United States v. Gilberto Gonzalez-Gonzalez

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10433
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GILBERTO GONZALEZ-GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant,
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00062-002-TFM
____________________
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2 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
Before ROSENBAUM and LAGOA, Circuit Judges, and WETHERELL,∗
District Judge.
WETHERELL, District Judge:
Following a jury trial, Gilberto Gonzalez-Gonzalez was con-
victed of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance
(cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Gonzalez’s primary
argument on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction. He also argues that the trial court erred in admit-
ting certain evidence, excluding other evidence, and instructing the
jury on “joint possession.” And, finally, Gonzalez contends that
the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial.
After a thorough review of the record and with the benefit
of oral argument, we affirm Gonzalez’s conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In the early afternoon of January 25, 2021, Baldwin County
Sheriff’s Office Corporal Jason Kolbe observed a white Ford F-650
flatbed work truck with a sleeper compartment driving north-
bound on Interstate 65 in Baldwin County, Alabama. The truck
had a large wooden crate haphazardly strapped to its bed. The
truck slowed down as it approached Kolbe, and it maintained a
∗ Honorable T. Kent Wetherell, II, United States District Judge for the North-
ern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 3
slower speed for an unusually long time after it passed by him, ra-
ther than speeding back up as most motorists would. After Kolbe
pulled out onto the highway to track the truck, he observed it drift
over the white line on the righthand side of the road. Accordingly,
Kolbe initiated a traffic stop.
Kolbe approached the truck and began to interact with Gon-
zalez, the driver. The passenger, Daniel Corona, was lying down
in the sleeper compartment at the time, and Gonzalez stated that
Corona was not a truck driver.
Gonzalez told Kolbe that he and Corona were transporting
the crate of broken transmissions from Houston to Atlanta, but
Gonzalez was unsure of the exact destination. Kolbe testified that
Gonzalez appeared exceedingly nervous—much more so than a
typical motorist—and that his nervous demeanor did not abate
even after Kolbe assured Gonzalez that he did not intend to write
him a ticket.
Kolbe requested paperwork for the load from Gonzalez, and
Gonzalez provided a bill of lading that was several months out of
date. The bill of lading listed “Edwin Martinez” as the driver and
gave an address in Houston as the origin of the trip and an address
in Atlanta as the destination. Kolbe’s online search of the Atlanta
address revealed that it corresponded with a produce store.
Gonzalez also provided Kolbe paperwork related to the
truck. The “cab card” Gonzalez produced was for a company
called Cheetah Transportation Systems, but the door of the truck
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4 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
displayed “Pure Power Logistics.” Gonzalez was unfamiliar with
those companies and the other companies and individuals refer-
enced on other paperwork he provided to Kolbe. The DOT num-
ber on the truck’s door was associated with Pure Power Logistics,
but the insurance card Gonzalez provided to Kolbe was in Chee-
tah’s name and had long since expired. Gonzalez also did not have
a logbook, which is typically required of commercial truck drivers
and is used to track driving hours and rest breaks.
Kolbe asked Gonzalez to accompany him to his police vehi-
cle. Before doing so, Gonzalez requested—and was granted—per-
mission to perform a safety inspection of his truck. Kolbe testified
that in his many years of experience as an officer patrolling the
highways, he could not remember ever receiving a similar request
from a truck driver.
Gonzalez’s purported safety inspection was conducted in a
manner atypical of an experienced commercial truck driver and
seemed to Kolbe to be designed to “buy time.” When conducting
the inspection, Gonzalez began by going immediately to the pas-
senger side storage box, but he did not open it, even though that
box typically would contain essential safety equipment. Gonzalez
hit two of the truck’s tires with his hands, rather than a hammer,
which Kolbe testified a commercial truck driver would typically
use to check tire pressure. Gonzalez also “slapped” the straps hold-
ing down the crate on the back of the truck, but he did not check
the hooking mechanisms or do anything to actually test the integ-
rity of the straps. As Gonzalez made his way around the truck, he
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 5
got back into the cab, where Corona was still located, and re-
mained there for more than a minute.
When Gonzalez finally made his way to Kolbe’s police vehi-
cle, Kolbe asked Gonzalez if there were any drugs inside the truck,
to which Gonzalez first replied “huh?” and then replied “no” when
asked again. Gonzalez then told Kolbe—in contrast with his earlier
representation—that Corona was a truck driver. Gonzalez also
claimed that he did not own the truck.
Kolbe asked Gonzalez, in English and in Spanish, for consent
to search the truck, which Gonzalez gave. Kolbe testified that Gon-
zalez appeared “apprehensive” and “nervous.” When Kolbe
opened the crate on the back of the truck, he found an engine block
and a transmission, which he described as “broken,” “junk,” and
“not something you would transport from Houston to Atlanta.”
When Kolbe asked for the keys to the truck’s storage boxes,
both Gonzalez and Corona said they didn’t have keys. Kolbe found
a “scarred up” knife blade wedged between the skirting around the
bottom of the truck and the back wall of the sleeper berth. Kolbe
testified that the door and locking pin of the passenger side storage
box was “extremely tooled,” meaning that someone used an item
to pry open the locking mechanism. Kolbe suspected that the knife
blade was used in this manner to open the storage box.
At this point, Gonzalez requested—and was granted—per-
mission to walk to a nearby line of trees to urinate. While Gonza-
lez was doing so, Kolbe used a screwdriver to pop open the door
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6 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
to the passenger side storage box. Inside, he observed a black duffel
bag. When Kolbe opened the bag, he found sixteen “bricks” of co-
caine inside, wrapped in cellophane and covered in grease to mask
the smell. The cocaine weighed a total of 15.86 kilograms.
