United States v. Eric Darnel Taylor

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-15996 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 13, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 97-00128-CR-3-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ERIC DARNEL TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 13, 2009)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Eric Darnell Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
order granting his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for sentence reduction, based on
Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, Taylor argues that the
court abused its discretion by failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in
determining the extent to which a reduction was warranted. Taylor further argues
that the court should have granted more than the two-level reduction that was
authorized by Amendment 706, and that the guidelines policy statements limiting
the court’s discretion in reducing a sentence are invalid in light of United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), and Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 558, 169 L. Ed. 2d 481 (2007).
“We review de novo a district court’s conclusions about the scope of its legal
authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” United States v. James, 548 F.3d 983,
984 (11th Cir. 2008). We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a
defendant’s sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003).
A district court may reduce a defendant’s sentence if he has been “sentenced
to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered . . ., after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In
2
determining whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under § 3582(c)(2), the
district court must engage in a two-step analysis:
First, the court must substitute the amended guideline range for the
originally applied guideline range and determine what sentence it
would have imposed. In undertaking this first step, only the amended
guideline range is changed. All other guideline application decisions
made during the original sentencing remain intact . . . Second, in light
of the conclusion reached in the first step, the court must consider the
factors listed in § 3553(a) and determine whether or not to reduce the
defendant’s original sentence.
United States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 760 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted,
emphasis added). The applicable policy statements instruct that, in considering
whether and to what extent a reduction is warranted, the court shall consider the
§ 3553(a) factors and public safety concerns, and it may consider the defendant’s
post-sentencing conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment. (n.1(B)) (emphasis added).
We have held that “a district court commits no reversible error by failing to
articulate specifically the applicability—if any—of each of the section 3553(a)
factors, as long as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into
account by the district court.” United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322
(11th Cir. 1997). However, we recently vacated and remanded the grant of a
§ 3582(c)(2) reduction where the record failed to indicate whether the district court
considered the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1257
(11th Cir. 2009).
3
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court correctly
calculated Taylor’s amended offense level and reduced guideline range. Contrary
to Taylor’s contention on appeal, the district court was not permitted to reduce his
offense level beyond the two-level reduction authorized by Amendment 706.
However, the district court’s order granting the reduction to the middle of the
amended range provides only that the court considered Taylor’s § 3582(c)(2)
motion. Because Taylor’s motion contained no analysis of the specific factors that
were relevant to the § 3553(a) inquiry, except for Taylor’s post-conviction
conduct, and the district court did not otherwise explain its decision, the record
does not clearly indicate whether the court properly considered the pertinent
factors. As a result, we vacate and remand for further consideration and
explanation.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
4