United States v. Audiel Lara-Mondragon

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14783
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cr-00010-RWS-SSC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AUDIEL LARA-MONDRAGON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(April 9, 2013)
Before HULL, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Audiel Lara-Mondragon appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm
by an illegal alien, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). On March 2, 2011, six
law enforcement agents, acting on information that Lara-Mondragon was the
owner of a semi-automatic rifle that was wanted in connection with an ongoing
investigation, arrived at his residence without a warrant. Three of the agents
encountered his wife, Hortencia Lara, at the front porch, while the remaining three
agents positioned themselves along both sides of the residence. When questioned
by the agents about her legal status, Lara admitted that both she and Lara-
Mondragon were illegally present in the United States. She was then detained and
removed from the front porch. Lara-Mondragon remained inside the residence
with his three children and refused to exit. Approximately 25 minutes later, a
female arrived at the residence to pick up her young child, who had been entrusted
to Lara-Mondragon and his wife for caretaking. Lara-Mondragon eventually
exited his residence with the child and his own children, at which time the agents
arrested him, conducted a search of the residence, and discovered the rifle.
Lara-Mondragon later pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm
by an illegal alien, but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress evidence—including the rifle—obtained during the encounter.
On appeal, he does not contest the validity of the arrest or post-arrest search. He
argues only that the district court erred by: (1) finding that the three agents who
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strayed from his front door during the initial encounter had a legitimate police
purpose for doing so, and thus concluding that the encounter qualified as a
consensual “knock and talk”; and (2) concluding that the agents’ presence on his
property for approximately 25 minutes after they detained his wife was authorized
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884–85 (1968).
A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact.
United States v. Bautista-Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009). We review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its application of the law to
the facts de novo. Id. Further, all facts are construed in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party below. Id. Finally, we afford substantial deference to the
factfinder’s credibility determinations. United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269,
1275 (11th Cir. 2003). The district court is in a better position to judge the
credibility of witnesses before it, and we will not disturb a finding of fact “unless it
is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that
no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289
F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). After careful
review, we affirm.
I.
On appeal, Lara-Mondragon first contends that the district court erred in
finding that the three agents who strayed from his front door during the initial
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encounter acted for a proper purpose and without their weapons drawn; therefore,
the court’s conclusion that the encounter was a consensual “knock and talk” is
untenable. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
by the government, is not implicated by consensual encounters with police. United
States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006). Police conduct in such
instances is analogized to, and delimited by, the regular conduct of ordinary private
citizens. See id. This means that, absent express orders from the person in
possession, “[o]fficers are allowed to knock on a residence’s door or otherwise
approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants just a[s] any private
citizen may.” Id. (alteration in original). While a “knock and talk” may, by the
terms of its designation, presuppose an encounter at the residence’s front door,
officers may move away from the front door so long as they do so for a legitimate
purpose unconnected to a search of the premises. See id. at 1205 (noting that
officers may depart from the front door as part of a legitimate attempt to contact
the occupants of a residence). Importantly, as has long been recognized, officer
safety is a concern whenever officers and arrestees or potential arrestees are in
close proximity. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226, 94 S. Ct.
467, 472 (1973) (adopting search-incident-to-arrest rule in part for reasons of
officer safety).
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If the citizen’s cooperation is induced by “coercive means” or if a reasonable
person would not “feel free to terminate the encounter,” however, then the
encounter is no longer consensual, a seizure has occurred, and the citizen’s Fourth
Amendment rights are implicated. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,
201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002).
In determining whether a police-citizen encounter was consensual or
whether a seizure has occurred, we consider the following factors:
whether a citizen’s path is blocked or impeded; whether identification
is retained; the suspect’s age, education and intelligence; the length of
the suspect’s detention and questioning; the number of police officers
present; the display of weapons; any physical touching of the suspect,
and the language and tone of voice of the police.
United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). These factors are not applied rigidly, however, but are instead
used as guidance. Id. “The ultimate inquiry remains whether a person’s freedom
of movement was restrained by physical force or by submission to a show of
authority.” Id. “The government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent
based on a totality of circumstances.” Id.In this case, the district court did not err in its conclusion that the initial
encounter between the agents, Lara-Mondragon and Lara constituted a consensual
“knock and talk” that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The lead
investigator testified that the agents initiated the encounter to investigate (1) the
location of a rifle that was displayed in an illegal alien’s photograph, (2) where that
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person was holding that rifle, and (3) who informed the agents that the rifle
belonged to appellant. As the agents approached Lara-Mondragon’s residence, he
immediately retreated into his home and appeared to lock the door. With this
evidence as backdrop, and mindful of the ever-present concern for officer safety in
such situations, the district court did not err in finding that the three agents who
positioned themselves alongside the residence did so for legitimate safety reasons.
