Donald Jones v. Union City

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-15085
NOVEMBER 18, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-03910-CC
DONALD JONES,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
UNION CITY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(November 18, 2011)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Donald Jones, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to the defendant, Union City.1 Jones sued the city in
December 2008, alleging several 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims after an officer
attempted to retrieve a woman’s bag from his apartment in November 2004, and
Jones allegedly locked the officer inside and would not allow him to leave. After
a brief struggle, officers arrested Jones, but the charges were eventually dismissed.
On appeal, Jones agues that the district court improperly granted summary
judgment to the city on his claims of illegal search, excessive force, false arrest,
and malicious prosecution, and that the district court judge improperly refused to
recuse himself. After review, we affirm.
We liberally construe pro se pleadings, Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157,
1160 (11th Cir. 2003). We review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of
summary judgment, and consider facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836–37 (11th Cir.
2006). We also review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application
of a statute of limitations. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d
1While Jones designated the district court’s denial of his post-judgment motion for
reconsideration in his notice of appeal, he did not provide any argument in his brief regarding
reconsideration. Therefore, we will construe Jones’s appeal as appealing the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to Union City.
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1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). We review a district court’s denial of a
recusal motion for an abuse of discretion. In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1308
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
I.
The Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims
“is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 387, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1094 (2007) (citation omitted). The parties agree
that Georgia law applies and that the statute of limitations is two years. O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-33.
We have held that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims begins to run
when facts supporting the cause of action are or should be reasonably apparent to
the claimant. Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2003) (per curiam). False arrest claims brought pursuant to § 1983, where
arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, accrue when the claimant is detained
pursuant to a legal process. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391, 127 S. Ct. at 1097. A
§ 1983 claim for malicious prosecution arises where the plaintiff, as part of the
commencement of a criminal proceeding, has been unlawfully and forcibly
restrained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and, due to that seizure, injuries
follow as the prosecution continues. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d
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1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010). Probable cause defeats a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim. Id.
Jones’s § 1983 claims of false arrest, illegal search, and excessive force are
time-barred. The facts supporting the claims arose and were known by Jones in
November 2004, but he filed his claims in December 2008, more than two years
later. In addition, Jones did not plead the essential elements of a malicious
prosecution claim because he did not claim he was injured by the prosecution or
that the action lacked probable cause.
II.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones’s motions
for recusal. Other than mentioning his recusal motions in his brief, and
designating one of the motions in his notice of appeal, Jones does not provide any
argument as to why recusal was necessary. We find that there was no reason to
believe that the district court’s impartiality could have reasonably been
questioned, and recusal was not warranted.
AFFIRMED.
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