Harsh Sharma, MD MBBS v. Susan Johnston

Case: 11-10488 Date Filed: 04/04/2013 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-10488
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-21560-JAL
HARSH SHARMA,
MD MBBS, et al.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
SUSAN JOHNSTON,
DOH, BOM, et al.,
FLORIDA BOARD OF MEDICINE,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 4, 2013)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Harsh Sharma, a medical doctor who had his license revoked by the Florida
Board of Medicine, part of the Florida Department of Health, appeals pro se the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees on Sharma’s
civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Board revoked
Sharma’s license as the result of three separate administrative complaints. Sharma
alleged that he did not receive due process in that he never received notice of the
administrative proceedings against him. After reviewing the briefs and record on
appeal, we affirm.
We begin by dispensing with a jurisdictional argument raised by Appellees
on appeal. Appellees contend that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider
Sharma’s complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 because Sharma
previously raised his due process concerns in his direct appeal of the administrative
adjudication filed in Florida state court.
Jurisdictional questions may be raised at any point during litigation, and we
review them de novo. Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, 660 F.3d 1283, 1287
(11th Cir. 2011). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, where a state-court
judgment has been issued prior to the commencement of a federal action, the
district court lacks jurisdiction to review complaints seeking district court review
of the state-court judgment. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.
1
This doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923),
and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
2
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2009). More specifically, the doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings.” Id. at 1274 (quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284–85, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22 (2005)).
We decline to apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine here because Sharma does
not argue that a state-court judgment caused him harm. Instead, Sharma’s
complaint in the federal district court—like the state-court action—alleged that a
state agency deprived him of a property interest without due process. The mere re-
litigation of a claim does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction under Rooker-
Feldman. See Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1273–74. Therefore, the district court had
jurisdiction to hear Sharma’s complaint. We now turn to Sharma’s argument that
the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. OSI,
Inc. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is
appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue
is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving
party. Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir.
2007). Pro se litigants are not excused from the burden of establishing that there
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exists a genuine issue of material fact. Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670
(11th Cir. 1990). Unsupported allegations and statements in affidavits based on
information and belief cannot raise genuine issues of fact. Ellis v. Englan, 432
F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Unsworn statements may likewise
not be considered when evaluating a summary judgment motion. Carr v.
Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1273 n.26 (11th Cir. 2003).
“A Section 1983 procedural due process claim requires a plaintiff to prove
three elements: (1) deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property
interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Catron v.
City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Due process entitles an individual to notice and some form of
hearing before state action may deprive him of a property interest. Cryder v.
Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994).
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Appellees presented
evidence that they had attempted to serve Sharma personally with notice of the
three administrative complaints, and that thereafter they had served notice of all
three via publication. They also presented evidence that Sharma filed a counseled
appeal in Florida state court from the administrative action. Sharma presents no
evidence to the contrary. His “affidavits” were not properly sworn, nor were they
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made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Therefore, the district court did not err
in granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, and we affirm. 2
AFFIRMED.
2
Because, on the merits, summary judgment was appropriate as to all claims against all
defendants, we need not consider Appellees’ alternative arguments that summary judgment was
proper on the basis of absolute or qualified immunity. See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257
F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that we may affirm summary judgment on any ground
supported by the record).
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