Moreover, the lead agent testified that no weapons were drawn during the
encounter.
Lara-Mondragon’s further contention that the encounter was coercive is
meritless. The agents did not block Lara-Mondragon’s path, as evidenced by his
retreat into his house, nor did they obstruct his wife’s movement until she was
subsequently detained on admission that she and Lara-Mondragon were illegally
present in this country. Although six agents were present, including three
alongside the perimeter of the residence, no weapons were drawn. Until the
moment that his wife was handcuffed—at which time the encounter undisputedly
ceased to be a consensual “knock and talk”—she was targeted only with questions,
not commands. The agents did not request any identifying documentation or
physically handle his wife in any way. In short, the agents’ conduct during the
initial encounter did not restrain the movement of Lara-Mondragon or his wife, and
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it lacked the use or showing of coercive force. The district court’s conclusion was
sound.
II.
Next, Lara-Mondragon challenges the district court’s conclusion regarding
the validity of the agents’ presence on his property during the 25 minutes that
immediately followed his wife’s detention until the arrival of the other child’s
mother—that is, from approximately 3:55 p.m. to 4:20 p.m. He maintains that the
duration of his wife’s detention and the agents’ accompanying presence on his
property were not authorized under Terry.
Absent probable cause to make an arrest, “[l]aw enforcement officers may
briefly detain a person for an investigatory stop if they have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion based on objective facts that the person has engaged, or is
about to engage, in criminal activity.” United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d
1216, 1220 (11th Cir. 1993). Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch; it
requires that the totality of the circumstances create some minimal level of
objective justification for the belief that the person is engaged in unlawful conduct.
Id. at 1220–21. “The reasonableness of the officers’ conduct must be judged
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
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that the action taken was appropriate.” United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572,
1576 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In Terry, the Supreme Court adopted a dual inquiry for evaluating the
reasonableness of an investigative stop.” United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141,
1144 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, the courts examine
whether the police action was justified at its inception. Id. Second, the courts
consider whether the stop was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. at 1145 (internal quotation
marks omitted). To determine whether the manner and length of an investigatory
detention during a Terry stop was reasonable under the second prong, we apply
four non-exclusive factors. Id. at 1146. The factors are: (1) the purpose of the
detention; (2) the diligence of the police in conducting the investigation; (3) the
scope and intrusiveness of the detention; and (4) the duration of the detention. Id.“There is no rigid time limitation or bright line rule regarding the permissible
duration of a Terry stop,” id. at 1147, but detentions of less than one hour have
been repeatedly upheld as reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 688, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985) (finding 20 minutes to be reasonable);
Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1492 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding 30 minutes
to be reasonable); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 761 (11th Cir. 1988)
(finding 50 minutes to be reasonable).
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Here, the agents’ presence on Lara-Mondragon’s property for 25 minutes
following the detention of his wife was reasonable. First, the legitimacy of the
detention’s purpose—that is, to further investigate the legal status of Lara-
Mondragon and his wife—is not in dispute. Second, the lead investigative agent
testified that shortly after Lara-Mondragon’s wife was handcuffed, he was in
regular and continuing contact with: (1) law enforcement authorities, to check on
the legal status of Lara-Mondragon; and (2) the U.S. Attorney’s office, to discuss
the development of probable cause and the possibility of securing a warrant to
search the residence. Moreover, the investigator diligently remained in contact
with the U.S. Attorney’s office until his attention shifted to the removal of a child
from the residence when the child’s mother arrived on the property approximately
25 minutes after Lara-Mondragon’s wife was detained––that is, until the moment
that Lara-Mondragon concedes the agents’ presence was justified by exigent
circumstances.
Third, with respect to Lara-Mondragon, whose Fourth Amendment rights
alone are presently at issue, the agents’ presence was limited in scope and
intrusiveness. Although they remained on his property during the contested period,
they positioned themselves away from the residence and they did not attempt to
enter, demand entry, or search the interior. Finally, the 25-minute duration of the
agents’ presence is well within the bounds of reasonableness demarcated in
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previous cases. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 688, 105 S. Ct. at 1576; Courson, 939
F.2d at 1492; Hardy, 855 F.2d at 761.
For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Lara-
Mondragon’s suppression motion, as well as his conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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