Sharon Creel v. Wachovia Corporation

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ JANUARY 27, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 08-10961 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00248-CV-T-24-MAP
SHARON CREEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WACHOVIA CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 27, 2009)
Before BIRCH and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and STROM,* District Judge.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska,
sitting by designation.
Sharon Creel appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Wachovia Corporation on her suit seeking long-term disability (“LTD”)
benefits under Wachovia’s Long Term Disability Plan (“the Plan”). The district
court concluded that Wachovia’s decision to terminate Creel’s LTD benefits was
neither de novo wrong nor unreasonable. After reviewing the record and the
arguments of the parties, we VACATE the grant of summary judgment and
REMAND for further proceedings in light of this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Wachovia’s LTD Plan
The Plan is an employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq..
Wachovia’s Benefits Committee is designated as the “Plan Administrator” and is
granted sole discretionary authority regarding the interpretation of the terms and
provisions of the Plan. The designated third-party Claims Administrator for the
Plan, Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston (“Liberty Mutual”), makes initial
decisions regarding eligibility for disability benefits.
To receive LTD benefits under the Plan, claimants must prove that they meet
the Plan’s definition of “disabled.” The Plan describes the requisite “proof” of
disability as:
2
(a) the evidence in support of a claim for benefits in a form or format
satisfactory to the Claims Administrator, (b) an attending Physician’s
statement in a form or format satisfactory to the Claims Administrator,
completed and verified by the Participant’s attending Physician, and
(c) provision by the attending Physician of standard diagnosis, chart
notes, lab findings, test results, x-rays and/or other forms of objective
medical evidence that may be required by the Claims Administrator in
support of a claim for benefits. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Plan Administrator, or the Claims Administrator acting as agent of the
Plan Administrator, may also consider other evidence of a claimed
Disability, including, but not limited to evidence discovered or
otherwise developed by the Plan Administrator or the Claims
Administrator.
WAC14611 (emphasis added). What a claimant must prove to establish disability
depends on how long she has received benefits. During the first twenty-four
months of coverage, a claimant would be “disabled” if she shows that she had an
illness or injury that made her unable to perform all of the regular duties of her
then-current job. After twenty-four months, the claimant would be “disabled” only
if she established that her condition made her unable to perform all of the duties
required for any occupation for which her background and experience would make
her qualified. However, if her disability is based on a mental illness, she generally
cannot receive more than twenty-four months of LTD benefits.2 The Plan defines
1
The administrative record in this case was filed as part of Wachovia’s motion for
summary judgment (R1-14) and Bates numbered from WAC0077 to WAC1529. All references
to documents from that record will use the corresponding Bates number.
2
Claimants are exempt from this rule if they are either in a hospital or confined for
treatment for at least fourteen consecutive days after the twenty-four-month period is over.
3
“mental illness” as “mental, nervous, or emotional diseases or disorders of any
type.” WAC1442.
B. Creel’s Benefits Claim
Creel is a fifty-six-year-old former employee of Wachovia. She worked
there until 15 July 2002, when she was hospitalized for an attack in which she
complained of chest pain and partial paralysis of the left side of her body. Creel
subsequently applied for short-term disability (“STD”) benefits under Wachovia’s
STD plan. As part of her application, Creel submitted two attending physician
statements (“APS”) to Liberty Mutual. One APS, from her primary care physician,
Dr. Nancy Sokany, made a primary diagnosis of major depression and a secondary
diagnosis of anxiety and migraine headaches. The other APS was from her
psychiatrist, Dr. Brian Harrelson, who rendered a primary diagnosis of anxiety and
panic disorder. Liberty Mutual approved her application, and she received STD
benefits for twenty-six weeks, the maximum period permitted under Wachovia’s
STD plan.
Creel also submitted a claim for LTD benefits under the Plan, which Liberty
Mutual approved in January 2003. Over the ensuing months, Liberty Mutual
requested medical records from Creel’s then-current physicians to monitor whether
she still had a disability under the Plan. The responses it received largely reiterated
4
the diagnoses from the initial APSs. For example, her primary care physician in
late 2003, Dr. Jorge Gadea, rendered a primary diagnosis of depression and a
secondary diagnosis of migraine headaches.