After discovering the cocaine, Kolbe and his partner de-
tained Gonzalez and Corona. Kolbe testified that Gonzalez
seemed calm and unsurprised, and that Gonzalez complied with
his commands without question or confrontation.
Special Agent Matthew Chakwin interviewed Gonzalez af-
ter his arrest. Gonzalez told Chakwin that he was an experienced
truck driver and that he owned his own business, Gonzalez Truck-
ing. Gonzalez further told Chakwin that he was asked by “Neto,”
a mutual friend of his and Corona’s, to drive the truck. Gonzalez
claimed to have had limited-to-no conversations with Corona prior
to the trip. Gonzalez also mentioned to Chakwin that he noticed
something wasn’t right about the bill of lading.
B. Pre-Trial Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Gonzalez and Corona on two counts
related to a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. In Count One, the
Indictment charged both defendants with conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute approximately 16 kilograms of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. In Count Two, the Indict-
ment charged both defendants with possession with intent to dis-
tribute approximately 16 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
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Corona filed a motion to suppress challenging the traffic
stop and search that led to inculpatory physical evidence and state-
ments. The district court permitted Gonzalez to join in that mo-
tion, but then denied it on the merits. Following that ruling, Co-
rona entered a guilty plea, which the district court accepted. Gon-
zalez proceeded to trial.
Before trial, Gonzalez filed a motion in limine seeking to ex-
clude certain communications (particularly images) found on his
cell phone. The district court orally denied that motion without
much discussion but left open the possibility of Gonzalez objecting
to individual pieces of evidence at trial.
C. Trial
1. The Government’s Case
At trial, the Government presented its case over the course
of nearly three days, calling seven witnesses. Kolbe and Chakwin
testified as to the circumstances leading up to the discovery of the
cocaine as laid out above. The Government also presented evi-
dence from Gonzalez’s and Corona’s cell phones, as well as evi-
dence pertaining to the drug trade.
The evidentiary rulings challenged by Gonzalez on appeal
relate to the cell phone evidence and an exhibit that Gonzalez
sought to introduce during his cross-examination of the witness
called by the Government to testify about the drug trade. That
evidence is summarized below.
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8 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
i. Cell Phone Evidence
Gonzalez consented to having his cell phone searched, and
forensics experts were able to extract data from both Gonzalez’s
and Corona’s phones. The Government called several witnesses to
discuss what was found on the phones.
When the Government sought to introduce evidence from
Gonzalez’s phone, Gonzalez renewed the argument from his mo-
tion in limine that the evidence was not relevant, violated Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, and was improper character evidence. The
district court ruled that the evidence was admissible as part of the
“res gestae” of the case—that is, closely connected to the case—
because it was on Gonzalez’s phone and that it was up to the jury
to determine what weight to ascribe to it.
The cell phone data showed 35 calls between Gonzalez and
“Neto” between November 11, 2020, and January 25, 2021. 1 Gon-
zalez’s phone also showed calls (both native and through
WhatsApp) in late 2020 and January 2021 to and from someone
named Tuckan and to and from Ricardo La Mula. Finally, Gonza-
lez’s phone showed four incoming calls from an unsaved number
(identified to be Corona) in the late evening of January 24 and early
morning of January 25, 2021. All of these individuals had phone
numbers corresponding to the Houston area.
1 This timeframe corresponded to the temporal scope of the conspiracy, as
alleged in Count One of the Indictment.
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 9
Gonzalez’s phone also contained messages (both native and
through WhatsApp) between Gonzalez and Tuckan, La Mula,
“Rene Exxtreme,” Ezequiel Rojas, and Julio Cesar Tampaon. Rene
Exxtreme and Tampaon had Mexican phone numbers.
The messages between Gonzalez and Rene Exxtreme dis-
cuss the formation of “Gonzalez Trucking” and reference deliver-
ies and pickups occurring at an address in Matamoros, Mexico.
Messages between Gonzalez and Neto direct Gonzalez to “make
arrangements” with Rene Exxtreme, give an address in Matamo-
ros, Mexico, and state “they will take you the things later if you are
going to be there.” Several of the calls between Rene Exxtreme
and Neto and Gonzalez occurred during these text conversations.
In one of these exchanges, Tuckan stated “they owe me two thou-
sand by tomorrow,” Gonzalez referenced “expensive” “kilos,” and
Tuckan commented that they had become even more expensive
because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Gonzalez replied, “I know
dude they are at 37 38 [thousand dollars].”
Some of these messages contained images (both memes 2
and actual pictures) that appeared to depict or reference cocaine
and were sent or received by Gonzalez between March 2019 and
2 A “meme” is “an amusing or interesting item (such as a captioned picture
or video) or genre of items that is spread widely online especially through so-
cial media.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/meme.
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10 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
January 2021. Gonzalez’s phone also contained ostensibly legiti-
mate images pertaining to his trucking business.
The Government also introduced evidence from Corona’s
phone. In addition to his calls to Gonzalez, Corona’s phone
showed numerous chats and calls between himself and “La Nanita”
and “Edwin M.” Messages between Corona and Edwin M. discuss
“meet[ing] up” and “do[ing] the run,” and reference travel to the
border. Messages between Corona and Neto from the day before
the traffic stop show that Neto put Corona in contact with Gonza-
lez for the purpose of making the trip from Houston to Atlanta.
Corona’s phone showed calls between himself and Neto on
the morning of the traffic stop, and calls and messages between
himself and Edwin M. while the truck was on the road. Corona’s
phone also contained sent images of currency, a black duffel bag, a
panel on the side of a truck matching the truck stopped by Kolbe,
as well as a news article link discussing cocaine seized during a traf-
fic stop. Corona sent the images of bulk currency and a duffel bag
to Neto on the same day that Neto was supposed to pick up legiti-
mate items related to Gonzalez Trucking from Rene Exxtreme.
ii. Testimony of David Noe
The Government called David Noe, a veteran law enforce-
ment officer with extensive training and experience working with
drug trafficking organizations, specifically Mexican cartels trans-
porting cocaine. Without objection, Noe was designated as an ex-
pert in drug-trafficking organizations.
