Sandi N. Johnson v. Alabama Department of Human Resources

Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-12187
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-03030-LSC
SANDI N. JOHNSON,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
a political sub-division of the State of Alabama,
ANGELA MCCLINTOCK,
in her official and individual capacity,
MICHELLE SHELTON,
in her official and individual capacity,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(January 31, 2013)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 2 of 10
PER CURIAM:
Sandi N. Johnson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (ADHR), Angela
McClintock, and Michelle Shelton (collectively, the defendants) on her
employment discrimination action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She argues
that the district court erred in finding that she did not proffer sufficient evidence of
intentional gender discrimination to survive summary judgment. Specifically, she
argues that: 1) there was sufficient evidence of gender discrimination based on
gender stereotypes regarding a pregnant woman’s ability to work and 2) the district
court overlooked circumstantial evidence suggesting gender discrimination was
present.
I. BACKGROUND
ADHR hired Johnson as a social case worker for the Jefferson County
Department of Human Resources (JCDHR) on May 11, 2009. Johnson was hired
as a probationary employee. When she was hired she was pregnant. She informed
her training supervisor and was told that there would not be a problem.
After a training period, on about August 24, 2009, Johnson reported to work
at the child abuse/neglect unit. Angela McClintock was the Assistant Director for
JCDHR. Michelle Shelton supervised the child abuse/neglect unit. According to
2
Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 3 of 10
Johnson, when she first reported to the child abuse/neglect unit, Shelton remarked
“oh no, they did not send me another pregnant one.”
Shelton had concerns about Johnson’s work performance. Specifically,
Johnson “failed to submit cases closures during the week of 09/21/09.” Shelton
met with Johnson on September 28, 2009, “to discuss her failure to close cases,
transfer cases timely and properly attempt first victim contacts.” Shelton also
received a written letter of complaint about Johnson and was informed that on
October 1, 2009, “Johnson reportedly called the complainant on the telephone and
cursed and yelled at the complainant about the letter.”
Johnson alleges that she “did [her] job in a satisfactory manner.” She asserts
that this is demonstrated by the fact that she “never received any warnings, written
reprimands, or suspensions” and “received a Meets Standards on [her]
Probationary Performance Appraisal for May 11, 2009 to November 10, 2009.”
The Performance Appraisal indicates that Shelton awarded Johnson a score that
warrants a “Meets Standards” appraisal, but Shelton marked the “Partially Meets
Standards” box. Johnson only scored a 16.66 out of 40 for responsibility. In the
“Disciplinary Actions” section, the Performance Appraisal indicated that there had
been no warnings, reprimands, or suspensions, but referred to the “attached letter
of termination.”
3
Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 4 of 10
On October 2, 2009, Shelton and McClintock told Johnson that she was not
being recommended for permanent employment. Johnson was given the option to
resign or be terminated and she chose termination. Johnson claims that at the
meeting McClintock stated that Johnson “was not able to ‘keep up with the work’
due to [her] pregnancy.” Johnson also alleges that McClintock said that it was best
for the JCDHR not to make Johnson a permanent employee because Johnson
would need to take maternity leave soon.
Shelton maintains that during the period she supervised Johnson, the only
discussion about Johnson’s pregnancy was “when she would be expected to start
her leave” and that there were no conversations about how Johnson’s pregnancy
affected “her job duties or performance.” McClintock stated that “[a]t no time
during the [October 2nd] meeting was the fact that [Johnson] was pregnant
mentioned in regards to her ability to do the job.” In fact, during this period three
other members of the child abuse/neglect unit were pregnant and performed their
job well.
On July 23, 2010, Johnson filed a “General Complaint Form for Pro Se
Litigants” against “Jefferson County Department of Human Resources and the
State of Alabama.” She alleged that she was “discriminated against due to [her]
pregnancy” and that “statements were made in concern of [her] pregnancy and the
effect that it had on [her] duties by [her] supervisor [and] the assistant director.”
4
Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 5 of 10
The district court issued an Order treating the application “as a complaint
under one or more of the federal civil rights acts,” but requiring that “an amended
complaint, complying with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” be filed “within
30 days from the date hereof . . ., failing which this cause shall be dismissed for
want of prosecution.” When Johnson failed to comply, the judge issued another
Order dismissing the action “for want of prosecution.” On the same day, counsel
for the Plaintiff entered an appearance with the Court and the following day
counsel filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to vacate the judge’s dismissal. This
motion was denied because the court found no “reason justifying relief from an
order that was completely and transparently promised if plaintiff did not timely
amend.” Johnson did not appeal.
