United States v. Arvester Lamonica Anderson

Case: 18-11886 Date Filed: 08/02/2019 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-11886
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cr-00486-JSM-JSS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARVESTER LAMONICA ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(August 2, 2019)
Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Arvester Anderson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (e). The district court sentenced Anderson to 180
months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Anderson
now appeals, arguing that his Florida convictions for robbery and drug possession
are not predicate offenses under the ACCA. We disagree and affirm.
I.
Anderson first argues that his Florida robbery convictions under Fla. Stat.
§ 812.13 are not violent felonies because they occurred prior to the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1997).
We review de novo whether a prior conviction is a violent felony under the
ACCA. United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014). Federal
law determines the meaning of the ACCA, but we are bound by the Florida
Supreme Court’s interpretation of its state law offenses. Curtis Johnson v. United
States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010).
The Supreme Court recently affirmed our holding that robbery under Fla.
Stat. § 812.13 is a violent felony under the ACCA. Stokeling v. United States, 139
S. Ct. 544, 549–50 (2019) (“Florida robbery qualifies as an ACCA-predicate
offense under the elements clause.”). And in United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937,
940–42 (11th Cir. 2016), we concluded that pre-Robinson robbery convictions are
violent felonies under the elements clause because Robinson did not announce a
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new rule of law, but merely announced what “the statute always meant.” Stokeling
and Fritts thus foreclose Anderson’s argument. See United States v. Vega-Castillo,
540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (prior panel precedent rule).
II.
Anderson next argues that his drug possession conviction under Fla.
Stat. § 893.13 should not qualify as a serious drug offense under the ACCA
because the statute lacks a mens rea requirement.
We review de novo whether a conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense
under the ACCA. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016).
In United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014), we held that a
conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13 is a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA.
We explicitly rejected the argument that the crime must contain a mens rea element
to qualify as a serious drug offense under the ACCA. Id. Smith thus forecloses
Anderson’s argument to the contrary. See Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1236.
III.
The district court correctly applied binding precedent to conclude that
Anderson’s prior Florida convictions for robbery and drug possession were
predicate offenses under the ACCA. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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