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 11
Noe testified that the price of cocaine increased because of
the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Noe, one kilogram of co-
caine was worth $37,000 or more wholesale, but could be diluted
with other substances such that what began as one kilogram of co-
caine could be worth up to $400,000 on the street. Noe opined that
the cocaine seized in this case was intended for distribution, and
that it had been wrapped in such a way as to conceal the odor and
to avoid fingerprints.
Noe testified that Atlanta is a “hub city” for drug trafficking,
meaning a location to which drugs are transported from the south-
west border to be distributed to customers in the United States. He
testified that Houston to Atlanta (through Mobile) is a roughly 800
mile and 11-to-12-hour drive and is a common drug trafficking
route. Noe testified that Matamoros, Mexico, is across the border
from Brownsville, Texas, and is a common location for cocaine to
cross into the U.S. from Mexico.
Noe further testified that drug shipments often utilize trac-
tor-trailers or “transportation-type vehicles” with “cover loads” to
disguise the fact that they’re hauling contraband. Drugs are often
stored in hidden compartments within the truck. Noe opined that
the crate on Gonzalez’s truck was a cover load because transmis-
sion and engine parts are often used as cover loads and it would
usually cost more to send them away for repairs than it would to
buy new ones.
Noe further testified that individuals hauling contraband
tend to drive the speed limit, unlike most other motorists on the
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12 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
interstates, in an effort to avoid being pulled over and discovered.
And when they do get pulled over, drug traffickers tend to be over-
cooperative with the officer.
Noe testified that couriers, referred to as “mules,” often pro-
vide transportation, but typically are not involved in selling the
drugs. Rather, couriers are typically people within the driving busi-
ness who have a reason to go to the destination city. Couriers are
typically paid in cash upon completion of their trip, and instead of
making several hundred dollars for a trip from Houston to Atlanta,
they could be paid $10,000 or more for the trip.
Noe testified that couriers typically know that drugs are in
the vehicle, and that “blind mules” are only seen through courier
agencies (e.g., UPS or FedEx) delivering packages via unwitting de-
livery drivers. Noe explained that drug traffickers typically do not
use unknowing or unaffiliated people to transport drugs because
that increases the likelihood of getting caught and/or losing the
drugs. Noe testified that he had never encountered drug traffickers
using a truck driver as a blind mule during his thirty-plus years of
experience.
According to Noe, while transporting drugs, couriers typi-
cally communicate with the drug trafficking organizations via tele-
phone, and have increasingly moved to “coded and blocked” appli-
cations (such as WhatsApp) in an attempt to avoid detection. Noe
opined that the calls and messages in this case were consistent with
the communications of a drug trafficking group.
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On cross-examination of Noe, in support of the defense the-
ory that Gonzalez was an unwitting blind mule, defense counsel
attempted to introduce what the parties refer to as the “blind mule
letter”—a 2011 letter written by an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the
Western District of Texas, which described an instance in which
drug traffickers utilized individuals in their personal vehicles with
access to commuter lanes to carry drugs3 into the United States by
placing duffel bags into the vehicles’ trunks. The Government ob-
jected on hearsay grounds, and the district court ruled: “I don’t
think right now you can introduce [the letter itself] because I don’t
think you can do that extrinsic on cross …. I’ll let you ask him
questions about it. I’m not going to let you offer it.”
Consistent with that ruling, the district court permitted de-
fense counsel to show the letter to Noe and to question him about
it. Noe ultimately admitted that it was possible that drug traffickers
could use individual drivers who were not commercial package
carriers as blind mules. The district court did not permit defense
counsel to admit the letter into evidence or publish it to the jury,
and the district court also prohibited references to the letter in clos-
ing arguments.
3 The letter specifically pertained to one instance in which drug traffickers had
placed a bag containing marijuana, not cocaine, in an unknowing individual’s
vehicle.
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14 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
2. Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
At the conclusion of the Government’s case, Gonzalez
moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the Government
failed to establish Gonzalez’s knowledge of the drugs that were hid-
den in the truck and that mere presence of the drugs in the truck
Gonzalez was driving was not sufficient for a conviction. The dis-
trict court denied the motion, reasoning that the testimony of
Kolbe was alone sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict and that the
messages on Gonzalez’s phone and the totality of the circum-
stances combined with Kolbe’s testimony provide sufficient evi-
dence for a reasonable jury to convict Gonzalez.
3. Defendant’s Case
The defense called two witnesses, Emilia Fuentes and Jose
Pena. Fuentes testified that Gonzalez formerly worked for her hus-
band, where he was honest, responsible, and friendly, and that she
helped him set up his trucking business and file his taxes. Pena tes-
tified that he used to work with Gonzalez, that he knew Gonzalez
to have a reputation for honesty, integrity, and hard work, and that
Gonzalez had never communicated with him about drugs. Pena
also testified that he was an experienced truck driver, and on cross-
examination, he testified that he would have been “in big trouble”
if he was driving without an accurate bill of lading. Gonzalez did
not testify.
