Maid of the Mist Corp. v. Alcatraz Media, LLC

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 31, 2011
JOHN LEY
Nos. 10-11758, 10-11981, 10-12515, 10-12516 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:06-cv-00714-ODE
MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs
lllllllllllllllllllll Counter Defendants
lllllllllllllllllllll Appellees,
versus
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC,
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC.,
llllllllllllllllllll Defendants
llllllllllllllllllll Counter Claimants,
WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant
lllllllllllllllllllll Counter Claimant
lllllllllllllllllllll Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 31, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2005, Maid of the Mist Corporation and Maid of the Mist Steamboat
Company, LTD. (collectively, “Maid of the Mist”) sued William Windsor and two
business entities in state court for interfering with business operations. After
removal and much litigation, the district court granted summary judgment and
entered a consent final order and judgment resolving all claims in the case.
Despite agreeing to the final order, Windsor continues to submit filings in this
matter.1
This opinion addresses four consolidated appeals brought by Windsor. In a
previous order we determined that any appeal he files must first pass a frivolity
screening. After numerous notices of appeal, we decided that Windsor could seek
review of four of the district court’s orders: (1) its April 9, 2010 order imposing
1
In addition to numerous orders, this Court has issued two opinions in this litigation.
Maid of the Mist Corp. v. Alcatraz Media, LLC, 294 F. App’x 463 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(“Maid I”); Maid of the Mist Corp. v. Alcatraz Media, LLC, 388 F. App’x 940 (11th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (“Maid II”).
attorneys’ fees against Windsor; (2) its April 26, 2010 order finding Windsor in
contempt of a December 22, 2009 order; (3) its April 30, 2010 order imposing
additional attorneys’ fees against Windsor; and (4) its May 4, 2010 denial of
reconsideration of the April 9, 2010 order. Our analysis will focus on those
orders, and we disregard Windsor’s countless remaining attacks on the district
court proceedings.
I.
The district court—on Maid of the Mist’s motion for post-judgment
attorneys’ fees and expenses—ordered Windsor to pay $192,377.87 for his post-
judgment litigation actions, pursuant to its inherent authority, inter alia. It
concluded that the dozens of motions filed by Windsor after his first Rule 60(b)
motion were “totally frivolous,” “filed in bad faith,” “objectively unreasonable,”
and served to “vexatiously and unreasonably multipl[y] the proceedings in this
closed case . . . in which [Maid of the Mist] prevailed on the merits nearly three
years ago.”
Windsor appeals from both the district court’s order awarding attorneys’
fees and its denial of his motion to reconsider that award. Those decisions are
subject to abuse-of-discretion review. See Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d
1169, 1179–80 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The abuse-of-discretion standard also applies to
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the extent that the district court’s order [awarding attorneys’ fees] relies on 28
U.S.C. § 1927 or the court’s inherent power.”); Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits,
Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e also review the denial of his
motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.”). A federal court, acting
under its inherent power, can assess attorneys’ fees if a party “has acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46, 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The imposition of sanctions in this instance transcends a
court’s equitable power concerning relations between the
parties and reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself,
thus serving the dual purpose of “vindicat[ing] judicial
authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions
available for contempt of court and mak[ing] the prevailing
party whole for expenses caused by his opponent’s
obstinacy.”
Id. at 46 (alterations in original) (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14,
98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978)). “Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be
exercised with restraint and discretion.” Id. at 44.
Based on our review of the extensive record and the parties’ briefs, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the fees requested by Maid
of the Mist. None of Windsor’s arguments regarding the district court’s ability to
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award sanctions are persuasive and, accordingly, each is summarily dismissed.
Furthermore, Windsor challenges neither Maid of the Mist’s specific time or
expense entries nor the specific hourly rates charged. Because the district court
possessed the discretion to award attorneys’ fees, and because Windsor did not
challenge the attorneys’ fees calculation, we affirm. Likewise, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Windsor’s motion for
reconsideration of the attorneys’ fees award.
II.
Windsor next appeals from the district court’s order finding him in
contempt of its filing injunction.2
This court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for civil
contempt under the abuse of discretion standard. Upon
appellate review, a civil contempt order may be upheld
only if the proof of the defendant’s contempt is clear and
convincing. “This clear and convincing proof must also
demonstrate that 1) the allegedly violated order was valid
and lawful; 2) the order was clear, definite and
unambiguous; and 3) the alleged violator had the ability to
comply with the order.”
2
We previously upheld the district court’s order preventing Windsor from filing any
motion, pleading, or other document in connection with the facts underlying the original lawsuit
in this case. Maid II, 388 F. App’x at 942. Accordingly, all of Windsor’s arguments pertaining
to the legitimacy of the filing injunction have previously been adjudicated.
5
McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Jordan v.
Wilson, 851 F.2d 1290, 1292 n.2 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). “‘[T]he focus of
the court’s inquiry in civil contempt proceedings is not on the subjective beliefs or
intent of the alleged contemnors in complying with the order, but whether in fact
their conduct complied with the order at issue.’” Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037,
1047 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512,
1516 (11th Cir. 1990)).
In its December 22, 2009 order, which we previously upheld, the district
court ruled that “Windsor is ORDERED not to file in any court any new lawsuit
which involves claims arising from the same factual predicate or nucleus of
operative facts as the instant case.” (emphasis in original). In February 2010,
Windsor filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia arising out of the same operative facts at issue in the previous litigation.
Windsor’s contempt is clear and convincing in this case. First, we previously
determined that the December 22 order preventing future filings was valid and
lawful. Second, the portion preventing Windsor from filing suit in any court could
not have been clearer. Finally, Windsor could have complied with the provision
prohibiting the filing of additional lawsuits by not filing additional lawsuits.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the civil contempt motion.
III.
Finally, Windsor appeals the district court’s award of additional attorneys’
fees for the work completed outside of the time frame covered by the initial award.
Windsor makes no discernible argument as to why the district court abused its
discretion in awarding additional fees. Accordingly, his claims are summarily
dismissed.
IV.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the district court’s orders are
AFFIRMED.
Maid of the Mist’s motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38 is DENIED.
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