United States v. Clark B. Sampson

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 14, 2007
No. 06-13756 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-20539-CR-PAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLARK B. SAMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 14, 2007)
Before CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges and STAGG,* District Judge.
_________________________________
*Honorable Tom Stagg, United States District Judge for the Western District of
Louisiana, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Clark Sampson appeals his conviction for mail fraud on the grounds that it
was not supported by sufficient evidence. Sampson was convicted of making
fraudulent representations in order to induce customers to purchase unprofitable
pay phones. He argues that he was unaware of the fraudulent nature of his
statements and that the government thus failed to prove “intentional participation
in a scheme to defraud.” United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir.
2003) (noting the elements of a mail fraud conviction). Reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence de novo, but drawing all inferences in favor of the government, we
find no merit in Sampson’s claim. United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327
(11th Cir. 2005). We have held that “direct proof of willful intent to defraud is not
necessary [for a mail fraud conviction]. It may be inferred from the activities of
the parties involved.” United States v. Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357, 1369 (11 th Cir.
2005) (citing Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 676 (5th Cir. 1967)). Here,
Sampson’s experience in the phone industry, his knowledge of customer
complaints, and his refusal to speak to customers after a completed sale creates an
inference that Sampson was aware that his representations were false. We thus
find that Sampson’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and affirm.
Sampson next argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying a
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mistrial request after previously excluded evidence was presented to the jury. In a
pre-trial order, the district court excluded evidence of civil claims against Ameritel,
Sampson’s prior employer. The challenged testimony established that Sampson
had prior experience in the phone industry, but made no reference to the
proceedings against Ameritel. Contrary to Sampson’s arguments, it is therefore
beyond the purview of the exclusionary order. Additionally, even if we were to
conclude that the testimony was improperly included, Sampson was not prejudiced
since the government introduced other evidence that established Sampson’s
awareness of the fraudulent nature of the enterprise. We thus find that the district
court properly exercised its discretion in denying Sampson’s motion for a mistrial.
Finally, Sampson argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the
district court failed to consider properly his relationship with his family and his
recent services to the community, and thus refused to impose a sentence below the
Guidelines range. The record demonstrates that the district court properly
calculated the Guidelines sentence, heard testimony on mitigating factors, and took
the U.S.S.G. §3553(a) factors into account when making its determination. In light
of Sampson’s extensive criminal history and the extensive financial loss to the
victims, we cannot say that Sampson has met his burden of establishing that the
sentence was unreasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.
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2005). Accordingly, his sentence, and the underlying conviction, is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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