . . not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully
entitled to enter or reside within the United States under the terms of this
chapter or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of
aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in respect to whom any
violation of this subsection occurs.
Id. at 1274 n.1 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976)).
The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the defendants
did not commit a “crime in presenting the Cubans at the border checkpoint.”20 We
20
The district court explained it in these words:
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) requires that an entry be made either by fraudulent or
59
affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the Government failed to prove that the
defendants acted with criminal intent, the mens rea element that the district court, at
the Government’s urging, ruled irrelevant in Dominguez’s case.21 Id. at 1273–74.
The defendants lacked the requisite mens rea because they clearly intended to submit
the aliens to proper immigration officials in full compliance with the law:
[N]ot only had the defendants presented the aliens to the proper
officials, but . . . their intention in doing so was to allow the aliens to
seek legal status in this country. . . . Such an intention neutralizes any
government theory that the defendants possessed the criminal intent
necessary for a conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1).
Id. at 1277.
The defendants’ lawful intent to retrieve Cubans without visas and deliver them
to U.S. immigration officials was effective the moment the boats left Mariel Harbor
and remained effective until delivery into the United States. See id. at 1274
(discussing stipulations made by the parties). Therefore, what the defendants
intended to do with the aliens after their arrival in the United States was relevant to
their intent to disobey the law. Id. at 1276–77.
surreptitious means. By admission and stipulation of the parties, no entry of
aliens was effectuated by the defendants’ actions in these boatlift cases. As stated
above, the defendants committed no crime in presenting the aliens at the border
checkpoint.
United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 299 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
21
We affirmed on a rationale not relied upon by the district court.
60
3.
In light of several concerns arising, in part, out of our decision in Zayas-
Morales, Congress revised § 1324 in 1986. I focus on those changes directly relevant
to my disagreement with the court’s holding today—that evidence of the federal
immigration policy governing the status of Cuban refugees and Dominguez’s reliance
on that policy is irrelevant.
First, Congress split the “bring into” provision of § 1324(a)(1) into two
separate provisions. The first provision, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), makes it unlawful to
bring an alien into the United States “at a place other than a designated port of
entry.”22 A person violating this provision may be sentenced to prison for not more
than ten years for each alien brought to the United States at such place.23 The second
provision, § 1324(a)(2), makes it unlawful to bring any alien to the United States who
22
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) applies to anyone who,
knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to bring to the United
States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place other than a designated
port of entry or place other than as designated by the Commissioner, regardless of
whether such alien has received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or
reside in the United States and regardless of any future official action which may
be taken with respect to such alien.
23
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006) declares, in pertinent part: “A person who violates
[§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)] shall, for each alien in respect to whom such a violation occurs . . . be fined
under Title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”
61
has not received prior official authorization.24 A comparison of the text of the old
version of § 1324(a) with the text of the new version reveals that Congress added
language to clarify that the new § 1324(a)(2) applies only to those individuals who
act “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior
official authorization to come into, enter or reside, in the United States” and that a
violation of § 1324(a)(2) can occur “regardless of any official action which may later
be taken with respect to such alien.”
In drafting § 1324(a)(2), Congress created both a misdemeanor and a felony.
The misdemeanor is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both;25 and the felony, depending on the intent or purpose for which it was
committed, is punishable by a fine and imprisonment for a maximum term of ten or
fifteen years.26 The presentence report prepared by the district court’s Probation
24
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (2006) states,
[a]ny person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has
not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United
States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner
whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official action which may later be taken
with respect to such alien shall, for each alien in respect to whom a violation of
this paragraph occurs [shall be subjected to a fine or imprisonment, or both].
25
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A) (2006) provides that a person violating § 1324(a)(2) “be
fined in accordance with Title 18 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both” for each
violation.
26
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B) (2006) provides that if the offense is:
62
Office for Dominguez’s case recommended imprisonment for a minimum term of
three years and a maximum term of ten years for Counts 5, 6, 28, and 29 and a
minimum term of five years and a maximum term of fifteen years for Counts 10, 13,
19, 33, 35, and 40.27
4.
Eight years after Congress revised 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot
policy emerged. The Clinton Administration sought to quell a new Cuban
immigration crisis by entering into the Joint Communique of 1994 and the Joint
Statement of 1995 (collectively, the “Migrant Accords”) with the Cuban
government.28 Signed on September 9, 1994, the Joint Communique provided that
(i) . . . committed with the intent or with reason to believe that the alien
unlawfully brought into the United States will commit an offense against the
United States or any State punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year,
(ii) . . . done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or
(iii) an offense in which the alien is not upon arrival immediately brought and presented
to an appropriate immigration officer at a designated port of entry,
[the violator shall] be fined under Title 18 and shall be imprisoned, in the case of
a first or second violation of subparagraph (B)(iii), not more than 10 years, in the
case of a first or second violation of subparagraph (B)(i) or (B)(ii), not less than 3
nor more than 10 years, and for any other violation, not less than 5 nor more than
15 years.
27
The § 1324(a)(2) offenses of which Dominguez was convicted were “done for the
purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).
28
The number of Cuban “boat people” setting out for United States shores “steadily rose
from a few hundred in 1989 to a few thousand in 1993.” Ruth Ellen Wasem, Cong. Research
Serv., R40566, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends 1 (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40566.pdf. Following a series of “threatening speeches”
63
migrants rescued at sea attempting to enter the United States will not be
permitted to enter the United States, but instead will be taken to safe
haven facilities outside the United States. Further, the United States has
discontinued its practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who
reach U.S. territory in irregular ways.
Cuba-United States: Joint Statement on Normalization of Migration, Building on the
Agreement of September 9, 1994, 35 I.L.M. 327, 329.
In return, Cuba agreed to “prevent unsafe departures using mainly persuasive
methods.” Id. The United States further committed “through other provisions of
United States law, to authorize and facilitate additional lawful migration to the United
States,” establishing that a “minimum of 20,000 Cubans each year” would be allowed
to legally migrate. Id. at 330.
The Joint Statement, issued on May 2, 1995, declared that “Cuban migrants
intercepted at sea by the United States and attempting to enter the United States will
be taken to Cuba,” rather than Guantanamo Bay or, presumably, other safe havens as
contemplated in the Joint Communique. Id. at 328. The Migrant Accords laid the
foundation for what came to be known as the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy, whereby
those Cubans who arrived on United States soil could seek asylum, parole, and
delivered by Fidel Castro, subsequent riots in the capital city of Havana, and a decree by the
Castro regime that future attempts to go to the United States would not be contested, the Cuban
flight to the United States reached nearly 40,000 in number in 1994—the highest level since the
Marielito exodus of 1980. Id.
64
adjustment of status under the CAA, and those interdicted at sea would be returned
to Cuba.
The specific contours of the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy were largely established
by a series of decisions made by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel
and instructions issued by the INS and its successor agency, the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). On its own terms, the Joint
Communique of 1994 would appear to cast doubt upon the ability of Cubans who
entered the United States in “irregular ways” to gain parole or seek protection under
the CAA. As the Communique states, “the United States has discontinued its practice
of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who reach U.S. territory in irregular ways.”
Id. 329.
Deputy Attorney General Richard L. Shiffrin, however, stated in one key
memorandum that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (the “IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified
as amended in scattered sections 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.), “substantially amended”
the INA, changing the terms by which aliens could be denied legal process in the
United States:
[T]he Reform Act has created the new category of “Aliens Treated as
Applicants for Admission” under section 235 of the INA. An alien’s
classification within that category will now determine whether he must
receive inspection, screening, and other attendant procedures . . . in
65
contrast to aliens who may be summarily repulsed or returned without
any INA screening and procedural requirements.
Memorandum from Richard L. Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of
Justice, to David A. Martin, Gen. Counsel, INS), Rights of Aliens Found in U.S.
Internal Waters, 20 Op. O.L.C. 381, 381, 1996 WL 33101205, at *2 (1996)(emphasis
in original) (citation omitted) [hereinafter the “Shiffrin Memorandum”].
Thus, while “aliens treated as applicants for admission” under the INA (as
amended by the IIRIRA) include any
alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of
arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after
having been interdicted in international or United States waters[.]
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (2006), the Shiffrin Memorandum concluded that,
unlanded aliens interdicted on internal waters29 do not constitute
“applicants for admission,” and therefore need not be inspected or
screened [. I]t necessarily follows that such aliens are not entitled to
removal proceedings (i.e., the amended INA’s substitute for deportation
proceedings) under section 240.30
1996 WL 33101205, at *3. The necessary implication of Shiffrin’s conclusion is that
aliens found on land did constitute “applicants for admission” and were entitled to the
attendant due process of law. Furthermore, while the United States might not grant
29
“Internal waters” is obviously a reference to the territorial waters of the United States.