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4. Closing Arguments
In closing arguments, the Government argued that the evi-
dence—including Gonzalez’s evasive driving, nervous behavior,
inconsistent statements, inaccurate or missing paperwork, an illog-
ical load, an unusual roadside inspection, distancing himself from
the truck while it was searched, the large quantity of cocaine found
in the truck, the lack of surprise when the cocaine was found and
he was arrested, and the communications found on his cell
phone—showed that Gonzalez’s knowledge and intent were that
of a knowing drug courier. The defense played a portion of the
dash cam video of the traffic stop and argued that driving alone was
not enough to convict Gonzalez and that he was merely an un-
knowing blind mule set up by Corona and their mutual contacts to
help them by driving their truck to Atlanta.
5. Jury Instructions
The district court instructed the jury that “[t]he defendant
can be found guilty of [possession with intent to distribute] only if
all of the following facts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
first, that the defendant knowingly possessed cocaine and, sec-
ondly, that the defendant intended to distribute the cocaine.”
The court instructed the jury on the different types of pos-
session (actual, constructive, sole, and joint), and with respect to
“joint possession,” the court stated that: “Joint possession of a
thing occurs if two or more people share possession of it. So if my
wife and I are driving in my car, we both are in joint possession of
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16 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
the car.” The second sentence was not a part of the written jury
instructions agreed upon by the parties, and it followed a series of
other examples involving a car and car keys that the district court
provided with the instructions on the other types of possession.
The district court also instructed the jury that it “must find
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was a willful participant
and not merely a knowing spectator” and that the jury “may find
that a defendant knew about the possession of a controlled sub-
stance if you determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend-
ant actually knew about the controlled substance or had every rea-
son to know but deliberately closed their eyes.” And the district
court “emphasize[d] that negligence, carelessness, or foolishness is
not enough to prove that a defendant knew about the possession
of a controlled substance.”
Gonzalez did not object to the district court’s “impromptu”
joint possession example, nor did he ask for a curative supple-
mental instruction. In fact, after the district court finished instruct-
ing the jury and asked the attorneys for both sides (at side bar)
whether they were “satisfied with the instructions,” defense coun-
sel responded in the affirmative.
6. Verdict
The jury found Gonzalez not guilty of Count One (conspir-
acy) and guilty of Count Two (possession with intent to distribute).
The jury made a specific drug quantity finding as to Count Two
that is not relevant to the issues on appeal.
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 17
D. Defendant’s Post-Verdict Motion
Gonzalez renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal or
for a new trial on Count Two, arguing that there was insufficient
evidence to support the guilty verdict. He also argued that intro-
duction of communications from his cell phone was improper char-
acter evidence; that the district court’s refusal to give a Rule 404(b)
limiting instruction was error; that the joint possession jury instruc-
tion was erroneous because it misled the jury to believe if it found
Gonzalez possessed the truck then he also possessed the drugs; and
that district court’s failure to admit the “blind mule” letter violated
his right to a fair trial. The district court orally denied the motion,
relying on its prior rulings on each of these issues, and further ex-
plaining:
I believe the jury concluded that Mr. Gonzalez-Gon-
zalez’s involvement was on this occasion, and I be-
lieve that they saw him as being involved in this trans-
action and it had not been established to their satisfac-
tion that he had involved himself in other transac-
tions. And so I find what they ruled was consistent.
True, they could have said his involvement, his
knowing involvement with his codefendant, would
be a basis to establish the conspiracy. But laypeople
sometimes miss the finer points of law.
E. Sentencing and Appeal
The district court sentenced Gonzalez to 121 months’ im-
prisonment, which was the low end of the guideline range and one
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18 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
month above the mandatory minimum. After the district court en-
tered judgment, Gonzalez timely filed his notice of appeal.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Mau-
rya, 25 F.4th 829, 838 (11th Cir. 2022). We review unpreserved
claims of error in the district court’s jury instructions for plain er-
ror. See United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir.
2008) abrogated on other grounds by Ruan v. United States, 142 S.
Ct. 2370 (2022). We review the sufficiency of the evidence and the
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. See Maurya,
25 F.4th at 841.
III. ANALYSIS
We will begin our analysis with Gonzalez’s challenges to the
district court’s evidentiary rulings because the resolution of those
issues may impact (or moot) his primary issue on appeal—the suf-
ficiency of the evidence. Next, we will consider Gonzalez’s chal-
lenge to the joint possession jury instruction. Then, we will con-
sider Gonzalez’s argument that the evidence is insufficient to sup-
port his conviction. Finally, we will consider Gonzalez’s claim of
cumulative error.
A. Evidentiary Rulings
Gonzalez challenges two evidentiary rulings: the exclusion
of the blind mule letter and the admission of certain evidence from
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 19
his cell phone. Each will be discussed in turn, after a brief summary
of the applicable abuse of discretion standard of review.
The abuse of discretion standard affords “considerable lee-
way” to the district court in making evidentiary rulings, and we will
only reverse a district court’s evidentiary ruling when the ruling is
“manifestly erroneous.” See United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323,
1330 (11th Cir. 2018). Thus, regardless of whether we would have
made a different decision in the first instance, “the abuse of discre-
tion standard allows a range of choice for the district court, so long
as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.”
United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004)
(cleaned up). Put differently, we “must affirm unless we find that
the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied
the wrong legal standard.” Barton, 909 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Fra-
zier, 387 F.3d at 1259). “However, basing an evidentiary ruling on
an erroneous view of the law constitutes an abuse of discretion per
se.” United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.
2005).
Further, we may affirm on any ground that finds support in
the record and the law, United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860,
879 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), and we will not reverse a decision of
the district court if an error committed below was harmless, see
Barton, 909 F.3d at 1337. In other words, we will only require a
new trial if the district court’s decision caused “substantial preju-
dice” to the affected party, and we will not reverse if the error did
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20 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
not have a substantial effect on the verdict. See Peat, Inc. v. Van-
guard Rsch., Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1162 (11th Cir. 2004).