In January 2005, Liberty Mutual sent a letter to Creel informing her that it
was commencing a review process to determine if she met the Plan’s post-twenty-
four-month definition of disability. The letter noted that Liberty Mutual would
terminate her LTD benefits unless it found that she was unable to perform any
occupation, rather than just her own.3 As part of Liberty Mutual’s inquiry, it
requested that Creel obtain various medical documents from her treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Walter Afield, and her treating neurologist, Dr. Denise Griffin.
Liberty Mutual also asked Creel to keep a headache diary, a blank copy of which it
attached to the letter.4 Creel completed the headache diary, in which she described
experiencing incapacitating migraine headaches on at least eight occasions between
19 January 2005 and 26 February 2005.5 She submitted the diary to Liberty
Mutual along with the other requested documents. Shortly thereafter, Liberty
3
The letter noted that she would continue to receive benefits pending the outcome of the
review, even after the twenty-four-month deadline had elapsed.
4
The diary asks the claimant to document her actions prior to the onset of the headache
and to list the amount of time she was “incapacitated” due to each headache. WAC1140.
5
Some of these migraines lasted more than one day, so she experienced migraines on
eleven days during that period.
5
Mutual sent her entire file to an independent physician consultant (“IPC”), the
board-certified neurologist Dr. Patrick Parcells, for review.
Dr. Parcells examined whether Creel’s file supported her assertion that her
headaches constituted a physical, rather than mental, limitation. He concluded that
her medical record supported the conclusion that her headaches were secondary to
depression and anxiety and that she was not suffering from migraines. Liberty
Mutual specifically asked Dr. Parcells to consider Creel’s headache diary, which it
characterized as reporting headaches on nine out of thirty days.6 He found this
evidence to be of limited value because of the lack of detail regarding each
headache, though he noted that the headaches appeared to result from fluctuations
in the weather. Additionally, he could find no information in her file showing that
her headaches were incapacitating. According to Dr. Parcells, her file overall
indicated that she “ha[d] subjective complaints of frequent headaches that
subjectively are incapacitating;” however, there was no “objective information
available on laboratory testing or by history that these headaches [were] an organic
process.” WAC1135. Accordingly, he found that the record supported the
6
It is unclear how Liberty Mutual reached this total, since there were eight entries and
eleven separate incidents over the thirty-nine days covered in the diary, from 19 January 2005 to
26 February 2005, and no particular thirty-day stretch had nine days of headaches. Creel’s initial
entry, on 19 January 2005, spanned two columns in the diary, so Liberty Mutual possibly
thought that this represented two distinct incidents. Dr. Parcells’s report describes the correct
length and number of reported incidents.
6
conclusion that Creel’s headaches were “not physically incapacitating” and should
not “be considered the main cause for any inability to work.” Id.After receiving Dr. Parcells’s report, Liberty Mutual sent a letter to Creel
notifying her that her benefits were terminated effective 26 April 2005. In taking
this action, Liberty Mutual primarily relied on Dr. Parcells’s conclusions about the
non-physical cause of Creel’s problems and her apparent ability to work. It also
noted that Creel herself, in her last visit with Dr. Griffin, indicated that her
headaches might have been weather-related. Since “the medical information
currently on file [did] not support the presence of a physical condition that would
prevent [Creel] from performing any occupation” for which she was qualified,
Liberty Mutual found her eligible to receive benefits only for the twenty-four
months allotted for mental illnesses. WAC1125.
Creel appealed this termination in October 2005. In support of her appeal,
she submitted additional medical records from Dr. Afield and Dr. Gadea, which
covered the period from February 2004 to September 2005. Creel contended that
these records demonstrated that her migraines were of a disabling nature and
resulted from a physical, rather than mental, impairment, thereby making the
mental illness limitation inapplicable to her claim.7 She also unsuccessfully sought
7
Though these notes contain multiple references to psychological problems, such as
depression, they also repeatedly mention disabling headaches and dementia, both of which were
7
to depose Dr. Parcells as an expert witness. After the district court denied Creel’s
Petition Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27 in April 2006, Liberty
Mutual gave her until 10 June 2006 to submit all documents she wanted it to
consider in the review of her appeal.8
Prior to this deadline, Creel provided additional medical records, including
various documents from Dr. Afield and a 25 May 2006 report from Dr. Robert
Martinez, a neurologist. Dr. Afield’s office notes indicated that Creel might be
experiencing the early stages of dementia and that she had reported suffering from
severe headaches approximately ten days out of every month. He also noted that
she was “totally disabled,” which was due solely to the rapidly-worsening, purely
physical, brain impairment that was causing her dementia. WAC0871, 0873–74.
