United States v. Travius Devon Ruffin

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-12642
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cr-14004-DMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TRAVIUS DEVON RUFFIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 22, 2019)
Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Travius Devon Ruffin challenges his 96-month sentence for possession of a
firearm by a felon as substantively unreasonable. He argues that the district court
failed to consider his incomplete defense of coercion and schizophrenia diagnosis,
while affording too much weight to his criminal history. We affirm the sentence
from the district court.
I.
Ruffin pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm and
ammunition by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). According to the Presentence
Investigation Report (PSI), Ruffin fired a gun into the air outside of a convenience
store and shot at a pickup truck as it accelerated towards him. Ruffin fled the
scene and entered a house, where he allegedly refused to leave and threatened the
house occupants so that they would not leave or call the police.
In the PSI, a probation officer calculated Ruffin’s base offense level as 20
under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and added a four-level increase under
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of a firearm during certain felony offenses,
including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, false imprisonment with a
weapon, and tampering with a witness, victim, or informant. The PSI included a
two-level increase for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1, and a three-level
decrease for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1. Based on these
calculations, Ruffin’s total offense level was 23.
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The PSI detailed Ruffin’s criminal history, including several incidents
involving violence as a juvenile and as an adult, and assigned criminal history
points based on Ruffin’s convictions. The PSI also detailed Ruffin’s history of
mental illness, including his diagnoses of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
With a total offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of VI, the
guideline range of imprisonment was 92 to 115 months. Ruffin filed a motion for
downward variance, arguing that his criminal history category overrepresented the
seriousness of his actual criminal history, particularly given his history of mental
illness. He argued that the three criminal history points for a sale of marijuana
conviction overrepresented his criminal history because he only sold $10 worth of
marijuana when he was sixteen years old and, had he been charged as a juvenile,
he would not have received those points. He also argued that the two criminal
history points that he received for driving with a suspended license overrepresented
his criminal history because the record made it appear as if he received a six-month
sentence for this offense, when he only remained in custody for a violation of
probation. Ruffin contended that his untreated schizophrenia contributed to the
commission of the instant offense; he also asserted that his diagnosis set him apart
from others with similar criminal histories scores who did not suffer from such an
illness. Finally, Ruffin argued that he had possessed a gun for protection—he fired
it once into the air only to disperse a group of aggressors and then fired it once at a
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truck accelerating dangerously towards him. He claimed that he never threatened
anyone with this gun while in the house.
The district court adopted the findings of the PSI and sentenced Ruffin to 96
months’ imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release. The court
ordered that Ruffin receive mental health treatment while on supervised release.
The court expressly evaluated the statements of both parties, the PSI, the advisory
guidelines, and statutory factors. The court added that it had considered Ruffin’s
argument for a variance and gave some weight to Ruffin’s arguments about his
prior charges resulting in criminal history points, “particularly the marijuana and
the suspended license.” The court expressed concern, however, with other parts of
Ruffin’s criminal history that included “violence and threats of violence,” noting
that “some of those offenses received no points.” Ultimately, the court was
unconvinced that Ruffin’s criminal history category overrepresented his previous
convictions. The court also noted the pending charges against Ruffin, emphasizing
that his “use of firearms and possession of firearms and . . . express willingness to
use them presents a danger to the community from which they need to be
protected.” Ruffin objected to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
II.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 56, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007). A sentence within the
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guideline range is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 40, 128 S. Ct. at 591. To
determine substantive reasonableness, we examine the totality of the circumstances
to decide whether the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support the sentence
in question. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam). A sentence may be substantively unreasonable if a district court
unjustifiably relied on any § 3553(a) factor, based the sentence on impermissible
factors, or failed to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Sarras,
575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009). We may vacate a sentence for substantive
unreasonableness only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
based on the facts of the case. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
The district court’s sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need
for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to promote respect for
the law, the need for adequate deterrence, the need to protect the public, and the
need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court must
also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the guideline
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range, any pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to
victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of showing that the
sentence is unreasonable given the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States
v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). The weight given to any specific
§ 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United
States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). As a result, the district court
need not specifically address every mitigating factor raised by the defendant for the
sentence to be substantively reasonable. See United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855,
873 (11th Cir. 2010). A sentence below the statutory maximum is another
indicator of reasonableness. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam). That we may reasonably conclude a different sentence is
appropriate is insufficient for reversal. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128
S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). The Guidelines allow a court to depart downward from the
guideline range “[i]f the defendant committed the offense because of serious
coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a complete
defense.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Ruffin’s sentence.
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Although Ruffin argues that the district
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court did not give weight to his incomplete defense of coercion based on U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.12, he did not seek such a departure in the district court. In any event, while
the district court did not specifically discuss that argument in announcing its
sentence, the court’s statement that it considered the other mitigating factors is
sufficient. Snipes, 611 F.3d at 873. And the weight given to this information, if it
bore on the nature and circumstances of the offense, is within the sound discretion
of the district court. See Clay, 483 F.3d at 743.
As to his criminal history, the district court agreed with Ruffin that his
previous marijuana and driving on a suspended license convictions, for which he
received criminal history points, deserved little weight. Even with less weight
afforded to those convictions, however, the court expressed concern with Ruffin’s
extensive and violent criminal history, which included offenses for which he
received no criminal history points. Thus, the court acted within its discretion in
determining that Ruffin’s criminal history was not overrepresented. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1); Clay, 483 F.3d at 743.
The district court also addressed the § 3553(a) factors by emphasizing the
need to protect the public due to Ruffin’s “express willingness” to use firearms and
the “danger to the community” he presented. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
Furthermore, the district court clearly considered Ruffin’s mental health issues,
evidenced by the court’s order that Ruffin receive mental health treatment during
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his supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Finally, Ruffin’s 96-month
sentence is well below the statutory maximum for his offense, which also indicates
its reasonableness. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Accordingly, Ruffin’s
sentence is substantively reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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