1. Blind mule letter
Gonzalez contends that the district court abused its discre-
tion by excluding the “blind mule” letter, arguing that the letter
was self-authenticating, that it was proper rebuttal evidence which
directly addressed the defense’s theory of the case, and that it was
relevant, probative, and admissible under the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence. Gonzalez further argues that exclusion of the letter im-
paired his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision
to exclude the blind mule letter for two reasons.
First, the letter was not properly authenticated. Federal
Rule of Evidence 901 requires that the proponent of an item of ev-
idence “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.” FED. R. EVID. 901(a). For
instance, a witness with firsthand knowledge can authenticate an
item. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). Other documents are “self-authenti-
cating,” so they do not require extrinsic evidence of authenticity to
be admitted. FED. R. EVID. 902. For example, documents that have
(a) a seal “purporting to be” that of a governmental unit and (b) a
signature attesting to the seal are self-authenticating. FED. R. EVID.
902(1)(A)–(B).
Here, Noe did not prepare the letter and was unfamiliar with
it, so he was not in a position to authenticate the letter. See FED.
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 21
R. EVID. 901(b)(1). Moreover, the letter was not self-authenticating
simply because it was on letterhead bearing an image of the logo
of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas since the let-
terhead is not a “seal” within the meaning of Rule 902(1), cf. United
States v. Hampton, 464 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[S]eals are
used to attest the authenticity of the document on which the seal
is stamped, and no seal was stamped on the copies. The copies
were copies of sealed documents rather than sealed documents
themselves. The rationale of Rule 902(1) … is that a seal is difficult
to forge. But that is not true of a copy of a seal.”), 4 and the seal was
not attested to in the letter or otherwise certified by a custodian of
records, cf. United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir.
2005) (“[T]he records were certified as correct by Greene, who also
stated that he was the legal custodian of the records and that he had
compared the certified copies to their originals.”).
4 Even though the Seventh Circuit in Hampton ultimately affirmed the admis-
sion of the documents at issue in that case under Fed. R. Evid. 1003 (permitting
duplicates), it did so because the original documents were stamped with a seal
and employees of the banks at issue “testified that they recognized the copies
shown them by the prosecutor as copies of the certificates possessed by or
posted in their banks.” 464 F.3d at 689–90. Here, there is no indication that
the original blind mule letter was stamped with a seal attesting to its authen-
ticity, and Noe (who did not write the letter, had no knowledge of the case to
which the letter referred, and had never seen the letter before) was not in the
same position as the bank employees in Hampton to be able to testify knowl-
edgeably as to the letter’s authenticity.
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22 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
Second, as the district court ruled, a party may not introduce
extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter when attempting to im-
peach a witness. See United States v. Adams, 799 F.2d 665, 671
(11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Russell, 717 F.2d 518, 520 (11th
Cir. 1983). The letter was collateral because it went to the issue of
whether drug cartels had used blind mules to smuggle marijuana
across the United States-Mexican border. Noe said he was unaware
of drug cartels using blind mules; the letter said drug cartels had
used blind mules (at least as to marijuana-smuggling over the bor-
der). But that issue is collateral to Gonzalez’s defense—whether
Gonzalez knew that there was cocaine in the truck on his intra-
United States trip. Thus, although the letter was relevant to Gon-
zalez’s defense insofar as it impeached Noe’s testimony that drug
cartels didn’t use blind mules, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to admit the letter as evidence because the
circumstances described in the letter were considerably different
from the circumstances of this case.
Moreover, even if the district court had abused its discretion
by excluding the letter, the error would have been harmless be-
cause the district court allowed defense counsel to impeach Noe by
making the point through cross-examination that blind mules may
occur in more circumstances than commercial package carriers.
Specifically, defense counsel asked Noe, “So having read the letter,
would you now agree that there are instances where the cartel may
use unwitting mules,” and Noe responded, “Again, it is possible
that they may use it. Based on reading this letter it is based on
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 23
somebody else’s opinion. I don’t have any further information
about that opinion.” And Noe agreed (in defense counsel’s words)
that there “must be some reason for writing [the letter]” because
(in Noe’s words) “I would believe there is a possibility that they had
credible information that this happened. It’s a 2011 letter.”
Admitting the letter itself into evidence would have had lit-
tle or no further probative value beyond the facts that were elicited
on cross-examination of Noe. Therefore, exclusion of the blind
mule letter was harmless and did not deprive Gonzalez of the op-
portunity to present his defense.
2. Evidence from Gonzalez’s cell phone
Gonzalez argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted certain text messages from his cell phone that
were sent or received beginning in 2019 and continuing until days
before the traffic stop. We agree in part but find that the error was
harmless.
i. Text messages between Gonzalez and Tuckan
Of the dozens of text messages from Gonzalez’s phone that
the district court admitted at trial, the only ones specifically chal-
lenged on appeal are the November 2020 messages between Gon-
zalez and Tuckan. In that exchange, which occurred two months
before the traffic stop and during period of the conspiracy charged
in Count One of the Indictment, Gonzalez and Tuckan discuss “ki-
los,” which Gonzalez stated were “very expensive.” Tuckan re-
plied that the increase in price was due to the pandemic, and
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24 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
Gonzalez said, “I know my dude they are at 37 38.” Gonzalez ar-
gues that the Government did not introduce any evidence tying
this conversation to the charged offenses, and that these commu-
nications do not show Gonzalez’s knowledge or intent.
