Ezell Gilbert v. United States

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-12513 MAY 19, 2011
____________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D. C. Docket Nos. 99-02054-CV-T-30-TGW,
95-00311-CR-T-3
EZELL GILBERT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 19, 2011)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, CARNES,
BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS, PRYOR, MARTIN, HILL, and BLACK, Circuit
Judges.*
*
Judge Charles R. Wilson recused himself and did not participate in this decision. Judge
James C. Hill elected to participate in it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(1), and Judge Susan H.
Black elected to continue to participate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(2).
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
Ezell Gilbert, a federal prisoner, wants to have an error of law in the
calculation of his sentence corrected based upon a Supreme Court decision
interpreting the sentencing guidelines, even though that decision was issued eleven
years after he was sentenced. Gilbert insists that prisoners have a right to have
errors in the calculation of their sentences corrected no matter how long it has been
since the sentences were imposed. His insistence calls to mind Justice Holmes’
observation that “All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme.” Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355, 28 S.Ct. 529,
531 (1908). But as Holmes also explained in the same thought, “Yet all [rights] in
fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than
those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to
hold their own when a certain point is reached.” Id.The principles of policy that limit the right to be resentenced in accord with
the latest guidelines decisions are those regarding finality of judgment and the
important interests that finality promotes. For reasons we will discuss, the
statutory provisions and the decisions furthering finality of judgment are strong
enough to hold their own against Gilbert’s claimed right to have a long-ago error in
calculating his sentence corrected.
2
In more technical terms, we granted rehearing en banc in this case to decide
whether the savings clause contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) permits a federal
prisoner to challenge his sentence in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition when he cannot
raise that challenge in a § 2255 motion because of the § 2255(h) bar against second
and successive motions. The primary question, in plainer English, is whether a
federal prisoner can use a habeas corpus petition to challenge his sentence. Our
answer is “no,” at least where the sentence the prisoner is attacking does not
exceed the statutory maximum.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts underlying the sentence in this case, and the procedural history,
illuminate the issue and the competing considerations that we consider in deciding
it.
A. Gilbert’s Crime and Criminal History
On October 11, 1995, Ezell Gilbert set off for a day of work, plying his trade
near the Cottage Hills Housing Project, a high crime area of Tampa, Florida. That
day Gilbert was working out of his car, a four-door 1985 Chevrolet Celebrity. He
was a drug dealer, and two officers of the Tampa Police Department, who were
hidden from view, were conducting surveillance of illegal activity in the area.
Around 9:30 a.m. the officers spotted Gilbert as he stopped his car and
3
allowed a man to enter it. Once inside, the man appeared to give money to Gilbert
in exchange for some rocks of crack cocaine. The officers then saw the man exit
the car as he counted the rocks he had bought. A short time later, the officers saw
another man enter Gilbert’s car and engage in another drug deal with him. At that
point, the officers conducting surveillance notified a patrol car that was a few
blocks away and provided the car’s license plate number. The officers in the patrol
car discovered through a computer check that the plate number was assigned to a
different make and model car. By this time Gilbert was on the move, driving in the
direction of the patrol car, which was at a nearby intersection. The officers in the
patrol car trailed Gilbert’s vehicle for about a block before it turned into the
parking lot of a convenience store. When the officers approached Gilbert’s car, he
tried to flee on foot but they stopped him.
The officers discovered that Gilbert had not been alone in the car. In a drug
dealer’s version of “Bring Your Daughter to Work Day,” Gilbert had brought his
five-year-old daughter, Keidra, along with him as he plied his trade. She had been
seated in the back seat of the small car the whole time. She was there as two drug
addicts climbed into the car to buy drugs from Gilbert, and he left her there as he
attempted to run away from the approaching officer.
When police demanded to see the car’s registration, Gilbert reluctantly
4
opened the glove compartment. A clear plastic bag containing what appeared to be
crack cocaine fell out into his hand and into plain view. Shoving it back in the
compartment, Gilbert told police that “nothing” was in the bag. At that point the
police placed him under arrest and started to search the car. As the officers did so,
Gilbert exclaimed, “[T]he car ain’t mine; I don’t know what’s in that car.”
What was in that car, in addition to Gilbert’s young daughter, was the bag
that had fallen from the glove compartment. It contained 67 grams of crack
cocaine, and there was a smaller bag containing 2 grams of powder cocaine in the
glove compartment. And there were also 40 “ring baggies” containing a total of
111 grams of marijuana stashed under the car’s front seat.
The record does not reveal whether that day was the first time that Gilbert
had taken his five-year-old daughter into harm’s way with him as he committed
crimes, but it does reveal that this was not the first time he had committed crimes.
Gilbert’s known criminal history began in 1989, when he was only 19 years old.
In March of 1989 he was arrested on state charges for possession of cocaine and
possession of alcohol by a minor, but those charges were dropped. Two arrests
followed in May 1989 for possession of alcohol by a minor, but the State evidently
did not pursue the charges.
Gilbert soon graduated to more serious crimes. In September 1989, while
5
still 19 years old, he was arrested for striking a police officer who had been
attempting to detain him for battery on a female. It appears from the record that
Gilbert was later convicted for battery and obstructing or opposing officers without
violence in connection with that incident, and he was sentenced to an unspecified
amount of time served. Also in September of 1989, Gilbert was arrested and
charged with two state felonies: possession of cocaine with intent to sell or
distribute and carrying a concealed firearm (a shotgun was found under the car
seat). In January of 1990, at age 20, he was sentenced to three years probation on
both counts, with formal adjudication withheld pending his successful completion
of probation.
Instead of successfully completing probation, however, Gilbert chose to
commit more crimes. As a result, a probation violation notice was filed on March
2, 1990, and a few days later Gilbert was arrested and charged with more state
crimes, including possession of cocaine. He was convicted of the new cocaine
charge on March 29, 1990, and on that date received a sentence of 2 years of
community control.
Seventeen days later, on April 16, 1990, state authorities filed yet another
notice that Gilbert had violated the terms of the probation that had been imposed
on him just three months earlier. On June 6, 1990, he was found to have violated
6
his probation and as a result was adjudicated guilty on the January 1990 crimes of
possession of cocaine with intent to sell or distribute and carrying a concealed
firearm. He was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment for those two crimes. On
or about that same date, Gibert also received the same sentence on the March 7,
1990 charge of possession of cocaine. Those sentences were imposed when
Gilbert was 20.
How much time Gilbert actually served is unclear, but it certainly was not 30
months. By October 24, 1991, only 17 months after he had been sentenced, the 21-
year-old Gilbert was free again, a fact we know because he was arrested on that
date for possession of marijuana. Gilbert was convicted of that marijuana charge
and on January 28, 1992, at age 22, he received yet another sentence of probation,
this time for one year. Less than two months later, yet another probation violation
notice had been filed, and in August of 1993, when Gilbert was 23, he was arrested
yet again, this time on two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or
distribute. The State filed an “order of release” as to both those charges on
September 8, 1993, but in what may have been a related action, on September 14
Gilbert was sentenced to one year imprisonment on the 1991 marijuana charge. He
was then 23 years old.
Gilbert once again did not serve his full time in prison; instead, he was
7
released on January 8, 1994, just four months into his one-year term. And once
again, it was not long before Gilbert was caught committing another crime. That
September, an officer who had stopped him for a traffic violation spotted a
handgun next to Gilbert’s right leg, and a search of his car revealed 22.3 grams of
crack cocaine. For some reason Gilbert, then age 24, was charged only with
carrying a concealed firearm and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On
December 19, 1994, shortly after he had turned 25, Gilbert was sentenced to three
years probation for each crime. And true to form, Gilbert did not successfully
complete his probationary period. Instead, he violated it when he committed the
drug crimes involved in this case on October 11, 1995, about a month before he
turned 26. This time he would not be treated leniently.
The State of Florida charged Gilbert with trafficking in cocaine, possession
of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and child abuse, all in connection
with his October 11, 1995 arrest. The child abuse charges stemmed from Gilbert’s
having his daughter with him while he was dealing drugs. All of those state
charges, however, were nolle prossed in January 1996, in deference to the federal
indictment of Gilbert for that same illegal drug conduct.
B. Gilbert’s Indictment, Conviction, and Sentencing
The indictment of Gilbert in December 1995 included one count of
8
possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and one count of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. The government filed a timely 21 U.S.C. § 851notice of the prior drug convictions that it intended to rely on in seeking an
enhanced statutory penalty range under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). That notice
listed three of Gilbert’s prior convictions: his March 1990 conviction for
possession of cocaine; his June 1990 conviction for possession of cocaine with
intent to sell or distribute; and his January 1992 conviction for possession of
marijuana. Given the quantity of crack cocaine that Gilbert was charged with
possessing with intent to sell, even without any of his prior convictions he faced a
statutory range of ten years to life on that count. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)
(1996) (“In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving . . . 50
grams or more of a mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine base . . . such
person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10
years or more than life.”) With any two of his three prior convictions listed in the
§ 851 notice, however, Gilbert faced a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
(without parole) on that count. See id. (“If any person commits a violation of this
subparagraph . . . after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense
have become final, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment without release . . . .”). On the second count, involving possession
9
with intent to sell marijuana, without any prior convictions Gilbert would have
faced a sentence of not more than five years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (1996).
With one or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense he faced a sentence of
not more than ten years on that count. See id.After Gilbert’s motion to suppress was denied, he pleaded guilty in March of
1996. At the plea hearing, Gilbert admitted possessing with intent to distribute
more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and more than 100 grams of marijuana.
Given the prior drug convictions listed in the § 851 notice, none of which Gilbert
ever denied, his guilty plea should have subjected him to a mandatory life
sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1996). But Gilbert pleaded guilty to the
indictment “as originally charged without the enhancement,” meaning without “the
[§] 851 enhancement.” The government did not object to Gilbert’s statement that
the statutory enhancement would not be applied, and the non-application of it
obviously was part of a plea agreement.1
1
The PSR states, “[t]here is no plea agreement in this case,” but the record shows that
there was an agreement that Gilbert would be sentenced without the statutory enhancement. A
defendant cannot escape the effect of a § 851 notice and the resulting enhanced penalty ranges
set out in § 841(b)(1) without the government’s agreement. The United States Attorneys’
Manual provides that the government may waive or withdraw a § 851 notice as part of a plea
agreement so long as its action is made known to the sentencing judge. See Dep’t of Justice,
United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.300(B) cmt. (1997). Here the fact that the statutory
enhancement notice was being withdrawn obviously was made known to the judge, because the
judge was the first one to note at the plea hearing that Gilbert was pleading guilty without the
enhancement.
10
Gilbert was sentenced on March 25, 1997. Because the government waived
the § 851 notice of prior convictions, his statutory sentencing range was ten years
to life imprisonment on the crack distribution count and not more than five years
on the marijuana distribution count. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (D) (1996).
Gilbert’s base offense level was 32 because his distribution offense involved at
least 50 grams but less than 150 grams of crack. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3),
(c)(4) (1995). There were no adjustments for specific characteristics of the
offense, characteristics of the victim, the defendant’s role in the offense, or
obstruction of justice.
Gilbert was sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1 based on two
convictions: his June 1990 conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell,
which was counted as “a controlled substance offense,” and his December 1994
That part of the colloquy went as follows:
The Court: “I understand that you’re pleading guilty to the indictment as originally
charged without the enhancement; is that correct?”
Defendant: “Yes, sir.”
[Defense Attorney]: “That’s the 851 enhancement.”
The Court: “The 851 enhancement.”
At the sentence hearing, Gilbert’s attorney stated, without objection from the government, that:
“[O]n page one of the sentencing memorandum, they have the mandatory minimum of life,
which is no longer applicable in this case, it’s a ten-year mandatory minimum.” And the
Addendum to the PSR states: “The government has indicated that the enhancement in this case
for a Life sentence was withdrawn at the time of the defendant’s plea.”
11
conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, which was counted as a “crime of
violence.” See id. § 4B1.1 (1995). Although Gilbert’s long criminal record
included other drug charges, some of them had resulted in convictions for
possession instead of distribution while a few had not resulted in convictions.2 As
a result, Gilbert had only one prior conviction that met the guidelines definition of
“a controlled substance offense.” See id. § 4B1.2(b) (defining “controlled
substance offense” to mean a felony that involves the manufacture, import, export,
distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance or possession with intent to do
so).3 That conviction and the one for carrying a concealed weapon were the two
that led to his being treated as a career offender under § 4B1.1. Because he was
treated as a career offender, Gilbert’s offense level was increased from 32 to 37.
See id. § 4B1.1(b)(A) (providing for an offense level of 37 where a career
offender’s current offense provides a maximum penalty of life imprisonment).4
2
The 1990 conviction on the cocaine charge was listed in the § 851 notice, while the 1994
carrying a concealed weapon conviction was not. The reason is that the § 851 requirement
applies only to drug convictions used to enhance the statutory range under § 841(b)(1); it does
not apply to controlled substance or crime of violence convictions used to obtain § 4B1.1
enhancements under the guidelines. See Young v. United States, 936 F.2d 533, 536 (11th Cir.
1991).
3
At the time of Gilbert’s sentencing, the guidelines definition of a “controlled substance
offense” was contained in § 4B1.2(2) (1995). Although that provision has since been
renumbered § 4B1.2(b) (2009), the content has not changed.
4
At the time of Gilbert’s sentencing, the guidelines provision containing the substituted
offense level for a career offender whose current offense carried a statutory maximum penalty of
life imprisonment was contained in § 4B1.1(A) (1995). Although that provision has since been
12
Gilbert was given a two-point downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1(a) (1995), bringing his adjusted offense level to 35.
His criminal history category would have been V,5 but the career offender
provision raised it to VI because of the § 4B1.1 enhancement. See id. § 4B1.1(b).6
The result was a guidelines range of 292 to 365 months.
If the § 4B1.1 career offender enhancement had not applied, Gilbert’s base
offense level would have been 32 minus 2 levels for acceptance of responsibility,
resulting in an adjusted offense level of 30. His criminal history category would
not have been increased from level V, and the guidelines range would have been
151 to 188 months.
Gilbert objected on a number of grounds at sentencing, the only relevant one
for present purposes being his objection to career offender treatment under the
guidelines. He did not dispute that his prior conviction for possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute was a “controlled substance offense,” but he did contend
renumbered § 4B1.1(b)(A) (2009), the content has not changed.
5
Gilbert had a criminal history score subtotal of 7 before two points were added because
he had been on probation at the time he committed these offenses, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d)
(1995), and one point was added because he committed these offenses within two years of his
release from custody in 1994 for possession of marijuana, see id. § 4A1.1(e) (1995).
6
At the time of Gilbert’s sentencing, the guidelines provision mandating that a career
offender’s criminal history category should be VI was contained in § 4B1.1 (1995). Although
that provision has since been renumbered § 4B1.1(b) (2009), the content has not changed.
13
that his prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon was not a “crime of
violence.” In rebutting his objection, the government relied on United States v.
Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 401–02 (11th Cir. 1996), which held that a conviction for
carrying a concealed weapon was a “violent felony” for purposes of § 4B1.4 (the
armed career criminal enhancement applicable in felon-in-possession cases). See
United States v. Oliver, 20 F.3d 415, 418 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Precisely the same
analytical framework applied by the courts in ascertaining the scope of a ‘crime of
violence’ [under the career offender guideline] logically obtains with respect to the
question of what kind of conduct comprises a ‘violent felony’ [under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA)].”).
