United States v. Robert Paul Hollman

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-15821
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cr-00292-KOB-HGD-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT PAUL HOLLMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(February 16, 2017)
Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Robert Paul Hollman appeals his conviction of conspiracy to defraud the
United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Hollman entered into a plea
agreement in which he agreed to serve a sentence of 25 months and to jointly and
severally pay $393,440 in restitution. He contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea because
he entered into his plea agreement believing that he would share liability for
restitution with four co-conspirators, when in fact only one other person was
convicted in relation to the conspiracy and that person’s liability for restitution was
limited. Upon careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs,
we affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Symington, 781 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th
Cir. 2015). The denial of such a motion is not an abuse of discretion unless the
denial was “arbitrary or unreasonable.” United States v. Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269,
1276 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after
a district court accepts the plea but before sentencing if “the defendant can show a
fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).
The court analyzes factors such as “whether [the defendant had] close assistance of
counsel,” and “whether the plea was knowing and voluntary.” See United States v.
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Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting United States
v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988)).
First, the record reflects that Hollman had close assistance of counsel. He
met with an attorney numerous times prior to signing the plea agreement, and they
discussed the contents and meaning of every paragraph of the plea agreement.
Indeed, Hollman signed a provision in the plea agreement representing that he had
discussed the case and his rights with his lawyer and was satisfied with his
lawyer’s representation. He reaffirmed this at his plea hearing.
Second, Hollman’s plea was knowing and voluntary. A guilty plea is
knowing and voluntary if a defendant enters the plea “without coercion and
understands the nature of the charges and the consequences of [the] plea.” United
States v. Brown, 586 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2009). By signing the plea
agreement, Hollman both consented to pay restitution of $393,440 “jointly and
severally with any convicted co-defendants” and acknowledged that he had read
and understood the provisions of the agreement. He also signed a rights
certification that explained that the district court would require him to pay
restitution to the victims of his offense. During the change of plea hearing,
Hollman reaffirmed that he understood the possible penalties for his offense and
that he did not have any questions about the plea agreement or sentencing.
Hollman was aware of the restitution liability that he faced as a consequence of
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pleading guilty and therefore has not shown that his guilty plea was not knowing
and voluntary.
Hollman has not shown that there is a fair and just reason for requesting
withdrawal of his plea. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Hollman’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and accordingly we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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