30
Codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
66
automatic parole to all Cubans who reached United States territory irregularly, “as a
practical matter, once a Cuban migrant is ‘feet dry,’ there is no place the United States
Government can send the individual because, under the Migrant Accords, the Cuban
Government will accept the repatriation of only those Cubans who [sic] the United
States interdicts ‘at sea.’” Lieutenant Commander Brian W. Robinson, Smuggled
Masses: The Need for a Maritime Alien Smuggling Law Enforcement Act, Army
Law., Aug. 2010, at 20, 29.
If a Cuban who physically arrives in the United States—i.e., has “dry feet”—is
thus to be treated as an “applicant for admission,” the question becomes one of the
process he is due under United States law and policy. There was once a point of
confusion among Immigration officers about the meaning of the word “admissible”
in the language of the CAA quoted supra.31 It appeared that Cubans who arrived in
the United States at a place other than a designated Port-of-Entry could be
inadmissible. This is because, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), “[a]n alien present
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is
inadmissible.”
31
The confusion regarding the word “admissible” in the CAA was addressed by the
Meissner Memorandum in 1999. It is not clear how long confusion or controversy surrounded
this term.
67
To ensure that Cubans would not be deprived of CAA adjustment on this
ground, then–INS Commissioner Doris Meissner announced that the “policy of the
[INS/USCIS] is that the inadmissibility ground that is based on an alien’s having
arrived at a place other than a port-of-entry does not apply to CAA applicants.”
Meissner Memorandum at 1 (emphasis in original). Otherwise, “the purpose of the
CAA would have been defeated.” Id. at 2. Nonetheless, the Meissner Memorandum
makes clear that this INS/USCIS “policy does not relieve the applicant of the
obligation to meet all other eligibility requirements. In particular, [CAA] adjustment
is available only to applicants who have been ‘inspected and admitted or paroled into
the United States.’” Id. (citation omitted). A Cuban “present without inspection,
therefore, would not be eligible for CAA adjustment unless the [Cuban] first
surrendered himself . . . into [INS/USCIS] custody and the [INS/USCIS] released the
alien from custody pending a final determination of . . . admissibility.” Id.
As Meissner noted, simply being “admissible” to the United States is not
enough for a Cuban to qualify for adjustment of status under the CAA; the Cuban
must, in the words of the CAA, also be “physically present in the United States” for
at least one year.32 CAA, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. at 1161. The expressed
32
The CAA was amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(i), 94
Stat. 102, 108. The 1980 Act reduced the “physical presence” requirement of the CAA from two
years to one year.
68
policy of the USCIS ensures that the dry-foot Cuban will have the opportunity to so
remain in the United States:
A native or citizen of Cuba who is present in the United States without
having been inspected and admitted is eligible to apply for an initial
parole at the USCIS field office having jurisdiction over the applicant’s
place of residence. Natives or citizens of Cuba need parole
documentation in order to become eligible for benefits under the Cuban
Adjustment Act . . . .
....
The validity period of the initial parole must be one (1) year. This will
allow natives or citizens of Cuba who have been physically present in
the United States for at least one year to apply for adjustment of status
under the CAA and seek employment authorization as an applicant for
permanent residence while the adjustment of status application is
pending.
Memorandum from Tracy Renaud, Chief, Office of Field Operations, USCIS, to Field
Leadership, File No. HQ 70/10.10, Processing of Initial Parole Requests Presented
by Natives or Citizens of Cuba to USCIS Field Offices 1, 2 (Mar. 4, 2008), available
at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/CubanParole_4Mar08.pdf (citation
omitted).
As stated supra, parole is to be granted to an alien on the basis of “urgent
humanitarian reasons” or a “significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
While these standards may appear to be high ones, appearances may be deceiving.
As the Meissner Memorandum explains, there exists a heavy presumption in favor of
parole for Cuban refugees in the United States:
69
In the absence of a disqualifying criminal record or other factors that
would bar CAA adjustment, however, the on-going difficulty in actually
removing aliens to Cuba and the availability of CAA adjustment should
ordinarily weigh heavily in favor of a grant of parole. The [USCIS] may
properly consider the avoidance of detention costs with respect to an
alien whose actual removal is unlikely as a factor in determining, as a
matter of discretion, that parole would yield “a significant public
benefit.” In similar fashion, the [USCIS] may properly consider the
availability of CAA adjustment as a factor in determining, as a matter of
discretion, that an “urgent humanitarian reason” justifies a grant of
parole.33
Meissner Memorandum 2–3 (citation omitted).
B.
Gustavo Dominguez is a native of Cuba and a naturalized United States citizen.
At the time of the events that led to the indictment in this case, Dominguez was a
sports agent. Through his company, Total Sports International (“TSI”), he had
represented over 100 baseball players, many of whom played for Major League
Baseball teams. This case involves five Cuban baseball players: Francisely Bueno-
Trueba, Osbek Castillo-Perez, Allen Guevara-Perez, Osmany Masso-Arredondo, and
Yoankis Turino-Montalno.
On August 22, 2004, they were brought from Cuba to the Florida Keys by boat
and taken to the residence of a former Major League player, a Cuban national, in
33
In this case, the Government presented no evidence to the effect that a “disqualifying
criminal record or other factors” would bar any of the five Cuban players from obtaining CAA
adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence.
70
Miami. Dominguez was informed of the players’ arrival, agreed to represent the
players, and arranged for their transportation to California.
Throughout this process, Dominguez retained the assistance of an experienced
immigration law attorney. Shortly after the players arrived in California, Stephen
Schneider, Dominguez’s TSI partner and a lawyer, arranged for Humberto Gray, an
immigration attorney, to process the players through immigration.34 Gray told
Dominguez that he set up an appointment for the players at the USCIS Los Angeles
office. On November 19th, Gray and Dominguez accompanied the players to the
USCIS office to apply for asylum and “to get their paroles.” They were paroled.
Gray thereafter represented them before the USCIS.
Because the players were presumptive refugees, all of this happened precisely
as set out by the CAA, the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy, and the Meissner
Memorandum; to wit, the Cuban aliens arrived in the United States at a location other
34
Testifying in the Government’s case, Schneider said that Gray had done immigration
work for TSI players since the late 1990s. During that time, Dominguez, through TSI, had
represented 30 to 40 Cuban players; “probably 15” of those eventually reached the Major
Leagues. According to his firm’s website, Gray is “recognized as an expert on Immigration
Law” and his firm, Humberto R. Gray, P.L.C.,
has represented many top foreign players playing in Major League Baseball. This
esteemed list includes, [sic] Pedro Martinez, Ramon Martinez, Raul Mondesi,
Andres Galarraga, Larry Walker, Jose Offerman, Ismael Valdez, Wilton Guerrero,
Deivi Cruz, Ramiro Mendoza, Pedro Astacio and Mariano Rivera, to name a few.
Gray Law, http://www.graylaw.com/index.html (last visited September 12, 2011).
71
than a designated port of entry, made their way to immigration authorities, and were
then paroled. These events, however, gave rise to the current prosecution for
conspiracy to smuggle, attempted smuggling, smuggling in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
371 and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii); transporting aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii); and harboring aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).
C.
Anticipating that Dominguez would frame a defense to those charges based on
“Legislative and Executive Branch immigration policies” that apply specifically to
Cubans, namely the CAA, the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy, and the Meissner
Memorandum, the Government moved the district court in limine to bar Dominguez
from referring to these policies in the presence of the jury at trial. In response,
Dominguez argued that, if these policies did not preclude his conviction, they were
at least relevant to the mens rea element of the charged offenses.
According to Dominguez, the policies the Government sought to exclude
enable undocumented Cubans who enter the United States at a location not
designated as a “Port-of-Entry” by the Attorney General and without valid entry
documents to apply for permanent residence status. Dominguez represented that he
was aware of these policies when he had the five players transported to California,
trained, observed by Major League baseball scouts, and presented to the federal
72
immigration authorities. In this light, he contended, he lacked the requisite criminal
intent to violate the law.
