Wright v. Dodd

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 18, 2011
No. 10-15609 JOHN LEY
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 4:10-cv-00134-RLV
BYRON SCOTT WRIGHT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KENNY DODD,
POLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND
POLICE MEN,
BAKER HARBIN,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(August 18, 2011)
Before HULL, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Byron Scott Wright, an state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Wright’s § 1983 complaint alleged
that he was arrested without a warrant and without first being informed of his
Miranda1 rights. Wright sought monetary damages and dismissal of the state
criminal charges pending against him. The district court sua sponte dismissed the
complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. After review, we affirm.2
A complaint fails to state a claim when, taking the complaint’s allegations as
true, it does not appear that a claim for relief “is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Although we liberally construe
pro se pleadings, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an
attorney, Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008), we will not
rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action. GJR Invs., Inc. v.
Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other
grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). To state a claim under
§ 1983, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right
secured under the United States Constitution or federal law and (2) such
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
2
We review de novo appeals from a § 1915A(b)(1) sua sponte dismissal for failure to
state a claim. Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of Corrs., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).
2
deprivation occurred under color of state law. Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d
734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010).
Because the allegations in Wright’s § 1983 complaint, even construed
liberally, fail to allege a claim that is “plausible on its face,” the district court
properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks
omitted). Specifically, as to Wright’s false arrest claim, the complaint alleges in
conclusory fashion that the police arrested Wright without a warrant, but does not
allege any facts showing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. See
Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the
existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to a § 1983 claim for false arrest).
Wright’s allegation that his Miranda rights were violated does not give rise
to a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1291
(11th Cir. 1999). Likewise Wright’s request for the dismissal of the pending state
criminal charges, which challenges the very fact of his confinement, cannot be
granted in the § 1983 context. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.
Ct. 1827, 1841 (1973). Furthermore, because Wright’s complaint alleges that his
criminal proceedings are pending, the district court properly refused to construe it
as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (providing
3
that a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the petitioner has exhausted
the remedies available in the state courts).
AFFIRMED.
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