Dr. Afield also examined a number of prior medical reports regarding Creel, which
he thought supported his conclusion that she suffered from “some rather
substantive cerebral dysfunction.” WAC0867. He also found the conclusions in
attributable to physical causes.
8
Rule 27 permits any “person who desires to perpetuate testimony regarding any matter
that may be cognizable in any court of the United States [to] file a verified petition in the United
States district court in the district of the residence of any expected adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 27(a)(1). Such a motion will be granted “[i]f the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the
testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3).
8
Dr. Parcells’s report to be “totally incorrect” and “wrong” because Dr. Parcells
failed to recognize that Creel’s impairments had a physical cause.9 WAC0868–70.
Dr. Martinez’s 25 May 2006 report evaluated Creel’s claims regarding
migraine headaches. He agreed with the diagnosis of atypical migraine syndrome
— a determination he found to be supported by Creel’s medical records, including
the results from a battery of lab tests, her responses to various medications, and her
own statements.10 As a result, he found that Creel’s headaches caused her to be
incapacitated, and thus unable to work, for ten days a month. Since there was no
discernable pattern for the onset of the migraines, he noted that it was impossible
to predict when they would occur.
Liberty Mutual submitted Creel’s entire file, including these new opinions,
to a second IPC, Dr. Leslie Kurt. According to Dr. Kurt, the evidence in her record
reflected “excellent comprehension and other cognitive functioning” and indicated
that any cognitive problems Creel experienced were episodic and minimal.
WAC0853. Dr. Kurt noted that no doctors appear to have observed Creel
experiencing a migraine, despite their alleged frequency. Though Creel had “a
9
As Wachovia notes, Dr. Afield’s analysis may contain some factual errors, including
the apparent assertion that Dr. Parcells relied on office notes that he likely was not shown.
10
The tests included an echocardiogram, magnetic resonance angiography (MRA), and
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Dr. Martinez also indicated that doctors tried at least ten
different medications to alleviate Creel’s problems.
9
documented history of hypertension, hypothyroidism and asthma,” Dr. Kurt
believed that the records showed that these problems had been stabilized and thus
were not contributing to her cognitive difficulties. Id. Accordingly, she
characterized Creel’s cognitive problems as “most likely secondary to depression
and anxiety” and deemed them to be “of insufficient severity” to necessitate any
work-related restrictions. Id. In reaching this conclusion, she discounted Dr.
Afield’s diagnosis of dementia because no other doctors had made such a diagnosis
and Dr. Afield had performed no memory tests to confirm his suspicions.11 Dr.
Kurt did find that the record supported a diagnosis of recurrent headaches
connected to various muscle spasms. As a psychiatrist, though, she felt unqualified
to determine whether Creel was experiencing migraines and thus suggested that the
file be reviewed by a neurologist to determine if the claim of medical impairment
due to migraines had adequate support.
Based on Dr. Kurt’s recommendation, Liberty Mutual had a third IPC, Dr.
Choon Rim, examine Creel’s file. Dr. Rim, a neurologist, reviewed all of the
documents in her record and spoke with Dr. Martinez over the telephone about
11
She also noted that Dr. Afield expressed the opinion that Creel had fibromyalgia and
chronic fatigue syndrome. Since there was no way to medically verify either condition, she
expressed no opinion on those diagnoses.
10
Creel.12 He thought that her file contained no evidence of a neurological
abnormality that could account for her headaches.13 He noted that Creel “ha[d] a
history of depression, anxiety, panic attacks, and chronic fatigue syndrome” and
that “her symptoms appear[ed] to be clinical manifestations being either
psychogenic or psychiatric in nature.” WAC0846. Though migraine headaches
normally would render a patient unable to work, he concluded that Creel did not
fall within this group since there was no evidence in her file to support an inability
to work.
On 25 July 2006, Liberty Mutual sent Creel a letter notifying her that her
appeal had been denied and that she could ask Wachovia’s Benefits Committee to
review the decision. In the letter, Liberty Mutual quoted extensively from Dr.
