Henry Craig v. Floyd County, Georgia, Georgia Correctional Health, LLC

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-13225 JUNE 20, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 4:08-cv-00100-HLM
HENRY CRAIG,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
FLOYD COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al.,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants,
GEORGIA CORRECTIONAL HEALTH, LLC,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 20, 2011)
Before CARNES, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question whether Henry Craig, a former detainee at
the Floyd County Jail in Rome, Georgia, failed to present sufficient evidence that
Georgia Correctional Health, LLC, had a policy or custom of deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainees in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While detained for nine days in jail,
Craig received sixteen evaluations from nine different employees of Georgia
Correctional before he received a computed tomography scan, which revealed that
Craig had air, bleeding, and fractures in his head that required neurological
surgery. The district court ruled that Craig could not prove a policy or custom of
deliberate indifference based on this single incident. Because Craig failed to
present evidence that Georgia Correctional had a policy or custom of
constitutional violations, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In the early hours of July 4, 2006, a police officer approached Henry Craig
as he walked down a road in Rome, Georgia. Craig had consumed
methamphetamine hours earlier, and he behaved erratically and commanded the
officer to shoot him. Two other officers arrived, and one of them used a taser to
disable Craig. Craig fell, and a puddle of blood formed on the ground beside his
head.
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An ambulance transported Craig to Floyd Medical Center. The paramedics
recorded that Craig’s right ear was bleeding and they took a blood sample from
Craig. Nurses at Floyd Medical Center took a urine sample from Craig and
performed an electrocardiogram test, and a physician cleared Craig for
incarceration at the Floyd County Jail.
Officers transported Craig to the jail that same morning. The arresting
officer informed Jason Watts, the intake paramedic, that Craig had stated multiple
times that he wished to die. Watts observed that Craig had blood around his nose,
elevated blood pressure, and an unsteady gait. Watts determined that Craig should
be placed in a padded cell for observation and suicide watch. Craig was also
scheduled to see a mental health medical provider, which was standard procedure
for detainees in padded cells.
Georgia Correctional Health, LLC, is a private contractor that provided
health care to the detainees of the Floyd County Jail. A nurse practitioner
employed by Georgia Correctional, Susan Hatfield, assessed Craig on July 5,
2006, the morning after his arrest. Hatfield recorded that Craig had dried blood on
the outside of his right ear, which she determined was a symptom of a ruptured ear
drum. Hatfield also found Craig to be alert and oriented as to time and place and
saw that Floyd Medical Center had cleared Craig for incarceration. Craig
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expressed no complaints about his health to Hatfield during the examination.
Hatfield did not obtain Craig’s medical records from Floyd Medical Center before
she evaluated Craig, nor did she refer Craig to a physician. Based on her
assessment, Hatfield determined that Craig’s medical condition should be
monitored while on suicide watch.
Over nine days, Craig received sixteen evaluations of his health by nine
different medical professionals employed by Georgia Correctional. Craig was
evaluated by nurses, nurse practitioners, a psychologist, and a physician. During
some of these evaluations, Craig failed to voice any complaints about his health.
At other times, Craig stated that he had not eaten in five days, that he had only
urinated once since arriving at the jail, and that he had severe headaches, neck
pain, and a lack of hearing in his right ear. When Craig complained of headaches
and other pain, employees of Georgia Correctional gave him acetaminophen,
ibuprofen, other pain killers, and muscle relaxants. Craig’s symptoms persisted,
and a physician, Dr. Walter Smith, examined him. Hatfield and Dr. Smith
requested Craig’s medical records from the night of his arrest.
On July 13, 2006, Hatfield ordered a computed tomography scan of Craig’s
head while she awaited receipt of his medical records. The scan revealed that
Craig had air and bleeding in his head, along with several fractures. Medical
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personnel transported Craig to Floyd Medical Center for treatment and then to
Grady Memorial Hospital, where he underwent neurological surgery.
On June 12, 2008, Craig filed a complaint that Georgia Correctional had
been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court
granted a summary judgment against Craig’s complaint. The district court
concluded, “[a]t most, . . . [Craig’s] evidence only points to one incident—the
instant case—involving an allegedly unconstitutional deprivation. Evidence of
this single incident, however, simply is not sufficient to establish a custom, policy,
or practice” of deliberate indifference. The district court explained that Craig’s
expert witness, Dr. Jimmy Graham, had no personal knowledge of Georgia
Correctional and instead “testified that his opinion was based on his experience
providing medical care at other jails.” The district court ruled that Craig had
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact about an essential element of his
complaint: whether a policy, practice, or custom of Georgia Correctional had
violated Craig’s constitutional right. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037–38 (1978).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo summary judgment rulings and draws all
inferences and reviews all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
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party.” Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the nonmoving party fails to “make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, . . . there can be
‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.
Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1963) (current version at
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010)).
III. DISCUSSION
Craig contends that Georgia Correctional violated his right to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment when it failed to provide him care for a serious
medical need. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “As a pre-trial detainee, [Craig]’s rights
exist[ed] under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than
the Eighth Amendment. . . . Nonetheless, [Craig’s] claims are subject to the same
scrutiny as if they had been brought as deliberate indifference claims under the
Eighth Amendment.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306 (11th Cir.
2009) (internal citation omitted). “To prevail on a deliberate indifference to
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serious medical need claim, Plaintiffs must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2)
the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that
indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at 1306–07.
Georgia Correctional is a private entity, but “[w]hen a private entity . . .
contracts with a county to provide medical services to inmates, it performs a
function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state” and “becomes
the functional equivalent of the municipality” under section 1983. Buckner v.
Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997). “[L]iability under § 1983 may not be
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335
F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Craig must prove that Georgia
Correctional had a “policy or custom” of deliberate indifference that led to the
violation of his constitutional right. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at
2037–38. Because municipalities rarely have an official policy that endorses a
constitutional violation, Craig “must show that [Georgia Correctional] ha[d] a
custom or practice of permitting it and that [Georgia Correctional’s] custom or
practice [was] ‘the moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.’” Grech,
335 F.3d at 1330 (last alteration in original) (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 (1989)).
“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to
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impose liability” against a municipality. City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 823–24, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2436 (1985) (plurality opinion). “A pattern of
similar constitutional violations . . . is ‘ordinarily necessary.’” Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. –, –, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409, 117 S. Ct. 1382,
1391 (1997)). “A single incident would not be so pervasive as to be a custom,”
Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330 n.6, because a custom must be such “a longstanding and
widespread practice [that it] is deemed authorized by the policymaking officials
because they must have known about it but failed to stop it,” Brown v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991). This requirement of proof
“prevents the imposition of liability based upon an isolated incident,” McDowell
v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004), and “‘ensures that a municipality
is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly
constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to
be those of the municipality,’” id. (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at
403–04, 117 S. Ct. at 1388). “[A]n act performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has
not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a
municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as
to have the force of law.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S. Ct. at
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1388. “In the absence of a series of constitutional violations from which
deliberate indifference can be inferred, the plaintiff[] must show that the policy
itself is unconstitutional.” Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226
F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2000).
A single incident of a constitutional violation is insufficient to prove a
policy or custom even when the incident involves several employees of the
municipality. For example, a former detainee alleged in McDowell that a policy or
custom of understaffing at a jail had led to a violation of his civil rights when
employees of the jail had failed to transport him to a hospital in a timely manner,
392 F.3d at 1286–89. The record established that the delay involved several
employees of the jail, including nurses, officers of the sheriff’s office,
communications personnel, intake area personnel, a morning watch commander, a
day watch deputy, a shift supervisor, a field division deputy, a field division
sergeant, and a physician. Id. at 1286–87. The former detainee underwent
emergency surgery on his spinal cord more than twenty-four hours after he had
reported that he could not urinate and had trouble walking. Id. Although the
complaint of the former detainee involved several employees of a municipality and
an extended period of time, we concluded that he had failed to prove a policy or
custom based only on his “isolated incident.” Id. at 1290–91. We determined
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that, “[w]hile McDowell’s case is tragic, he cannot point to another occasion when
the Jail’s understaffing, and resulting inability to transport, contributed to or
exacerbated an inmate’s medical condition. Simply put, this isolated incident,
however unfortunate, does not demonstrate evidence of the County’s ‘persistent’
or ‘widespread’ policy.” Id.
Craig’s proof of a policy or custom rests entirely on a single incident of
alleged unconstitutional activity. Craig presented evidence that several employees
of Georgia Correctional evaluated his single injury. Craig complained that the
actions and omissions of the employees of Georgia Correctional, taken together,
not individually, amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.
