William Arsis v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14497
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:11-cv-02040-ACC-DAB
WILLIAM ARSIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(February 18, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
William Arsis filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that the state court violated his Sixth and
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Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to appoint counsel for a discussion
relating to his competency during trial. The district court denied the petition, and
we granted Mr. Arsis a certificate of appealability on this claim. We now affirm.
I
Mr. Arsis, a Florida prisoner, is serving a total sentence of life imprisonment
following jury convictions for burglary, aggravated battery, false imprisonment,
kidnapping a child, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and theft.
On March 4, 2005, the state trial court determined that Mr. Arsis was
incompetent to stand trial, and Mr. Arsis was committed to the Department of
Children and Family Services (“DCF”) to be placed in a mental health facility. On
August 14, 2006, the trial court found that Mr. Arsis’ competency had been
restored. Two weeks later, the court granted Mr. Arsis’ motion to proceed pro se.
On the first day of trial, Mr. Arsis represented himself and made cogent
objections. See Ex. I at 145-48, 167, 187–88. 1 He also presented an opening
statement to the jury and made challenges to the court’s jurisdiction. See id. at
174-82, 200-01. After a few hours, Mr. Arsis agreed to allow the court to appoint
his standby counsel to represent him, but he then quickly recanted and decided to
again represent himself. Mr. Arsis continued to make objections during the state’s
1
Unless otherwise noted, citations to the record refer to the appendices filed with the
respondents’ brief.
2
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case, cross-examined the state’s witnesses, and renewed his jurisdictional
challenges until the day’s end. See id. at 207-82.
On the second day of trial, Mr. Arsis began the day by, for the first time,
raising the issue of his competency. He explained to the trial court that he was told
in jail to request a competency hearing. The court asked whether he believed he
was competent, and Mr. Arsis then presented the court with details about his belief
that he was abducted by aliens when he was 13 and that a camera was installed in
his eye as part of a larger conspiracy. The court reviewed Mr. Arsis’ prior mental
health records and determined that this information was not new and had been
previously evaluated during the determination of his competency. At that point,
the trial court did not press the issue of Mr. Arsis’ competency and continued the
trial—noting that the report referenced Mr. Arsis’ history of exaggerating mental
health symptoms. Id. at 299-300. A jury later convicted Mr. Arsis.
Upon a motion by conflict counsel, who was appointed after Mr. Arsis was
convicted, the trial court again evaluated Mr. Arsis’ competency before sentencing,
and found him incompetent. Mr. Arsis was committed to DCF for another year
until his competency was again restored. The court ultimately sentenced Mr. Arsis
to life imprisonment plus forty years and sixty days.
On direct appeal, Mr. Arsis argued, among other things, that the trial court
should have appointed counsel for him during the colloquy on the second day of
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trial. The Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld Mr. Arsis’ convictions and
sentence in a per curiam order. See Arsis v. State, 22 So. 3d 559, 559 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2009). Mr. Arsis then unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
and sought post-conviction relief in state court, alleging he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Ex. FF, JJ.
Mr. Arsis then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The
district court denied his petition, ruling that the discussion between Mr. Arsis and
the state court was not a competency hearing. See D.E. 16 at 10. The district court
thus declined to reach the issue of whether such a hearing would be a “critical
stage” of the prosecution so as to require appointment of counsel. See id. Mr.
Arsis then appealed, and we granted a certificate of appealability to determine
whether the trial court’s discussion with Mr. Arsis about his competency on the
second day of trial was a competency hearing, and, if so, whether the trial court
erred when it failed to appoint counsel to represent Mr. Arsis for that hearing.
II
We review de novo the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See
Ferguson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 1315, 1330 (11th Cir. 2013). The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 precludes federal
courts from granting habeas relief on a claim already adjudicated on the merits in
state court unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an
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unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), or (2) “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” Id. This review is “highly deferential.” Williams v. Allen, 598 F.3d
778, 787 (11th Cir. 2010).
A state court decision violates § 2254(d)(1) if it applies a rule that
contradicts Supreme Court precedent or arrives at a result that differs from such
precedent when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010). A
state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent
if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to
the facts of the petitioner’s case in an objectively unreasonable manner, see Brown
v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), or “if the state court either unreasonably
extends a legal principle from this Court’s precedent to a new context where it
should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context
where it should apply,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). Where, as
here, a state court’s summary decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the
burden on a habeas petitioner is to show that no reasonable basis existed for the
state court to deny relief. See Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct.
770, 784 (2011).
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This does not, however, permit a de novo review of the merits of a
petitioner’s claim. See Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1286
(11th Cir. 2012). Rather, to demonstrate objective unreasonableness, “a state
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement . . . that [the state court’s] arguments or theories are inconsistent with
the holding in a prior decision of the Supreme Court.” Id. (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
III
We conclude, as did the district court, that the trial court’s discussion with
Mr. Arsis did not amount to a competency hearing. The trial court therefore did
not err in not providing Mr. Arsis with counsel during that discussion.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits requiring
mentally incompetent defendants to stand trial. See Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960). See also Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir.
1987) (“The test to determine whether a defendant is competent is whether he ‘has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyers with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’”) (quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402).
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Courts have a duty to adequately ensure a defendant is not mentally
incompetent during trial. See Fallada, 819 F.2d at 1568 (citing Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1966)). To comply with this duty and avoid a Pate
violation, a court should consider three factors: “(1) evidence of the defendant’s
irrational behavior; (2) his demeanor at trial; and (3) any prior medical opinion on
his competence to stand trial.” Id. (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180
(1975). See also Drope, 420 U.S at 172 (“In [Pate], we held that the failure to
observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or
convicted while incompetent deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.”).
Review of the trial court transcript shows that the trial court’s discussion
with Mr. Arsis was not a competency hearing but rather an inquiry to determine
whether a hearing was necessary at all. The court’s questioning reasonably applied
the Drope factors to determine the existence of Pate “bona fide doubt” because the
court asked Mr. Arsis why he believed he was incompetent, compared his answers
with prior medical opinions about his competency, and found that the information
had already been weighed as a factor in determining that he was competent. In
addition, the trial court had just observed his demeanor the day before as Mr. Arsis
waived his right to counsel and represented himself, making timely and cogent
objections, presenting an opening statement to the jury, and questioning the court’s
jurisdiction. Finally, the court had reason to consider the timing of Mr. Arsis’
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competency concerns—which came after he received advice from others in jail to
ask for a hearing and after he was visibly frustrated during trial the day before.2
Thus, despite Mr. Arsis raising the issue during trial and in light of prior
competency hearings that had already taken place, the trial court justifiably found
that no new competency concerns had arisen and that there was no bona fide doubt
of competency meriting another hearing at that time. Had the court found such
doubt, it could have then conducted a competency hearing and ordered another
evaluation of Mr. Arsis, as was the case when Mr. Arsis was evaluated for
competency prior to his sentencing.
IV
The trial court appropriately questioned Mr. Arsis under Drope without
initiating a full competency hearing. As a result, there was no constitutional
violation in failing to appoint counsel for Mr. Arsis during that colloquy. See, e.g.,
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993) (holding that the competency
standard for waiving assistance of counsel is the same as competency to stand
trial).
AFFIRMED.
2
Mr. Arsis also contends that he was not competent to stand trial because he was not
given his required medication. See Appellant’s Br. at 16. Mr. Arsis, however, did not bring this
matter to the court’s attention during the discussion. See Fallada, 819 F.2d at 1568 (explaining a
Drope review “must focus on what the trial court did in light of what it then knew”).
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