Kurt’s and Dr. Rim’s reviews, including their conclusions regarding a lack of any
neurological impairment or physical cause for her cognitive problems. It then
found that, “[b]ased on the totality of information contained in Ms. Creel’s file,” it
12
According to Dr. Rim, in this conversation, Dr. Martinez reiterated his belief that Creel
had atypical migraine headaches but also agreed that anxiety, depression, and medication
overuse could be contributing to the headaches. Dr. Rim attempted to speak with Dr. Afield as
well, but was unsuccessful in contacting him by telephone.
13
Although Dr. Rim found no evidence that Creel had ever suffered a stroke or
experienced partial seizures, he noted that the 15 July 2002 attack for which she was initially
hospitalized might have been a transient ischemic attack (TIA), or mini-stroke. There appeared
to have been no further occurrences of TIAs, however. Dr. Rim also discounted the possibility
of a hemiplegic or complicated migraine since Creel had no family history for what is normally a
very rare disorder. Hemiplegia involves paralysis on one side of the body.
11
had no support for concluding that she either had a physical impairment that
prevented her from performing any occupation for which she was qualified or a
“continued physical disability.” WAC0834. Since she already had received the
maximum benefits permitted for mental illness-based disabilities under the Plan,
she was ineligible to receive further LTD benefits.
Creel timely appealed this decision to Wachovia’s Benefits Committee. As
part of this appeal, she submitted a 7 September 2006 opinion from Dr. Martinez,
which was based on his examination of Creel and her medical records.14 In this
document, Dr. Martinez reiterated his earlier diagnosis of atypical complex
migraine syndrome.15 He indicated that this condition would cause Creel to feel
sharp pains on the right side of her head, to experience weakness on her left
extremities, and to become partially paralyzed. The onset of these attacks would
be unpredictable, and, when they occurred, she would be “totally incapacitated and
in bed” for, on average, ten days a month, with each attack lasting anywhere from
four hours to two days. WAC0814. This combination of problems, he asserted,
made her “100% permanently, totally disabled, unable to work, function, or
14
It appears that Dr. Martinez conducted a new physical examination of Creel in making
this report, but it is unclear if his report utilized any other information he did not have when he
wrote his 25 May 2006 opinion.
15
His earlier opinion identified the condition as “atypical migraine syndrome,” but there
appears to be no difference between the two terms. WAC0896.
12
compete in a competitive job environment.” WAC0817. Creel’s appeal letter
referenced these conclusions and noted that they contradicted the IPCs’ findings
regarding the lack of a neurological cause for her migraines and the unlikelihood of
her experiencing hemiplegic migraines.
Wachovia’s Benefits Committee sent Creel a letter notifying her that it was
affirming the decision to deny further LTD benefits. The Committee referenced
the Plan’s mental illness limitation and disability definition as well as Dr. Rim’s
conclusion that there was no neurological basis for her impairment, though it did
not address Dr. Martinez’s new opinion nor the appeal letter. According to the
Committee, Creel had submitted “[n]o new medical documentation . . . which
would controvert the previous decisions” to deny benefits.16 WAC0783. As a
result, there was an “absence of documentation supporting a physical impairment
that meets the definition of Disability or Disabled under the provisions of the
plan,” which meant the Committee had no basis upon which to reverse the earlier
decisions to deny benefits. Id.16
Liberty Mutual apparently believed that the documents did not affect its earlier
conclusion and that it was unnecessary to send them to an IPC for review. An appeals review
consultant for Liberty Mutual noted in an email to Wachovia that Dr. Martinez’s report was not
based on any new neurological or physical findings but rather on Creel’s self-reported
complaints. Accordingly, the consultant thought that the information contained in that report
was consistent with that already addressed in earlier IPC reviews.
13
In February 2007, Creel filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida seeking LTD benefits from Wachovia under the Plan.
Wachovia moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. See
Creel v. Wachovia Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2008). The court
evaluated Wachovia’s decision under the six-step standard of review for ERISA
benefit denials set forth in Williams v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 373
F.3d 1132, 1137–38 (11th Cir. 2004). See id. at 1305–06. The court found that
Wachovia’s decision to terminate benefits was not de novo wrong in light of the
facts of the case and the language of the Plan. See id. at 1306. In particular, the
court focused on the “proof” standard in the Plan, which it viewed as requiring
Creel to submit evidence in whatever form Wachovia deemed satisfactory and
permitting Wachovia to require objective medical evidence. See id. at 1306–07.
Under Williams, this finding was sufficient to uphold the denial of benefits, and
the court therefore granted Wachovia’s summary judgment motion.17 See id. at
1305–06, 1309. Creel now appeals the district court’s decision.