The district court granted the Government’s motion.35 The court rejected the
notion that the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy and the CAA provided a legal defense to
any of the pending charges against Dominguez, holding that the policy and the CAA
were “irrelevant” for such purpose. As for Dominguez’s mens rea argument, the
court held that Dominguez’s beliefs about the law were “irrelevant to his intent” to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii). The court explained: “[t]he
mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s
conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption, deeply rooted in the
American legal system, that, ordinarily, ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is
no defense to criminal prosecution.” Order Granting Gov’t Mot. In Limine 2, Mar.
14, 2007 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3, 114 S. Ct. 1793,
1805 n.3, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). As such, the court implicitly found
that Dominguez’s knowledge of the CAA and the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy was not
relevant to his culpability.
35
In granting the Government’s motion, the district court simultaneously denied
Dominguez’s request for a hearing on the motion.
73
The district court’s order governed the conduct of Dominguez’s trial. That is,
the order precluded Dominguez from (1) testifying that he arranged to have the
players brought to California for what he thought was a lawful purpose, to enable
them to attain asylum and parole in conformance with the immigration policy
established by the CAA, Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy, and Meissner Memorandum; and
(2) presenting the expert testimony of a retired Immigration Judge to explain that
immigration policy. The jury received the case without hearing a word about the
policy from the witness stand or the court’s instructions on the law. Moreover, the
instructions the court actually did give on the elements of the smuggling offenses did
not contain an instruction on criminal intent.36
36
Nor did the court’s instructions on the transporting and harboring offenses contain a
criminal intent instruction.
74
II.
I now turn to the court’s affirmance of the district court’s treatment of the mens
rea defense Dominguez attempted to present in countering the charges that he
conspired to violate and violated 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii). The court first recites
the language of § 1324(a)(2),37 noting that a defendant must know or recklessly
disregard “the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come
to, enter, or reside in the United States” and that a smuggling offense occurs
“regardless of any official action which may later be taken with respect to such alien,”
so long as the defendant brings or attempts to bring the alien to the United States.
Ante at 29. The court highlights the mens rea requirement for the first element, that
the defendant know or recklessly disregard the alien’s status, and points out that
Congress omitted any mens rea for the second element of the offense. Ante. Then,
the court notes that there is a presumption that each statutory element contains some
level of scienter. Ante. The court concludes that:
[A] court may treat the mens rea Congress provided in the statute as
modifying each element that follows it. Thus, we decide a defendant
must knowingly bring an alien to the United States.
37
See supra note 4, for the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
75
Ante (emphasis added)38
To support its conclusion that the statutory language it highlighted rendered
Dominguez’s criminal intent irrelevant, the court points to the legislative history of
the revisions Congress made to the statute in the wake of Zayas-Morales, finding that
the legislative history explains that Congress intended to overrule Zayas-Morales and
“expand the scope of activities proscribed by federal law to reach the conduct of those
participating in such operations as the Mariel boatlift.” Ante at 32–33.
The court also highlights the opinions from three cases to establish that
Congress intended to omit criminal intent as an element of the § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii)
offense. Ante at 30. First, the court cites United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692,
698 (2d Cir. 1994), for the proposition that “reckless disregard” or knowledge can
satisfy the requirement of a mens rea element. Ante at 31. The challenge raised in
that case, however, focused on whether “reckless disregard” could be a sufficient
mens rea, or whether actual knowledge was necessary. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d at 698.
I do not question that a defendant who acts in reckless disregard of an alien’s status
can be convicted under the statute; rather, the central issue is whether the Government
38
The question facing the court is not an argument that “the evidence supporting
[Dominguez’s] smuggling convictions [was] insufficient.” Rather, the argument is that the
district court erred in ruling Dominguez’s mens rea defense irrelevant.
76
must also prove criminal intent for the second element. Thus, Mussaleen addressed
a different concern than at what is issue here.
Second, the court discusses United States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887 (9th Cir.
1995). Ante at 33–34. In Nguyen, the court found that 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1), a
felony, requires proof of criminal intent—although the statutory language did not
expressly require it—but questioned, in dicta, whether the misdemeanor provision of
§ 1324(a)(2) required the same proof. 73 F.3d at 892–93. Here, we deal with the
felony provision.
Finally, the court points to a concurring opinion in United States v.
Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring). Ante
at 34. In Garcia-Cordero, the concurring opinion contains this comment:
“Consequently, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)[B], which does not require
general criminal intent, to make it a misdemeanor to engage in conduct of the kind
at issue in the Mariel Freedom Flotilla cases.” 610 F.3d at 619 (Korman, J.
concurring) (emphasis added). Notably, the concurring opinion cites no case in
support of the above-quoted proposition.
In sum, no opinion cited by the court states that criminal intent is not an
element of the § 1324(a)(2)(B) felony offenses.
77
III.
I must respectfully disagree with the court’s reasoning and conclusion that the
§ 1324(a)(2)(B) felony offenses do not require proof of criminal intent. In the
simplest terms, the court today creates a circuit split on this issue. In doing so, it
rejects the reasoned analysis of our sister circuits that have analyzed this provision
and the nearly identical language found in the § 1324(a)(1) felony offenses. For the
reasons set forth below, I do not read the statute to eliminate a general criminal intent
mens rea, but instead conclude that proof of general criminal intent is an element of
the § 1324(a)(2)(B) felony offenses.39
39
In reaching its conclusion, the court expressly rejects inclusion of criminal intent,
holding that “a specific intent to violate the law is not required.” Ante at 30. To be clear, I
would not require proof of specific criminal intent. Rather, like our decision in Zayas-Morales,
and the majority of decisions from other circuits who require mens rea, I would instead require
proof of general criminal intent. This requires more than a showing that the defendant acted
knowingly, see Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) at 35, Basic Offense
Instruction 9.1A (“The word ‘knowingly’ means that an act was done voluntarily and
intentionally and not because of a mistake or by accident”), but less than acting with specific
intent. The Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) at 35, Basic Offense Instruction
9.1A, explains the meaning of general criminal intent:
The word “willfully” means that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely,
with the intent to do something the law forbids; that is, with the bad purpose to
disobey or disregard the law. While a person must have acted with the intent to
do something the law forbids before you can find that the person acted “willfully,”
the person need not be aware of the specific law or rule that [his] [her] conduct
may be violating.
The Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) at 37, Basic Offense Instruction 9.1B,
also explains the instruction for more rigorous standard of specific intent, requiring proof that
“the act was done voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to violate a known legal duty,
that is, with the intent to do something the law forbids.” The comments following Basic Offense
78
A.
1.
The analysis of the mens rea issue appropriately begins with the language of
the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B). See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
605, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1994). The challenge the court faces
here is that the language provides little guidance; without question, Congress did not
expressly eliminate the mens rea requirement. Rather, the language of the statute
merely makes it unlawful for a person who,
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not
received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the
United States, brings to the United States in any manner whatsoever,
such alien regardless of any official action which may later be taken
with respect to such alien.
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
Considered in light of legislative history, the court concludes that Congress
intended to omit criminal intent as an element of the § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) offenses.40
Ante at 35. The court’s analysis, however, reaches its mens rea holding without
considering the “interpretative presumption” that proof of criminal intent or in other
Instruction 9.1A provide a helpful distinction between the two definitions of “willful.”
40
The court’s analysis fails to recognize the distinction between the § 1324(a)(2)
misdemeanor offense and the § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) felony offense. Here, Dominguez was tried and
convicted for the felony offense.
79
words, an evil mind, is required to convict a defendant of a crime, such as smuggling,
which has its origin in the common law,41 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 437, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2873, 57 L. Ed. 2d. 854 (1978) (“Although
Blackstone's requisite “vicious will” has been replaced by more sophisticated and less
colorful characterizations of the mental state required to support criminality intent
generally remains an indispensable element of a criminal offense.” (internal citation
omitted)),42 for each element of the offense, United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
513 U.S. 64, 72, 115 S. Ct. 464, 469 (1994) (“[Supreme Court precedent] instructs
that the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the
statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.”). The presumption
articulated by the U.S. Gypsum Court draws from the Court’s earlier decisions in
41
Amongst his “Offences Against Public Trade,” Blackstone identified the crime of
“Smuggling,” which he classified as a felony. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*155–56 (describing the common law crime of smuggling).
42
This presumption does not apply in prosecutions for public welfare or regulatory
offenses. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606–07, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797–98, 128 L.
Ed. 2d 608 (1994) (noting that typically these prosecutions involve regulation of potentially
harmful items or in areas of public health or safety); see also Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 891 n.1 (“The
government does not contend that section 1324(a)(1)(A) is a public welfare statute, nor could it.