The district court overruled all of Gilbert’s objections and sentenced him on
March 25, 1997. Acting under the then-mandatory guidelines system, the district
court sentenced Gilbert to 292 months imprisonment on the intent to distribute
crack cocaine count after the judge made it abundantly clear that he would have
preferred to give Gilbert a shorter term of imprisonment. The court also sentenced
Gilbert to 120 months imprisonment on the intent to distribute marijuana count, to
run concurrently.
C. The Post-Sentencing Procedural History
On direct appeal Gilbert raised three issues, one of which was his contention
14
that carrying a concealed weapon was not a “crime of violence,” as defined in §
4B1.2(a), for § 4B1.1 purposes.7 See United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1372
(11th Cir. 1998) (Gilbert I). This Court rejected his argument and concluded that
carrying a concealed weapon “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury,”
within the meaning of § 4B1.2(a)(2). Gilbert I, 138 F.3d at 1372. We denied
Gilbert’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, United States v. Gilbert, 156
F.3d 188 (11th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision), which raised the issue, and
the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Gilbert v. United
States, 526 U.S. 1111, 119 S.Ct. 1754 (1999) (mem.), which also raised it.
In September of 1999 Gilbert filed pro se a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion raising
a number of claims, none of which reiterated the contention he had already made at
sentencing and on appeal that the § 4B1.1 career offender enhancement guideline
should not have been applied in his case. The district court denied his § 2255
motion in July 2003.8 That court also denied Gilbert a certificate of appealability,
7
At the time of Gilbert’s sentencing, the guidelines definition of a “crime of violence”
was contained in § 4B1.2(1) (1995). Although that provision has since been renumbered §
4B1.2(a) (2009), the content has not changed. To avoid confusion, throughout this opinion we
refer to the current enumeration, § 4B1.2(a).
8
Between the filing of the § 2255 motion and the ruling on it, the case was reassigned to a
different judge, and there was some confusion about the pleadings, and Gilbert fired his attorney,
and the new district court judge recused himself, and the third judge referred the matter to a
magistrate judge, and so on. As a result, it took four years for Gilbert’s § 2255 motion to be
decided.
15
and in June 2004 we did too.
There the matter was laid to rest, and there it rested until a series of events
beginning in August 2008 led to its being exhumed. The United States Sentencing
Commission had published Amendment 706 on November 1, 2007, which
provided for a two-level reduction in base offense levels for crack cocaine
offenses. U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 706 (Supp. 2007). That amendment, which
was made retroactively applicable by Amendment 713 on March 3, 2008, allowed
prisoners serving time for crack cocaine offenses to receive a reduction in their
sentences. Id.; U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 713 (Supp. 2008).
On August 26, 2008, the district court on its own initiative issued an order
directing the Federal Public Defender to represent Gilbert in an 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) proceeding before the court to determine whether he was entitled to
have his sentence reduced under Amendment 706. The court also ordered the
Probation Office to file a supplemental report in the case. After hearing from the
Federal Public Defender and the United States Attorney’s Office, the court issued
an order on January 21, 2009, concluding that Gilbert was not entitled to relief
under Amendment 706. The court reasoned that while Amendment 706 did reduce
Gilbert’s base offense level, it did not “have the effect of lowering the applicable
sentencing guideline range because the career offender guideline, not the crack
16
guideline, was applied at sentencing.” The court also briefly addressed and
rejected the possibility of granting Gilbert relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241.
Gilbert then filed through counsel what he styled a “Motion to Reopen and
Amend First 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion” on January 28, 2009. See Gilbert v.
United States, 609 F.3d 1159, 1162 (11th Cir. 2010) (Gilbert II). That motion
asserted the claim that the sentencing court’s application of the § 4B1.1 career
offender guidelines enhancement had been error, which was the same claim that we
had rejected 11 years before in our Gilbert I decision on direct appeal. As Gilbert
pointed out, however, in the intervening years his position that he should not have
been treated as a career offender had been vindicated. The Supreme Court had
issued Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (2008), holding that
the offense of driving under the influence was not a “violent felony” within the
definition contained in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), an ACCA enhancement
provision. 553 U.S. at 148, 128 S.Ct. at 1588. And we had then extrapolated from
that decision to hold in United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir.
2008), that carrying a concealed firearm was not a “crime of violence,” as defined
in § 4B1.2(a) for purposes of the § 4B1.1 career offender enhancement. In Archer,
we concluded that Begay had effectively overruled our holding in Gilbert I. See
17
Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352.9
The problem for Gilbert was that his Archer-based claim clearly was barred
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA’s) second
and successive petitions provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). By styling his pleading as
one to reopen the § 2255 motion that he had filed more than 9 years before, Gilbert
was attempting to avoid that statutory bar. The government opposed that specific
attempt and Gilbert’s motion in general.
Gilbert urged on the district court “two vehicles” by which it could grant
him relief. He argued that the court could construe his motion as one under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and (b)(6) to reopen and revisit its original order denying his
initial 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. In the alternative, Gilbert argued that the court
could treat his motion as one for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on the theory that
the savings clause of § 2255(e), as interpreted in Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236(11th Cir. 1999), permitted it. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
The district court rejected both arguments. It concluded that Gilbert’s 60(b)
argument was foreclosed by the reasoning in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524,
9
This was the series of events the district court had in mind when, denying Gilbert §
3582(c) relief, it commented: “Unfortunately, Mr. Gilbert is in the unenviable position of having
to remain in prison even though under the present interpretation of the law he is no longer
deemed a career offender and has served the time that would be required of him were he
sentenced today.”
18
125 S.Ct. 2641 (2005), which held that Rule 60(b) could not be used to bring a
claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition that would otherwise be prohibited by the §
2244(b) bar against second or successive petitions. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at530–32, 125 S.Ct. at 2647–48. The district court also rejected Gilbert’s argument
based on the savings clause in § 2255(e), concluding that his claim that the
sentencing guidelines had been misapplied when he was sentenced 13 years before
did not meet the requirements of our Wofford decision.
A panel of this Court reversed the district court’s denial of relief. See
Gilbert II, 609 F.3d at 1168. Without addressing the Rule 60(b) issue, the panel
decided that the savings clause contained in § 2255(e) authorized Gilbert to bring
his Begay/Archer claim in a § 2241 petition notwithstanding (or perhaps because
of) the § 2255(h) bar on second or successive motions. Id. at 1165–68. We
granted rehearing en banc, Gilbert v. United States, 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010),
and now affirm the district court’s denial of relief.
II. DISCUSSION
Gilbert’s savings clause contention requires much more discussion than his
Rule 60(b) one, so we will address it first. Before doing that, however, we need to
address some assumptions the parties make that relate to the issues we will be
deciding.
19
A. Assumptions About the Effect of the Error
in Calculating Gilbert’s Sentence
Gilbert’s arguments presume that if Begay and Archer had been on the
books when his case arose he would have received a lighter sentence because the
career offender enhancement, which those decisions rule out for his case, did
increase his mandatory guidelines range. His arguments also presume that if he
were resentenced today, which is the relief he is seeking, he would receive a lighter
sentence with the career offender enhancement out of the picture. We are not so
sure of either proposition.
Gilbert’s sentencing occurred in 1997, eight years before the decision in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), and while the
mandatory guidelines system was still in effect. At sentencing his 1994 conviction
for carrying a concealed weapon was counted as a “crime of violence” as that term
is used in § 4B1.1 and defined in § 4B1.2(a). The result was that Gilbert was
treated as a career offender, which did result in a much higher guidelines range—
292 to 365 months instead of 151 to 188 months.
If Begay had begotten Archer before Gilbert was sentenced and his sentence
was affirmed on direct appeal, his earlier weapons conviction would not have been
treated as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a), and he would not have been
classified as a career offender under § 4B1.1. As a result, Gilbert would have had a
20
lower guidelines range in that pre-Booker, mandatory guidelines era and would
have received a lower sentence if we assume that the government still would have
waived its statutory right to have a mandatory life sentence imposed on him. But
that is a big assumption.
On the possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute charge, Gilbert
faced a mandatory life sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which requires
life imprisonment for anyone who possesses crack cocaine or other drugs with
intent to distribute after being convicted of two or more felony drug offenses. The
government filed a 21 U.S.C. § 851 notice listing three prior felony drug offenses
that Gilbert had been convicted of before he committed the crack cocaine
distribution offense in this case, all of which qualified him for the mandatory life
sentence. See supra at 9–11. Gilbert never denied the existence or validity of any
of the three prior drug convictions listed in the § 851 notice (or any of his other
convictions either). By failing to object to the part of the presentence report listing
his prior convictions, Gilbert admitted them, see United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d
825, 833–34 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th
Cir. 2006), and to this day he has never disputed their validity.
If the Begay decision had been on the books when Gilbert was facing these
charges, the government would have known that the guidelines range he faced was
21
151 to 188 months instead of 292 to 365 months. Given a minimum sentence that
was 141 months lower, the government might well have decided not to waive the §
851 notice and the mandatory life sentence it had an absolute right to insist on
under § 841(b)(1)(A). It is one thing not to insist on a life sentence when the
defendant is facing at least 292 months without the enhancement, and quite another
to forgo it if he might be sentenced to less than half that much time.
While the government did waive its right to insist on a mandatory life
sentence as part of a plea bargain, the record does not establish that it would have
done so if it could not have counted on the career offender enhancement to double
the sentence that Gilbert would receive. It is not as though the government needed
a guilty plea because there was a risk of acquittal or the trial would have taken a
long time. The evidence against Gilbert was overwhelming and the trial would
have been short and simple. Two police officers saw Gilbert as he sold crack
cocaine out of his car. Soon thereafter, when another officer approached him,
Gilbert attempted to flee on foot. The charges against Gilbert were based on crack
cocaine that was found in the glove compartment of his car, and marijuana that was
bagged for sale and found under the seat. Even if Gilbert had wanted to take the
stand and deny it all, there is little or no chance a jury would have believed him
given all of the evidence against him and all of his prior convictions. And the fact
22
that Gilbert had brought his little daughter along with him while dealing drugs
would have squelched any stray feelings of sympathy that the jury might otherwise
have felt for him.
The point is that we cannot say with certainty that if Begay and Archer had
been the law when Gilbert committed these crimes, he would have received a
lesser sentence. Ironically, for the reasons we have just discussed, he might have
received an even harsher one. Rather than speculate, however, we will assume for
present purposes that if those two decisions had been on the books more than a
decade earlier, Gilbert would have received a substantially lighter sentence then
than he did—a sentence in the range of 151 to 188 months instead of 292 months.10
That is, however, only an assumption.
Gilbert also presumes that if he could just get a new sentence hearing, he
will receive a shorter sentence than the one he now has. We have our doubts about
10
Actually, the assumption might extend to an even lower guidelines range. If Gilbert
had not been classified as a career offender under § 4B1.1, he would have been eligible for
resentencing consideration under Amendment 706. The district court held in Gilbert’s 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c) proceeding that he was ineligible for resentencing under that amendment because it
does not apply to career offenders. See United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir.
2008). If it were not for Gilbert’s career offender status, under Amendment 706 the district court
would have recalculated his guidelines range to 130 to 162 months and then had discretion under
§ 3582(c)(2) to impose a new sentence after considering the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). See United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780–81 (11th Cir. 2000). However, the
court also would have had discretion under § 3582(c) to let Gilbert’s original guidelines range
and sentence stand. See id. And there are many reasons it might have decided to do so after
consulting § 3553(a). See infra at 25–26.
23
that. It is true that if Gilbert is resentenced the calculation of his guidelines range
will be free of any Begay/Archer error and he will not be treated as a career
offender. His guidelines range will be lower. There is, however, no guarantee that
his new sentence under the post-Booker advisory guidelines system will be shorter
than 292 months. It could be the same or even longer.
There are a number of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in Gilbert’s case that a
sentencing judge could use to vary upward substantially from the advisory
guidelines range. After all, in a six-year period when he was between the ages of
19 and 25, Gilbert committed and was convicted of five drug felonies and three
weapons felonies. See supra at 6–9. He is an eight-time drug and weapons felon.
And his record includes a number of occasions on which he was shown leniency in
the form of dropped charges, probationary sentences, or early release. Every time
Gilbert received probation, he violated it. Every time charges against him were
dropped or he was released early, he immediately went back to his life of crime.
And, most disturbing of all, when Gilbert committed the serious drug crimes in this
case he took his five-year-old daughter along with him to watch it all. He
endangered his little girl by having her in the back seat of the small car in a high
crime area as crack addicts climbed into the front seat and bought drugs from him.
A sentencing judge could easily decide to vary significantly upwards from
24
the advisory guidelines range in view of: “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1); “the
need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,” §
3553(a)(2)(A); and the need for the sentence “to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct,” § 3553(a)(2)(B). A sentence of 292 months, or even a life
sentence, would not be unreasonable or disproportionate to the crime. See
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002–03, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705–06 (1991)
(plurality opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor & Souter, JJ.)11 (discussing
the great harm that the crime of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute does to
society and holding that a life without parole sentence is not disproportionate even
for a first time offender); United States v. Villareal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1359–60 (11th
Cir. 2010) (upholding as substantively reasonable a 328-month sentence for a
defendant convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana); United States v.
Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1366 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding as substantively
reasonable a sentence of life imprisonment for a defendant convicted of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 500
grams or more of methamphetamine, and aiding and abetting the possession of a
11
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Harmelin is the opinion of the Court on the
proportionality issue. United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1339–40 & n.30 (11th Cir. 2010).
25
firearm by an illegal alien).12
Nonetheless, because it does not affect our reasoning or the result we reach,
we will assume that Gilbert would receive a substantially lower sentence if he were
resentenced today, just as we are assuming that his sentence would have been
lower when he was sentenced in 1997 if the Begay and Archer decisions had been
out at that time.
Begay and Archer were not, however, issued before Gilbert was sentenced.
They were issued eleven years after Gilbert was sentenced, ten years after we
affirmed his sentence on direct appeal, nine years after the Supreme Court denied
certiorari review, and five years after his § 2255 motion was denied. Gilbert’s
sentence had long since become final before those two decisions were issued. The
question we face is whether there is a finality-shattering procedure that allows
Gilbert to have his sentence vacated and entitles him to be resentenced all these
years later.
B. The Savings Clause Issue
Having already unsuccessfully filed a § 2255 motion raising other issues,
12
We realize, of course, that the judge who sentenced Gilbert in 1997 wanted to give him
a shorter sentence. That judge, however, would not be handling any resentencing of Gilbert,
because he was a visiting judge from New York who has not been back to the Middle District of
Florida in at least a decade.
26
Gilbert concedes, and we agree, that he may not raise his Begay/Archer claim
about the misapplication of the career offender guidelines in another § 2255
motion. Section 2255(h) bars second and successive motions except in two narrow
circumstances, neither of which applies here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) & (2).
