United States v. Stephanie Fields

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-13592 APRIL 23, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00381-CR-CG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEPHANIE FIELDS,
a.k.a. Stephanie Renee' Fields,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 23, 2009)
Before DUBINA, FAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2007, Stephanie Fields was indicted on one count of stealing $5,195.00
from the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. Fields had been a
“Section 8” tenant through the Greenville, Alabama, Housing Authority (“GHA”),
which received funding from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. During an annual re-certification process, the GHA discovered that
Fields had misreported her income and received rental assistance to which she was
not entitled. Fields agreed to a repayment plan and made one payment, but did not
pay the balance until shortly before learning of the indictment. Fields proceeded to
trial, but the district court ruled that she could not present evidence of repayment or
her statements to investigators about her willingness to repay. A jury found Fields
guilty. Fields now appeals her conviction on the basis that the district court erred
in excluding evidence of her repayment and related statements. She argues that
such evidence was relevant to her lack of intent to defraud the government, and
should have been admitted as long as its relevance was not outweighed by the
potential for confusion. She also argues that the exclusion of the evidence
prevented her from presenting a “viable defense.”
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings, including rulings on the
relevance of evidence, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Todd, 108 F.3d
1329, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 1997). However, a district court may not exclude
“crucial relevant evidence necessary to establish a valid defense. When proffered
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evidence is of substantial probative value, and will not tend to prejudice or
confuse, all doubt should be resolved in favor of admissibility.” Id. at 1332(citation and quotations omitted). Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we will
affirm unless “the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied
the wrong legal standard.” United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir.
2005) (quotation omitted).
“Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or
the use of another . . . any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United
States or of any department or agency thereof . . . Shall be fined . . . or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 641. To support a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 641 for theft of government money, the government must prove
that (1) the money described in the indictment belonged to the United States or an
agency thereof, (2) the defendant stole or converted the property to her own use,
and (3) the defendant did so knowingly with the intent to deprive the government
of the money. See United States v. Moore, 504 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (11th Cir.
2007) (noting that the defendants acknowledged spending money received from a
government agency, but denied doing so knowingly with the intent to deprive the
government because no one told them they were not entitled to the money).
Section 641 requires the intent to deprive the owner of the use of the money “either
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temporarily or permanently.” United States v. McRee, 7 F.3d 976, 982 (11th Cir.
1993) (concerning a charge of conversion under § 641). A defendant’s intention to
repay stolen money, and “even actual repayment,” is not a defense to a charge
under § 641. United States v. Lanier, 920 F.2d 887, 895 (11th Cir. 1991)
(concerning a charge of embezzlement under § 641). “Repayment in the face of
litigation does not show a lack of fraudulent intent.” See United States v. Suba,
132 F.3d 662, 677 (11th Cir. 1998) (addressing intent to commit mail fraud under
18 U.S.C. § 1341 by improperly using Medicare funds).
We have stated that, in cases involving possible check-kiting, evidence of
repayment can be relevant because a defendant may try to establish that she did not
know a check was bad at the time of writing it. United States v. Morales, 978 F.2d
650, 653-55 (11th Cir. 1992). In other cases, however, the necessary intent is
established by knowingly participating in a fraudulent transaction, whether or not
there was repayment or an intent to repay. Id. (discussing, inter alia, United States
v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1983)). In Scott, for example, repayment was
irrelevant to the offense of intentionally providing false information to acquire loan
accounts. Id. at 655. Likewise, in Morales, we held that the defendant’s unlawful
intent to obtain cash for bad checks could not be negated by an intent to repay. Id.
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Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, “relevant evidence” is “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. “All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided . . . . Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.” Fed.R.Evid. 402. “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Fed.R.Evid. 403. ““Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Hearsay generally is not admissible.
Fed.R.Evid. 802.
Because repayment was not relevant to Fields’s intent to deprive the
government of its funds under § 641, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in disallowing evidence of repayment. To the extent that Fields argues that her
statements to investigators regarding her willingness to repay were admissible,
such argument fails because those statements were inadmissible hearsay.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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AFFIRMED.
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