United States v. Charles Jackson

USCA11 Case: 22-11639 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 03/02/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11639
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00052-TWT-JSA-2
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11639
Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Jackson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
peals the denial of his motion for compassionate release pursuant
to the First Step Act. 1 The government, in turn, moves for sum-
mary affirmance and to stay briefing.
The record shows that a federal grand jury charged Jackson
with, among other things, one count of armed robbery of a postal
worker through use of a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2114(a)
(“Count 2”) and one count of use of a weapon during a crime of
violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A) (“Count 3”). He later pled
guilty to these charges. The district court sentenced him to a total
of 228 months’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ supervised re-
lease.
After filing several motions not relevant to the current ap-
peal, Jackson filed his initial motion for compassionate release,
which the district court denied in 2021. Later, Jackson filed the pre-
sent pro se motion for compassionate release. The district court
denied his motion, finding that he lacked extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons meriting relief, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did
not weigh in favor of release, and he presented a danger to the com-
munity. In doing so, the court otherwise incorporated by reference
1 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018) (“First Step Act”).
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22-11639 Opinion of the Court 3
its 2021 order denying his first motion for compassionate release.
This appeal follows.
On appeal, Jackson, who is still pro se, argues that the district
court overestimated the need for just punishment and his danger
to the community when it considered the § 3553(a) factors. He
asserts that COVID-19 in combination with his health issues and
the prison environment still presented an extraordinary and com-
pelling reason, even with the availability of vaccines. He contends
that the district court abused its discretion by relying on its previ-
ous order in 2021 to formulate its new order. He does not expressly
note or argue against the district court’s finding that he would be a
danger to the community.
Rather than responding, the government moves for sum-
mary affirmance. It argues that his medical conditions and the ex-
istence of COVID-19 did not qualify as an extraordinary and com-
pelling reason. It asserts that district court properly weighed the
§ 3553(a) factors and properly found he represented a danger to the
community.
I.
Summary disposition is appropriate, in part, where “the po-
sition of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that
there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case
. . . .” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th
Cir. 1969). A motion for summary affirmance shall postpone the
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11639
due date for the filing of any remaining brief until we rule on such
motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).
We will review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court abuses
its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows im-
proper procedures in making the determination, or makes findings
that are clearly erroneous. United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d
1178, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011).
We liberally construe pro se pleadings. See United States v.
Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1068 n.11 (11th Cir. 2021). An appellant
abandons a claim when he makes only passing references to it or
raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments
and authority. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridan Ins. Co., 739 F.3d
678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).
In the context of compassionate release, the statute provides
that “the court, upon . . . motion of the defendant . . ., may reduce
the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth
in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,
if it finds that—extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such
a reduction.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also requires that any reduction be
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentenc-
ing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Section 1B1.13 of the
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22-11639 Opinion of the Court 5
Sentencing Guidelines provides the applicable policy statement for
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
The application notes to § 1B1.13 list four categories of ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical
condition, (B) his age, (C) his family circumstances, including the
death of a caregiver of a minor child, and (D) “other reasons.” Id.,
cmt. (n.1(A)–(D)). Subsection D serves as a catch all provision,
providing that a prisoner may be eligible for relief if, “[a]s deter-
mined by the Director of the [BOP], there exists in the defendant’s
case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in com-
bination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through
(C).” Id., cmt. (n.1(D)).
Section 1B1.13 says that extraordinary and compelling rea-
sons exist if the defendant is suffering from, among other things, a
terminal illness or a serious physical or medical condition that sub-
stantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care within the envi-
ronment of a correctional facility and from which he is not ex-
pected to recover. Id. cmt. (n.1(A)(i)).
We have noted that the fact that a prisoner has a common
ailment that could “possibly” make his risk of a serious illness
“more likely” if he contracts COVID-19 is not the kind of debilitat-
ing condition that meets the policy-statement definition of an “ex-
traordinary and compelling reason” for early release from prison.
See Harris, 989 F.3d at 912.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11639
The § 3553(a) factors include, among other things, the na-
ture and circumstances of the defendant’s offense, his history and
characteristics, and the need to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It is the defendant’s
burden to show that his circumstances warrant a reduction.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The policy statement also requires district courts to deter-
mine that a defendant is no longer a danger to the safety of others
or to the community as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(2). These factors include the nature and circumstances of
the offense—including whether the crime involved a controlled
substance—the weight of the evidence against the person, the his-
tory and characteristics of the person—including physical and men-
tal condition, family tires, past conduct, history relating to drug or
alcohol abuse, and criminal history—and the nature and serious-
ness of the danger to any person or community posed by the per-
son’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment if the
§ 3553(a) factors favored doing so, there are extraordinary and
compelling reasons for doing so, and the reduction would not en-
danger any person or the community. United States v. Tinker,
14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). All of these necessary condi-
tions must be satisfied before it can grant a reduction. Id. There-
fore, the absence of even one condition would foreclose a sentence
reduction. Id. at 1238.
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22-11639 Opinion of the Court 7
We conclude that summary affirmance is warranted here for
several reasons. First, Jackson did not identify an extraordinary and
compelling reason for releasing him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A);
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1(A)–(D)); Harris, 989 F.3d at 912. Sec-
ond, with respect to the § 3553(a) factors, he did not show that
those factors weighed in his favor. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Third, with respect to the danger he posed to the community, Jack-
son has likely abandoned any argument related to the district court
finding in that respect, but even if he has not, he did not show that
the district court abused its discretion when it found that he was
still a danger to the community, particularly given the circum-
stances of his offense conduct. Cordero, 7 F.4th at 1068 n.11;
Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680; see 18 U.S.C. § 3142; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2).
We can affirm the denial on any of these grounds. Tinker, 14 F.4th
at 1237–38
Finally, Jackson does not show how the district court abused
its discretion when it incorporated by reference its previous order.
The district court did not follow an improper procedure in this re-
spect, incorporation facilitated meaningful appellate review of
Jackson’s claims, and there is no indication that he was harmed by
the court’s action. Barrington, 648 F.3d at 1194.
II.
Accordingly, because the government’s position is clearly
correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11639
for summary affirmance and deny its motion to stay the briefing
schedule as moot. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162; see
also 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).
AFFIRMED.