Gilbert’s primary contention is that his claim is cognizable in a 28 U.S.C. §
2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Section 2255(e), however, provides that
a § 2241 petition “shall not be entertained” if the prisoner has failed to seek or has
already been denied relief by § 2255 motion, as Gilbert has, “unless it also appears
that the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The quoted exception to the § 2255(e)
bar on § 2241 petitions, commonly referred to as the “savings clause,” is the focus
of our issue: Does the savings clause of § 2255(e) apply to claims that the
sentencing guidelines were misapplied in the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines era
in a way that resulted in a substantially longer sentence that does not exceed the
statutory maximum?
1. Some Issues We Need Not Decide
The government asserts, as its first line of defense, that a guidelines
misapplication claim may not be brought in any collateral attack, not even an initial
one. We have no reason to decide that issue because this is not Gilbert’s first
27
collateral attack on his sentence. He filed a § 2255 motion that was denied in
2003.13
The government concedes that a claim that a sentencing error resulted in a
sentence longer than the statutory maximum may be brought in an initial § 2255
motion or, if that remedy is foreclosed by § 2255(h), in a § 2241 habeas petition by
virtue of the savings clause in § 2255(e). We have no reason to decide whether to
write that concession into the law of this circuit because Gilbert was not sentenced
in excess of the statutory maximum for his crimes.14 We have written into our
phrasing of the issue that is before us the qualification that Gilbert’s sentence did
not exceed the statutory maximum. We did that in order to make it clear we are
not deciding that issue, and we do not imply any view about how that issue should
be decided when and if it is presented in some other case.
13
Our decision not to decide whether Gilbert’s Begay/Archer claim could be brought in a
first § 2255 motion renders irrelevant some of the decisions that Gilbert relies on. See, e.g.,
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346–47, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 2305 (1974) (claim that the
prisoner was convicted of an act that the law did not make criminal is cognizable in a first §
2255 motion); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 471 (1962) (claim that the
prisoner had been denied his right under a rule of criminal procedure to make a statement before
being sentenced is not cognizable in a first § 2255 motion). Neither Davis nor Hill had to do
with the savings clause or the type of claims that could be brought through that or any other
procedure after an earlier § 2255 motion had been denied.
14
If that issue were before us, we would not be bound to accept the government’s
concession. See Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 253, 119 S.Ct. 685, 687 (1999)
(“[T]he concession of a point on appeal by respondent is by no means dispositive of a legal
issue.”); United States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859, 866 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that a court is not
required to accept the concession of the government as a party).
28
We do need to explain here what we mean by “statutory maximum
sentence.” For each crime, Congress prescribes a punishment ceiling beyond
which no defendant convicted for committing that particular crime may be
sentenced regardless of the circumstances of the crime, regardless of the
defendant’s history, and regardless of the sentencing guidelines. In Gilbert’s case
§ 841(b)(1)(A) specified a punishment range of ten years to life for the crime of
possession of 50 or more grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute.15 See 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(A)(iii) (1996). Life imprisonment is the statutory
maximum sentence for Gilbert’s crime. See id.That seems obvious, but attempting to bring himself within the scope of the
government’s concession, Gilbert insists that the maximum sentence specified in
the statute providing a punishment range for the crime of conviction is not really
the statutory maximum sentence. Instead, he argues that with a pre-Booker
mandatory guidelines sentence, the top of the guidelines range, as correctly
calculated or recalculated to take into account any changes in case law, is the
maximum statutory sentence. His reasoning is that because Congress authorized
the Sentencing Commission to prescribe the sentencing guidelines and made the
guidelines mandatory, they trump the statutory punishment range or at least
15
An amendment to § 841 effective August 3, 2010 changed “50 grams or more” to “280
grams or more.” See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2010).
29
supersede what would otherwise be the statutory maximum. We disagree. To the
extent of any inconsistency, the guidelines would have to bend to statutorily
prescribed limits, not the other way around. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1 (a)–(b) (stating
that when the statutory maximum is less than the minimum of the applicable
guidelines range, or when the statutory minimum is greater than the maximum of
the applicable guidelines range, the statutory maximum and minimum prevail); see
generally United States v. Shimoda, 334 F.3d 846, 849–50 (9th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that sentencing guidelines were “statutes of
conviction” as that term was used in his plea agreement); United States v. Dawn,
129 F.3d 878, 883 n.8 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Sentencing Guidelines are not laws
in the sense that penal statutes are.”); Mungiovi v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 98 F.3d
982, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A]lthough the [Sentencing] Guidelines have the ‘force
of law,’ they are not statutes.”); Scott v. United States, 997 F.2d 340, 341 (7th Cir.
1993) (concluding that sentencing guidelines are not “laws” within the meaning of
§ 2255).
In any event, Gilbert’s point is beside the point. The government can shape
its concession as it pleases. The government concedes only that a sentence beyond
the maximum punishment statutorily specified for anyone who commits the crime
may be remedied in a § 2255 motion or through the savings clause in a § 2241
30
petition. And that is, once again, an issue we are not deciding.
2. The Text and History of the Clause
We turn now to the issue we are deciding. The text of the savings clause
itself does not indicate that it authorizes the filing of a § 2241 petition to remedy a
miscalculation of the sentencing guidelines that already has been, or may no longer
be, raised in a § 2255 motion. The language of the savings clause provides that it
applies, and a § 2241 petition may be filed, only when “the remedy by [§ 2255]
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the petitioner’s]
detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The history behind the savings clause does not
provide much help with its meaning. See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1238–41; id. at
1241 (“Unfortunately, we have found nothing in the legislative history explaining
why the relevant language was changed or what the new language means.”); In re
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he legislative history is
uninformative . . . . Again, there is no helpful legislative history.”); see generally
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S.Ct. 263 (1952); but see Prost v.
Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he history of the clause
illustrates that Congress’s purpose in enacting it surely wasn’t to ensure that a
prisoner will win relief on a meritorious successive motion, or receive multiple
bites at the apple.”). What does the provision mean? This is one of those times
31
when it is easier to determine something that a provision does not mean, and that
determination is enough to dispose of this case.
3. The Relationship of § 2255(e) and 2255(h)
Assuming that a sentencing guidelines error that resulted in a longer
sentence may be remedied in a collateral proceeding, the reason Gilbert cannot
obtain relief through a § 2255 motion now is that he unsuccessfully filed one
earlier (six years before he filed this motion), and § 2255(h) expressly bars him
from filing another one. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). The existence of the statutory
bar on second and successive motions cannot mean that § 2255 is “inadequate or
ineffective” to test the legality of Gilbert’s detention within the meaning of the
savings clause. If it did, the savings clause would eviscerate the second or
successive motions bar, and prisoners could file an endless stream of § 2255
motions, none of which could be dismissed without a determination of the merits
of the claims they raise.
That simply cannot be, as every circuit to address the matter has pointed out.
See e.g., Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 586 (10th Cir. 2011) (“If the rule were
otherwise—if the § 2255 remedial mechanism could be deemed ‘inadequate or
ineffective’ any time a petitioner is barred from raising a meritorious second or
successive challenge to his conviction—subsection (h) would become a nullity, ‘a
32
meaningless gesture.’”); United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir.
2001) (“The circumstances in which § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective are
narrow, for to construe § 2241 relief much more liberally than § 2255 relief would
defeat the purpose of the restrictions Congress placed on the filing of successive
petitions for collateral relief.”); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 50 (1st Cir.
1999) (“A petition under § 2255 cannot become ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ thus
permitting the use of § 2241, merely because a petitioner cannot meet the AEDPA
‘second or successive’ requirements. Such a result would make Congress’s
AEDPA amendment of § 2255 a meaningless gesture.”); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d
605, 608 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that “when the new limitations [on
second or successive motions] prevent the prisoner from obtaining relief under
2255, his remedy under that section is inadequate and he may turn to 2241,” with
this explanation: “That can’t be right; it would nullify the limitations.”); Triestman
v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 376 (2d Cir. 1997) (“If it were the case that any
prisoner who is prevented from bringing a § 2255 petition could, without more,
establish that § 2255 is ‘inadequate or ineffective’ . . . then Congress would have
accomplished nothing at all in its attempts—through statutes like the AEDPA—to
place limits on federal collateral review.”). We join all of those other circuits in
refusing to interpret the savings clause in a way that would drop the § 2255(h) bar
33
on second and successive motions, defeat its purpose, and render it pointless.
Fundamental canons of statutory construction support the conclusion that the
generally worded and ambiguous savings clause, which was first enacted in 1947,
cannot override the specifically worded and clear statutory bar on second or
successive motions that was enacted as part of AEDPA in 1996. An ambiguous or
general statutory provision enacted at an earlier time must yield to a specific and
clear provision enacted at a later time. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
550–51, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2483 (1974) (“Where there is no clear intention otherwise,
a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of
the priority of enactment.”); Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th
Cir. 2009) (“The canon is that a specific statutory provision trumps a general
one.”); ConArt, Inc. v. Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum, Inc., 504 F.3d 1208, 1210
(11th Cir. 2007) (“We don’t have the authority to excise specific statutory
provisions in favor of more general ones.”); id. (“[W]here two statutory provisions
would otherwise conflict, the earlier enacted one yields to the later one to the
extent necessary to prevent the conflict.”); I.C.C. v. S. Ry. Co., 543 F.2d 534, 539
(5th Cir. 1976) (“Under the usual rules of statutory construction, where there is a
conflict between an earlier statute and a subsequent enactment, the subsequent
enactment governs.”).
34
4. Finality Interests
The critically important nature of the finality interests safeguarded by §
2255(h) also weighs heavily against an interpretation of the savings clause that
would lower the second or successive motions bar and permit guidelines-based
attacks years after the denial of an initial § 2255 motion. Sentencing guidelines
provisions are many and complex, the English language and those who use it are
imperfect, and the case law about what various and sundry guidelines mean and
whether they apply in different factual situations is in a constant state of flux. See,
e.g., United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2008) (describing the case
law surrounding the federal sentencing guidelines as a “precedential labyrinth”);
United States v. Mills, 485 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Guideline drafters have,
in fact, transformed the technique [of cross-referencing] into something of an art:
The Sentencing Guidelines are a veritable maze of interlocking sections and
statutory cross-references.”); United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767, 773 (11th
Cir. 2005) (Carnes, J., concurring) (referring to “the Sentencing Guidelines, some
provisions of which are mind-numbingly complex”).
The single guidelines term that gave rise to this litigation illustrates the
phenomenon. Many are the decisional oars that have churned the law about the
meaning of “crime of violence,” as it appears in § 4B1.1. See, e.g., Johnson v.
35
United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1271–72 (2010); Chambers v. United
States, 555 U.S. 122, ___, 129 S.Ct. 687, 691–93 (2009); Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137, 144–148, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1586–88 (2008); United States v. McGill,
618 F.3d 1273, 1274–79 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rainer, 616 F.3d 1212,
1215–16 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 609 F.3d 1168, 1169–70
(11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Harris, 608 F.3d 1222, 1225–26, 1233 (11th Cir.
2010); United States v. Whitson, 597 F.3d 1218, 1221–23 (11th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1293–96 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lee,
586 F.3d 859, 873–74 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347,
1352 (11th Cir. 2008).16 And there will undoubtedly be more churning to come as
additional decisions are issued refining the term “crime of violence” as it applies
to hundreds of crimes variously defined in the codes of the fifty states and in the
federal criminal code that might be classified as violent. From 1991 to 2004 the §
4B1.1 career offender guideline was applied in 2,906 cases in this circuit alone.
See United States Petition for Rehearing, App. B. It was applied in 16,049 cases
nationwide during that same period. Id.
Of course, the finality-busting effects of permitting prisoners to use the
16
Some of the listed decisions concern the definition of “violent felony” in the ACCA,
but we have held that term is “virtually identical” to “crime of violence” in § 4B1.1, so that
decisions about one apply to the other. See United States v. Harris, 586 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th
Cir. 2009); Oliver, 20 F.3d at 417–18.
36
savings clause as a means of evading the second or successive motions bar would
not be confined to cases in which later case law development showed errors were
made in applying the § 4B1.1 career offender enhancement. The rule Gilbert asks
us to create for his benefit would apply to every type and kind of enhancement, of
which there are scores in the sentencing guidelines. Many of those enhancements
turn on terms whose precise meaning is not manifestly clear even where the terms
are defined in the guidelines. Definitions employ their own terms, the meaning of
which can also be debatable, as the whole saga with the § 4B1.1 term “crime of
violence” and its § 4B1.2(a) definition of that term proves. Consider just a few
examples of enhancement terms which lend themselves to litigation about their
extent and scope, and thereby open up the possibility of clarifying case law years
after sentences are imposed: “physical contact,” “bodily injury,” “substantial
bodily injury,” “permanent or life-threatening bodily injury,” “reckless conduct,”
“custody, care or supervisory control of the defendant,” “uncontrollable
circumstances,” “substantial disruption of public, governmental, or business
functions or services,” “a pattern of activity,” “a substantial part of a fraudulent
scheme,” “personal information,” and “abuse of a position of trust.”17 Those terms,
17
Those terms, in the order listed, appear in at least the following provisions of the
sentencing guidelines: §§ 2A2.4(b)(1)(A); 2A2.2(b)(3); 2A2.3(b)(1)(B); 2A2.1(b)(1)(A);
2A1.4(a)(2)(A); 2A3.1(b)(3)(A); 2A3.5(b)(2)(B); 2A6.1(b)(4)(A); 2A6.2(b)(1)(D);
2B1.1(b)(9)(B); 2B1.1(b)(15)(B); 3B1.3 (2010).
37
and many others like them, form a seed bed from which decisions can sprout,
undermining sentencing calculations that were made years before.
And the rule Gilbert is seeking could not be confined to sentence
miscalculations based on enhancement errors. If the savings clause operates to
allow attacks on old sentences that were lengthened by enhancements that later
decisions have called into doubt, there is no reason it would not also operate to do
the same with any other guidelines calculation error. As a result, no federal
judgment imposing a sentence would be truly final until the sentence was
completely served or the prisoner had gone on to face a different kind of final
judgment. The exception that Gilbert would have us write into § 2255(h) using the
savings clause as our pen would wreak havoc on the finality interests that Congress
worked so hard to protect with the AEDPA provisions.18
As we have pointed out more than once, “one of the principal functions of
AEDPA was to ensure a greater degree of finality for convictions.” Johnson v.
United States, 340 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Jones v. United
States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A fundamental purpose for the
18
Gilbert’s contentions have a little more allure because he is the one who first litigated
what would become known as the Archer issue and the first one to have the issue decided against
him in this circuit. There is, however, no trailblazer exception to the § 2255(h) bar against
second or successive motions or to the inapplicability of the savings clause to guidelines
misapplication claims. There could be no principled basis for a special exception that would
grant relief to the first petitioner to raise an issue but deny it to all who came after him. The rule
that is announced must apply to all.
38
AEDPA was to establish finality in post-conviction proceedings.”). The Supreme
Court has reached the same conclusion we have about what Congress did and why,
observing that “AEDPA’s purpose [is] to further the principles of comity, finality,
and federalism.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 1490
(2000). More particularly, the Supreme Court has explained that “AEDPA’s
central concern [is] that the merits of concluded criminal proceedings not be
revisited in the absence of a strong showing of actual innocence.” Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 1502 (1998). To put it in the
vernacular, the provisions of AEDPA, like § 2255(h), are a big deal for finality of
judgment. Or to put it in topographical terms, as the Supreme Court has, “The
enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered the landscape for federal habeas
corpus petitions.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 1533
(2005).
