Nolan Nathaniel Edwards v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11831 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar AUGUST 3, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:08-cv-01956-VMC-TBM
NOLAN NATHANIEL EDWARDS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 3, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nolan Nathaniel Edwards, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Executive Office for United States
Attorneys (EOUSA) in his civil action brought pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).1 No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
The FOIA requires a federal agency -- upon a request for records reasonably
describing documents in that agency’s possession -- to make those documents
promptly available to any person unless the information within the records is
protected from disclosure by a statutory exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (b).
The disclosure provisions of the FOIA are construed broadly; and the exemptions
are interpreted narrowly. Ely v. F.B.I., 781 F.2d 1487, 1489 (11th Cir. 1986). The
agency bears the burden of proving that a particular piece of information is exempt
from disclosure. Id. at 1489-90.
Edwards sought information about his prior criminal case, specifically,
information about statements his codefendant, Shawn Williams, made to the
police. In response to Edwards’s request, the EOUSA provided Edwards with five
and a half pages of material; but the EOUSA withheld seven pages, claiming that
the information was exempt from disclosure because it reasonably could be
1
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo; and we view the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008).
2
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or could
reasonably be expected to disclose a confidential source.2 See 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7)(C), (D).
On appeal, Edwards makes no challenge to the applicability of these
exemptions; instead, he argues that the EOUSA waived the exemptions because it
earlier had disclosed the documents that he requested. Edwards bases this
argument on a public records request he made under the Florida Public Records
Act where he received a redacted investigative supplement report prepared by the
St. Petersburg Police Department that described his codefendant’s debriefing.
If an agency voluntarily discloses information, it may not claim in a later
proceeding that the previously released information is exempt from disclosure.
Florida House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 961 F.2d 941, 946
(11th Cir. 1992). But Edwards has not established that the EOUSA already had
disclosed the information it withheld in his case. Although Edwards suggested (in
his response to the EOUSA’s summary judgment motion) that the EOUSA had
provided him with a copy of the investigative supplement report, his supporting
2
The withheld documents contained (1) names and identifying data of other suspects in
the investigation; (2) the identity of a third party who was merely mentioned in the investigation;
and (3) names and other important information about law-enforcement officers who participated
in the investigation.
3
evidence revealed that the St. Petersburg Police Department actually disclosed the
report. That Edwards obtained a copy of the investigative report from another
source does not establish that the EOUSA voluntarily waived any FOIA
exemption on that information. See L & C Marine Transport, Ltd. v. United
States, 740 F.2d 919, 922, 925 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that a person “does not
lose his privacy interest under [5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)] because his identity as a
witness may be disclosed through other means” and that the “per se limitation on
disclosure under [5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D)] does not disappear if the identity of the
confidential source later becomes known through other means”).
Edwards showed no genuine issue of material fact about whether the
EOUSA waived its right to invoke the statutory exemptions in the FOIA; and the
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the EOUSA. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
AFFIRMED.
4