Jerri L. Dunn v. Harris Corporation

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-13847 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Sept. 8, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-01526-CV-ORL-28DAB
JERRI L. DUNN,
an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HARRIS CORPORATION,
a foreign corporation,
FIDELITY EMPLOYER SERVICES COMPANY LLC,
a foreign corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 8, 2009)
Before BLACK, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case arose after an employee of Harris Corporation (Harris), Buddy
Cox, died on March 25, 2005. At the time of Buddy’s death, Fidelity Employer
Services Company, LLC (Fidelity) had two beneficiary designation forms in
Buddy’s file. One designated Buddy’s son, Dr. Thomas G. Cox, as the sole
beneficiary and another listed as beneficiaries one of Buddy’s daughters, Sharon
L. Taylor, and Buddy’s former girlfriend, Jerri L. Dunn. The latter form was
received by Fidelity more than ten years after the form naming Dr. Cox as the
beneficiary, but it was not signed or dated.
Dr. Cox and Dunn each claimed they were entitled to the 401(k) plan funds.
After Harris’s Employee Benefits Committee determined Dr. Cox was the sole
beneficiary, Harris filed an interpleader action against Dr. Cox, Dunn, and Taylor
to determine the proper beneficiary, pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The district court granted Harris’s
motion to be dismissed from that action and denied Dunn’s repeated requests to
re-add Harris as a party, so Dunn filed the instant suit against Harris and Fidelity.
Dunn also brought her action pursuant to § 1132, alleging the second beneficiary
designation form should be given effect or, alternatively, the defendants breached
their fiduciary duty when they received the defective form and failed to notify
Buddy or take corrective action.
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The district court ruled on both cases the same day. In the first case, the
court held Dr. Cox was the proper beneficiary. In the instant case, the court
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding Dunn could not state a
cause of action against Harris or Fidelity because (1) the enforcement mechanisms
of ERISA do not allow for the relief Dunn sought, and (2) Dunn was procedurally
barred because her claim was a compulsory counterclaim that should have been
brought in the first case. Dunn appealed both cases and they were initially
consolidated. On July 24, 2009, we summarily affirmed the district court’s
judgment in the first case because Dunn failed to present any arguments for
overturning that judgment. Now, with her claim 401(k) plan benefits abandoned,
we conclude Dunn has no statutory standing to proceed with this appeal.
“Section 1132 is essentially a standing provision [that] sets forth those
parties who may bring civil actions under ERISA and specifies the types of actions
each of those parties may pursue.” Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520,
1524 (11th Cir. 1987). The only parties authorized to bring a lawsuit under § 1132
are participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor. ERISA
defines a beneficiary as “a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.” 29
U.S.C. § 1002(8). “Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which
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remains open to review at all stages of the litigation.” Nat’l Org. For Women, Inc.
v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 802 (1994).
The only basis for Dunn to have standing to sue Harris and Fidelity in this
case is if she is deemed a beneficiary. Dr. Cox has already been determined to be
the proper beneficiary of Buddy’s 401(k) plan, and that determination has been
affirmed by this Court. In light of that judgment, Dunn cannot become entitled to
the 401(k) plan benefits, so she is not a beneficiary or potential beneficiary who
has standing to bring a claim under § 1132. See Arnold, 809 F.2d at 1524. Dunn
does not have standing, so we dismiss this appeal.1
DISMISSED.
1
We do not address whether Dunn had standing to pursue her claims in district court. See
Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles, 351 F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Litigants must establish their
standing not only to bring claims, but also to appeal judgments.”).
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