The statutory bar against second or successive motions is one of the most
important AEDPA safeguards for finality of judgment. As we explained in our en
banc decision in the Gonzalez case, “The central purpose behind the AEDPA was
to ensure greater finality of state and federal court judgments in criminal cases, and
to that end its provisions greatly restrict the filing of second or successive
petitions.” Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir.
39
2004) (en banc) aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S.
524, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (2005); see also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661, 121 S.Ct.
2478, 2481–82 (2001) (“AEDPA greatly restricts the power of federal courts to
award relief to state prisoners who file second or successive habeas corpus
applications.”). If second and successive motions are not “greatly restrict[ed],”
there will be no end to collateral attacks on convictions and sentences, and there
will be no finality of judgment.
That would be a bad thing because “[o]ne of the law’s very objects is the
finality of its judgments.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491, 111 S.Ct. 1454,
1468 (1991). “Neither innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the
final judgment is known.” Id., 111 S.Ct. at 1468. The principle of finality of
judgment “is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without
finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.” Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1074 (1989). The lack of finality also
frustrates rehabilitation. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 n.32, 102 S.Ct.
1558, 1571 n.32 (1982). “Both the individual criminal defendant and society have
an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with
an end to litigation . . . .” Id. at 127, 102 S.Ct. at 1571 (quotation marks and
alteration omitted). Justice Powell, in a passage that the Supreme Court would
40
later quote with approval, pointed out why we must have finality of judgment:
No effective judicial system can afford to concede the continuing
theoretical possibility that there is error in every trial and that every
incarceration is unfounded. At some point the law must convey to
those in custody that a wrong has been committed, that consequent
punishment has been imposed, that one should no longer look back
with the view to resurrecting every imaginable basis for further
litigation . . . .
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2065 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring) (quoted with approval in Engle, 456 U.S. at 122 n.31, 102
S.Ct. at 1571 n.31). And on another occasion the Court explained that “[a]
procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law
in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the
possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of underlying
substantive commands.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1454,
1469 (1991) (quotation marks omitted). The Court warned that “[t]here comes a
point where a procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer
reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for immobility.” Id., 111
S.Ct. at 1469 (quotation marks omitted); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S.
485, 497, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 1739 (1994) (“As we have explained, inroads on the
concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures
and inevitably delay and impair the orderly administration of justice.” (alteration
41
and quotation marks omitted)). We believe that for claims of sentence error, at
least where the statutory maximum was not exceeded, the point where finality
holds its own against error correction is reached not later than the end of the first
round of collateral review.
We decline Gilbert’s invitation to undermine finality of judgment principles
by using § 2255(e) to knock down the second or successive motions bar that
Congress constructed in § 2255(h).
5. Decisions of Other Circuits on This Issue
Every circuit to decide this issue has reached the same conclusion we do:
the savings clause of § 2255(e) does not permit a prisoner to bring in a § 2241
petition a guidelines miscalculation claim that is barred from being presented in a §
2255 motion by the second or successive motions bar of § 2255(h). Not one circuit
has held to the contrary.
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue in Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209 (5th
Cir. 2000), a case in which the petitioner had been sentenced, when the guidelines
were mandatory, to a sentence enhanced by the § 4B1.1 career offender provision.
A later decision unmistakably showed that the career offender provision should
never have been applied to the petitioner and that his mandatory guidelines
sentence should have been shorter. Id. at 211–12. Because Kinder had already
42
unsuccessfully filed a § 2255 motion, he brought his claim under § 2241,
contending that he was entitled to do so by virtue of the savings clause in §
2255(e). Id. He argued that he was “actually innocent of being a § 4B1.1 career
offender,” and that the savings clause route was the only one he could use to get a
remedy for his erroneous sentence. Id. at 212–13. Although it recognized that as a
practical matter the petitioner could not have raised the claim before, see id. at 213,
the Fifth Circuit rejected his attempt to use the savings clause to remedy the
misapplication of the § 4B1.1 career offender guidelines provision to him, see id. at
213–14.
The Fifth Circuit explained in Kinder that the savings clause had not been—
and it should not be—applied to sentencing claims, such as a claim that the §
4B1.1 career offender provision had been erroneously applied. Id. The Court
acknowledged that some courts had held that the savings clause applies where the
petitioner can show actual innocence of the crime of conviction itself. Id. at
213–14 (“Where the petitioner’s case has been viewed as falling within the savings
clause, it was in part because the petitioner arguably was convicted for a
nonexistent offense. Thus, in each case, the petitioner could claim he was actually
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted.”) (footnote and citations
omitted)). But it correctly distinguished actual innocence of the crime of
43
conviction from a claim that the petitioner was “innocent” of some guidelines
enhancement, such as the one for career offenders. See id. at 213 (“Kinder’s
argument that he is actually innocent of being a career offender in light of [a later
decision], however, is not the type of argument that courts have recognized may
warrant review under § 2241.”); accord Padilla v. United States, 416 F.3d 424, 427
(5th Cir. 2005) (“Thus, because Padilla does not attack his conviction and his
claims challenge only the validity of his sentence, Padilla’s § 2241 petition does
not fall within the savings clause of § 2255.”); see also Jeffers v. Chandler, 253
F.3d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that “‘[a]ctual innocence’ for the purposes
of our savings clause test could only be shown if Jeffers could prove that based on
a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision, he was convicted for conduct
that did not constitute a crime.”).
The Sixth Circuit agrees. In United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458 (6th
Cir. 2001), after the three appellants’ pre-Booker sentences had been affirmed, an
intervening decision in a co-conspirator’s case established that the three appellants
had received longer sentences than they should have under the law. Id. at 459–60.
Because they were barred from filing a second or successive motion by § 2255(h)
and by the statute of limitations contained in § 2255(f), the three appellants filed §
2241 motions, seeking relief under the savings clause. Id. at 460. Finding that
44
there had been a change in the law that was applicable to their case, and that it
would be a miscarriage of justice not to give the three the benefit of a correct
sentence, the district court granted their § 2241 petitions and resentenced them to
lesser terms. Id.
The Sixth Circuit reversed that application of the savings clause to
sentencing claims, holding that while the savings clause applies to claims of actual
innocence of the crime of conviction, it does not apply to sentencing claims, at
least not where the sentence being attacked does not exceed the statutory
maximum. Id. at 461–62. In reaching its decision, the Court warned that: “The
circumstances in which § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective are narrow, for to
construe § 2241 relief much more liberally than § 2255 relief would defeat the
purpose of the restrictions Congress placed on the filing of successive petitions for
collateral relief” in the AEDPA. Id. at 461. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
some courts had held the savings clause applies to claims based on intervening
changes in the law establishing a petitioner’s actual innocence of the crime of
conviction, but the Court was firm in its conclusion that the clause was not
available to the three petitioners in that case who were challenging only their
sentences. Id. at 462.
The Third Circuit has reached the same conclusion. See Okereke v.United
45
States, 307 F.3d 117, 120–21 (3d Cir. 2002) (pre-Booker sentence) (“Unlike the
intervening change in law in In re Dorsainvil [119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997)]
that potentially made the crime for which that petitioner was convicted
non-criminal, Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000)] dealt
with sentencing and did not render conspiracy to import heroin, the crime for
which Okereke was convicted, not criminal.”); see also United States v. Kenney,
No. 01-4318, 391 Fed. App’x 169, 172 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (unpublished)
(explaining that under the Okereke decision the savings clause and § 2241 “relief is
available only in ‘rare situations’ where the crime of conviction was later deemed
non-criminal” and “is not available for intervening changes in the sentencing
law”).
While acknowledging that no circuit has embraced her position, one of our
dissenting colleagues views the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Davenport, 147
F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998), as “favorable to Mr. Gilbert,” and suggests that “it may
well be that he would prevail in the Seventh Circuit.” Dissenting Op. of Martin, J.,
at 100. Actually, the Davenport decision establishes just the opposite.
There were two petitioners in that case—Davenport and Nichols.
Davenport, 147 F.3d at 607. Davenport, who had already filed one § 2255 motion
challenging his sentence, filed what the district court construed as a second motion
46
to challenge the enhancement of his sentence under the ACCA. Id. He contended,
among other things, that he should be allowed to file a second or successive motion
under § 2241 challenging his sentence because he was “innocent” of being an
armed career criminal. Id. at 609–10. In rejecting that contention and affirming
the district court’s denial of relief, Judge Posner explained for the Seventh Circuit
why claims that sentencing enhancements had been misapplied could not be
cognizable under the savings clause:
[Davenport] complains that if he is indeed innocent of the “armed
career criminal” offense, it is atrocious that he should have no remedy
against languishing in prison except for an appeal, which is quite
likely to be futile, to executive clemency. But if this complaint were
to be accepted, it would make an arbitrary hole in the Antiterrorism
Act. Davenport is attacking his sentence rather than his conviction,
for the armed career criminal act is a sentence-enhancement statute; he
is “innocent” (if his claim has merit) only in a technical sense. For
him to be able to file successive motions for postconviction relief, but
not someone who had been denied all right to counsel or had a
confession beaten out of him but was unable to argue that he had in
fact been innocent of the crimes of which he had been convicted,
would correspond to no intelligible concept of either legal or
substantive justice. And the privileged status for which Davenport
contends would if accepted allow him to file not just one successive
appeal; a prisoner who was claiming to be innocent could by the logic
of Davenport’s argument file an indefinite number of successive
motions for postconviction relief—could indeed file an identical new
motion every day of his incarceration.
Id. (emphasis added). That explanation, and the decision it accompanied, strongly
supports the conclusion we reach and is at war with the dissenting position.
47
At the same time it rejected Davenport’s claim, the Seventh Circuit ordered
relief granted to Nichols, the petitioner whose case had been consolidated with
Davenport’s. See id. at 607, 610–12. But that part of the Davenport decision is
fully consistent with the denial of relief to Gilbert in the present case. Nichols,
unlike Gilbert and unlike Davenport, “ha[d] a claim that he [was] indeed being
held in prison for a nonexistent crime.” Id. at 610. Nichols had been convicted for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) by possessing a firearm in the commission of a drug
offense. Davenport, 147 F.3d at 607, 610–11. After his conviction became final
and his § 2255 motion had been denied, the Supreme Court held in Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), that it was not a crime under §
924(c) to merely possess a firearm during a drug crime, as Nichols had. See
Davenport, 147 F.3d at 607. The Bailey decision, which the Supreme Court made
retroactively applicable, meant that Nichols had been convicted of a non-existent
offense and was actually innocent of the § 924(c) crime.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned: “A procedure for postconviction relief can
fairly be termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted
defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in
his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.” Id. at 611
(second emphasis added). The savings clause contained in § 2255(e) saved
48
Nichols, who was convicted of a non-existent crime, but it did not save Davenport,
whose sentence had been erroneously enhanced under the ACCA. See id. at 609
(“Davenport is attacking his sentence rather than his conviction, for the armed
career criminal act is a sentence-enhancement statute; he is ‘innocent’ (if his claim
has merit) only in a technical sense.”). So, instead of supporting the dissenters’
position in this case that the savings clause extends to sentencing claims, the
Davenport decision rejects that position.
The Seventh Circuit reiterated the point in Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832(7th Cir. 2002). The appellant in that case was attempting to use the savings clause
to raise a sentencing claim. Refusing to allow it, the Seventh Circuit stressed that
the movant who had been granted relief in Davenport (Nichols) had asserted a
claim of actual innocence of the crime of conviction, unlike Taylor who was
asserting a sentencing claim. Taylor, 314 F.3d at 835–36. The opinion, written by
Judge Easterbrook, is devastating to Gilbert’s position in this case, which our
dissenting colleagues are espousing. This is how he explained the Seventh
Circuit’s position:
What Davenport strongly implied—what we now make explicit—is
that a claim of error in addressing the sort of constitutional theory that
has long been appropriate for collateral review does not render § 2255
“inadequate or ineffective.” [Section 2255(e)] poses the question
whether the remedy is adequate “to test the legality” of the detention.
This implies a focus on procedures rather than outcomes. Judges
49
sometimes err, but this does not show that the procedures are
inadequate; it shows only that people are fallible. How often to rerun
a search for error is a question to which § 2255[(h)] speaks directly,
and the statutory limitation to a single collateral attack, unless the
conditions of § 2255[(h)] (elaborated in 28 U.S.C. § 2244) have been
met, does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. If it did, then
the statute would be internally contradictory. It would not be sensible
to read § 2255[(h)] as making § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” and
thus nullifying itself. This is a subject on which the courts of appeals
are in agreement. Every court that has addressed the matter has held
that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” only when a structural
problem in § 2255 forecloses even one round of effective collateral
review—and then only when as in Davenport the claim being
foreclosed is one of actual innocence. See, e.g., Cradle v. United
States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538–39 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Jones,
226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000); Reyes-Requena v. United
States, 243 F.3d 893, 902–03 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2001); Wofford v. Scott, 177
F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 835–36 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit’s position on the issue before
us could not be clearer: Section 2255(e)’s savings clause does not apply to
sentencing claims.
Contrary to Judge Martin’s characterization of our position, we do not
categorically state that every other circuit has interpreted the savings clause of §
2255(e) to rule out sentencing claims. See Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 99. We
do categorically state, however, as Judge Easterbrook did in Taylor, that every
circuit called upon to actually decide this issue has concluded, as we do, that the
savings clause does not apply to sentencing claims, at least not to those where the
50
sentence imposed was within the statutory maximum. Not one has held to the
contrary.19
The fact that the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have reached the
same conclusion that we do—and without a single dissent from any of their
decisions—puts into context our own dissenters’ florid phrases. Pumping all the
pedals on the prose organ, they charge that by disagreeing with them on this legal
issue, we have not only “neglect[ed] our responsibility,” “shirked our duty,” and
“diminish[ed] the institution of the federal courts,” Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at
19
Judge Martin seeks comfort for her position in Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361(2d Cir. 1997), but that case did not involve a sentencing claim of any type. Instead, it involved
a claim that the movant was actually innocent of the crime for which he had been convicted.
Triestman, 124 F.3d at 363, 380. Because of that, the Second Circuit could not, and did not,
hold that the savings clause extended to a claim that the guidelines had been misapplied.
Moreover, the Triestman opinion warned against the path the dissenters in this case would have
us take, explaining that if any prisoner prevented from bringing a second or successive motion
could resort to the savings clause of § 2255(e) and bring a § 2241 petition, “then Congress would
have accomplished nothing at all in its attempts—through statutes like the AEDPA—to place
limits on federal collateral review.” Id. at 376.
To the extent that the dissenters would have us uproot the “serious constitutional issue”
standard that Triestman applied to claims of actual innocence and transplant it into cases
involving misapplications of the sentencing guidelines, no court of appeals, including the Second
Circuit, has ever done that. Moreover, Triestman’s squishy standard has not been favorably
received by other circuits. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 903 n.28 (5th Cir.
2001) (noting that the Triestman test had been “criticized as too indefinite for practical
enforcement,” agreeing with that criticism, and adding that the test “creates the appearance of a
standardless test with no limiting principles”); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir.
