United States v. James Samuel Peeples

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-12652 APRIL 6, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cr-20484-AJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JAMES SAMUEL PEEPLES,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 6, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Samuel Peeples appeals his classification as an armed career criminal
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and the
resulting 180-month total sentence of imprisonment, imposed after he pleaded
guilty to one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of possession of marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Peeples argues that his prior convictions for
burglary of unoccupied dwellings do not qualify as violent crimes under ACCA
because the offenses created no risk or possibility of violence. This Court reviews
de novo whether a conviction constitutes a violent felony under ACCA. United
States v. Matthews, 466 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006).
ACCA defines a “violent felony” as:
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year . . . that–
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an offense
constitutes “burglary” under ACCA when “either its statutory definition
substantially corresponds to ‘generic’ burglary, or the charging paper and jury
instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of generic burglary
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in order to convict the defendant.” 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2160
(1990). The Court defined “generic burglary” as “having the basic elements of
unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with
intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 598–99, 110 S. Ct. at 2158. Most pertinent for
our purposes, the Taylor Court noted that Congress never proposed to limit the
predicate offense to “some special subclass of burglaries that might be especially
dangerous, such as those where . . . the building is occupied,” and that Congress’s
“choice of language indicate[d] that Congress thought ordinary burglaries . . .
presented a sufficiently ‘serious potential risk’ to count toward enhancement.” Id.
at 588, 597, 110 S. Ct. at 2153, 2158.
“The main risk of burglary arises not from the simple physical act of
wrongfully entering onto another’s property, but rather from the possibility of a
face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third party—whether an
occupant, a police officer, or a bystander—who comes to investigate.” James v.
United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203, 127 S. Ct. 1586, 1594 (2007) (holding that
attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is a “violent felony” under ACCA);
see also United States v. Matthews, 466 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006)
(determining that burglary of the curtilage of a structure “is indeed a crime that
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‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’”) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
Peeples’s argument that his burglary convictions presented no risk of
physical injury to others because they involved unoccupied dwellings fails under
Taylor and our precedent. Because his crimes presented a very real risk of
physical injury to innocent third parties, the district court properly categorized
Peeples’s prior convictions as violent crimes under ACCA. Accordingly, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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