Like the former detainee in McDowell, Craig “cannot point to another occasion”
when an alleged policy or custom “contributed to or exacerbated an inmate’s
medical condition.” Id. at 1290. Craig instead relies on “[p]roof of a single
incident of unconstitutional activity,” Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823–24, 105 S. Ct. at
2436, which is “not sufficient to impose liability” against Georgia Correctional, id.
at 824, 105 S. Ct. at 2436.
Craig contends that Georgia Correctional had three “persistent and
widespread practices” that led to his complaint of deliberate indifference. First,
Craig contends that Georgia Correctional had a practice of not referring detainees
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to physicians. Second, Craig contends that Georgia Correctional erroneously
relied on hospital clearance forms instead of independently clearing detainees for
admission into Floyd County Jail and performing their own diagnostic tests.
Third, Craig contends that Georgia Correctional had a practice of using the least
costly means to treat detainees.
Even if we assume that these practices amount to constitutional violations,
Craig did not even present evidence that these practices had been employed by
Georgia Correctional for any other detainees regardless of whether the detainees
had been injured. The only other evidence that Craig presented was testimony
from an expert witness, Dr. Jimmy Graham, who testified that he did not have any
personal knowledge of the Floyd County Jail or Georgia Correctional. Dr.
Graham instead based his expert opinion on his experience providing medical care
at other jails, but that evidence tells us nothing about whether an alleged policy or
custom of Georgia Correctional has led to more than one alleged constitutional
violation.
Craig alleges that Georgia Correctional had a policy or custom of not
referring detainees to physicians and that this policy or custom “was widespread
throughout [Georgia Correctional’s] organization,” but Craig’s only proof of this
alleged policy or custom is that nine medical providers evaluated him sixteen
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times over nine days before referring him to a physician for a computed
tomography scan. Craig concedes that a physician also evaluated him on the
seventh day of his incarceration, but “only because the doctor was visiting the
center that day.” Even if we were to assume that employees of Georgia
Correctional should have referred Craig to a physician sooner, Craig offered no
proof of a policy or custom that was persistent or widespread. Craig has failed to
present any evidence of “a series of constitutional violations from which deliberate
indifference can be inferred.” Cnty. of Wood, 266 F.3d at 531. Instead, Craig
relies on his own experience, which is, at most, “[p]roof of a single incident of
unconstitutional activity.” Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823–24, 105 S. Ct. at 2436. That
proof is “not sufficient to impose liability” under section 1983. Id. at 824, 105 S.
Ct. at 2436.
Craig also alleges that Georgia Correctional had a policy or custom of
relying on hospital clearance forms, which led to a violation of his constitutional
right, but Craig’s only proof of this alleged custom is that, on at least three
occasions, Hatfield treated Craig based on the medical clearance form of the Floyd
County Medical Center. Craig presented no evidence that Georgia Correctional
relied on medical clearances for other detainees. Even if we were to accept the
dubious proposition that reliance on hospital clearance forms can amount to
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deliberate indifference, Craig’s evidence falls short of proving a policy or custom
of constitutional violations so persistent and widespread as to be “deemed
authorized by the policymaking officials because they must have known about it
but failed to stop it.” City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d at 1481. At most, Craig’s
evidence, which involves the evaluation of a single detainee by a single nurse,
would tend to prove “a single incident of unconstitutional activity.” Tuttle, 471
U.S. at 823–24, 105 S. Ct. at 2436.
Craig also alleges that Georgia Correctional had a policy or custom of using
the least costly means of treating patients and that this custom deprived him of his
constitutional right, but even on the highly questionable assumption that the
alleged policy or custom would amount to a constitutional violation, Craig again
relies on his experience alone to prove a policy or custom. Craig alleges that the
medical providers repeatedly gave him pain killers instead of treating him with
more costly means. Although several employees of Georgia Correctional treated
Craig over the course of nine days, those treatments of him are insufficient to
prove that Georgia Correctional had a policy or custom of constitutional violations
against detainees that was “persistent,” Connick, 563 U.S. at –, 131 S. Ct. at 1359,
or “so widespread as to have the force of law,” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at
404, 117 S. Ct. at 1388.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of Georgia Correctional.
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COX, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I do not join the majority opinion because I am not satisfied that this case
involves a “single incident.” I do not have to count “incidents,” however, to
conclude that Craig has failed to offer proof that can support a finding that there
was a custom, policy or practice of deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs. I therefore concur in the result and the judgment.
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