1998) (criticizing the Triestman test as “too indefinite”). We have also justifiably criticized that
standard. See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1243 (“A ‘serious constitutional question’ standard is only
about as definite as a ‘tough issue’ or ‘hard set of circumstances’ standard would be. Moreover,
there is no apparent logical or textual nexus between the crucial ‘inadequate or ineffective’
language of § 2255 and the difficulty of any constitutional issue that may arise because of that
language’s interpretation.”).
51
94–95, but have also “adopt[ed] a posture of judicial impotency that is shocking”
and that “emasculates” this Court, Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 102, 104, and in the
process we have rendered the judicial system “morally bankrupt,” id. at 104, and
converted the United States into a system of “‘gulags,’” id. at 105. That is not our
intent.
Instead, our intent is to apply the law to the facts of the case that is before us.
That is our duty. In carrying it out, we do not question our dissenting colleagues’
sincerity, nor do we charge them with any offense more serious than sincerely
disagreeing with our view about the meaning and effect of § 2255(e)’s savings
clause in these circumstances. The circumstances are that an unquestionably guilty
defendant, who was sentenced to less than the statutory maximum, claims that the
sentencing guidelines were misapplied in his case based on decisions that were
issued years after his sentence became final on direct appeal and years after his §
2255 motion was denied.
6. The Suspension Clause
None of the other circuits that have refused to apply the savings clause of §
2255(e) to sentencing claims have felt that by declining to do so they were
violating the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 9. Nor do we. Our
dissenting colleagues disagree. In her dissenting opinion, Judge Martin relies on
52
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S.Ct. 263 (1952), which involved a
first time motion filed under the relatively new 28 U.S.C. § 2255 procedure. See
Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 94. The Supreme Court in Hayman reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision that § 2255 violated the Suspension Clause. While doing
that, the Court found that the district court had erred in conducting an evidentiary
hearing without the movant being present. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219–24, 72 S.Ct.
at 272–75. The result was a remand for another evidentiary hearing with directions
that the movant be transported to the district in which he was sentenced so that he
could be present at the hearing. Id. at 223–24, 72 S.Ct. at 274–75. Having been
issued 44 years before the AEDPA was even enacted, the Hayman decision did not
have anything to say about any Suspension Clause issue involving § 2255(h).
The Supreme Court did have something to say in Felkner v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 116 S.Ct. 2333 (1996), about the Suspension Clause as it involves the
AEDPA’s clamp down on second or successive petitions in 28 U.S.C. § 2254cases. What the Court decided in Felker is that the increased restrictions that the
statute placed on second or successive habeas petitions do not violate the
Suspension Clause. Felker, 518 U.S. at 654, 663–64, 116 S.Ct. at 2335, 2339–40.
In the course of reaching that decision, the Court explained how the “[t]he writ of
habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite different from that which exists
53
today,” and traced its evolution over two centuries. Id. at 663–64, 116 S.Ct. at
2340. The Court acknowledged that the AEDPA “works substantial changes” to
the authority of federal courts to grant the writ, id. at 654, 116 S.Ct. at 2335, and
“further restricts the availability of relief to habeas petitioners,” but explained that
“judgments about the proper scope of the writ are normally for Congress to make,”
id. at 664, 116 S.Ct. at 2340 (quotation marks omitted). Describing the law
restricting second and successive filings as “a complex and evolving body of
equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory
developments, and judicial decisions,” the Court concluded that “[t]he added
restrictions which the Act places on second or successive petitions are well within
the compass of this evolutionary process, and we hold that they do not amount to a
‘suspension’ of the writ contrary to Article I, § 9.” Id. at 664, 116 S.Ct. at 2340.
Although Felker was a § 2254 case, the Suspension Clause issue is
essentially the same in § 2255 cases. The changes made by the AEDPA
restrictions on second or successive filings are materially identical in both types of
cases, the evolution of the remedy and restrictions on it are materially identical,
and the relationship of the AEDPA changes to that evolution are materially
identical. Central to the dissenters’ position is the premise, which Judge Barkett
articulates, that “§ 2255(e) operates to ‘save’ § 2255 from violating the Suspension
54
Clause of the United States Constitution.” Dissenting Op. of Barkett, J., at 86.
The Felker decision demonstrates why that crucial premise cannot be right. There
is no savings clause in § 2254. Yet the Supreme Court held in Felker that § 2254’s
restrictions on second or successive petitions, which are materially identical to
those in § 2255, do not violate the Suspension Clause. Therefore, the savings
clause cannot be essential to the constitutional operation of the restrictions on the
second or successive filings that are contained in §§ 2254 and 2255. That clause
need not, and should not, be used to punch holes in the operation of the § 2255(h)
restrictions. We conclude, in keeping with the Supreme Court’s decision in Felker,
that the restrictions § 2255(h) places on second or successive motions do not
violate the Suspension Clause.
In their dissenting opinions, Judges Barkett and Martin express their view
that Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008), requires that the
savings clause lift the restrictions on second or successive motions found in §
2255(h) in order to save those restrictions from running afoul of the Suspension
Clause. Dissenting Op. of Barkett, J., at 86; Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 89. In
other words, the purpose and effect of the § 2255(h) restrictions must be lost in
order to save them. We disagree.
The Boumediene case did not involve prisoners who had been convicted and
55
sentenced by a federal district court, whose convictions and sentences had been
reviewed by a federal appeals court, and whose previous collateral challenges to
those convictions and sentences had been decided by a federal district court and
court of appeals. Instead, Boumediene was an executive detention case. The
Supreme Court emphasized the difference, explaining that where the petitioner is
seeking relief from the judgment of a state court in federal court, “it can be
assumed that, in the usual course, a court of record provides defendants with a fair,
adversary proceeding,” and with federal court judgments “the prisoner already has
had a chance to seek review of his conviction in a federal forum through a direct
appeal.” 553 U.S. at 782, 128 S.Ct. at 2268. The problem with the detainee cases
in Boumediene, the Court explained, is that they “fall outside these categories,
however; for here the detention is by executive order.” Id. at 782, 117 S.Ct. at
2268; see also id. at 797, 117 S.Ct. at 2277 (“[F]ew exercises of judicial power are
as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the
authority of the Executive to imprison a person.”).
The question was not whether the detainees in Boumediene were entitled to
multiple rounds of habeas review of their detention but whether they were entitled
to any habeas review at all. It was in that context the Court made the statement
that Judges Barkett and Martin rely on, about each detainee having been denied “a
56
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to the
erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
779, 128 S.Ct. at 2266 (quotation marks omitted). The Suspension Clause decision
about restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus in purely executive detention cases
is Boumediene. The Suspension Clause decision about restrictions on second or
successive petitions and motions attacking judgments of conviction and sentences
is Felker. This case is governed by the Felker decision.
7. The Actual Innocence Exceptions
Section 2255(h) itself contains an actual innocence exception to its bar
against second or successive motions, but it is a narrow one. The exception applies
only when the claim is based on “newly discovered evidence that, if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the
movant guilty of the offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1). As Gilbert concedes, this
exception is of no help to him because his claim is not based on newly discovered
evidence, and he does not pretend to be innocent of the offense for which he was
convicted, possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute.
A number of courts have held that the savings clause permits a claim of
actual innocence of the crime of conviction to be brought in a § 2241 petition when
57
it cannot be brought in a second or successive motion because of § 2255(h). This
decisional law exception is broader than the statutory one contained in §
2255(h)(1), because it encompasses innocence based on changes in the law where
the evidence remains the same. The exception’s primary function to date has been
to permit claims based on Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501(1995), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998). In that
case the Supreme Court construed the term “use” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1995)
more narrowly than many circuits had and held that passive possession of a firearm
during a drug crime was not a violation of the statutory prohibition against “use” of
one. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 150, 116 S.Ct. at 509. The Bailey decision established
that many prisoners had been convicted and were serving sentences for a
nonexistent crime: passively possessing a firearm during a drug crime. The
prisoners who had already unsuccessfully pursued a § 2255 motion when the
Bailey decision was released were barred by § 2255(h) from bringing their claim in
a second or successive motion. In those circumstances courts have held that the
prisoners could use the savings clause to bring their Bailey actual innocence claims
in a § 2241 petition. See, e.g., Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893,
904–06 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000); In re
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607–11 (7th Cir. 1998); Triestman v. United States, 124
58
F.3d 361, 376–80 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir.
1997); see also Kinder, 222 F.3d at 213 (“Recent cases examining the scope of §
2255’s savings clause have done so because of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bailey . . . .”).
Bailey actual innocence claims are what the Wofford panel had in mind
when it stated that the savings clause would permit a prisoner to bring a § 2241
petition claiming that a retroactively applicable, circuit law-busting decision of the
Supreme Court established that he had been convicted of a nonexistent crime. See
Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1242–45. That statement was, however, only dicta because
all Wofford’s claims were sentencing claims, “none of which rest[ed] upon a
circuit law-busting, retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision.” Id. at 1245.
All of them could have been presented at trial or on appeal. Id. The actual
holding of the Wofford decision, which is undoubtedly correct, is simply that the
savings clause does not cover sentence claims that could have been raised in earlier
proceedings. See id. at 1244–45 (expressly noting that there was no need to decide
which sentencing claims, if any, the savings clause does cover).20
20
The Wofford opinion also contains dicta that the savings clause “may conceivably”
apply to some sentencing claims in some circumstances where there was a fundamental defect in
sentencing that the prisoner had no opportunity to have corrected before the end of his § 2255
proceeding. See id. at 1244–45. What the Wofford panel may have had in mind are pure Begay
errors, by which we mean errors in the application of the “violent felony” enhancement, as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), resulting in a higher statutory minimum and maximum
sentence under § 924(e). A Begay error in the classification of a prior conviction that was used
59
The Wofford dicta and the Bailey-related actual innocence decisions of other
circuits are of no use to Gilbert because the crimes for which he was convicted,
possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing marijuana with
intent to distribute, do exist, as thousands of federal prisoners can attest. Unable to
colorably contend that he was convicted of a nonexistent crime, Gilbert asserts
instead that he “is actually innocent of being a career offender, factually and
legally.” Put in its best light, Gilbert’s argument assumes that he was convicted of
the nonexistent offense of being a career offender with only one qualifying
predicate offense. But he wasn’t. As the indictment and the judgment in this case
show, Gilbert was not charged with, nor was he convicted of, being a career
to impose an enhanced sentence under § 924(e) would necessarily have resulted in the defendant
being sentenced to a term of imprisonment that exceeded what would have been the statutory
maximum without the error. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (“Whoever knowingly violates
subsection . . . (g) . . . of section 922 shall be . . . imprisoned not more than 10 years . . . .”), with
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (“In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) . . . and has three
previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense . . . such person shall be . .
. imprisoned not less than fifteen years . . . .”).
For that reason, a pure Begay error would fit within the government’s concession that the
savings clause applies to errors that resulted in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum that
would have applied but for the error. See supra at 29–31. That is not, however, the claimed
error we have in this case. Instead, Gilbert’s claim is that his sentence calculation involved an
Archer error in the application of § 4B1.1 of the guidelines, and that error did not result in a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum. For that reason, we have no occasion to decide
whether what the Wofford dicta conceived might be the law, and what the government concedes
should be the law, is actually the law. What we do decide is that the savings clause does not
apply to sentencing errors that do not push the term of imprisonment beyond the statutory
maximum.
60
offender. A defendant who is convicted and then has the § 4B1.1 career offender
enhancement, or any other guidelines enhancement, applied in the calculation of
his sentence has not been convicted of being guilty of the enhancement. If
guidelines enhancements were crimes, they would have to be charged in the
indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v.
Kenney, No. 01-4318, 391 Fed. App’x 169, 172 n.2 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2010)
(unpublished) (“The career offender enhancement is not a separate offense,
however. If it were, its elements would need to be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.”). Gilbert’s position turns on treating sentences as convictions,
and an argument that depends on calling a duck a donkey is not much of an
argument.
Nor is Gilbert helped by the actual innocence of sentence exception set out
in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514 (1992). That case had nothing
to do with either the savings clause of § 2255(e) or with sentencing guidelines
errors. Instead, it involved a second or successive motion claiming constitutional
error in a jury’s determination that the petitioner should be sentenced to death. In
that pre-AEDPA era, the law barred raising claims in second or successive
petitions unless the petitioner could show cause and prejudice or could establish a
miscarriage of justice. Id. at 338–39, 112 S.Ct. at 2518–19. The miscarriage of
61
justice exception required a showing of actual (factual) innocence. Id., 112 S.Ct. at2518–19. The question in Sawyer was when a constitutional error in capital
sentencing would fit within the actual innocence exception. The answer the
Supreme Court gave is that the actual innocence exception applies to constitutional
errors in capital sentencing only when the constitutional error resulted in the
petitioner becoming statutorily eligible for a death sentence that could not
otherwise have been imposed. Id. at 348–50, 112 S.Ct. at 2523–25.
There are four reasons the Sawyer actual innocence of sentence exception
does not apply in this case. First, the Supreme Court emphasized in Sawyer that its
exception to the rule against second and successive petitions for actual innocence
of the sentence was “a very narrow exception,” id. at 341, 112 S.Ct. at 2520, and
one that applied “in the setting of capital punishment,” id. at 340, 112 S.Ct. at
2519; accord Cade v. Haley, 222 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] showing
of actual innocence can only refer to those state-law requirements that must be
satisfied to impose the death penalty, i.e., the elements of the capital crime and
minimum required aggravating factors.”). The limitation of the Sawyer holding to
death sentence cases is not surprising, because the Supreme Court and this Court
have long recognized that “death is different.” See Monge v. California, 524 U.S.
721, 732, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 2252 (1998) (observing that “the death penalty is unique
62
‘in both its severity and its finality’” (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 (1977))); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411, 106
S.Ct. 2595, 2602 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“[E]xecution is the most irremediable
and unfathomable of penalties; . . . death is different.”); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct 2978, 2991 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long.”); Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(recognizing that “death is different in kind from all other criminal sanctions”);
Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 962 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he jurisprudence of this
circuit has consistently recognized that ‘death is different’ for a variety of reasons
and in a number of contexts . . . .”).
Because death is different, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever
applied the Sawyer actual innocence of the sentence exception except in death
penalty cases, and the better view is that the exception does not apply to non-
capital sentencing errors. See United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th
Cir. 1993) (“[The defendant] does not claim to be actually innocent of the offense
for which he was convicted; he claims only that he should have received a lesser
sentence. A person cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence,
however.”); see also Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740–41 (8th Cir. 1997)
63
(en banc)21 (“Sawyer, in terms, applies only to the sentencing phase of death
cases.”); but see Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d
162, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2000).
The second reason that the Sawyer exception does not apply here is that it
operates where there is constitutional error, not statutory or guidelines
interpretation error. The Supreme Court expressed the holding in these terms:
“We therefore hold that petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that but for constitutional error at his sentencing hearing, no reasonable
juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty under Louisiana law.”
Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 350, 112 S.Ct. at 2525; see also id. at 338, 112 S.Ct. at 2518(“[T]he evidence he argued had been unconstitutionally kept from the jury . . . .”);
id. at 347–48, 112 S.Ct. at 2523 (noting that Sawyer was advancing two claims, a
Brady claim and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
The Sawyer requirement that the claim be a constitutional one is borrowed
from the actual innocence exception to procedural bars for conviction claims in
21
The Eighth Circuit had previously applied the actual innocence exception to a non-
capital sentencing case in Pilchak v. Camper, 935 F.2d 145, 148 (8th Cir. 1991). That holding
was impliedly overruled by Embrey v. Hershberger, as recognized by the Third Circuit in Cristin
v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 422 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[I]n the Eighth Circuit, an early case applying
Sawyer to non-capital sentencings, [Pilchak], was effectively overruled by that Court, en banc,
because ‘Sawyer, in terms, applies only to the sentencing phase of death cases’ and the ‘quarrel
[in that case was] not really with his sentence, it [was] with the fact that he was convicted.’”)
(citation omitted).
64
capital and non-capital cases. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct.
851, 867 (1995) (“The Carrier standard [of actual innocence of a conviction]
requires the habeas petitioner to show that a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.”) (quotation marks
omitted); Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“To successfully plead actual innocence, a petitioner must show that his
conviction resulted from ‘a constitutional violation.’”). Gilbert’s claim that a
sentencing guidelines provision was misapplied to him is not a constitutional
claim. If it were, every guidelines error would be a constitutional violation.
However prescient the Founders may have been in other respects, they did not
think to incorporate the sentencing guidelines into the Constitution or Bill of
Rights. Nor is it plausible to suggest, as Gilbert does, that every error adversely
affecting a defendant’s sentence violates the Due Process Clause. Sometimes a
cigar is just a cigar, and sometimes an error is just an error.
The third reason the Sawyer exception is of no help to Gilbert is that even if
it were not limited to death sentences, and even if it reached non-constitutional
claims, he still would fail to meet the exception’s requirement that but for the
claimed error he would not have been statutorily eligible for the sentence he
received. See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 348–50, 112 S.Ct. at 2523–25; Sibley v.
65
Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1205 (11th Cir. 2004) (the petitioner must prove that “he
is ‘innocent’ of the death penalty because none of the aggravating factors legally
necessary for invocation of the death penalty applied”); Cade, 222 F.3d at 1308(“Sawyer excuses procedural default . . . when a petitioner shows by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would
have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state
law.” (quotation marks omitted)). Because of the drug crimes for which he was
convicted, Gilbert was statutorily eligible for a sentence of between 10 years and
life. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Even if the error in application of the § 4B1.1
career offender enhancement were undone, Gilbert would still be statutorily
eligible for a sentence of 10 years to life. That is yet another reason his case does
not fit within Sawyer’s “very narrow exception.” Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 341, 112
S.Ct. at 2520.
Finally, Gilbert is also outside the scope of the Sawyer exception for a
reason explained by the Seventh Circuit in Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119(7th Cir. 1997). In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that the pre-AEDPA “actual
innocence” exceptions for second or successive motions did not apply to any
sentencing guidelines errors after AEDPA clamped down on those motions. The
petitioner in Hope had argued that AEDPA’s language permitting a second § 2255
66
motion when “no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the
offense,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1), should be interpreted to permit a motion
raising a sentencing guidelines claim. The Hope court rejected that argument,
explaining:
The “actual innocence” exception of the prior law was judge-made,
and so its contours were appropriately judge-fashioned and
permissibly judge-expanded. The exception in the new law is graven
in statutory language that could not be any clearer. When we consider
how limited the review of sentencing traditionally was, how strongly
Congress evidently disfavors successive rounds of collateral attacks
on duly reviewed convictions such as that of [the defendant], how
doubtful it is that any violation of the sentencing guidelines rises to
the level necessary to justify collateral relief even under the standards
of the old law, and the absence of any indication in the legislative
history that “offense” was being used in some special sense different
from its ordinary meaning, we think it highly unlikely that Congress
intended the word to bear a special meaning.
Id. at 120 (citation omitted). In other words, the actual innocence of sentence
exception to the bar against second or successive motions involving sentence
claims, as narrow as it was, did not survive AEDPA.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the Sawyer actual innocence of
sentence exception does not apply to claims that the guidelines were misinterpreted
to produce a higher guidelines range than would otherwise have applied, and that is
as true with pre-Booker sentencing errors as it is with post-Booker ones.
C. The Rule 60(b) Issue
67
Although he does not spend much of his argument effort on the issue,
Gilbert does contend that the district court should have treated his “Motion to
Reopen and Amend First 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion” as one under Rule 60(b)(5) &
(6) and used that procedural vehicle to re-open and vacate his sentence.
The district court declined to do so based on the reasoning of Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (2005). In that decision the Supreme Court held that
state prisoners could not use Rule 60(b) to evade the second or successive petition
bar contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) by either adding a new ground for relief or
attacking the federal court’s previous rejection of a claim on the merits. Id. at 532,
125 S.Ct. at 2648. A Rule 60(b) motion in a § 2254 case that asserts or reasserts
no claim but instead attacks “some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas
proceedings” is not barred. Id. at 532, 125 S.Ct. at 2648.
The petitioner in Gonzalez was a state prisoner trying to get around the §
2244(b) bar, not a federal prisoner like Gilbert trying to get around the § 2255(h)
bar, and the Supreme Court did explicitly limit its consideration to state prisoner
cases. See id. at 529 n.3, 125 S.Ct. at 2646 n.3. Although § 2255(h) is not
identical in all respects to § 2244(b), it is close enough that the relationship
between each of those two provisions and Rule 60(b) should be the same. Both of
those AEDPA provisions further finality interests by severely restricting second or
68
successive collateral attacks on judgments in criminal cases. The operation and
effect of both provisions would be undercut if new claims could be brought or old
claims could be relitigated through the simple expedient of slapping a Rule 60(b)
label on what is in all other respects a second or successive petition or motion.
We join every other circuit that has addressed the issue in concluding that
the standard announced in Gonzalez applies to federal prisoner cases as well. See
United States v. Buenrostro, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1023696, *1 (9th Cir. Mar.
23, 2011) (“Because § 2254 is nearly identical to § 2255 in substance . . . . [w]e
agree with our sister circuits and hold that Gonzalez applies to such motions.”);
accord Curry v. United States, 507 F.3d 603, 604–05 (7th Cir. 2007); Nailor v.
United States (In re Nailor), 487 F.3d 1018, 1021–23 (6th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1147 (10th Cir. 2006). Because Gilbert’s motion sought
to assert or reassert a claim for relief, instead of pointing out a defect in the
integrity of the earlier § 2255 motion proceeding in his case, under Gonzalez his
motion is the equivalent of a second or successive motion and is barred by §
2255(h).
III. CONCLUSION
We do not decide whether a claim that the sentencing guidelines were
misapplied may be brought in a first time § 2255 motion. Nor do we decide if the
69
savings clause in § 2255(e) would permit a prisoner to bring a § 2241 petition
claiming that he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding the statutory
maximum. What we do decide is that the savings clause does not authorize a
federal prisoner to bring in a § 2241 petition a claim, which would otherwise be
barred by § 2255(h), that the sentencing guidelines were misapplied in a way that
resulted in a longer sentence not exceeding the statutory maximum. We also
decide that the reasoning, standards, and tests announced by the Supreme Court in
Gonzalez, which involved a state prisoner case, also apply to federal prisoner
cases.
To put our reasoning and the result in the broader terms with which we
began this opinion, a federal prisoner’s right to have errors in the calculation of his
sentence corrected is not without limits. After a case has passed the stage of a first
§ 2255 proceeding, the right to error correction is narrowly limited by principles of
policy that reside in the finality of judgment neighborhood of the law—principles
which further critically important interests. The restrictions that those finality of
judgment principles place on error correction have been reinforced and
strengthened by AEDPA provisions such as §§ 2255(e) & (h), and they have been
embodied in decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. The result in this case
is that Gilbert must serve the sentence that was imposed on him fourteen years
70
ago.22
AFFIRMED.
22
After the panel issued its decision, it ordered Gilbert released from prison immediately.
That order, which was issued on July 1, 2010, is rescinded immediately on the date this opinion
is issued.
71
DUBINA, Chief Judge, concurring specially:
Even though I initially agreed with the panel opinion, I now concur fully in
the well-reasoned majority opinion and write separately to emphasize that after
studying the issue further and having the benefit of en banc oral argument and
briefing, I am persuaded that Gilbert’s sentencing guidelines claim does not fall
within the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and that the policy principles
regarding finality of judgment weigh most heavily in denying Gilbert the relief he
seeks. As the majority opinion states, “one of the principal functions of AEDPA
was to ensure a greater degree of finality for convictions.” Johnson v. United
States, 340 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2003). In enacting AEDPA, Congress
placed restrictions on the filing of second or successive petitions to ensure the
finality of state and federal court judgments. Because the principle of finality of
judgment is paramount to our criminal justice system, Gilbert’s attempt to
circumvent the second or successive motions bar that Congress placed in § 2255(h)
cannot succeed. Accordingly, I join the majority in affirming the district court’s
judgment denying habeas relief.
72
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring, in which EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
joins:
I fully agree with the court’s explanation of why the district court could not
grant Gilbert the relief he seeks, but feel obliged to make the following
observations.
First, I think it unnecessary to describe in detail the circumstances of
Gilbert’s crime—including the presence of his five-year old daughter—and
Gilbert’s criminal record, and then posit that, if he were to be resentenced, the
district court would likely impose the same sentence he received in the first
instance. None of that is relevant. I therefore do not join in part II.A of the court’s
opinion. The sole issue we are called upon to decide is whether the savings clause
applies in this case. The court holds, correctly, that it does not.
Second, having decided that the savings clause does not apply in this case,
we do not need to imagine the potential consequences of a contrary holding. I
therefore decline to join part II.B.4 of the court’s opinion.
73
PRYOR, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join fully in the opinion of the majority. I write separately to respond to
the dissenting opinions, which argue that this Court is “morally bankrupt,”
Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 104, unless we find some way to read the Suspension
Clause creatively or otherwise find a way to hold that Gilbert is entitled to
immediate release from prison. The dissents are overwrought for several reasons,
but I address only a few flaws that are particularly disturbing.
The dissents argue that Gilbert has not had a “meaningful opportunity” to
challenge the legality of his imprisonment, Dissenting Op. of Barkett, J., at 86;
Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 98 n.3; Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 104, but that
assertion is silly. To the contrary, the federal judiciary knows Ezell Gilbert well:
Gilbert pleaded guilty to drug charges in 1996; he appealed his sentence to this
Court, and we affirmed, United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1998);
he petitioned for rehearing en banc, but his petition was denied, United States v.
Gilbert, 156 F.3d 188 (1998) (unpublished table decision); he petitioned for a writ
of certiorari, but that petition was denied too, Gilbert v. United States, 526 U.S.
1111, 119 S. Ct. 1754 (1999); he filed a motion to vacate his sentence, which the
district court denied; he tried to appeal this denial, but this Court denied him a
certificate of appealability. Gilbert, like all other criminals prosecuted in the
74
United States, has been afforded a panoply of rights, including the right to a jury
trial, the right to counsel, and the rights to appeal and to seek postconviction relief.
Several constitutional provisions grant rights to criminals like Gilbert, but
the Suspension Clause is not one of them. The Supreme Court explained, shortly
after the ratification of the Constitution, that “for the meaning of the term habeas
corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law.” Ex parte Bollman,
4 Cranch. 75, 93–94 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). “[A]t common law a judgment of
conviction rendered by a court of general criminal jurisdiction was conclusive
proof that confinement was legal,” United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211, 72
S. Ct. 263, 268 (1952), a fact curiously omitted in the discussion of Hayman in one
of the dissenting opinions, Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 94. Courts instead
“exercised the writ in light of its most basic purpose, avoiding serious abuses of
power by a government, say a king’s imprisonment of an individual without
referring the matter to a court.” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 322, 116 S. Ct.
1293, 1298 (1996). Early American habeas legislation protected citizens primarily
from arbitrary detention, true to the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. See
Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776-1865, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243,
251–52 (1965). That Act empowered judges to order the release of prisoners
“other than persons Convict or in Execution.” 31 Car. 2, c. 2 § 3. The Judiciary
75
Act of 1789 embodied this limitation. “As limited by the act of 1789, [the writ]
did not extend to cases of imprisonment after conviction, under sentences of
competent tribunals . . . .” Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 101 (1868). For example,
when Tobias Watkins petitioned the Supreme Court for an original writ following
his conviction and imprisonment for what he alleged was a non-existent crime, the
Court denied his petition in the following terms written by Chief Justice John
Marshall: “An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that
judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general
jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous.” Ex parte Watkins, 28
U.S. 193, 203 (1830). Because no one contends that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to sentence Gilbert, he would not be entitled to the writ at common
law.
The arguments of my dissenting colleagues that the Suspension Clause
entitles Gilbert to relief, Dissenting Op. of Barkett, J., at 86; Dissenting Op. of
Martin, J., at 89; Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 105, must presume that the
Suspension Clause underwent a metamorphosis sometime between 1789 and 2011.
The dissents understandably fail to cite any authorities for this position. The
Supreme Court has never held that the Suspension Clause protects anything more
than the writ as understood in 1789. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746,
76
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2248 (2008) (“[T]he Court has said that ‘at the absolute
minimum’ the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified.”) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301,
121 S. Ct. 2271, 2279 (2001)); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301, 121 S. Ct. at 2279 (“[A]t
the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it existed in
1789.’”) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2340
(1996)); Felker, 518 U.S. at 663–64, 116 S. Ct. at 2340 (“But we assume, for
purposes of decision here, that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to
the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.”). Two of our sister
circuits have concluded that the Suspension Clause protects access to the writ only
as it was understood in 1789. The Seventh Circuit held, “What is protected from
suspension is the writ that limits a person’s detention by the executive branch
without trial. There is no constitutional entitlement to post-judgment collateral
review by the inferior federal courts, let alone to unending rounds of such review.”
Benefiel v. Davis, 403 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.); see also
Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 867–68 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d on other
grounds, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The Third Circuit similarly
reasoned, “[I]t would appear that the complete denial of the writ of habeas corpus
to convicted federal prisoners would not violate the Constitution” because in 1789
77
“habeas corpus was not available to persons convicted of crime to test the legality
of their convictions.” United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1953).
Several justices of the Supreme Court have also interpreted the Suspension Clause
to protect nothing more than it protected in 1789. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
844, 128 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas
and Alito, JJ.) (“The nature of the writ of habeas corpus that cannot be suspended
must be defined by the common-law writ that was available at the time of the
founding.”); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384, 97 S. Ct. 1224, 1231 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., concurring, joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.) (“The sweep of
the Suspension Clause must be measured by reference to the intention of the
Framers and their understanding of what the writ of habeas corpus meant at the
time the Constitution was drafted.”); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S.
447, 471 n.9, 62 S. Ct. 676, 686 n.9 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Particularly
in the clauses dealing with the rights of the individual, the Constitution uses words
and phrases borrowed from the common law, meaningless without that
background, and obviously meant to carry their common-law implications. Thus,
we find in it . . . ‘Privilege of the Writ of habeas Corpus’ . . . .”).
