United States v. Richard Owen Brown

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 2, 2006
No. 06-11563 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-60219-CR-KAM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RICHARD OWEN BROWN,
a.k.a. Dwight Wynter,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 2, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Richard Owen Brown appeals his conviction for conspiracy to
import cocaine, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and attempt
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and
846. On appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress physical evidence seized from his girlfriend’s car because the police
lacked probable cause to search the car. Brown further argues that the police
exceeded the scope of a valid inventory search when they read the contents of a
document found in the car, thus converting it into an investigatory search.
“A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact. This Court reviews the district court’s finding of facts under the
clearly erroneous standard. The district court’s application of the law to those facts
is subject to de novo review.” United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). “Further, when considering a ruling on a motion to
suppress, all facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below.” United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000).
A party moving to suppress evidence must first show that he has standing,
consisting of “a legitimate expectation of privacy” in the car being searched.
United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548 (11th Cir. 1987). On appeal, the
government does not dispute that Brown has standing to challenge the search of the
car at issue, even though his girlfriend owned it. Furthermore, the record reflects
2
that Brown had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car because Brown had
permission to drive it. See United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548 (11th Cir.
1987) (holding that a driver of a borrowed car had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in it, and thus, had standing to challenge a search of the car).
In most circumstances, unless there is consent, police officers must obtain a
warrant supported by probable cause to justify a search under the Fourth
Amendment. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2966 (2006). There are, however, several exceptions to
this rule, including “the automobile exception,” which allows “officers [to] search
any container in an operational car without a warrant as long as they have probable
cause to believe that the container holds evidence of a crime.” Id. (citing
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L. Ed. 2d
619 (1991)). “Probable cause for a search exists when under the totality of the
circumstances there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “In
examining the totality of the circumstances, a reviewing court must give due
weight to the officer’s experience.” United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709
(11th Cir. 1991).
Furthermore, inventory searches, in accordance with reasonable police
3
policy, are also permissible. Colorado v. Bertine 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S. Ct.
738, 742, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987). An inventory search permits a thorough search
of property lawfully in police custody, as long as that search is consistent with the
police caretaking function. United States v. O’Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th
Cir. 1985). Probable cause is not required to conduct a valid inventory search.
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2608, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65(1983). In this context, “the legitimacy of the search . . . turns on its
reasonableness in light of the community caretaking functions that allow inventory
searches. . . . [T]he reasonableness of the inventory search depends on the
particular facts and circumstances.” United States v. Laing, 708 F.2d 1568, 1571
(11th Cir. 1983). We have held that “the mere expectation of uncovering evidence
will not vitiate an otherwise valid inventory search.” United States v. Roberson,
897 F.2d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation and citation omitted).
Based on the totality of the evidence known at the time, we conclude from
the record that authorities had a reasonable belief that Brown used the car to
facilitate the drug transaction and a reasonable belief that they would find drugs or
other evidence of criminal activity inside the car. Thus, authorities had probable
cause to search the car and the search was permissible under the “automobile
exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See Magluta, 418
4
F.3d at 1182-83. We do not address whether authorities exceeded the scope of a
valid inventory search by reading the contents of the seized documents because the
warrantless search of Carlita’s car was otherwise supported by probable cause, and
thus, the district court did not err in denying Brown’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm Brown’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
5