The ‘public welfare’ exception does not extend to offenses derived from the common law.”);
Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960) (Blackmun, J.) (“[W]here a federal
criminal statute omits mention of intent and . . . where the penalty is relatively small, where
conviction does not gravely besmirch, [and] where the statutory crime is not one taken over from
the common law, . . . the statute can be construed as one not requiring criminal intent.” (emphasis
added)). Without question, § 1324(a)(2) does not create a public welfare or regulatory offense.
80
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952),43 and
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500, 71 S. Ct. 857, 862, 95 L. Ed. 1137(1951).44
In Dennis, decided a year before Morissette, the Court observed that “[t]he
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” 341 U.S. at 500, 71 S. Ct. 857 at 962. In
Morrisette, the Court explained the origin of the judiciary’s practice of finding
legislative intent to include criminal intent as a requirement for a felony conviction,
even where the statute was silent as to the requirement. The Court in Morissette
noted:
As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their
enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the
omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely
recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it
required no statutory affirmation. Courts, with little hesitation or
division, found an implication of the requirement as to offenses that
were taken over from the common law.
342 U.S. at 252, 72 S. Ct. at 244.
43
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52, 72 S. Ct. 240, 241, 96 L. Ed. 288(1952) (“Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an
evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took
deep and early root in American soil.”).
44
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500, 71 S. Ct. 857, 862, 95 L. Ed. 1137 (1951)
(“It has been suggested that the presence of intent makes a difference in the law when an ‘act
otherwise excusable or carrying minor penalties’ is accompanied by such an evil intent.”).
81
The Court tacitly, if not expressly, approved this practice again in 1985 in
Liparota v. United States, reiterating the fundamental principle that criminal offenses
without a mens rea element are “generally disfavored.” 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S. Ct.
2084, 2088, 85 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1985). In sum, “far more than the simple omission of
the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing
with an intent requirement.” U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438, 98 S. Ct. at 2874. That
is, more than a “simple omission” is necessary to rebut the interpretative presumption
that proof of criminal intent is required for a felony conviction. As I will explain,
there is nothing in the text or the legislative history that is sufficient to rebut that
presumption for § 1324(a)(2)(B).
2.
Congress did not overcome this presumption for three reasons: (1) the text and
legislative history are not sufficiently clear to infer any implied intent to eliminate
criminal intent, (2) the specific language Congress chose to use in the 1986 revision
mirrors language that courts have overwhelmingly held to include a criminal intent
mens rea, and (3) the potential penalties imposed for a violation under this provision
are severe enough to indicate that Congress intended to retain the requirement to
show proof of criminal intent.
82
First, the statutory language itself is unclear, as Congress simply omitted any
mens rea element in reference to the “brings to or attempts to bring to” element.
Also, nothing in the legislative history is clear enough to overcome the presumption
that criminal intent is an element under § 1324(a)(2)(B). The court essentially hinges
its interpretation of the statute on one portion of the legislative history. Ante at
31–34. After reviewing the holdings of the district court in United States v. Anaya,
509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982), and Zayas-Morales, the House
committee stated:
The Committee is convinced that this gap in current law must be closed.
Without the threat of criminal prosecution, there is no effective way to
deter potential transporters from inundating U.S. ports of entry with
undocumented aliens. As happened during the Mariel episode, the
United States would be forced to expend extraordinary amounts of
money and human resources in processing, monitoring, caring for and
giving hearings to exorbitant numbers of people.
H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I) at 20 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5670.
I am not convinced that Congress authorized the courts to read the statute as
eliminating proof of an evil mind for a felony conviction under § 1324(a)(2)(B).45
45
As the Ninth Circuit in Nguyen explained, “we cannot accept the government's leap
from this premise to the conclusion that Congress intended to dispense with the mens rea
requirement inferred by the Eleventh Circuit in Zayas-Morales.” Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 892
(reviewing history in light of changes to § 1324(a)(1)); see also United States v. Barajas-Montiel,
185 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that “nothing, in the statute or legislative history,
indicates that Congress intended to dispense with a mens rea requirement for the felony offense
83
The unexplained “gap” referred to in the legislative history is ambiguous at best.
While I do not doubt that the statutory revisions made in 1986 were intended to
“expand the scope of activities proscribed,” 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5670, the “gap”
could focus on any number of issues raised by the decisions of the district court and
this court.46 This bare assertion alone is not sufficient. My reading of the statute is
in accord with the other courts who have interpreted the legislative history. See part
III.A.3, infra.
Second, § 1324(a)(2)(B) should be read as requiring a criminal intent mens rea
element because Congress intentionally chose to use language in the 1986 revisions
that federal courts have consistently interpreted to include criminal intent. The
Supreme Court has held that “Congress will be presumed to have legislated against
the background of our traditional legal concepts which render intent a critical factor,”
and “absence of contrary direction [will] be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted
definitions, not as a departure from them.” U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437, 98 S. Ct.
at 2873 (alteration in original) (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263, 72 S. Ct. at 250).
of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)”).
46
It goes without saying that there are inherent problems with excessive reliance on
ambiguous legislative history. See Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Service, Inc., 616 F.3d 1217,
1224 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Before proceeding, we must note that severe problems
attend the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation; its analysis is a practice that we
seek regularly to avoid.” (citing United States v. Fields, 500 F.3d 1327, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2007)
(Carnes, J., concurring))).
84
The Supreme Court’s decision in Liparota, is one illustration of this point.47
Liparota involved a “food stamps” prosecution. The defendant was charged with
acquiring and possessing food stamps in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1). That
section provided at the time and in relevant part: “[W]hoever knowingly uses,
transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons . . . in any manner not authorized by
this Act or the regulations issued pursuant to this Act[.]” 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1981).
The Government’s case consisted of the testimony of an undercover agent of
the Department of Agriculture who had gone to the defendant’s sandwich shop and,
on three occasions, had purchased a total of $1,195 of food stamps for $800. The
defendant argued that this testimony, standing alone, was insufficient to establish that
he had violated § 2024(b)(1); he argued that the Government had to prove that he
knew he was violating a federal law when he purchased the food stamps. The district
court disagreed and instructed the jury that,
the Government had to prove that the Defendant acquired and possessed
food stamp coupons for cash in a manner not authorized by federal
statute or regulations and that the Defendant knowingly and wilfully
(sic) acquired the food stamps.
47
There are numerous other illustrations of courts reading in a criminal intent mens rea
element to similar statutes. For another example, the statute in Morissette provided: “Whoever
embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another . . . [a] thing of
value of the United States . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 641. The Supreme Court held that criminal intent
was an essential element of the crime in any prosecution for “knowingly convert[ing]” property
of the United States. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 275, 72 S. Ct. at 256.
85
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422, 105 S. Ct. at 2086 (internal quotations omitted).48
The defendant was convicted, and, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether in a prosecution under
[§ 2024(b)(1)] the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he was acting
in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations.” Id. at 420–21, 105 S. Ct. at
2086. The answer was a matter of statutory interpretation, and the Court, disagreeing
with the Government, held that such knowledge was an element of the offense. In a
§ 2024(b)(1) prosecution, the Court concluded that the jury must be informed of what
the statute and regulations proscribe, then instructed to determine whether the
defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful. Id. The Court elaborated on its
holding:
[T]he Government must prove that the defendant knew that his
acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner unauthorized
by statute or regulations. This holding does not put an unduly heavy
burden on the Government in prosecuting violators of § 2024(b)(1). To
prove that petitioner knew that his acquisition or possession of food
stamps was unauthorized, for example, the Government need not show
that he had knowledge of specific regulations governing food stamp
acquisition or possession. Nor must the Government introduce any
extraordinary evidence that would conclusively demonstrate petitioner’s
48
Although the instruction contained the word willfully, it appears that it was not used in
this context to confer any criminal intent element given that the Court notes, “[p]etitioner
objected that this instruction required the jury to find merely that he knew that he was acquiring
or possessing food stamps; he argued that the statute should be construed instead to reach only
‘people who knew that they were acting unlawfully.’” Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422–23, 105 S. Ct.
at 2086.
86
state of mind. Rather, as in any other criminal prosecution requiring
mens rea, the Government may prove by reference to facts and
circumstances surrounding the case that petitioner knew that his conduct
was unauthorized or illegal.
Id. at 433–34, 105 S. Ct. at 2092–93 (footnote omitted).