Because the Suspension Clause does not provide any rights to prisoners
convicted and sentenced by courts of competent jurisdiction, any relief that
78
Congress chooses to provide to federal prisoners is, to borrow language from a
dissent, a “gift[] that may be bestowed or withheld.” Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at
104 n.2. And if a federal prisoner suffers some “injustice” that Congress has not
empowered the courts to correct, the President can exercise his “Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons.” U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. There is nothing unjust
about federal courts not granting relief when the law does not provide a right to
relief.
But the dissents fret, what is a judge to do when he or she thinks Congress
was not generous enough when it gave prisoners the right to attack collaterally
their sentences? The dissents offer an answer: Help Congress and the President
with their work. After all, the President may be too busy “with the vast
responsibility of exercising executive powers,” Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 95,
and Congress may be too busy with other legislative responsibilities to provide
relief to a recidivist serving a federal sentence that is less than the statutory
maximum. In the light of the growing national debt, releasing Gilbert from prison
may also be a good idea because his incarceration is “very expensive.” Id. at 97.
This grandiose conception of judicial supremacy would threaten the
separation of powers and undermine the rule of law. The fundamental “role of the
courts” is not to “hear [the] cases” presented by prisoners “detained without a
79
remedy” and give them relief not provided by law. Id. at 101. The Supreme Court
has held that, subject to constitutional limitations, rules that govern the application
of the writ “reflect a balancing of objectives (sometimes controversial), which is
normally for Congress to make, but which courts will make when Congress has not
resolved the question.” Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 323, 116 S. Ct. at 1298. We do not
have to balance competing objectives here because Congress has already done so.
Congress chose to deny Gilbert the right to a successive motion to vacate his
sentence. The Supreme Court has held that Congress did not violate the
Suspension Clause when it imposed this same restriction on petitions filed by state
prisoners. Felker, 518 U.S. at 664, 116 S. Ct. at 2340. This undisputed fact should
end our inquiry. The argument that “this court sits at the apex of its power to free
Mr. Gilbert” because “we do not address a state court conviction here,” Dissenting
Op. of Martin, J., at 99, disregards the fact that review of Gilbert’s sentence would
disturb the division of powers between the three branches of the federal
government. We neither “shirk[] our duty” nor “diminish the institution of the
federal courts,” id. at 94, when we respect the separation of powers provided by the
Constitution. We instead provide that respect “to the end it may be a government
of laws and not of men.” Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XXX. See Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 697, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2622 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
80
the origin of this phrase as tied to the separation of powers).
After charging that this Court is “morally bankrupt” unless it can find a way
to do “justice,” Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 104, Judge Hill’s dissent notes that the
law sometimes provides relief to individuals as unsympathetic as Gilbert, such as
the rapist Ernesto Miranda, id. at 105, but Miranda’s victory does not mean that the
judiciary must correct every error committed at trial or sentencing years after the
sentence has become final. The first citation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), by the Supreme Court proves the point. Prisoners sentenced
to death before 1966, whose confessions were obtained in violation of the rule
established in Miranda, were denied relief because, as Justice William Brennan
announced for the Court, Miranda did not apply retroactively. Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 1780 (1966); see also Campbell v.
Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573, 1580 (11th Cir. 1984) (Hill, J.) (refusing to apply
retroactively a new rule regarding racial discrimination in jury selection).
The denial of Gilbert’s petition does not mean that “[t]he Great Writ is
dead,” Dissenting Op. of Hill, J., at 102. Far from it. The federal judiciary
steadfastly has protected the writ and ensured that it remains available to those who
would have been entitled to it in 1789. The Supreme Court recently held that the
writ is available even to enemy combatants who are captured abroad and detained
81
by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723, 128
S. Ct. 2229. The writ is also available to Americans who are captured in a foreign
country and detained at a military base operated by an American-led multinational
coalition, Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008); to illegal aliens
detained in the United States, Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 125 S. Ct. 716(2005); to a former Panamanian dictator who recently unsuccessfully challenged
his extradition to France, Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2009); and
to convicted sex offenders to challenge their civil commitment, Dutil v. Murphy,
550 F.3d 154 (1st Cir. 2008).
Congress generously has made the writ available to prisoners serving
sentences imposed by state and federal courts even though those prisoners would
not have been entitled to the writ in 1789. We have entertained thousands of
petitions from prisoners sentenced by state and federal courts. The primary effect
of the expansion of the availability of the writ beyond the requirements of the
Suspension Clause has not been to vindicate the rights of prisoners, but to
undermine the finality of judgments. A recent empirical study found that, for most
state prisoners, the writ is an illusory remedy as it is granted for only 0.35 percent
of petitions filed by state prisoners not sentenced to death. Nancy J. King &
Joseph L. Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century 79 (2011). In addition,
82
state prisoners sentenced to death, but whose guilt is beyond dispute, routinely use
postconviction remedies provided by Congress and by state governments to litigate
the legality of their sentences for decades following conviction. See, e.g., Harvey
v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2011) (challenge to
sentence imposed in 1986); Kokal v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 623 F.3d 1331 (11th
Cir. 2010) (challenge to sentence imposed in 1984), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
Mar. 21, 2011) (No. 10-9693); Puiatti v. McNeil, 626 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010)
(challenge to sentence imposed in 1984), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Apr. 21,
2011) (No. 10-1302). The writ is also available to challenge not only convictions
and sentences, but humdrum matters such as the failure to grant early release from
prison or the revocation of “good time” credits. See, e.g., Brown v. McFadden,
416 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2005); Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049 (11th Cir.
2003). The above-referenced empirical study found that, of the 2,384 petitions in a
sample of petitions filed by state prisoners not sentenced to death, 17.8 percent of
the petitions did not challenge the constitutionality of a conviction or a sentence,
and none of these petitions were granted. King & Hoffmann, supra, at 154-55.
It is also absurd to assert that we have “render[ed] the savings clause a dead
letter.” Dissenting Op. of Martin, J., at 93. By operation of the savings clause for
motions to vacate, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), Congress has allowed federal prisoners to
83
petition for writs of habeas corpus when a decision of the Supreme Court applies
retroactively and “establishes the petitioner was convicted for a nonexistent
offense” and circuit precedent prevented the petitioner from raising the issue on
direct appeal or in a motion to vacate. Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244
(11th Cir. 1999); see also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998). In
other words, Tobias Watkins’s twenty-first century counterpart would be
statutorily entitled to the writ.
The dissents trivialize the Great Writ when they argue that it must issue to
reverse the sentence of a confessed and recidivist drug dealer, who has already
challenged his conviction and sentence both on direct and collateral review, only
so that he may be resentenced by a court that could impose a sentence even greater
than the one originally imposed. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
275, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2072 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (“There has been a halo
about the ‘Great Writ’ that no one would wish to dim. Yet one must wonder
whether the stretching of its use far beyond any justifiable purpose will not in the
end weaken rather than strengthen the writ’s vitality.”); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 536, 73 S. Ct. 397, 425 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[I]t [is] important to
adhere to procedures which enable courts readily to distinguish a probable
constitutional grievance from a convict’s mere gamble on persuading some
84
indulgent judge to let him out of jail. . . . [We should not] sanction[] progressive
trivialization of the writ until floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions
inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our own.”). The Great Writ
developed in England as a tool to challenge arbitrary detentions by the government
that fortunately have rarely been seen in this country. The Framers enshrined the
protection of the Great Writ in the Constitution out of awareness of the excesses of
British monarchs. An expansive application of the writ is “at odds with the historic
meaning of habeas corpus—to afford relief to those whom society has ‘grievously
wronged.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721
(1993).
Judges cannot mold the Suspension Clause to provide relief whenever they
feel sorry for a prisoner or to comport with their personal sense of justice, and that
fact does not mean that the “Great Writ is dead.” Congress allowed prisoners to
attack collaterally their sentences, but Congress had every right to restrict second
or successive collateral attacks. Gilbert is not entitled to relief.
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BARKETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting, in which HILL, Circuit Judge, joins:
I join in full the dissenting opinions authored by Judge Martin and Judge
Hill. I write separately to emphasize that 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) is referred to as the
“savings” clause for a reason. By permitting a federal prisoner to bring a habeas
corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where § 2255 proves “inadequate or
ineffective remedy to test the legality of his detention,” § 2255(e) operates to
“save” § 2255 from violating the Suspension Clause of the United States
Constitution. In a recent landmark decision comprehensively interpreting the
Suspension Clause, the Supreme Court squarely held that the Suspension Clause is
violated when a prisoner is denied “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that
he is being held pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of relevant
law.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008).1 Thus, where the
application of the statutory bar in § 2255(h) would deny a federal prisoner such a
meaningful opportunity, the savings clause must apply in order to avoid an
1
Judge Pryor’s concurring opinion is premised on the view that the Suspension Clause
applies only where a prisoner has been convicted and sentenced by a court of incompetent
jurisdiction. That view, however, is not one shared by the Supreme Court. See
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (“Even when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally
sound, the Suspension Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant. This is so . . . even where
the prisoner is detained after a criminal trial conducted in full accordance with the protections of
the Bill of Rights.”) (internal citation omitted).
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unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.2 In this case, there can be
no dispute that Gilbert, through no fault of his own, has been denied a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the legality of his detention.3 Because the Constitution
guarantees him that opportunity, I believe that the savings clause authorizes him to
bring his claim in a habeas corpus petition under § 2241.
2
Relying on Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996), the majority suggests that
the statutory bar in § 2255(h) is wholly immune from the Suspension Clause. But the Supreme
Court in Felker held only that the analogous statutory bar in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) did not
violate the Suspension Clause on its face. Nowhere did the Court suggest, let alone hold, that the
statutory bar would not violate the Suspension Clause where its application in a particular case
has the egregious effect of denying a prisoner a meaningful opportunity to challenge the legality
of his detention.
3
Not only does Judge Pryor dispute this point, he deems it “silly.” But every court to
review Gilbert’s meritorious claim, which he has pursued with diligence, has lacked the
authority to correct the legal error he identified. Judicial review of this sort is vacuous and
hollow, not meaningful. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (“Habeas corpus is a collateral
process that exists, in Justice Holmes’ words, to ‘cut through all forms and go to the very tissue
of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and
although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been more
than an empty shell.’”) (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (alterations omitted). The denial of such meaningful review is further compounded
by the now-undisputed fact that Gilbert was sentenced pursuant to an erroneously-calculated
mandatory guideline range that effectively increased his term of imprisonment by at least eight
and a half years. In short, there is nothing silly—and everything solemn—about this case.
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MARTIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting, in which BARKETT and HILL, Circuit
Judges, join:
Ezell Gilbert is now before us asking to be relieved of the consequences of a
mistake we made in his direct appeal in 1998. He told us then that the District
Court was wrong in sentencing him substantially more harshly based on that
court’s decision that carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence. We
rejected his argument, and affirmed his sentence of more than 24 years. United
States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1998). We did this on a record
containing the District Judge’s clear statement that the sentence was longer than he
would have imposed, but for the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at
1372–73. It turns out, of course, that Mr. Gilbert was right and we were wrong.
Carrying a concealed weapon is not a crime of violence. We said so, belatedly for
Mr. Gilbert, in United States v Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008).
The effects of our mistake are quite dire for Mr. Gilbert, insofar as his
properly calculated (and advisory) guideline range would today be 130–162
months, or approximately 11 to 13 years. As I write this, I understand that he has
already served more than fourteen years in prison. And yet the majority opinion
tells Mr. Gilbert that the laws and Constitution of this country offer him no relief.
I differ with the majority insofar as I believe the statute offers Mr. Gilbert a remedy
88
under these extraordinary circumstances. If, on the other hand, I must accept the
majority position that Mr. Gilbert has no statutory remedy, I say that he has been
subjected to a deprivation of liberty of such magnitude that, when paired with no
possible remedy, we are confronted with a constitutional question that we
otherwise need not have reached. That constitutional question is whether the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), as interpreted by the majority, constitutes a
suspension of the writ in violation of Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States
Constitution.1 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266
(2008) (recognizing that it is “uncontroversial . . . that the privilege of habeas
corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is
being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant
law.” (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2281 (2001)));
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a “safety hatch”
available when “[28 U.S.C. §] 2255 proved in a particular case not to be an
adequate substitute for habeas corpus . . . would block any argument that Congress
was suspending the writ”).
1
The commonly referred to Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that
“[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
89
In order to more clearly delineate Mr. Gilbert’s avenue for relief, it is
necessary to review the remedies that are not available to him. First, because Mr.
Gilbert raised the issue of his career offender enhancement in his direct appeal, and
because the Supreme Court had not yet decided Begay v. United States, 553 U.S.
137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), he was barred from arguing in his first and timely-
filed 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition that carrying a concealed weapon is not a crime of
violence. Our precedent clearly forecloses a habeas court from granting collateral
relief on a matter raised on direct appeal. United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340,
1343 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nce a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant
on direct appeal it cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255.”)
(quotation marks omitted).
Second, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), which was enacted into law as a part of
AEDPA, and permits a second or successive petition for relief, is not available to
Mr. Gilbert. In order to be eligible to file a second or successive motion for relief
under § 2255(h), the statute requires a showing either that (1) there is newly
discovered evidence which would, under a strict standard of review, result in no
reasonable fact finder finding him guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that had not been previously available. We have held that the “newly
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discovered evidence” requirement of this statute refers to the offense of conviction,
so it cannot be relied upon by someone, like Mr. Gilbert, who is challenging his
sentence. See, e.g., In re Dean, 341 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003). Also,
Begay, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581, in which the Supreme Court abrogated our
ruling in Mr. Gilbert’s direct appeal, Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, dealt with a
sentencing issue, and therefore has not been deemed to pronounce a new rule of
constitutional law under § 2255(h). This means that Mr. Gilbert, who was never a
career offender in light of Begay’s retroactive application, has no remedy under
§ 2255(h) even though he will be incarcerated for just short of a quarter century
based on a mistaken determination that he was a career offender.
For me, Mr. Gilbert’s particular circumstance is addressed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e), which was already in existence at the time of AEDPA’s passage, and
not expressly repealed by it. It is often referred to as the “savings clause” of
section 2255, and provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that
such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy
by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.
Mr. Gilbert did not fail to apply for relief, but rather has diligently pursued every
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legal avenue available to him, including, of course, direct appeal to this Court.
Since Mr. Gilbert still faces a sentence of more than 24 years despite our admission
that we decided his case wrongly, his efforts can only be said to have been of no
effect. Therefore, proceeding under the plain terms of the statute, as we must,
§ 2255 has been both inadequate and ineffective for Mr. Gilbert. See Connecticut
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992)
(“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says.”) Under the statute, therefore, Mr. Gilbert may turn
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Shortly after Mr. Gilbert was convicted, we mentioned the possibility that
relief for a “fundamental defect” in a sentence might be available by way of this
savings clause. Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1999). In
Wofford, we said “the only sentencing claims that may conceivably be covered by
the savings clause are those based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme Court
decision overturning circuit precedent.” Id. at 1245. Here, the government has
never disputed that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Begay fits this
description of a “retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision overturning
circuit precedent.” Indeed the government could not, because the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Begay caused us to overturn circuit precedent, applied in Mr. Gilbert’s
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direct appeal, that carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence.
The majority today forecloses the possibility we left open back in 1999.
