Charessa Douglas v. Comr. of Social Security

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 23, 2005
No. 04-16235 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-00300-CV-OC-10-GRJ
CHARESSA DOUGLAS, for
Tyrone Patterson Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 23, 2005)
Before BLACK, WILSON and COX, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
Tyrone Patterson, Jr., a minor child, through his mother, Charessa Douglas,
appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s
decision to deny his application for Supplemental Security Income disability
benefits. “Our [de novo] review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to an
inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v.
Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Since substantial
evidence showed that Patterson did not exhibit “marked” limitations in two or
more domains, or “extreme” limitations in one domain, the Administrative Law
Judge correctly concluded that his impairments did not functionally equal any
listed impairment. Accordingly, we affirm.
We are not persuaded by Patterson’s argument that the ALJ erred by failing
to consider his ADHD in combination with his other impairments. During the
sequential evaluation, the ALJ considered Patterson’s impairments in combination
when he was assessing whether Patterson met, equaled, or functionally equaled a
listed impairment. Specifically, the ALJ stated, “claimant’s combination of
impairments does not meet or medically equal the criteria set forth for any
impairment in the listings.” It is clear from the ALJ’s statements that he
considered Patterson’s impairments in combination. See Wheeler v. Heckler, 784
F.2d 1073, 1076 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
Patterson’s argument that the ALJ failed to refute the opinions of two, non-
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examining Social Security Administration psychologists is similarly unpersuasive.
Both psychologists found that Patterson had “less than marked” limitations in two
areas of functioning and “marked” limitations in one area of functioning.
However, the regulations require that a claimant have “marked” limitations in two
domains or an “extreme” limitation in one domain. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d).
Therefore, their evaluations do not support a finding that Patterson’s impairments
functionally equaled a listed impairment.
Patterson’s final argument, that he received a subsequent award of benefits
based on the same impairments demonstrates that the ALJ erred in evaluating his
impairments, also fails. “We review the decision of the ALJ as to whether the
claimant was entitled to benefits during a specific period of time, which period was
necessarily prior to the date of the ALJ’s decision.” Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d
1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). The subsequent award of benefits
indicated that Patterson was to begin receiving SSI disability benefits as of
November 1, 2002, a year and five months after the date of the ALJ’s decision. A
subsequent award of benefits is irrelevant to this case. Instead, it indicates that
Patterson’s condition deteriorated after the ALJ’s decision to the point that by
November 1, 2002, his condition was in fact disabling.
AFFIRMED.
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