We disagree. It is common knowledge (and Kolbe and Noe
confirmed) that trafficking quantities of cocaine are typically meas-
ured in kilograms, or “kilos,” and that cocaine is often trafficked in
bricks weighing roughly that amount. Noe further testified that
the wholesale price of cocaine in the Atlanta area had risen to more
than $37,000 per kilogram during the COVID-19 pandemic. Noe
also opined that the messages on Gonzalez’s phone concerned
drugs and drug trafficking. Thus, these messages are evidence of
Gonzalez’s familiarity with trafficking quantities of cocaine and the
price of a kilogram of cocaine in the Atlanta area, which is relevant
to his knowledge in this case. See United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th
1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2021) (text messages discussing prior sale of
prescription pills “rebutted the suggestion that [the defendant] was
not familiar with drug trafficking” and “could have allowed a jury
to infer knowledge”); United States v. Contreras, 602 F.2d 1237,
1240 (5th Cir. 1979) 5 (evidence of the defendant’s prior cocaine use
“demonstrated [his] familiarity with illicit drugs and was therefore
relevant on the question of knowledge”).
5 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued on or before September 30, 1981,
are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 25
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the November 2020 text message exchange between
Gonzalez and Tuckan.
ii. Memes found on Gonzalez’s cell phone.
Gonzalez also contends that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in admitting memes that he sent or received from his cell
phone. The challenged images depicted or referenced cocaine (ex-
cept for one that referenced marijuana), most often intending to be
humorous. The images were found in Gonzalez’s conversations
with La Mula, Rojas, and Tuckan, not Corona or Neto. The images
were sent or received by Gonzalez as far back as March 2019 (well
before the timeframe of the charged conspiracy), and the most re-
cent one was sent or received in January 2021, days before the traf-
fic stop. The district court ruled that these images were not inad-
missible character evidence, but rather were part of the res gestae
of the case because they were inextricably intertwined with the
charged offenses.
Evidence is admissible as res gestae when “it is (1) part of the
same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense,
(2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably
intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.”
United States v. Nerey, 877 F.3d 956, 974 (11th Cir. 2017). Here,
most of the challenged memes were sent or received months or
years before the charged offenses and none were directly tied to
the charged offenses or inextricably intertwined with evidence of
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26 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
the charged offenses. Thus, the district court erred in admitting
the memes as res gestae.
However, under the circumstances, we find that the admis-
sion of the memes was harmless.
“[E]rroneous admission of evidence does not warrant rever-
sal if the … error had no substantial influence on the outcome and
sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.”
United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1992).
We reverse “only if [the error] resulted ‘in actual prejudice because
it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict.’” United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353
(11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449
(1986)).
We have previously held that a district court’s erroneous ad-
mission of evidence was harmless when the evidence’s lack of pro-
bative value diminished the potential for undue prejudice. See
United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“[T]he paucity of probative value creates an additional problem
for Sanders—the remoteness and dissimilarity of the prior convic-
tion not only decreases the probative value to show intent but also
diminishes the potential for unfair prejudice.”). Here, the memes
had limited probative value, given their remoteness to the charged
offenses and the fact that Gonzalez had no part in creating them
and merely shared images that were readily available online. In-
deed, Gonzalez’s counsel emphasized these shortcomings by
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 27
vigorously challenging the significance of the memes on cross-ex-
amination and during closing argument.
We have also held that the erroneous admission of evidence
was harmless when it was mentioned to the jury only in passing
and it described actions that were “trivial” in comparison to the
other conduct in the case, see United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955
F.2d 1510, 1518 (11th Cir. 1992), and when substantial or over-
whelming evidence of guilt remained even disregarding the erro-
neous evidence, see United States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099,
1109–11 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305,
1317 (11th Cir. 2000).
Here, the Government did not emphasize the memes over
the other evidence in this case: discussion of the memes on direct
examination totals only a few pages of the trial transcript, and the
Government mentioned the memes only briefly in its closing argu-
ment. 6 Moreover, sharing memes is a ubiquitous activity in to-
day’s world and Gonzalez’s sharing of drug-related memes is trivial
when compared to the conduct charged in the case—trafficking a
significant quantity of cocaine from Houston to Atlanta—and the
6 In fact, in rebuttal, the Government explained to the jury that “[Gonzalez] is
not in that chair because he sent memes from his phone,” reiterated Gonza-
lez’s First Amendment right to send such memes, and again clarified to the
jury that the memes were introduced simply as evidence of his knowledge and
intent.
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28 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
substantial other evidence of Gonzalez’s consciousness of guilt that
is summarized below.
At bottom, there was substantial evidence unrelated to the
memes from which a reasonable jury could find Gonzalez’s
knowledge or consciousness of guilt. Indeed, as the district court
pointed out, the jury very well could have convicted Gonzalez
based on Kolbe’s testimony alone. Therefore, any error commit-
ted by the district court in admitting the memes from Gonzalez’s
cell phone was harmless.
We did not overlook Gonzalez’s suggestion that the district
court’s failure to give a Rule 404(b) limiting instruction concerning
the cell phone evidence was reversible error. However, putting
aside the fact that Gonzalez did not develop this argument in his
initial brief and only mentioned it in passing in his reply brief, 7 we
have held that refusal to give a requested Rule 404(b) limiting in-
struction warrants reversal only when: “(1) the requested instruc-
tion correctly stated the law; (2) the actual charge to the jury did
not substantially cover the proposed instruction; and (3) the failure
to give the instruction substantially impaired the defendant's ability
to present an effective defense.” United States v. Fulford, 267 F.3d
1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, Gonzalez was not precluded
7 See United States v. Woods, 684 F.3d 1045, 1064 n.23 (11th Cir. 2012) (ex-
plaining that a party abandons an issue “by failing to develop any argument
on it in his opening brief”); United States v. Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 632 n.7 (11th Cir.
1994) (“Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly
before a reviewing court.”).
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 29
from presenting an effective defense because, as discussed above,
his counsel attacked the significance of the memes on cross-exami-
nation and in closing arguments, and the Government even con-
ceded in its own closing and in rebuttal that the memes were intro-
duced simply as evidence of Gonzalez’s knowledge and intent.