Moreover, several of our sister circuits have read this type of statutory
language and structure to include “willfully” to modify the verb in § 1324 offenses,
rather than applying, as the court does here, the “knowing” mens rea that is applicable
only to the first element of the offense. For example, in United States v. Parmelee,
42 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit concluded that the predecessor to §
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) required that an element of criminal intent—that the defendant act
willfully—be read into the statute.49 See id. at 390. The Parmelee court reached this
conclusion because to hold otherwise would lead to “sweeping liability.” Id. at 39.
Numerous other circuits follow the same approach to read in “willfully” as an
element, rather than requiring only that the defendant act “knowingly.” See United
States v. Chavez-Palacios, 30 F.3d 1290, 1294 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that there
49
The Seventh Circuit specifically stated,
[w]e have no question that section 1324(a)(1)(B) implicitly requires the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the defendant knew
the alien he transported had entered this country in violation of immigration law,
but also that the defendant knowingly transported the alien to further that
violation, that is, acted willfully.
Parmelee, 42 F.3d at 390.
87
is a “willful” mens rea element required under statute with identical language to
current § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)); United States v. Diaz, 936 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1991)
(reading in “willful” mens rea for the transporting provision that is now in §
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)); United States v. Medina-Garcia, 918 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1990)
(addressing mens rea for transporting provision now in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), which
requires that the defendant acted “willfully”); United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d
568, 569 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (interpreting § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) to find that the
defendant acted “willfully in furtherance” of alien’s violation of the law was a
required element); United States v. 1982 Ford Pick-Up, 873 F.2d 947, 951 (6th Cir.
1989) (concluding that the Government must prove “the defendant willfully
transported an illegal alien” under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)); United States v.
Morales-Rosales, 838 F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that Government
must prove that defendant acted “willfully” to prove a violation of the transporting
provision), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Longoria, 298 F.3d 367(5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming
a jury instruction that included a “willful” element for the transporting violation). But
see United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 162 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
Nguyen while interpreting the harboring provision in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), but
offering no explanation other than “[t]his circuit follows a different rule and has held,
88
as to similar offenses, that proof of specific intent to violate immigration laws is not
required.”). That other circuits have interpreted provisions with the same language
and structure to include a “willful” element is instructive to the approach we should
take in interpreting this provision. Namely, it is highly persuasive that other courts
have consistently rejected the interpretation suggested by the court today—that we
should read “knowingly” to apply to each element—and instead concluded that
criminal intent is the proper mens rea.
Thus, it is fair to conclude that when Congress chose the particular language
of § 1324(a)(2)(B), it did so with full knowledge of the widespread practice to
interpret such language to include a criminal intent element.50 See Morissette, 342
U.S. at 252, 72 S. Ct. at 244. Congress could have expressly indicated that a general
criminal intent mens rea element was not required for the “bring” or “attempts to
bring” element in a § 1324(a)(2)(B) prosecution; instead, it left a blank slate for us
50
In Morissette, the Supreme Court specifically noted,
[a]nd where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning
from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind
unless otherwise instructed.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263, 72 S. Ct. at 250.
89
to interpret. This omission does not establish that Congress intended to eliminate
criminal intent.
Finally, a third factor that weighs in favor of reading a criminal intent element
into § 1324(a)(2)(B) is that Congress prescribed harsh penalties for its violation. The
Supreme Court has held that the severity of potential punishment is a major factor in
finding whether Congress intended to omit an evil-mind requirement. See Staples,
511 U.S. at 616, 114 S. Ct. at 1802 (“Historically, the penalty imposed under a
statute has been a significant consideration in determining whether the statute should
be construed as dispensing with mens rea.”); see also Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256, 72
S. Ct. at 246 (noting that in statutes without a mens rea, the “penalties commonly are
relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.”).
The imposition of significant penalties without any requirement of criminal intent is
“incongruous.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 617, 114 S. Ct. at 1803.
The severity of the penalties authorized under § 1324(a)(2)(B) clearly indicates
that Congress intended a mens rea element. Section 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), addressing an
“offense done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain,”
authorizes imprisonment for a first- or second-time violation of “not less than 3 nor
more than 10 years,” and “not less than 5 nor more than 15 years” for subsequent
90
violations. See § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).51 These penalties are a far cry from the petty
punishments, such as a fine or short jail sentence, typically associated with a crime
that does not require mens rea. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 616, 114 S. Ct. at 1803
(“Certainly, the cases that first defined the concept of the public welfare offense
almost uniformly involved statutes that provided for only light penalties such as fines
or short jail sentences, not imprisonment in the state penitentiary.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Raymond, 97 Mass. 567 (1867) (involving a fine of up to $200 or
six months in jail, or both); Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. 489 (1864)
(discussing a penalty limited to a fine); People v. Snowburger, 71 N.W. 497 (Mich.
1897) (addressing penalties of only a fine of up to $500 or incarceration in county
jail).
Here, Congress authorized more severe punishments under § 1324(a)(2)(B)
than it did for violations under the current version of § 1324(a)(1)(A) and the version
of § 1324(a)(1) that existed in Zayas-Morales.52 In Nguyen, one of the cases the court
51
The district court sentenced Dominguez to concurrent prison terms of five years.
52
See § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) (describing punishment and, for all offenses other than those
involving serious bodily injury, a threat to someone’s life, or the death of someone, noting that
“in the case of a violation of subparagraph (A)(i) or (v)(I) or in the case of a violation of
subparagraph (A)(ii), (iii), or (iv) in which the offense was done for the purpose of commercial
advantage or private financial gain, be fined under Title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both”); § 1324(a)(1) (1976) (stating that violators “shall be guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a
term not exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this
91
cites, ante at 33–34, the Ninth Circuit’s holding depended in part on the severity of
the penalties for violating § 1324(a)(1)(A). Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 892. In many ways,
there is a more persuasive argument that Congress intended an element of criminal
intent in § 1324(a)(2)(B) given that the mandatory minimum prison sentence of three
or five years and the maximum sentence of ten or fifteen years creates a more punitive
scheme than the one in § 1324(a)(1)(A).53
In short, the greater the penalty, the more Congress is aware that, if it intends
to eliminate criminal intent, it must do so clearly. If the district court decided to run
Dominguez’s sentences consecutively, the total sentence could have been as low as
forty-seven years and as high as one hundred thirty-five years.54 The potential penalty
authorized by Congress under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) is great indeed. There is nothing
subsection occurs”).
53
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit heavily relied upon the severity of the potential
punishments in concluding that § 1324(a)(2)(B) contained some mens rea requirement. See
Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d at 953 (noting that the exact same concerns at issue in Nguyen are at
issue in any analysis of § 1324(a)(2) because of “[t]he substantial overlap between the felony
statutes and the serious penalties for their violation.”). The court dismisses Barajas-Montiel as
unpersuasive, yet cites Nguyen with approval. I do not attempt to reconcile this inconsistency,
concluding instead that both Barajas-Montiel and Nguyen are instructive.
54
These figures include five years on the conspiracy count, 18 U.S.C. § 371. The 47
years’ total sentence incorporates the three-year and five-year mandatory minimums prescribed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B); the 135 years’ total sentence incorporates the maximum sentences
prescribed by that provision. These totals are, of course, theoretical. The mandatory minimums
§ 1324(a)(2)(B) prescribes required the court to impose sentences above the sentencing range
prescribed by the applicable Sentencing Guideline, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.1.
92
in the language of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(i),(ii), or (iii) or the legislative history indicating
a legislative intent to omit criminal intent as an element of the offenses, let alone a
clear statement one would expect given the severe penalties authorized. Thus, the
penalties the statute imposes weigh heavily in favor of a finding that Congress
intended that general criminal intent remain an element.
Finally, I note that in instances where there is ambiguity concerning the scope
of a criminal statute, courts traditionally apply the longstanding rule of lenity. See
Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d at 952–53 (“If after examining the statutory language and
the legislative history we perceive any ambiguity regarding Congress's intent to
require a showing of criminal intent, we will resolve the ambiguity by implying a
mens rea element.” (quoting Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 890–91)). Even absent the reasons
why I conclude that mens rea is an element of the § 1324(a)(2) offenses, at a bare
minimum, the considerable ambiguity as to the inclusion of that element counsels that
we apply the rule of lenity. See U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437, 98 S. Ct. at 2873; see
also Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427, 105 S. Ct. at 2089 (“Application of the rule of lenity
ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered
illegal and strikes the appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and
the court in defining criminal liability.”); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348,
92 S. Ct. 515, 523, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal
93
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal
activity.”).
3.
