United States v. Trenton A. Copeland

Case: 12-11908 Date Filed: 05/09/2013 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-11908
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cr-00037-LC-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TRENTON A. COPELAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(May 9, 2013)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Trenton A. Copeland appeals his conviction and life sentence for conspiracy
to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine. Copeland argues on appeal that the court should have given his requested
instructions with regards to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) evidence and multiple conspiracies,
and thus his theory of defense. After thorough review, we affirm.
We typically review a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury
instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Palma, 511 F.3d 1311, 1314-
15 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court’s decision will not be disturbed on abuse of
discretion review if its decision falls within a range of possible conclusions that do
not constitute a clear error of judgment. United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222,
1236 (11th Cir. 2011). The issue of whether a jury instruction correctly stated the
law or misled the jury is reviewed de novo. United States v. Daniels, 685 F.3d
1237, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sep. 28, 2012) (No. 12-
6556). However, where a defendant fails to object to a jury instruction, we review
for plain error. United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000).
We have held that the presentation of a request for an instruction, and the court’s
specific denial thereof, is sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. United States
v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1114 n.3 (11th Cir. 1994).
First, we are unpersuaded by Copeland’s claim that the district court abused
its discretion in refusing to give his requested instruction concerning Fed.R.Evid.
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404(b) evidence. A refusal to give a requested jury instruction warrants reversal
only if: (1) the requested instruction was substantively correct; (2) the instruction
was not covered elsewhere in the charge; and (3) the failure to give the instruction
substantially impaired the defendant’s ability to effectively present a defense.
Palma, 511 F.3d at 1315. A trial court is given broad discretion in formulating its
charge to the jury, but a defendant is entitled to have instructions given relating to
a theory of defense where there is any foundation in the evidence to support them.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant a particular instruction is
reviewed in the light most favorable to the accused. Id.We have held that it is not error to give the pattern instruction on Rule
404(b) evidence. See United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1072-73 (11th
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2711 (2012). Where the government offers
“similar transaction” evidence in regard to a specific, substantive count of
indictment, it can be error for the court to deny the defendant’s request for a
limiting instruction. United States v. Gonzalez, 975 F.2d 1514, 1517-18 (11th Cir.
1992). That error may impair the defendant’s ability to present a defense, and
constitute reversible abuse of discretion, where all of the other evidence of the
substantive count was circumstantial, and no other part of the charge covered or
addressed the issue. Id.3
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Neither arrest nor incarceration automatically triggers withdrawal from a
conspiracy. United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1427 (11th Cir. 1991).
Withdrawal is an affirmative defense that a defendant must prove by his own
affirmative steps to disavow or defeat the conspiratorial objectives. Id.Here, Copeland’s suggested instruction -- this Circuit’s pattern instruction
on Rule 404(b) evidence -- was generally a substantively correct statement of the
law. However, it is not clear from the record, nor did the district court ever rule,
that the evidence that Copeland complains of was, in fact, extrinsic to the
conspiracy as charged in the indictment. Therefore, it is not clear that, as applied
to the facts of his case, Copeland presented the court with an instruction containing
a correct statement of the law.
In any event, the court did not abuse its discretion in not giving the
instruction under the next two parts of the test found in Palma. See Palma, 511
F.3d at 1315. 1 Copeland’s argument for why the charge was necessary was that it
would avoid the risk that the jury would conflate Copeland’s actions separate from
the charged conspiracy with his actions that actually furthered the charged
conspiracy. That risk was substantially covered by the court’s instruction that
1
In this instance, we review the court’s alleged error in failing to give a Rule
404(b) limiting instruction for abuse of discretion. Copeland requested that the
court give the instruction, and, even though the court never explicitly said that it
would not give the instruction, its subsequent failure to do so constituted an
implicit ruling, sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. See Morris, 20
F.3d at 1114 n.3.
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Copeland could only be found guilty if the government proved that he “joined the
conspiracy charged in this indictment, rather than some other conspiracy that may
have been mentioned during the trial.” While the charge would have explained the
appropriate but limited use of this evidence, defense counsel was content to wait
until the end of the trial for any explanation at all.
The failure to give Copeland’s additional instruction also did not impair
Copeland from presenting his defense that: (1) all of the evidence linking Copeland
to the charged conspiracy came from cooperating witnesses who had a reason to
lie; and (2) all of the other direct evidence linking Copeland to drugs was outside
the scope of the indictment. It was a jury question whether the two seizures
showed continuing conduct that was part of the conspiracy as charged in the
indictment, and the court’s instructions did not impair Copeland’s ability to
adequately defend himself on that point to the jury. Therefore, the court did not
abuse its discretion.
Nor do we agree with Copeland’s argument that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to give an instruction concerning multiple conspiracies. For
starters, where the defendant expressly agrees with the court’s given instruction,
any claimed error is waived and we will not review it. Daniels, 685 F.3d at 1244.
Further, the district court generally should instruct the jury on a theory of defense
where there is some basis in the evidence and legal support for the instruction.
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United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1030 (11th Cir. 2001). In determining if
there is a proper evidentiary foundation, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant. United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1404 (11th
Cir. 1984). A specific theory of defense charge is not warranted where the charge
adequately covers the substance of the requested instruction. See United States v.
Jones, 933 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1991).
As the record shows, Copeland initially requested two separate full
instructions on multiple conspiracies and his theory of defense. However, in
discussing the jury charge with the court, Copeland stated that the court only
needed to give one charge or the other, but not both. After the court suggested that
it would give a modified, one sentence instruction, Copeland argued that the
court’s instruction would be sufficient if it added that: “The government must
show an interdependence among the alleged co-conspirators in order to prove that
the indicted conspiracy was a single, unified conspiracy as opposed to a series of
small or uncoordinated conspiracies . . . .” Therefore, Copeland assented to the
court’s given instruction with the exception of its omission of the sentence
involving a “single, unified conspiracy.” As a result, Copeland has waived any
argument concerning the rest of his initially requested instruction, and we review
only the court’s failure to give the “single, unified conspiracy” instruction. See
Daniels, 685 F.3d at 1244.
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The court’s instruction that the jury must convict Copeland only if the
charged conspiracy was proven adequately covered Copeland’s requested
instruction. Copeland’s requested charge that the government must prove a
“single, unified conspiracy as opposed to a series of small or uncoordinated
conspiracies” is arguably redundant to the court’s instruction that the court must
find that Copeland “joined the conspiracy charged in this indictment.” While the
court could have given that instruction, it was not an abuse of discretion to not give
an instruction that was substantially covered elsewhere. See Palma, 511 F.3d at
1315. That rationale applies with equal force to a requested theory of defense
charge. See Jones, 933 F.2d at 1544. Based on the given instructions, Copeland’s
argument that the jury could have convicted based on evidence of a separate
conspiracy is unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm Copeland’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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