Diane Williams v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 4, 2008
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 07-15254
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-02360-CV-T-23-TGW
DIANE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.,
a Georgia Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 4, 2008)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Diane Williams, a pro se African-American woman, appeals the
district court’s dismissal, based on res judicata, of her discrimination and
retaliation claims against SunTrust Banks, Inc. (“SunTrust”), and the district
court’s denial of her motion for a default judgment. On appeal, Williams argues
that the district court erred in (1) finding that SunTrust was in privity with
Huntington Bank (“Huntington”), which was her former employer before SunTrust
purchased Huntington’s assets, and (2) denying her motion for a default judgment.
I. Res judicata
We review de novo the district court’s application of res judicata, but review
for clear error whether a party is in privity with another because the determination
regarding privity is a question of fact. E.E.O.C. v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d
1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2004). Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a party from
relitigating a cause of action that was, or could have been, raised in a previous suit
between the parties that resulted in a final judgment on the merits. In re Piper
Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). We liberally construe pro se
briefs. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Issues not sufficiently raised in a party’s brief are deemed abandoned. Dalrymple
v. United States, 460 F.3d 1318, 1324 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006).
A party seeking to invoke res judicata must satisfy four elements: “(1) the
prior decision must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2)
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there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) both cases must involve
the same parties or their privies; and (4) both cases must involve the same causes
of action.” In re Piper Aircraft, 244 F.3d at 1296. If the party satisfies these
requirements, the district court must determine whether the new claims could have
been raised in the prior suit, and if so, the claims are barred by res judicata. Id.
The burden of establishing that a current action is barred by res judicata is on the
party asserting res judicata. Id. Summary judgment is a final decision on the
merits. United States v. One Colt Python .357 Cal. Revolver, 845 F.2d 287, 289
(11th Cir. 1988).
Generally, there is privity between a non-party and a party in a prior action if
the non-party’s interests were adequately represented by a party that had the same
interests. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d at 1286. For res judicata purposes,
claims are part of the same cause of action when they arise out of the same nucleus
of operative fact, or are based on the same factual predicate. In re Piper Aircraft,
244 F.3d at 1296-97. It is the substance of the actions, and not their form, that is
important. Id. at 1297. Additionally, res judicata bars all legal theories and claims
arising out of the same nucleus of facts as a prior action, as the analysis centers on
whether the primary right and duty are the same between the two causes of action.
Adams v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 493 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007)
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(citation omitted).
We conclude from the record that the district court did not err in finding that
this action was barred by res judicata, because (1) the prior suit was a final
judgment on the merits, issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the
underlying facts forming the basis of this action occurred prior to Williams’s prior
action; and (3) it has not been established that SunTrust was not in privity with
Huntington.
II. Default judgment
“We review the denial of a motion for a default judgment for abuse of
discretion.” Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1316
(11th Cir. 2002). Additionally, we review the denial of a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) motion for an abuse of discretion. Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga.,
253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 states that,
when a party fails to plead, or otherwise defend, a default must be entered.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Motions to alter or amend judgment cannot be used to
relitigate previously decided matters or raise arguments that could have been made
prior to entry of judgment. Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408
F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
We conclude from the record that the district court did not abuse its
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discretion in denying the motion for default judgment because SunTrust defended
the action, and the motion was filed after the court had dismissed the action with
prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of dismissal and the district
court’s order denying Williams’s motion for default judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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