The approach I endorse is confirmed by a clear majority of circuits that have
considered whether criminal intent is an element of the §§ 1324(a)(1) and 1324(a)(2)
offenses.55 My research reveals that only the Ninth Circuit has answered the question
regarding the § 1324(a)(2) offenses. Other courts have addressed the question
regarding the § 1324(a)(1) offenses; as a whole, their holdings support my
interpretation.
The Ninth Circuit in Barajas-Montiel confronted the § 1324(a)(2)(B) issue and
concluded that criminal intent is an element of the offense. Barajas-Montiel, 185
55
Today the court addresses this question under the § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) offenses, but
none of the cases it cites provides any significant analysis of this issue. See United States v.
Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring) (asserting, without
any citation for support that, “[c]onsequently, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), which
does not require general criminal intent, to make it a misdemeanor to engage in conduct of the
kind at issue in the Mariel ‘Freedom Flotilla’ cases.”); United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692,
698 (2d Cir. 1994) (addressing an entirely different issue); see also Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 892–94
(holding that § 1324(a)(1)(A) requires proof of criminal intent because nothing in the statute or
legislative history indicated that Congress “intended to dispense with the mens rea requirement
assumed to be an element of every common law offense” and drawing a distinction between the
felony § 1324(a)(1) and the misdemeanor § 1324(a)(2), in dicta, intimating that Congress may
have dispensed with the mens rea requirement for the misdemeanor penalty under § 1324(a)(2));
but see Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d at 953 (rejecting any attempt in Nguyen to draw a distinction
between § 1324(a)(1) and § 1324(a)(2)(B)).
94
F.3d at 952. In that case, the court drew on its decision in Nguyen, see id. (reviewing
the text and legislative history of § 1324 to conclude that there was insufficient proof
Congress intended to dispose of the mens rea requirement for common law offenses,
noting that “[c]ertainly there is nothing in the legislative history suggesting a desire
to do so.”) (quoting Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 893)), and held that the reasoning of Nguyen
applies with equal force to § 1324(a)(2)(B). Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d at 953. In so
holding, the court emphasized the lack of clarity in the legislative history, the
similarity between offenses under § 1324(a)(1) and the felony provisions of §
1324(a)(2)(B), and the potential for harsh penalties. Id. at 952–53 (“Without a
specific intent instruction, the jury does not have to consider whether a defendant
intended to violate immigration laws, and therefore the jury could conceivably
believe that they had to convict . . . where the defendant . . . had plausible claims that
he nevertheless lacked the intent to violate the law.”).
Although not precisely on point, other circuits have almost uniformly
interpreted other § 1324(a)(1) provisions by reading in an element of criminal intent.
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit has held that the § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) “bringing in”
felony offense includes an element of criminal intent. See Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 894
(reading in mens rea for § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)). Similarly, the First, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have read in criminal intent for the §
95
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) transporting offense. See Parmelee, 42 F.3d at 390;
Chavez-Palacios, 30 F.3d at 1294 (holding that there is a mens rea element required
under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)); Diaz, 936 F.2d at 788 (reading in mens rea for
transporting offense now in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)); Medina-Garcia, 918 F.2d at 7–8
(addressing mens rea for transporting offense now in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)); Hernandez,
913 F.2d at 569 (per curiam) (interpreting § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)); 1982 Ford Pick-Up,
873 F.2d at 951 (concluding that the Government must prove “that the defendant
willfully transported an illegal alien with the specific intent of supporting the alien’s
illegal presence” under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)); Morales-Rosales, 838 F.2d at 1360
(discussing mens rea for transporting offense). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has also
held that criminal intent is a required element for the § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) harboring
offense. See United States v. Chang Guo You, 382 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“The court instructed the jury that it must find that Appellants had acted with ‘the
purpose of avoiding [the aliens'] detection by immigration authorities.’ This
instruction is synonymous with having acted with necessary intent as required in
Barajas-Montiel and Nguyen.”) (emphasis and alteration in original).
B.
Applying the tools courts use in determining whether a criminal statute requires
criminal intent and considering the decision-making reflected in the case law, I am
96
lead to the conclusion that § 1324(a)(2)(B) must contain an element of criminal
intent. The court, however, arrives at a different conclusion, believing instead that
to require proof of criminal intent is contrary to the plain language and legislative
history of the statute and functionally eliminates the “reckless disregard” language.
Ante at 31. While initially appealing, the court’s analysis withers under close
scrutiny.
As an initial matter, the statutory language is silent as to what the requisite
mens rea is for the “bring” or “attempt to bring” element; we cannot merely read the
“plain language” of the statute because Congress omitted any mens rea for the second
element entirely. The question is not how to define the phrase “knowingly or in
reckless disregard” but rather, in the absence of any mens rea for the second element,
should we merely require proof of knowledge or should we require proof that the
alleged smuggler acted with an evil mind, i.e., that the Government show proof of
general criminal intent?
The mens rea established by Congress for the first element is “knowingly or in
reckless disregard.” The court, on the other hand, would read in “knowing” to the
second element of § 1324(a)(2), but would discard the “or in reckless disregard”
language; without question, the court does not merely apply the mens rea Congress
chose in an even-handed manner to each element of the statute. To read in one level
97
of mens rea—knowing—yet omitting the second level of mens rea—in reckless
disregard— when considering the second element of the offense is hardly adhering
to the “plain language” of Congress. In fact, it is fair to say that the court’s reading
does far more to “functionally eliminate” the “or in reckless disregard” language than
does my interpretation. And the legislative history is equally unclear for the reasons
mentioned supra.
Instead we are left to conduct a full analysis, using the tools described by
Supreme Court precedent, to determine whether Congress made a showing sufficient
to overcome the presumption of criminal intent. After considering the text, structure,
and penalties authorized for felony offenses under § 1324(a)(2), the answer is
clear—Congress did not eliminate criminal intent from the § 1324(a)(2) felony
offenses, or at a bare minimum, the issue is sufficiently unclear such that the
interpretive presumption cannot be rebutted.
Moreover, for proof that my interpretation would not lead to the results claimed
by the court, we need look no further than the numerous decisions of our sister
circuits. These decisions are persuasive regardless of whether they interpret §
1324(a)(1) or § 1324(a)(2) because the same structure and language is present in both
provisions; to wit, both sections contain the “knowing or in reckless disregard”
introduction relating to the status of the alien, followed by some verb that does not
98
contain any explicit mens rea element specified by the statutory language.56 When
evaluating any of these provisions, courts are faced with the question of adopting an
approach similar to the one taken by the court today, applying the “knowing or in
reckless disregard” to each element, or to follow the approach I advocate.
Because the language and structure found in § 1324(a)(1) and § 1324(a)(2) is
virtually identical, how our sister circuits answered this question of statutory
interpretation is highly persuasive, and yet largely ignored by the court’s opinion. In
short, three important lessons are readily apparent after comparing the approach taken
by our sister circuits with the approach adopted by the court today: first, the court’s
approach to the interpretation of § 1324 is the first of its kind—none of the courts
cited in the court’s opinion or my opinion that have addressed this issue applied the
“knowing or in reckless disregard” mens rea to each element; second, a clear majority
56
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (penalizing any person who “knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in
violation of law, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within the
United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law”
(emphasis added)), and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (penalizing any person who “knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in
violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or
shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any means of
transportation” (emphasis added)), with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (penalizing any person who
“knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to the
United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official action which may
later be taken with respect to such alien shall, for each alien in respect to whom a violation of this
paragraph occurs” (emphasis added)).
99
of courts have concluded, as I do, that Congress intended that criminal intent remain
an essential element, as these courts read in “willfully” to apply to the second
element—modifying the verb—in this statute; and third, for over twenty years courts
have read this type of statute to include “knowing or in reckless disregard” as the
mens rea for the alien’s status and “willful” as the mens rea for the defendant’s act
(bringing, transporting, or harboring) without impacting, much less functionally
eliminating, any other language in the statute.
Quite simply, for the reasons discussed supra, neither the text of the statute nor
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to do away with the
requirement that a defendant act with an evil mind. That smuggling was a crime at
common law, that Congress deliberately chose to use a statutory structure and
language that courts have traditionally read to include a criminal intent element, and
that Congress prescribed imprisonment for up to fifteen years for a violation are all
strong indications that some criminal intent requirement must be read in to the statute.
If, by chance, any question remains as to Congress’s intent, the rule of lenity requires
that we construe the statute to include an evil-mind element.
Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the court’s holding that proof of
criminal intent is not required for § 1324(a)(2)(B) offenses. Like our decision in
Zayas-Morales and the decisions of our sister circuits, I would hold that in addition
100
to proving that Dominguez knew or acted in reckless disregard of the fact that the
players had not received receive prior official authorization to enter, the Government
had to prove that Dominguez acted with general criminal intent. In other words, that
he acted “willfully.”
C.
Assuming that criminal intent is an element of the § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) offense,
the district court erred in prohibiting Dominguez from going forward with his defense
that he lacked the criminal intent necessary for conviction. The prohibition was
sweeping: the jury was not to hear a word about the CAA, Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy,
the Meissner Memorandum, whether it would come from Dominguez’s testimony or
the testimony of the retired Immigration Judge Dominguez attempted to call as an
expert witness to explain the operation of the Government’s immigration policy as
it related to Cuban refugees.57 True, Dominguez was able to testify on redirect
examination that Cubans are entitled to stay in the United States “regardless of how
they got to the United States,” but only because the prosecutor, on cross-examination,
opened the door. Dominguez’s statement fell on deaf ears; the court’s prohibition
prevented Dominguez from testifying at length about how the immigration authorities
57
It requires no citation of authority to say that the district court’s order granting the
Government’s motion in limine was so comprehensive in its scope that Dominguez was relieved
of the necessity of proffering the evidence he would have presented in his defense.
101
handle dry-foot Cubans and from buttressing his testimony with that of the retired
Immigration Judge he proffered.
In instructing the jury at the close of the case, the district court rejected
Dominguez’s requested mens rea instructions.58 Dominguez’s Theory of Defense
Instruction No. 2 read:
It is the defense in this case that Gustavo “Gus” Dominguez did not
intentionally engage in illegal alien smuggling or attempt to illegally
smuggle aliens, and that he did not illegally transport aliens or harbor
illegal. At all times, Gus Dominguez was a legitimate Major League
Baseball player agent who acted lawfully and in the best interests of his
clients.
I instruct you that if you find Defendant Dominguez in fact did not
intentionally engage in smuggling, transporting, or harboring illegal
aliens, you may consider this as evidence of the lack of criminal intent
by Defendant Dominguez.
(emphasis added). The court sustained the Government’s objection to Instruction No.
2, and gave the following instruction, instead:
It is Gustavo "Gus" Dominguez's theory of the case that he never entered
or intended to enter into any conspiracy to bring aliens into the United
States illegally, to transport illegal aliens within the United States, or to
harbor illegal aliens in the United States, nor did he knowingly engage
in illegal alien smuggling or attempt to illegally smuggle aliens, and that
the did not illegally transport aliens or harbor aliens.
58
Defendant’s Requested Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 17, 30, and 31.
102
(emphasis added). The instruction was wrong because, for the reasons I state in part
III.A., supra, the Government needed to show that Dominguez acted willfully, with
the general criminal intent to disobey the law. To find that Dominguez willfully
engaged in illegal smuggling, the jury had to be fully informed as to his state of mind.
They were not informed because the district court barred the information on which
Dominguez acted. That Dominguez honestly believed that he was acting lawfully,
in reliance on official pronouncements such as the Meissner Memorandum, and that
he intended to present the Cubans to immigration authorities makes this case identical
to that in Zayas-Morales; in Dominguez’s case as in Zalas-Morales, the defendant’s
state of mind is critical.59
In sum, the district court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the
jury that criminal intent was an element of the § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) offenses and from
59
Dominguez was justified in reliance on an official Government policy, the Wet-
Foot/Dry-Foot policy, and the Meissner Memorandum, which was an official memorandum from
the Commissioner of the I.N.S. for his belief that Cuban immigrants have a unique status under
federal immigration policy. See United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 487, 87 S. Ct. 574, 581, 17
L. Ed. 2d 526 (1967) (“Ordinarily, citizens may not be punished for actions undertaken in good
faith reliance upon authoritative assurance that punishment will not attach.”); see also Raley v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438, 79 S. Ct. 1257, 1266, 13 L. Ed. 2d 1344 (1959) (stating that individuals
should not be punished when the statutes are “inexplicably contradictory” and therefore lead to
good-faith mistakes) (citing United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 73 S. Ct. 189, 97 L. Ed. 200(1952)); United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough
the basic policy behind the mistake of law doctrine is that, at their peril, all men should know and
obey the law, in certain situations there is an overriding societal interest in having individuals
rely on the authoritative pronouncements of officials whose decisions we wish to see respected.”
(footnote omitted)).
103
precluding the jury from hearing about the CAA, the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy, the
Meissner Memorandum, and, from Dominguez’s proffered Immigration Judge, the
Government’s implementation of that policy. These errors require reversal of the
conspiracy, attempt, and smuggling convictions.
IV.
Even if the court somehow concluded general criminal intent is not an element
of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), all of the above-discussed evidence was, at a minimum,
relevant to the conspiracy charge under Count 1. The indictment prepared by the
Government, the Government’s requested jury instructions, and the district court’s
actual instructions to the jury required the jury to find that Dominguez acted
“willfully,” thereby squarely putting Dominguez’s intent at issue. Thus, the district
court erred in excluding the CAA, the Meissner Memorandum, the Wet-Foot/Dry-
Foot policy, and the testimony from the Immigration Judge.
Dominguez’s intent was at issue for the Count 1 conspiracy charge under 18
U.S.C. § 371, for conspiring to violate the transporting, harboring, and smuggling
provisions of Title 8. The grand jury, when it indicted Dominguez, alleged that
Dominguez “did knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, confederate, and agree
with other persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit offenses against
104
the United States.” What’s more, the Government requested the following jury
instructions for the conspiracy count:
First: That two or more persons in some way or manner, came to a
mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan,
as charged in the indictment; and
Second: That the Defendant, knowing the unlawful purpose of the plan,
willfully joined in it;
Third: That one of the conspirators during the existence of the
conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the methods (or “overt
acts”) described in the indictment; and
Fourth: That such “overt act” was knowingly committed at or about the
time alleged in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the
conspiracy.
For a definition of “willfully” the Government requested the following: “The
word ‘willfully[,]’ as that term is used in the indictment or in these instructions,
means that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent
to do something the law forbids; that is with bad purpose to either disobey or
disregard the law.”60 The district court, when instructing the jury, accepted the
Government’s requested instructions and gave the instructions to the jury exactly as
60
I note in passing that the Government requested a hybrid between the general intent
definition of “willfully” and the specific intent version of “willfully” by essentially giving the
pattern jury instruction for general intent, but adding the word “specific.” See supra note 39 for a
comparison between the two pattern instructions. For the sake of clarity we will refer to the
required intent for the conspiracy conviction as specific criminal intent, but whether general or
specific criminal intent was the mens rea for the conspiracy count is irrelevant to my conclusion.
105
written above. The Government has never maintained, before the district court or this
court, that the indictment, requested instructions, and actual jury instructions
contained any mistakes. We therefore take the “willfully” language and the definition
of “willfully” to be what the Government contends is an accurate statement of the law
for the conspiracy charge.
Without question, then, criminal intent was an essential element to the
conspiracy conviction. For the reasons described in part III.C., the jury had to be
informed as to the legal status of the aliens under Cuban-specific immigration policy
through reference to the CAA, the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy, the Meissner
Memorandum, and the Government’s implementation of that policy. Without this
evidence, the jury was simply unable to make a finding that Dominguez acted with
the criminal intent required for a conviction.
Thus, regardless of whether criminal intent was an element of the substantive
offenses, there is no question that criminal intent was an element of the conspiracy
charge in Count 1. Exclusion of evidence essential to the jury’s determination of
whether Dominguez acted with lawful or unlawful intent was reversible error.
V.
Finally, although less compelling, even if the court somehow found that the
evidence was properly excluded despite both the grounds explained above, there are
106
additional reasons why Dominguez’s conspiracy and smuggling convictions still have
to be reversed and a new trial granted. Dominguez’s knowledge of the government’s
policy of treating undocumented Cubans as presumptive refugees entitled to apply for
permanent residence status under the CAA was relevant to the question of whether
Dominguez knew that the “prior official authorization” phrase of § 1324(a)(2) applied
to the players.
Recall that to obtain a conviction under § 1324(a)(2), the Government must
prove that the defendant knew61 that the alien he was bringing to the United States
“ha[d] not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the
United States.” As to the attempt to smuggle and smuggling counts, the district court
instructed the jury on the elements of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) as follows: Regarding the
attempt to smuggle counts, the elements were:
First: That the defendant knowingly attempted to bring an alien to the
United States;
Second: That the defendant knew such person was an alien;
Third: That the offense was done for the purpose of commercial advantage or
financial gain.
