United States v. Damien Laron McDaniel

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-12600
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cr-00067-LSC-SGC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAMIEN LARON MCDANIEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(March 11, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Damien McDaniel appeals after pleading guilty to one count of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); one count of carrying and using a firearm during and in
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relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); two
counts of being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1); and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D). Following his guilty plea, McDaniel, on his own
accord, moved at sentencing to withdraw his plea, but the district court denied the
motion. On appeal, McDaniel argues that: (1) the district court erred in denying
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he was denied close assistance of
counsel at sentencing; and (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to assist him with
the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After careful review, we affirm.
First, we find no merit to McDaniel’s claim that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We review the
district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006). There is no abuse
of discretion unless the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea was arbitrary or
unreasonable. Id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it ‘fails to apply the
proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination,
or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.’” United States v. Izquierdo,
448 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006). The defendant-movant carries the burden
on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Id.
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A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before it is accepted by the court
“for any reason or no reason.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(1). However, after the district
court has accepted a defendant’s guilty plea, but before sentencing, the defendant
may withdraw a guilty plea if: (1) the district court rejects the plea agreement, or
(2) “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(A)-(B). In determining whether a defendant has met his
burden to show a “fair and just reason” to withdraw a plea, a district court may
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea, including whether:
(1) close assistance of counsel was available; (2) the plea was knowing and
voluntary; (3) judicial resources would be conserved; and (4) the government
would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea. United
States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471-72 (11th Cir. 1998). A plea is knowing and
voluntary if the defendant: (1) enters his guilty plea free from coercion, (2)
understands the nature of the charges, and (3) understands the consequences of his
plea. United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005).
Furthermore, the good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s
representations in support of the motion to withdraw are issues for the trial court to
decide. Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472. Lastly, there is a strong presumption that
statements made during a plea colloquy are true. United States v. Medlock, 12
F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McDaniel’s oral
motion to withdraw his guilty plea because McDaniel failed to meet his burden of
providing a “fair and just reason” to withdraw his plea. See Fed.R.Crim.P.
11(d)(2)(B). For starters, the district court was entitled to find that McDaniel
received close assistance of counsel. As the record shows, McDaniel signed the
plea agreement, which included various provisions detailing McDaniel’s
knowledge of its contents, and included the 312-month total sentence that the
parties had stipulated to; McDaniel and his counsel signed a certification, which
outlined counsel’s discussions with McDaniel concerning the plea agreement and
procedure; and during the change-of-plea hearing, McDaniel admitted that counsel
had explained the plea agreement, the certification and the charges against him,
that counsel had done a great job, and that he did not have any complaints about
counsel’s representation.
Second, McDaniel has not shown that his plea was not knowing and
voluntary. McDaniel’s statements at the change-of-plea hearing and in the plea
agreement revealed that, among other things, nobody threatened, forced, or
coerced him to plead guilty; that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact
guilty; and that he understood the extent of the punishment he was facing. As
we’ve said, there is a strong presumption that McDaniel’s statements made during
the plea colloquy were true. Moreover, at the hearing, the district court
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summarized the charges to which McDaniel was pleading guilty and the elements
of those charges; and the plea agreement and the court outlined the minimum and
maximum sentences for the charges, the 312-month stipulated total sentence by the
parties, and the rights that McDaniel would give up by pleading guilty.
Third, judicial resources would not be conserved if McDaniel were
permitted to withdraw his plea. Indeed, the district court would have to hold a
trial, which would expend resources rather than conserve them. By the same
token, the government would be prejudiced by having to reconvene and expend
time and resources to try the case. Therefore, based on the totality of the
circumstances and, specifically, the Buckles factors, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying McDaniel’s oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
As for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we decline to consider it
here. We generally do not consider ineffectiveness claims raised on direct appeal
if the district court did not entertain the claim or develop a factual record. United
States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Massaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003). “The preferred means for deciding a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
even if the record contains some indication of deficiencies in counsel’s
performance.” Patterson, 595 F.3d at 1328 (quotation omitted).
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In this appeal, the record is insufficiently developed for us to consider
McDaniel’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Because McDaniel did not
specifically raise the ineffectiveness arguments below, the district court did not
inquire into them. Furthermore, McDaniel’s appeal waiver would not bar this
claim in a collateral proceeding. Therefore, we decline to consider his ineffective
assistance claim on direct appeal.
AFFIRMED.
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