* * *
For these reasons, we conclude that any error in admitting
evidence from Gonzalez’s phone is not a basis for reversal of his
conviction.
B. Joint possession jury instruction
Gonzalez challenges the district court’s instruction to the
jury on joint possession. He conceded (in his brief and at oral ar-
gument) that he must show plain error because he did not object
to the instruction before the jury retired to deliberate. See Merrill,
513 F.3d at 1305.
Under the plain error standard, a defendant must show “an
error that is plain; that affects substantial rights; and that ‘seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial pro-
ceedings.’” United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1261 (11th Cir.
2015) (quoting United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th
Cir. 2013)). An error is plain when it is clear and obvious under
current law. Madden, 733 F.3d at 1322 (quoting United States v.
Dortch, 696 F.3d 1104, 1112 (11th Cir. 2012)). An error affects sub-
stantial rights when it is “prejudicial” (i.e., when it “affect[s] the
outcome of the … proceedings”). Id. at 1323 (quoting United States
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30 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). Whether an error affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings is “a
case-specific and fact-intensive inquiry,” which is met when, for ex-
ample, the error risks unnecessary deprivation of liberty. See
Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1908–09 (2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, immediately following the pattern instruction for
joint possession, the district court told the jury: “So if my wife and
I are driving in my car, we both are in joint possession of the car.”
Gonzalez contends that this “impromptu example” “improperly fo-
cused the jury’s attention on possession of the truck, rather than
the drugs, which is contrary to the law of this circuit.” According
to Gonzalez, the district court’s instructions “misle[d] the jury to
believe if it found [Gonzalez] was in possession of the truck, then
he also possessed the drugs hidden in the truck.”
In United States v. Cochran, relied on by Gonzalez, we ex-
pressed our disapproval of a constructive possession jury instruc-
tion “stat[ing] that control over the premises—rather than control
over the contraband itself—is sufficient to convict.” 683 F.3d 1314,
1320 (11th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). In addition to the pat-
tern language, the challenged instruction in Cochran stated that
“[c]onstructive possession of a thing also occurs if a person exer-
cises ownership, dominion, or control over a thing or premises
concealing the thing.” Id. (emphasis added).
However, when applying the plain error standard to a chal-
lenged jury instruction, we have held that
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 31
we do not consider the asserted errors in isolation. In-
stead we consider the totality of the charge as a whole
and determine whether the potential harm caused by
the jury charge has been neutralized by the other in-
structions given at the trial such that reasonable ju-
rors would not have been misled by the error. … If
another instruction the court gave neutralized the er-
ror, then it was not an error at all, let alone a reversi-
ble plain error.
United States v. Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155, 1178 & n.12 (11th Cir. 2020)
(cleaned up). The panel in Cochran reached that same conclusion,
holding that despite the erroneous instruction, when the instruc-
tions were read as a whole, they laid out the proper elements of the
offense, and thus, there was no doubt that the jury was properly
guided. See 683 F.3d at 1320–21.
Here, the district court gave the challenged instruction as
part of a series of examples illustrating different types of possession
with reference to a car and car keys. However, the district court
also instructed the jury that the Government had to “prove[] be-
yond a reasonable doubt… that the defendant knowingly possessed
cocaine”; that he “was a willful participant and not merely a know-
ing spectator”; and that he “actually knew about the controlled sub-
stance or had every reason to know but deliberately closed [his]
eyes.”
As in Cochran, we find that the instructions in this case,
when read as a whole, laid out the correct elements of the offense
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32 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
and properly instructed the jury on the issues of possession and
knowledge. Thus, even if the district court’s joint possession car
example was imperfect and ill-advised, 8 it was clarified and neutral-
ized by the correct instructions, which provided the jurors with the
requisite elements of the crime, including possession of cocaine
and knowledge (or deliberate avoidance) of the fact that he pos-
sessed cocaine, which ensured that a finding that Gonzalez pos-
sessed the truck would not itself result in a conviction. See Iriele,
977 F.3d at 1182; United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1332–33
(11th Cir. 2019); Cochran, 683 F.3d at 1320–21. Accordingly, the
district court did not commit plain error when instructing the jury
on the issue of joint possession.
C. Sufficiency of the evidence
Gonzalez contends that the evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain his conviction. We disagree.
When reviewing for sufficiency of evidence, we must “view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and draw all
reasonable inferences and make all credibility choices in favor of
the verdict.” United States v. Howard, 28 F.4th 180, 187 (11th Cir.
2022). “A guilty verdict cannot be overturned if any reasonable
8 Although we understand that that the district court was attempting to pro-
vide clarification of the somewhat esoteric concept of possession, it would
have been better practice for the district court to stick to the jury instructions
agreed to by the parties and avoid impromptu hypotheticals that might create
an issue for appeal that would otherwise not exist.
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 33
construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iriele, 977 F.3d
at 1168 (cleaned up). Moreover, “because a jury can freely choose
among reasonable constructions of the evidence, ‘it is not neces-
sary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of in-
nocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except
that of guilt.’” Howard, 28 F.4th at 188 (quoting Iriele, 977 F.3d at
1168). We must view the evidence in its totality, not each piece in
isolation. See United States v. Prince, 883 F.2d 953, 958 (11th Cir.
1989); United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 881 (11th Cir. 1985).
Moreover, the test is the same regardless of whether the evidence
is direct or circumstantial, and neither category of evidence re-
ceives special weight. United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278, 1303
(11th Cir. 2014).
