United States v. Karl Bernard Bell

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 18, 2011
No. 11-12074
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:01-cr-00423-PCH-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KARL BERNARD BELL,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(November 18, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Karl Bernard Bell appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his “Motion
for Clarification” of whether the court had jurisdiction to impose his mandatory
terms of life imprisonment. Because Bell’s motion was actually a successive
habeas petition filed without our authorization, the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to rule on it.
I.
Bell was convicted in 2001 of two counts of distribution of crack cocaine.
Before the trial, the government had filed a notice of intent to seek enhanced
penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 851 based on Bell’s prior drug-related felony
convictions. The district court applied the § 851 enhancement, sentencing Bell to
two concurrent mandatory life sentences. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). After
Bell’s conviction and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a motion
to vacate his sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied.
He did not appeal that judgment.
Later, Bell filed a pro se “Motion for Clarification” in the district court
arguing that the government’s § 851 enhancement notice did not give him
adequate notice of the government’s allegations because it cited to the wrong
subsection of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Thus, Bell argued the district court had lacked
jurisdiction to impose the mandatory life sentences. The district court summarily
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denied the motion. Bell asks us to vacate his sentence and remand his case for
resentencing.
II.
“Whether the district court had jurisdiction . . . is a legal question subject to
plenary review.” United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir.
2002). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a district court generally “may not modify a
term of imprisonment once it has been imposed,” but “may modify an imposed
term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”1 “[E]xpressly permitted by
statute refers to situations where the defendant is incarcerated pursuant to a plainly
illegal sentence.” Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d at 1316 (quotation marks omitted). It
does not, however, refer to situations where the second or successive motion bar
prohibits bringing a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id.We must “look beyond the label of a pro se inmate’s motion to determine if
it is cognizable under a different statutory framework.” United States v. Stossel,
348 F.3d 1320, 1322 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Jordan, 915
F.2d 622, 624–25 (11th Cir. 1990) (same). However labeled, Bell’s motion sought
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Rule 35 permits a sentencing court to correct “a sentence that resulted from arithmetical,
technical, or other clear error” within 14 days or to reduce a sentence for substantial assistance.
Neither applies here.
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modification of his sentence, and that could have been done, if at all, only under
Rule 35 or under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Rule 35 does not apply, and Bell’s motion is
properly construed as a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because Bell
had already filed a § 2255 motion, this one is his second.
A second or successive motion under § 2255 must be certified by the
appropriate court of appeals to contain newly discovered evidence that establishes
the petitioner’s innocence or “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); see also § 2244(b). Absent this Court’s permission, the
district court lacks jurisdiction to address the motion, and it must be dismissed.
See United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Without
authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or
successive petition.”); Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir.
2003) (same).
The district court should have construed Bell’s “Motion for Clarification” as
a successive § 2255 motion to vacate. Because that motion was filed without
authorization from this Court, the district court should have dismissed it for lack
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s denial and remand the
matter to the district court with instructions to dismiss the motion for lack of
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subject matter jurisdiction.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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