Smith v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 21, 2009
No. 09-11423 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-14361-CV-DLG
GLENN C. SMITH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, Walter A. McNeil,
STEPHEN W. KEGERREIS,
individual capacity, et al.
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(December 21, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Glenn C. Smith, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim for relief and the denial of his motion
for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As to the complaint, Smith argues that the district court erred by (1) dismissing his
retaliation claims, (2) dismissing his due process claims, and (3) finding that a
prison rule requiring inmates to comply with all orders issued by the guards is
constitutional. He also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for relief from the judgment because his complaint stated a
claim for relief.
I.
First, Smith argues that the district court erred by dismissing his retaliation
claims, in which he claimed that prison guards filed a retaliatory disciplinary report
against him for exercising his First Amendment right to protest cold conditions in
his cell by covering his air vent.
“A district court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A is reviewed de novo, taking the allegations in the complaint as
true.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). “Pro se pleadings
are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,
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therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,
1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Section 1915A of the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[t]he court
shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable
after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from
a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Upon review, the court is to identify cognizable claims, or dismiss the
complaint or portions thereof that are “frivolous, malicious, . . . fail [] to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek [] monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). “A complaint is
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true,
show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215,
127 S. Ct. 910, 920, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007). A prisoner’s “complaint must
contain enough facts to state a claim of retaliation by prison officials that is
plausible on its face.” Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliating against
prisoners for exercising the right of free speech.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,
1248 (11th Cir. 2003). It is well established that a prisoner exercises his First
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Amendment right when he complains about his conditions of confinement. Id. To
state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) his speech or act was
constitutionally protected, (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely
affected the protected speech, and (3) there is a causal connection between the
retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech. Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d
1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). To establish a claim for retaliation, the inmate must
show a causal connection between his protected conduct and the prison official’s
action. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, prison officers issued
Smith a disciplinary report because he refused to obey an order to uncover his air
vent, which he had covered to block cold air from coming out of it. Thus, the
allegations of the complaint establish that prison officials issued the report because
he failed to comply with an order, not because he engaged in First Amendment
expression. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly found that
there was no causal connection between any protected expression and the
disciplinary report.
II.
Next, Smith argues that the district court erred by dismissing his due process
claims, in which he claimed that prison officials wrongfully subjected him to
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disciplinary confinement in connection with the disciplinary report discussed
above. Smith contends that he had a liberty interest in being free from disciplinary
confinement.
The Due Process Clause protects against deprivations of “life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. “A § 1983 action
alleging a procedural due process clause violation requires proof of three elements:
deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; state action;
and constitutionally-inadequate process.” Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177
(11th Cir. 1994). This Court has recognized two situations in which a prisoner,
who already has been deprived of liberty in the traditional sense, can further be
deprived of his liberty, such that due process is required. Kirby v. Siegelman, 195
F.3d 1285, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1999). First, a prisoner is entitled to due process
when a change in his conditions of confinement “is so severe that it essentially
exceeds the sentence imposed by the court.” Id. at 1291. Second, due process is
required “when the state has consistently bestowed a certain benefit to prisoners, . .
. and the deprivation of that benefit imposes atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held that placement in
disciplinary confinement for 30 days did not give rise to a protected liberty interest
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where the punishment, “with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions
imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody.”
Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 475-76, 486, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2296, 2301, 132 L.
Ed. 2d 418 (1995).
Here, although Smith asserted a number of ways in which disciplinary
confinement differed from being in the general prison population, he also conceded
that the conditions in disciplinary confinement essentially were the same as the
conditions in administrative confinement. Accordingly, we conclude that Smith
did not have a liberty interest in being free from disciplinary confinement, and the
district court correctly found that he failed to state a due process claim.
III.
Smith also argues that the district court erred by finding that the rule
requiring prison inmates to obey all orders issued by the guards is constitutional.
He asserts that the rule wrongly requires inmates to comply with illegal orders.
“Unlike the strict standards of scrutiny applicable to the constitutional rights
of persons in free society, the Supreme Court has adopted a deferential standard for
determining whether a prison regulation violates an inmate’s constitutional rights.”
Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000). A prison regulation, even
one that infringes on the inmate’s constitutional rights, “is an actionable
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constitutional violation only if the regulation is unreasonable.” Id. In examining
the reasonableness of a regulation, we consider the following factors:
(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the
regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put forward to
justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the
asserted constitutional right that remain open to the inmates;
(3) whether and the extent to which accommodation of the asserted
right will have an impact on prison staff, inmates, and the allocation
of prison resources generally; and (4) whether the regulation
represents an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns.
Hakim, 223 F.3d at 1247-48 (quoting “Pope v. Hightower, 101 F.3d 1382, 1384
(11th Cir 1996)).
Here, (1) there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the
necessity of maintaining safety and security in the prisons; (2) alternative means
existed for Smith to express his First Amendment rights; (3) revising the rule to
require prisoners to comply only with legal orders would create vagueness in the
regulation and allow prisoners to challenge every order they believe to be illegal;
and (4) the rule is not an exaggerated response to safety concerns. Accordingly,
we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Smith’s constitutional
challenge to the regulation.
IV.
Finally, Smith argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his motion for relief from the judgment where his complaint stated valid retaliation
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and due process claims.
Regardless of how the parties label the motion, the district court will treat a
post-judgment motion as having been filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59 or 60, depending on the type of relief sought. Burnam v. Amoco Container Co.,
738 F.2d 1230, 1231 (11th Cir. 1984). We review the denial of either motion for
an abuse of discretion. Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001)
(addressing Rule 60(b) motions), Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir.
2006) (addressing Rule 59(e) motions).
A Rule 59(e) motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to
alter or amend a judgment and must be filed no later than ten business days after
the entry of judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e); see Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d
43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997). In order for a Rule 59(e) motion to be granted, a party
must identify “newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.”
Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to relitigate matters that already
have been considered. Id. Moreover, such a motion cannot be used to raise
arguments or present evidence that could have been raised before the judgment was
entered. Id.
A Rule 60(b) motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may
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provide relief from a judgment due to: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered earlier with due diligence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) a void judgment; (5) a judgment that has been
satisfied, released, discharged, reversed, or vacated; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Relief
under Rule 60(b)(6) “is an extraordinary remedy, but it is within the district court’s
discretion to grant it in order to do justice.” Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1400
(11th Cir. 1987).
In his motion for relief from the judgment, Smith did not identify any
newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. Moreover, he did not
argue that he was entitled to relief under any of the specific justifications found in
Rule 60(b). Accordingly, regardless of whether it fell under Rule 59(e) or
Rule 60(b), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion for relief from the judgment.
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
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