As for the smuggling counts, the elements were:
61
Or was “in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has not received prior
authorization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). In this case, the Government did not rely on this phrase;
rather, it sought to prove that Dominguez knew of the players’ unauthorized status.
107
First: That the defendant knowingly brought an alien to the United
States;
Second: That the defendant knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that
the alien had not received prior official authorization to come to or enter the
United States; and
Third: That the offense was done for the purpose of commercial advantage or
financial gain.
The court obviously erred in the attempt to smuggle instruction by omitting the
“prior official authorization” phrase, and thus caused an attentive juror to have
difficulty reconciling the attempt to and smuggle instructions. I need not pause to
consider whether the omission constitutes reversible error because the district court
erred in precluding Dominguez from testifying in full as to his state of mind
throughout his involvement with the players. The jury needed to know what
Dominguez knew about the application of the “prior official authorization” phrase as
it applied specifically to Cuban refugees. Put another way, what did Dominguez
know about the law?
A defendant is presumed to know the law. See Dimenski v. I.N.S., 275 F.3d
574, 578 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In immigration law, as in tax law – and criminal law, too,
where knowledge of the law is presumed – the Constitution permits the government
to leave people to their own research.” (citation omitted)); Edwards v. United States,
334 F.2d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1964) (en banc) (“It is often stated that every person is
108
‘presumed’ to know the law.”).62 What constituted the law that Dominguez should
have known?
We start with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a); he presumably knew its wording, including
the “prior official authorization” phrase, which refers to the alien’s legal status. He
also knew that, unlike aliens from other countries, the Meissner Memorandum
authorized Cuban refugees to enter the United States anywhere, at a location other
than a designated port of entry.63 And the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy authorized them
62
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
October 1, 1981.
63
For example, there are two provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) that apply to all aliens
that are not likely to apply in a case where a Cuban refugee arrives as a place other than a port of
entry. They are §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1324 (a)(2)(B)(iii):
(1)(A) Any person who—
(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to bring to the United
States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place other than a designated
port of entry or place other than as designated by the Commissioner, regardless of
whether such alien has received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or
reside in the United States and regardless of any future official action which may
be taken with respect to such alien;
(2) Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has
not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United
States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner
whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official action which may later be taken
with respect to such alien shall, for each alien in respect to whom a violation of
this paragraph occurs--
...
(B) in the case of—
(iii) an offense in which the alien is not upon arrival immediately brought and
109
to enter the United States without valid entry documents, and to remain here—even
absent “prior official authorization.” Then, after the passage of a specified period of
time, the USCIS entertained, in accordance with the CAA and the Meissner
Memorandum, the refugees’ applications for adjustment of status to that of permanent
residency regardless of how they entered the United States.
Finally, Dominguez is presumed to have known of the federal court decisions
interpreting § 1324(a). He knew of our Zayas-Morales decision, in which the
defendants were acquitted even though they knew that the refugees they brought here
were “not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States” and were
warned by the U.S. Customs Service and the Coast Guard that, if they brought the
refugees here, they would be prosecuted. 685 F.2d at 1274 (noting that the
defendants stipulated that “[t]he object of the[ir] trip to and/or from Mariel, Cuba,
was to bring back Cuban nationals without visas.”). The defendants were acquitted
because they lacked the intent to violate the law; they brought the refugees here “so
that [they] could seek political asylum or some other status which would permit them
to come into the United States and remain.” Id.
presented to an appropriate immigration officer at a designated port of entry
110
The baseball players stood in the same shoes as the Zayas-Morales refugees;
they were not lawfully entitled to come to the United States. And Dominguez stood
in the same shoes as the Zayas-Morales defendants; he brought the players here so
they could seek political asylum and remain in the United States—to play baseball.
Zayas-Morales implicitly held that, in light of the trier of fact’s finding (albeit
a stipulated finding) that the defendants’ purpose in bringing the Cuban refugees to
the United States was to enable the refugees to obtain political asylum, the words of
the statute, “not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States,” had no
legal effect. The district court was bound to follow Zayas-Morales, including this
implicit holding—unless it was able to engage in the analysis this court engages in
here. From all I have been able to gather from the trial court record, including the
district court’s order granting the Government’s motion in limine, the district court
engaged in no such analysis; rather, it simply ruled irrelevant the immigration policy
regarding Cubans. Although the district court was unable to explain why the policy
was irrelevant, this court, in affirming the district court’s ruling today, attempts to
provide an explanation.
This court’s explanation, however, does not address the fact that the
Government had the burden of proving that Dominguez knew that the players lacked
“prior official authorization” to enter—what Dominguez had in his mind while the
111
players were en route to the Florida Keys. Dominguez contends that he was free to
say what was in his mind; he was helping the players obtain political asylum and
permanent residence here. The district court said: No, the law was clear; what
Dominguez had in his mind was irrelevant. Dominguez was mistaken about his view
of the law, and “a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution.” Order
Granting Gov’t Mot. In Limine 2, Mar. 14, 2007.64
The district court was stating, in effect, that Dominguez knew what this court
is saying today; that the “plain language of the statute” made it clear that the effect
of the CAA and the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy on the players’ immigration status
after they arrive[d] in the United States [was] not relevant. Ante at 35.
Implicit in this court’s statement about the effect of the CAA and the Wet-
Foot/Dry policy on the players’ immigration status after their arrival is a holding that
the evidence the district court ruled irrelevant—the effect of such policy—was
relevant to Dominguez’s prosecution for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii),
transporting the players from Florida to California in furtherance of the players’
64
A sound argument can be made that whether Dominguez’s knew that the players
lacked “prior official authorization,” i.e., whether he knew of the players’ immigration status,
presented a question of fact, not of law. It is elementary that a person’s state of mind is a fact.
Whether the players had “prior official authorization” is also a question of fact. The
Government’s proof of such fact came solely from the players, whom the Government called to
the stand in its case in chief. They said they lacked “papers” entitling them to come to the United
States. The jury heard nothing else regarding official authorization. Under this question of fact
theory, the evidence the district court precluded the jury from hearing was admissible.
112
“violation of law,” Counts 44 through 48, and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii),
harboring or shielding the players “from detection,” Counts 49 through 53.65 The
district court’s error in barring such evidence is of no consequence only because we
are reversing Dominguez’s convictions on those ten counts on the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence ground.
The impact of such evidence is relevant not only to Dominguez’s state of mind
regarding the players’s immigration status after their arrival, but to their arrival as
well. As I have shown, the policy provides Cuban refugees with unique authorization
to arrive without documents at a location at a place other than a port of entry, an
authorization aliens from other countries do not enjoy. I cannot understand how
Dominguez could have harbored a mistake of law as to the players’ immigration
status, i.e., the official authorization status.
The district court, in barring Dominguez from presenting evidence of the
federal immigration policy as it pertains to Cuban refugees, instructed the jury as to
his state of mind. Therefore, in barring this evidence, the court deprived Dominguez
of his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury on a critical element of the §
65
As the district court correctly observed in a colloquy with counsel out of the jury’s
presence, the players, as Cuban refugees, were “entitled to be here under the policy. So be it.
And that seems to me to be the end of it.” And again, “[o]nce they’re here, they’re here. They’re
legally entitled to be here.” Having said this, I am at a loss as to why the court did not allow
evidence of the players’s immigration status to come before the jury regarding Counts 44 through
53.
113
1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) offense, whether he knew that the players lacked “prior official
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States.” The court today
agrees that the players had the functional equivalent of “prior official authorization”
to enter and reside; what they lacked was “prior official authorization” to come. This
complex and unsettled distinction presents a procedural due process problem, a
problem of notice. Dominguez would need a Philadelphia lawyer66 to explain how
this could possibly be so.
VI.
Accordingly, I would reverse Dominguez’s convictions under the smuggling
counts, including the convictions for conspiracy to smuggle, Count 1; attempt to
smuggle, Counts 5, 6, 10, 13, and 19; and smuggling, Counts 28, 29, 33, 35, and 40.
Otherwise, I concur in the judgment of the court reversing Dominguez’s convictions
for the transporting counts, Counts 44 through 48; and the harboring counts, Counts
49 through 53.
66
A “Philadelphia lawyer” is a lawyer knowledgeable in the most minute aspects of the
law. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 872 (10th ed. 1993).
114