United States v. Lonnie Davis, Jr.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-10758 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Sept. 11, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 08-00413-CR-T-30-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LONNIE DAVIS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 11, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Government appeals the district court’s order granting the Defendant
Lonnie Davis’s motion to suppress physical evidence seized as a result of a search of
Davis’s vehicle after a traffic citation was issued. The Government contends that
police officers had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop for a short time
and that, therefore, the use of a canine unit in the search of Davis’s car was not
unconstitutional.
Davis argues that the Government waived its right to appeal the order
suppressing evidence because the Government failed to object after the district court
made its ruling. And, Davis argues, even if the Government did not waive its right
to appeal the suppression order, the district court did not err in granting the motion
to suppress because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the
traffic stop beyond the time at which the traffic citation was issued. Davis does not
argue that the initial stop was improper, only that he was unconstitutionally detained
after the traffic stop should have been completed and that the evidence suppressed
resulted from the unconstitutional delay.
We address Davis’s procedural argument first. We hold that the Government
did not waive its right to appeal the suppression order. As long as a timely objection
appears in the record, “Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record
admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an
objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” Fed. R. Evid.
103(a). The record here contains the Government’s sixteen-page written response in
2
opposition to Davis’s motion to suppress, laying out the facts and legal support for
the Government’s position that the evidence is admissible. (R.1-16.) This written
opposition preserved the Government’s right to appeal the order granting the motion
to suppress.
Next, we consider the Government’s substantive argument that the evidence
was erroneously suppressed. The grant of a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed
as a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969
(11th Cir. 2003). Ordinarily, the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear
error and the application of the law to the facts is considered de novo. Id. Here, the
district court held no evidentiary hearing but assumed that the facts presented in the
Government’s written opposition to the motion to suppress were true. And, neither
party objected to this assumption as to the facts. Thus, we review only the application
of search and seizure law to the facts set forth in the Government’s written
opposition, which appears in the record at R.1-16, to the motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.
2001). “Ordinarily, when a citation or warning has been issued and all record checks
have been completed and come back clean, the legitimate investigative purpose of the
3
traffic stop is fulfilled.” United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir.
2004). However, an officer may detain an individual beyond the purposes of the
traffic stop if there is “articulable suspicion illegal activity has occurred or is
occurring” or if the driver consents. United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220
(11th Cir. 1999). Articulable suspicion must be drawn from specific facts, and
rational inferences therefrom, measured under the totality of the circumstances and
in light of the officer’s knowledge. United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370
(11th Cir. 1990). Officers cannot rely on a mere “hunch,” but must point to specific
factors that led them to suspect other legal wrongdoing. United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 274-75, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750-51 (2002).
What is at issue here is the detention for a short period of time to have a canine
unit brought to the scene to search for drugs. The dog alerted on the vehicle within
a few minutes after arriving at the scene. We conclude that the officers had
reasonable suspicion supporting this short detention, and thus the detention was
reasonable and constitutional.
Here, the initial traffic stop was made because the officer was suspicious of a
vehicle of the type Davis was driving emerging from a senior citizens’ community
late in the night; because the area was known to him to be a high crime area; because
the window tint on Davis’s vehicle was so dark that the officer could not see the
4
driver and the officer believed that tint to be in violation of Florida traffic laws; and
because, when the officer pulled up next to the vehicle, Davis made an abrupt and
short detour onto a side road, resuming his original path of travel after it appeared
that the officer had left. After the officer signaled for Davis to pull over, Davis
delayed in doing so, passing up two opportunities to pull to the side of the road then
parking in a parking lot in a manner that raised the officer’s suspicions that Davis was
seeking to maintain the option to exit. Once the officer began talking with Davis, he
encountered additional reasons to be suspicious that Davis was involved in criminal
activity. The discrepancy between the address on Davis’s driver’s license and his
initial statement of the location of his residence was suspicious, especially in light of
the fact that he was a registered sex offender who was required by law to report his
residence. Also suspicious was the fact that Davis claimed he had just dropped his
brother off but did not know the name of the street on which he left his brother. As
a result of a routine background check, the officer learned that both Davis and his
passenger had criminal histories. Then, Davis consented to a search of the trunk but
either denied or revoked consent for a search of the interior of his vehicle. And, when
another officer arrived, that officer reported that he had been present when Davis
recently was stopped in the same car and arrested for possession of crack cocaine.
Viewing the circumstances as a whole, the police officers had reasonable suspicion
5
that Davis was involved in criminal activity. The record suggests that they detained
him for no more than about ten minutes while they waited for a canine unit to arrive.
That detention was not unreasonable.
Because the detention was not unconstitutional, we vacate the court’s
suppression order and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
6