To convict Gonzalez for possession with intent to distribute
cocaine, the Government had to prove “knowing possession” of
and “an intent to distribute” the cocaine. United States v. Cruick-
shank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2016). “[A] defendant may
constructively possess a controlled substance if he exercises some
measure of control over the contraband, either exclusively or in
association with others” and “[t]he defendant’s intent to distribute
may be inferred from a variety of factors, including whether the
government seized a large quantity of controlled substances.” Id.In situations where drugs are hidden in a vehicle, this Court has
required that “in addition to mere presence in the vehicle, or con-
trol over it, there be circumstances evidencing a consciousness of
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34 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
guilt on the part of the defendant.” United States v. Stanley, 24 F.3d
1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lira,
936 F.2d 184, 192 (5th Cir. 1991)).
Gonzalez argues that there is not sufficient evidence to sus-
tain the jury’s guilty verdict because there is no direct evidence of
his knowledge of the cocaine in the truck and that the circumstan-
tial evidence of his consciousness of guilt is insufficient. The Gov-
ernment responds that the jury reasonably found that Gonzalez
knowingly possessed the cocaine in the truck’s storage box. We
agree with the Government.
The evidence presented at trial shows that Gonzalez drove
a type of truck that was not typically used on long-haul interstate
routes for hours across multiple states along a common drug traf-
ficking route; that Gonzalez engaged in suspicious driving after
passing a law enforcement officer; that Gonzalez appeared unusu-
ally nervous during the traffic stop, even after being assured he
would not receive a ticket; that, unlike the experienced truck driver
that he claimed to be, Gonzalez performed an unorthodox and per-
functory “safety inspection” of the truck, including noticeably fo-
cusing on, but not opening, the cargo box that would typically con-
tain safety equipment and that turned out to contain a duffel bag
full of cocaine; that the engine parts Gonzalez was hauling was
likely a “cover load” because they would cost more to transport
cross-country for repair than it would cost to buy new ones; that
Gonzalez had limited knowledge of what he was hauling, produced
irregular documentation for the load (including an incorrect bill of
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 35
lading which listed a produce stand as the destination), and lacked
proper paperwork for the truck; that Gonzalez did not recognize
the names on most of the paperwork he presented, knew little to
nothing about Pure Power Logistics (the company named on the
side of the truck), and lacked knowledge of other features of his
trip; that Gonzalez made inconsistent statements, including a shift-
ing account of Corona’s role; that Gonzalez and Corona both
claimed that they lacked a key to open the storage box where the
cocaine was found; that Gonzalez tried to distance himself from the
search of the truck by going to relieve himself in the trees when the
officers began attempting to open the storage box; that Gonzalez
was not surprised when the cocaine was found and he was arrested;
that the storage box contained sixteen bricks of cocaine, each worth
approximately $37,000 wholesale and up to $400,000 on the street
once diluted; that drug traffickers do not typically use non-com-
mercial-package-carrier blind mules, nor do they entrust such large
high-value quantities of drugs to someone unaffiliated and un-
knowing, because that would risk losing valuable drugs; that Gon-
zalez’s phone contained communications about drugs interspersed
with communications about trucking and his trucking business,
and some of the people with whom Gonzalez communicated were
located in a known cocaine trafficking hub in Mexico; that Gonza-
lez expressed knowledge of the wholesale value of cocaine; and
that Neto, Gonzalez and Corona’s mutual connection, traveled to
Matamoros to pick up items associated with Gonzalez’s trucking
business on the same day that Corona sent Neto photographs of
bulk cash.
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36 OPINION OF THE COURT 22-10433
This evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the
jury’s verdict, is more than sufficient to meet each of the elements
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, including Gonza-
lez’s knowing possession and consciousness of guilt. Indeed, we
have found similar evidence sufficient to uphold a conviction under
analogous circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Almanzar, 634
F.3d 1214, 1222–23 (11th Cir. 2011) (evidence was sufficient to find
knowledge via “consciousness of guilt” when defendant was
openly unnerved during the traffic stop, provided an implausible
story about retrieving the truck from a boyfriend whose address
she did not know, lied about who gave her the truck, provided
phony proof of ownership, and was in control of the trip and dom-
inated the conversation with the officer); United States v. Leonard,
138 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir. 1998) (government brought sufficient
evidence to meet the “consciousness of guilt” prong with evidence
of inconsistent stories and lack of surprise when the drugs were
found in the car); United States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719, 721–
22 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] reasonable jury could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a person who is caught with luggage con-
taining a significant amount of drugs [in a hidden compartment]
knew of the presence of the drugs [and] could infer from the quan-
tity of drugs seized that a ‘prudent smuggler’ is not likely to entrust
such valuable cargo to an innocent person without that person’s
knowledge.”); United States v. Bustos-Guzman, 685 F.2d 1278,
1280–81 (11th Cir. 1982) (defendants had been onboard what was
ostensibly a fishing vessel for days, but the boat “contained no ice,
tackle, refrigeration equipment, nets, or bait,” the paperwork and
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22-10433 Opinion of the Court 37
license for the boat did not match up, and marijuana was found
locked up below deck).
In sum, because the evidence was sufficient to sustain Gon-
zalez’s conviction, the district court correctly denied Gonzalez’s
motions for judgment of acquittal.
D. Cumulative error
Gonzalez argues that the cumulative effect of the errors he
alleges deprived him of a fair trial. However, having found only
one harmless error in admitting the memes on Gonzalez’s phone,
we find no cumulative error. See United States v. Walden, 363 F.3d
1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause no individual errors under-
lying the district court’s [challenging ruling] have been demon-
strated, no cumulative error can exist.”); United States v. Allen, 269
F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2001) (“If there are no errors or a single error,
there can be no cumulative error.”) (cited in Walden).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm Gonzalez’s conviction for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
AFFIRMED.