II. DISCUSSION
17
The court also noted that Wachovia’s decision was reasonable given the language of
the Plan and facts of the case and thus, under Williams, could be affirmed even if it was de novo
wrong. See id. at 1309. In making this determination, the court reviewed the denial under a
heightened arbitrary and capricious standard because Wachovia had operated under a conflict of
interest. See id. According to the court, Wachovia met this heightened standard because the
objective evidence requirement “benefits all of the participants of the Plan by ensuring that only
legitimate claims are paid, thus maximizing assets available to pay legitimate claims.” Id.
14
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment and “apply
the same legal standards that governed the district court’s decision.” Doyle v.
Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2008). As
previously noted, the district court evaluated Wachovia’s decision under the six-
step rubric set forth in Williams. Since the district court rendered that decision,
though, we have recognized that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. , 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008),
implicitly overruled this rubric “to the extent it requires district courts to review
benefit determinations by a conflicted administrator under the heightened
standard.” Doyle, 542 F.3d at 1360. Our previous guidelines were as follows:
(1) Apply the de novo standard to determine whether the claim
administrator’s benefits-denial decision is ‘wrong’ (i.e., the court
disagrees with the administrator’s decision); if it is not, then end the
inquiry and affirm the decision.
(2) If the administrator’s decision in fact is ‘de novo wrong,’ then
determine whether he was vested with discretion in reviewing claims;
if not, end judicial inquiry and reverse the decision.
(3) If the administrator’s decision is ‘de novo wrong’ and he was
vested with discretion in reviewing claims, then determine whether
‘reasonable’ grounds supported it (hence, review his decision under
the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard).
(4) If no reasonable grounds exist, then end the inquiry and reverse
the administrator’s decision; if reasonable grounds do exist, then
determine if he operated under a conflict of interest.
(5) If there is no conflict, then end the inquiry and affirm the decision.
(6) If there is a conflict of interest, then apply heightened arbitrary and
capricious review to the decision to affirm or deny it.
15
White v. Coca-Cola Co., 542 F.3d 848, 853–54 (11th Cir. 2008). Glenn affects
only the sixth step in this scheme by making the existence of a conflict of interest a
factor in the ERISA analysis, rather than the impetus for applying a heightened
arbitrary and capricious standard.18 See id. at 854. Accordingly, if there is a
conflict of interest, a court should treat it as a factor in considering whether an
administrator’s benefits decision was arbitrary and capricious. See Doyle, 542
F.3d at 1360. Additionally, the burden is on the plaintiff to show the existence of
such a conflict, not on the defendant to disprove its influence. See id.Creel raises four issues on appeal. First, she argues that the district court
erred by permitting Wachovia to require objective medical evidence of her
inherently subjective condition. Second, she contends that the court improperly
allowed Wachovia to interpret the admittedly ambiguous mental illness limitation
against her, thereby violating the doctrine of contra proferentem. Third, she asserts
that the district court erred by deeming Wachovia to have given a full and fair
review to the new medical evidence presented to the Benefits Committee. Finally,
18
Of course, Glenn would also affect the wording of the third step because there would
be a single level of arbitrary and capricious review and thus no need to term it a “more
deferential” arbitrary and capricious standard. This “arbitrary and capricious” review would
look at whether the administrator abused his discretion, whereas “heightened arbitrary and
capricious” review would have applied a level of scrutiny in between abuse of discretion and de
novo review. See Williams, 373 F.3d at 1137.
16
she argues that the district court improperly applied the heightened arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. We will address these arguments in turn.
A. Objective Medical Evidence Requirement
Creel contends that the decision to deny her claim based on a lack of
objective medical evidence for her disability was both wrong and unreasonable.
She reads the Plan not as requiring claimants to produce particular forms of
evidence but rather as permitting claims administrators to require certain kinds of
evidence. Under her interpretation, the Plan leaves it up to the administrator to
decide what evidence would be necessary to show a disability in light of the
circumstances of the individual claim. Since her migraines are inherently
subjective, she argues it was inappropriate for Wachovia to require objective
medical evidence of them. Further, she notes that she actually produced objective
evidence regarding her claim, i.e., the various office notes, APSs and opinions
from her physicians acknowledging her condition and the degree to which it
incapacitated her, even if no medical tests specifically rendered the diagnosis of
migraines.19
Wachovia contends that the Plan’s language should be read as mandating
that a claimant produce objective medical evidence to make out a claim. Even if
19
She also deems it unreasonable to discount her headache diary as objective evidence
when the claims administrator, like the doctors, requested that she provide the diary.