The action now before us on appeal was filed on November 8, 2010.
Johnson claimed that the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of
gender and pregnancy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court concluded that Johnson had “not proffered admissible
evidence that Defendants terminated her for any gender-related reason or
stereotype aside from the pregnancy itself” and that there was no evidence that
there was the type of pregnancy discrimination that would support a gender
discrimination claim.
5
Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 6 of 10
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Alvarez v. Royal
Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010). “Summary
judgment is appropriate if the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gitlitz v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 556 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
“In any § 1983 action, a court must determine whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted). Here, the question is whether Johnson’s termination violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “[W]e have recognized an equal
protection right to be free from employment discrimination” based on gender. See
e.g., Williams v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir.
2003). Johnson argues that her termination violated this right because “she was
terminated based on a stereotype about the capacity of a pregnant woman to do a
job.”
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that not every classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification under the equal protection
clause. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271, 113 S.
6
Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 7 of 10
Ct. 753, 760 (1993); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20, 94 S. Ct. 2485,
2492 n.20 (1974). The Court has also clearly stated that discrimination on the
basis of a gender stereotype is a sex-based discrimination. See Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1790–91 (1989); see also Glenn,
663 F.3d at 1316–18. Johnson’s claim lies at the intersection of these two rules.
Claims like Johnson’s may allege a type of pregnancy classification or gender
stereotype discrimination that amounts to gender discrimination under the equal
protection clause. They may allege neither.
However, in Johnson’s case it is unnecessary to make this determination.
“When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [we] may affirm if there exists
any adequate grounds for doing so, regardless of whether it is the one on which the
district court relied.” Sharp v. Fisher, 532 F.3d 1180, 1183 (11th Cir. 2008). In
this case, we can affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants based on res judicata, an argument raised by the defendants before
the district court.
The doctrine of res judicata “bars the filing of claims which were raised or
could have been raised in an earlier proceeding.” Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc.,
193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). “Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, a claim
will be barred by prior litigation if all four of the following elements are present:
(1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court
7
Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 8 of 10
of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, are
identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is involved in both cases.”
Id. Each of these elements is present here.
The only element of res judicata that Johnson disputed in her opposition to
summary judgment was whether there is a final judgment on the merits. Johnson’s
prior complaint was dismissed for want of prosecution because Johnson had not
complied with the district court’s prior order. Rule 41(b) permits an involuntary
dismissal of an action, on a defendant’s motion, if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to
comply with a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). A dismissal under Rule 41(b) or
any other dismissal “—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or
failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the merits”
unless “the dismissal order states otherwise.” Id. Although the dismissal was not
on a defendant’s motion, it may still be considered a dismissal under Rule 41(b), in
which case the presumption that the dismissal was an adjudication on the merits
would apply. See Brutus v. IRS, 393 F. App’x. 682, 683 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Even if this dismissal is not a dismissal under Rule 41(b), the presumption still
applies. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 286–87, 81 S. Ct 534, 545
(1961) (holding that “a sua sponte dismissal by the Court for failure of the plaintiff
to comply with an order of the Court” should operate as an adjudication on the
8
Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 9 of 10
merits because “the defendant has been put to the trouble of preparing his defense
because there was no initial bar to the Court’s reaching the merits”). Because the
dismissal order did not state otherwise, the prior dismissal “operates as an
adjudication on the merits.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).1
All of the other elements of res judicata are clearly present. The decision
was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. There is privity between the
ADHR, McClintock, and Shelton, sued by Johnson in the present case, and the
State of Alabama and the JCDHR, sued by Johnson in the previous case. The
defendants’ “interests [were] adequately represented” by the State of Alabama and
the JCDHR because those parties had the “same interest” to defend against claims
arising out of Johnson’s termination of employment with the JCDHR. See EEOC
v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). Finally, the same
cause of action was involved in both cases because both cases arise “out of the
same nucleus of operative fact” and “is based upon the same factual predicate.”
See Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1239 (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Johnson’s
claim is barred by res judicata.
III. CONCLUSION
1
This conclusion is further supported by the district court’s reference to the prior dismissal as a
“dismissal with prejudice” in its subsequent order denying Johnson’s Rule 60 motion to set aside
the dismissal.
9
Case: 12-12187 Date Filed: 01/31/2013 Page: 10 of 10
As all four elements of res judicata are satisfied, we affirm the district
court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED
10