This decision removes any possibility of habeas relief for Mr. Gilbert by equating
the requirements for relief under § 2255(e) with those under § 2255(h) and, in the
process, renders the savings clause a dead letter. So now it is true that there is no
relief in Alabama, Florida or Georgia for any person who is, for some reason,
barred from relief under § 2255 but wrongfully incarcerated on account of a
sentencing error. This is so, even here, where that sentencing error leaves him
incarcerated for a decade or more beyond what is called for by law.2
Requiring a prisoner to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) in
order to be eligible for relief under § 2255(e) (and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 2241)
raises long recognized constitutional concerns. The writ of habeas corpus is now,
2
I recognize that my estimate of the difference between Mr. Gilbert’s current sentence,
and what his sentence would be if he were sentenced today makes the generous assumption that
the District Judge would again impose a sentence at the low end of the guidelines. My estimate
comes from subtracting the number of months which constitute the low end of what we now
know to be Mr. Gilbert’s correct guideline range from the sentence he is serving. The majority’s
estimate is much higher. The majority speculates that Mr. Gilbert could be resentenced to 292
months of incarceration or could get an even longer sentence. In order to get to this number the
majority has second guessed the charging decisions made by the prosecutor with regard to Mr.
Gilbert. This is not permitted by our precedent. United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“The decision as to which crimes and criminals to prosecute is entrusted by the
Constitution not to the judiciary, but to the executive who is charged with seeing that laws are
enforced.”). Although the answer to the question of how long Mr. Gilbert’s sentence would be if
he were resentenced has some bearing on the extent of the deprivation for which he is here
seeking relief, we can all agree that Mr. Gilbert has already been incarcerated for a period well
beyond the top of today’s accurate guideline range for the charge of which he was convicted in
this case.
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and has been since the beginning, fundamental to our system of justice. We know
that the “[p]ower to issue the writ of habeas corpus, the most celebrated writ in the
English law, was granted to the federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789.”
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210, 72 S. Ct. 263, 268 (1952) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). In Hayman, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed the reasons for passage of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and evaluated the then new
statute as well. Id. at 210–22, 72 S. Ct. at 268–74. The Court recognized the role
of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for those cases in which § 2255 cannot provide relief, stating
“[i]n a case where the Section 2255 procedure is shown to be ‘inadequate or
ineffective,’ the Section provides that the habeas corpus remedy [§ 2241] shall
remain open to afford the necessary hearing.” Id. at 223, 72 S. Ct. at 274.
While the Hayman court was addressing § 2255 well before the enactment of
the AEDPA amendments, I am aware of no development in the decades that have
passed since the ruling in Hayman, including the passage of AEDPA, that was
intended to remove the power and responsibility of the judiciary to enforce § 2241.
Our duty to interpret that provision according to its plain terms is especially robust
in light of the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. By today’s decision we
have shirked our duty in that regard, and in doing so we diminish the institution of
the federal courts.
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As if to highlight the harm we do to the court, during oral argument the
government stated that the only possible avenue of recourse for Mr. Gilbert is to
seek clemency from the Executive Branch of government. Surely we neglect our
responsibility when we turn away a wrongfully incarcerated defendant with the
suggestion that he seek relief from the branch already charged with the vast
responsibility of exercising executive powers. The responsibility for assuring
individual justice is ours.
The plain text of § 2255(e) permits Mr. Gilbert to petition for habeas corpus
through a § 2241 motion. My application of the majority’s own analysis leads to
this conclusion as well.
a. Statutory Construction
In construing the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) to deplete the
importance of the previously existing § 2255(e) the majority says: “[f]undamental
canons of statutory construction support the conclusion that the generally worded
and ambiguous savings clause, which was first enacted in 1947, cannot override
the specifically worded and clear statutory bar on second or successive motions
that was enacted as part of AEDPA in 1996.” Maj. Op. at 34. This ignores another
fundamental canon of statutory construction, recognized by the Supreme Court in
the very case relied upon by the majority, which disfavors repeal of a statute by
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implication. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549–50, 94 S. Ct. 2474, 2482
(1974); see Maj. Op. at 34. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly declined to
find that certain AEDPA amendments repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by implication.
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2339 (1996). And yet, the
majority effectively comes to that result here. By grafting the requirements of §
2255(h) onto the savings clause, the majority has stripped that clause of any
independent meaning. Such a result flies in the face of Congress’s deliberate
choice to leave the savings clause intact when passing AEDPA.
b. Finality
In this case of statutory construction, the majority also speaks of the
importance of finality. Surely Mr. Gilbert’s case is a poor vehicle to promote the
idea that finality builds confidence in our criminal justice system. Today we tell a
man he must sit in the penitentiary for years beyond the sentence that a proper
application of the law would have imposed, when we rejected his correct
interpretation of what the law meant back in 1998.
Finality is valued in our system insofar as it promotes certain principles: (1)
to build confidence in the integrity of the judicial system; (2) to minimize
administrative costs and delay; (3) to avoid spoilation of evidence; and (4) to honor
comity. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.11, 99 S. Ct. 2235,
96
2240 n.11 (1979); see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 451–53 (1962). We
advance none of these principles by denying Mr. Gilbert relief here.
First, denying relief does not build confidence in our court system because
this looks to the world like a court refusing to acknowledge or make amends for its
own mistake. Second, to the extent that there have been administrative costs and
delay in considering Mr. Gilbert’s request for relief, they have already been
incurred, and we need only grant him that relief to end his very expensive
incarceration. Third, because the only issue before us is a purely legal one, there is
no evidence we must consult. Thus spoilation is not a concern. And finally, Mr.
Gilbert’s case presents no comity concerns insofar as he seeks to correct a sentence
imposed in federal court and not by the state.
It is worth pausing briefly to properly emphasize that this case does not raise
comity concerns because we are asked to correct a mistake we ourselves made in
federal court. We are not reviewing a state court conviction which would require
our deference. To be sure, AEDPA was designed “to further the principles of
comity, finality, and federalism.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.
Ct. 1479, 1491 (2000); accord Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S. Ct.
1029, 1040 (2003). As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, finality is
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most important when federal courts are reviewing state court as opposed to federal
court convictions:
Finality has special importance in the context of a federal attack on a
state conviction. Reexamination of state convictions on federal
habeas frustrate[s] . . . both the States’ sovereign power to punish
offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.
Our federal system recognizes the independent power of a State to
articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of the
State to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them.
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 480, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). AEDPA codified the previously existing procedures
which placed limits on the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus
to state prisoners. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 337, 123 S. Ct. at 1039–40; Williams v
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 n.11, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1506 n.11 (2000). Giving life to
this limit on federal courts where state convictions are concerned, the abuse of the
writ doctrine was codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which governs those in custody
“pursuant to the judgment of a State Court.” See Williams, 529 U.S. at 380 n.11,
120 S. Ct. at 1495 n.11 (discussing codification of “abuse of the writ doctrine
applied in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S. Ct. 1068 (1963)”).3 Because
3
As the Supreme Court explained in Felker, the “abuse of the writ” doctrine constitutes “a
modified res judicata rule.” 518 U.S. at 664, 116 S. Ct. at 2340. But abuse of the writ principles
do not properly come into play here, because Mr. Gilbert has not abused the writ. To the
contrary, he has never once had “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held
pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 779, 128 S. Ct. at 2266.
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we do not address a state court conviction here, this court sits at the apex of its
power to free Mr. Gilbert from his unlawful detention, and yet we have declined to
do so.
c. Jurisprudence from Other Circuits
The majority states categorically that every other circuit court has refused to
interpret the savings clause (28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)) “in a way that would drop the
§2255(h) bar on second and successive motions.” Maj. Op. at 33–34. Such a
definitive statement is not accurate for two reasons. First, the Second and Seventh
Circuits have left the question open. Second, no other court has addressed this
legal question in the context of facts which carry the magnitude of the impact this
case has on Mr. Gilbert. I do agree with the majority that the Third, Fifth and Sixth
Circuits have either denied the relief which Mr. Gilbert seeks here, or at least
strongly indicated that such relief is not available. For that reason, I will elaborate
only on the opinions from the Second and Seventh Circuits.
In Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997), that court did
wade into the meaning of the “inadequate or ineffective” language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e). The court said:
We have already stated that ‘inadequate or ineffective’ is not limited
merely to the practical considerations suggested by the government,
but refers to something that is still less than the full set of cases in
which § 2255 is either unavailable or unsuccessful. We now hold that
99
that ‘something’ is, at the least, the set of cases in which the petitioner
cannot, for whatever reason, utilize § 2255, and in which the failure to
allow for collateral review would raise serious constitutional
questions.
Id. at 377. In contrast to the majority’s reading of this case, I do not read it to
foreclose relief to Mr. Gilbert. Surely it must be true that keeping someone in the
penitentiary for such a substantial duration beyond what the correct sentence would
call for constitutes a “serious constitutional question.”
I also see the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, as
favorable to Mr. Gilbert. The majority characterizes Davenport as rejecting the
argument that a defendant may assert a § 2241 claim when the procedural hurdles
of § 2255 bar a second or successive motion. Maj. Op. at 33, 46–49. I agree with
this characterization, as far as it goes. But the Davenport court said more. The
court concluded that “[a] federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas
corpus only if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction
of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after
his first 2255 motion.” Id. at 611 (emphasis added). Because Mr. Gilbert has
never had a “reasonable opportunity” to obtain a judicial correction of such a
fundamental defect, it may well be that he would prevail in the Seventh Circuit. At
the very least, I do not think it accurate to say the possibility for relief has been
foreclosed to Mr. Gilbert, or someone similarly situated, whose case arose in the
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Seventh Circuit.
While we may be enriched by the consideration our sister circuits have given
to the substantial legal issues we consider here, the decision in Mr. Gilbert’s case is
ours. For the reasons set out above, I see no impediment imposed by statute or
legal precedent which prevents this court from correcting the mistake we made in
Mr. Gilbert’s case so long ago. To the contrary, I see it as our duty to do so.
Finally, I do not share the majority’s concern that giving Mr. Gilbert relief
under these extraordinary circumstances will open the floodgates to other
prisoners. Indeed if there are others who are wrongfully detained without a
remedy, we should devote the time and incur the expense to hear their cases. What
is the role of the courts, if not this? But what is important today is the
consequence to Mr. Gilbert of our unwillingness to correct our past legal error.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent. I would vacate Mr. Gilbert’s
sentence and remand his case to the District Court so that he can be resentenced
with the law correctly applied.
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HILL, Circuit Judge, dissenting, in which BARKETT, Circuit Judge, joins:
Ezell Gilbert’s sentence was enhanced by eight and one-half years as the
result of his being found by the district court – reluctantly and at the explicit urging
of the government – to be a career offender. Ezell Gilbert is not now, nor has he
ever been, a career offender. The Supreme Court says so.
Today, this court holds that we may not remedy such a sentencing error.
This shocking result – urged by a department of the United States that calls itself,
without a trace of irony, the Department of Justice – and accepted by a court that
emasculates itself by adopting such a rule of judicial impotency – confirms what I
have long feared. The Great Writ is dead in this country.
Gilbert raised his claim of sentencing error to every court he could, every
chance he got. No court correctly resolved his claim until the Supreme Court made
clear that Gilbert’s claim was meritorious – he was never a career offender. Now,
he has come back to us for relief from his illegal confinement. Our response to
him is that he cannot apply for relief under § 2255 because he has done so before,
and, although we erroneously rejected his claim, the statute does not permit such
reapplication. Of course, had he not applied for § 2255 relief, we would be holding
now that he had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to raise it before.
This “Catch-22" approach to sentencing claims is nothing more than a
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judicial “gotcha.” Through our self-imposed limitations, we have found a way to
deny virtually all sentencing claims. We do this, avowedly, in the pursuit of
“finality.” But, in so doing, we cast a pall of unconstitutionality over the otherwise
beneficial provisions of § 2255.
Furthermore, to “seal the deal” on finality, we hold today that even the
savings clause of § 2255 – which appears to permit resort to the Great Writ itself in
circumstances such as these – provides no avenue to relief for Gilbert because
confinement pursuant to sentencing errors such as his does not offend the
Constitution. Rather than acknowledging that Gilbert’s sentence is fundamentally
defective and a miscarriage of justice, we hold that the error resulting in an
additional eight and one-half years of prison time for Gilbert is a mere technicality,
a misapplication of the Guidelines that has no remedy because it is not all that
important. Gilbert’s erroneous enhancement as a career offender – demanded by
the government at the time – is argued to be mere harmless error now that he has
been proven right.1
1
I refer the reader to the original panel opinion, now vacated but originally published at
609 F. 3d 1159, which recounts the district court’s sua sponte effort to remedy the sentencing
error in Gilbert’s case, saying:
Unfortunately, Mr. Gilbert is in the unenviable position of having to remain in
prison even though under the present interpretation of the law he is no longer
deemed a career offender and has served the time that would be required of him
were he sentenced today. Salt to the wound is that he legally challenged the very
issue that now incarcerates him – but lost. It is faint justice to tell him now that
he was right but there is no legal remedy. Having exhausted all avenues know to
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The government even has the temerity to argue that the Sentencing
Guidelines enjoy some sort of legal immunity from claims of error because they
are not statutes at all, but mere policy suggestions. And the majority appears not to
understand that Gilbert’s imprisonment – no matter how his sentence was
calculated – is the act of the Sovereign, who is forbidden by our Constitution to
deprive a citizen of his liberty in violation of the laws of the United States.2
I recognize that without finality there can be no justice. But it is equally true
that, without justice, finality is nothing more than a bureaucratic achievement.
Case closed. Move on to the next. Finality with justice is achieved only when the
imprisoned has had a meaningful opportunity for a reliable judicial determination
of his claim. Gilbert has never had this opportunity.
A judicial system that values finality over justice is morally bankrupt. That
is why Congress provided in § 2255 an avenue to relief in circumstances just such
as these. For this court to hold that it is without the power to provide relief to a
citizen that the Sovereign seeks to confine illegally for eight and one-half years is
to adopt a posture of judicial impotency that is shocking in a country that has
the court, the Court determines that at this time it is unable to provide relief to
Mr. Gilbert under the law as it currently exists.
2
The government’s suggestion, at en banc, that an application for clemency by Gilbert
might be favorably received by the government mocks our constitutional guarantees by implying
that they are gifts that may be bestowed or withheld at the whim of the Sovereign.
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enshrined the Great Writ in its Constitution. Surely, the Great Writ cannot be so
moribund, so shackled by the procedural requirements of rigid gatekeeping, that it
does not afford review of Gilbert’s claim.
Much is made of the “floodgates” that will open should the court exercise its
authority to remedy the mistake made by us in Gilbert’s sentence. The government
hints that there are many others in Gilbert’s position – sitting in prison serving
sentences that were illegally imposed. We used to call such systems “gulags.”
Now, apparently, we call them the United States.
One last thought. The majority spends an enormous amount of time arguing
that Gilbert is not a nice man. Perhaps. But neither, I expect, was Clarence
Gideon, the burglar, or Ernesto Miranda, the rapist. The Supreme Court managed
to ignore this legal irrelevancy in upholding the constitutional principle under
attack in those cases. Would that we could have also.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding. With the addition of these
thoughts of my own, I join in both Judge Barkett’s and Judge Martin’s dissents.
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