17
the Plan contains no such requirement, however, Wachovia asserts that its decision
to require such evidence is reasonable. A contrary interpretation, it argues, would
render the disability claims review process effectively meaningless by always
forcing administrators to accept claimants’ subjective descriptions of their ailments
regardless of the amount of evidence supporting them. Such a situation would
inhibit the administrator’s ability to fulfill its fiduciary duty to compensate only
those who have legitimate disability claims.
Our prior cases provide guidance for assessing the reasonableness of
benefits denials for disabilities that involve some subjective element, such as
migraines, fibromyalgia, and chronic pain syndrome. When a plan requires
claimants to provide objective medical evidence, an administrator’s decision to
deny benefits for failure to produce such evidence is reasonable, even though such
evidence might be impossible to obtain for that condition. See Doyle, 542 F.3d at
1358 (deeming the denial of benefits reasonable for a claimant suffering from
fibromyalgia who failed to put forth the objective evidence explicitly required in
the plan). When the plan has no such requirement, however, we evaluate the
reasonableness of the decision in light of the sufficiency of the claimant’s
subjective evidence and the administrator’s actions. Assuming that the claimant
has put forward ample subjective evidence, we look at what efforts the
18
administrator made to evaluate the veracity of her claim, particularly focusing on
whether the administrator identified any objective evidence that would have proved
the claim and on what kinds of independent physician evaluations it conducted.
Accordingly, an administrator’s decision to deny benefits would be unreasonable if
it failed to identify what objective evidence the claimant could have or should have
produced, even if the administrator submitted the file for peer review. See Oliver
v. Coca-Cola Co., 497 F.3d 1181, 1196–97 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated in part on
other grounds, 506 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding it arbitrary and capricious
to deny benefits for fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome when claim was
supported by ample evidence and administrator never requested any particular kind
of evidence).
Considering Creel’s case in light of our past case law, we find Wachovia’s
decision to deny her claim based on a lack of objective medical evidence both
wrong and unreasonable. We agree with Creel that the Plan does not mandate that
claimants produce any specific kind of such evidence to establish a successful
disability claim. Instead, it provides a disjunctive list of various types of evidence
that the administrator may require a claimant to produce, and includes among these
the catch-all category of “other forms of objective medical evidence.” As Creel
notes, this distinction is important, since it vests the administrator with discretion
19
to determine what forms of evidence would be appropriate for analyzing a
particular disability claim. However, this discretion would be limited to evaluating
whether the claimant provided whatever evidence the administrator deems “may be
required” for that particular disability. Accordingly, depending on the evidence
provided by the claimant, an administrator’s decision to deny a benefits claim
based on a lack of objective evidence without ever identifying what objective
evidence the claimant failed to produce could be unreasonable.
In this case, we find that Creel produced enough subjective and objective
evidence to support her claim of a disability. She provided chart notes, standard
diagnoses, and lab reports from multiple physicians discussing her condition and
identifying it as physically-based, all of which are valid forms of objective proof
under the Plan and can serve as the basis for a diagnosis of migraines.20 These
documents, particularly those from Drs. Afield and Martinez, indicate that she was
suffering from debilitating headaches, which had a neurological basis. In addition,
she provided her headache diary, which was the sole additional evidence requested
20
Neither party has identified any objective tests that would automatically establish the
existence of neurologically-based migraines, and there appears to be no set standard for
establishing the existence of migraines. See Thompson v. Barnhart, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215
(S.D. Ala. 2007) (noting that “neither the SSA nor the federal courts require that an impairment,
including migraines, be proven through objective clinical findings”); Ortega v. Chater, 933 F.
Supp. 1071, 1075 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (finding that, because “present-day laboratory tests cannot
prove the existence of migraine headaches,” objective clinical evidence of the symptoms of
migraines can suffice as proof).
20
by the claims administrator.21 This diary both corroborated the diagnosis of
migraines and chronicled the degree to which they incapacitated her at regular
albeit unpredictable, intervals.
Against this evidentiary backdrop, we find that Wachovia took insufficient
action to justify the denial of benefits. Creel complied with its request for the
headache diary. It identified no other forms of objective evidence which it would
deem necessary for establishing the existence of a physically-based migraine.
Additionally, though Creel’s file had been reviewed by three IPCs, it never
requested an IME to test the veracity of her complaints, even though the Plan
permitted it to do so. Given that at least two of the IPCs, Drs. Kurt and Parcells,
recognized that the evidence showed that she was suffering from headaches that
were subjectively incapacitating, such an action would have been warranted. An
IME might have provided a better foundation for analyzing her claim than the
paper-based IPC reviews. Wachovia failed to make such a request and instead
imposed an unreasonable objective evidence requirement. It is unreasonable for
the claims administrator to deny the claim for a lack of objective medical evidence
21
Though the diary incorporates subjective observations, we find it to be “objective
proof” since it is a form of evidence commonly used by physicians treating potential migraine
patients, similar to how other doctors utilize x-rays or test results. It is also objective in that it
comes in a form that can be easily reviewed by claims administrators, as opposed to non-
tangible, subjective evidence, such as pain tests for fibromyalgia.
21
when the claimant has provided ample subjective evidence of a disability and the
administrator neither identified any objective evidence that the claimant could have
supplied to support the claim nor had the claimant undergo an IME or a similar in-
person probative procedure to test the validity of her complaints.22 See Oliver, 497
F.3d at 1196–97. The decision to deny benefits based on a lack of objective
evidence thus constituted an abuse of discretion.
Even though we conclude that the administrator’s denial based on a lack of
objective evidence constituted an abuse of discretion, there is insufficient evidence
in the record for us to determine whether Creel’s migraines prevented her from
performing the tasks involved in any line of work. The district court concluded
that Creel failed to provide objective evidence that she could not fulfill these
duties. Even for subjective conditions like migraines, it is reasonable to expect
objective medical evidence of an inability to work. See Boardman v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Amer., 337 F.3d 9, 16 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that although the
diagnoses of subjective conditions like “chronic fatigue syndrome and
22
This conclusion should also not be read to require claims administrators to give
deference to the opinions of a claimant’s treating physicians over those of an IPC. See Black &
Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834, 123 S. Ct. 1965, 1972 (2003) (noting that
“courts have no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the
opinions of a claimant’s physician”). However, the decision not to accord special weight to the
views of the claimant’s physician must be based on “reliable evidence,” which would involve
something more than a paper-based peer review for disabilities involving subjective proof. See
id. (holding that courts may not “impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation
when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician’s evaluation”).
22
fibromyalgia may not lend themselves to objective clinical findings, the physical
limitations imposed by the symptoms of such illnesses do lend themselves to
objective analysis”). However, as with the existence of the disability itself, the
claims administrator appears not to have identified what objective evidence Creel
could have used to show this inability to work.23 Since Dr. Martinez declared that
she was completely unable to work and Dr. Rim noted that migraines would
generally be incapacitating, there could be an objective evidentiary basis for so
finding, but we make no conclusions either way. Instead, we remand this case to
the district court to address the issue by examining the extent to which Creel is
limited by her headaches.24
B. Remaining Issues
Creel asserts that the mental illness limitation was ambiguous, and therefore
Wachovia should not be allowed to interpret it so as to exclude her claim. We
need not address this argument now because whether Wachovia’s interpretation of
the provision was wrong and unreasonable can only be decided once the district
23
Wachovia alludes to a home business that Creel may have started, which it asserts is an
occupation in which she could be employed even with irregular headaches. We do not have
enough information to address this issue, but the district court may investigate it on remand.
During the appeals process, Liberty Mutual did request that Creel provide records regarding a
business for which Creel was a registered agent. However, it did so in order to determine
whether she would be subject to an offset of any LTD benefits she received.
24
As part of this analysis, the court could order, or conduct on its own, an investigation
similar to the functional capacity examination used in Social Security benefits disputes.
23
court addresses on remand Wachovia’s findings regarding Creel’s ability to work.
We also need not consider whether Creel received a full and fair review because
that issue can only be decided after the district court applies our findings about the
objective evidence requirement. The district court should reconsider these two
issues in light of our findings about the objective evidence requirement.
III. CONCLUSION
Creel appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Wachovia regarding its denial of her claim for LTD benefits. We find that the
district court erred in concluding that Wachovia’s plan permitted it to require Creel
to produce objective evidence of her migraines. Accordingly, we VACATE the
summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
24