Flick Mortgage Investors, Inc. v. Metropolis Promotion Investments & Properties (1993) Ltd.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 31, 2006
No. 06-11749
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-21900-CV-AJ
FLICK MORTGAGE INVESTORS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
METROPOLIS PROMOTION INVESTMENTS &
PROPERTIES (1993) LTD.,
ANGLO-SAXON REAL ESTATE AGENCY (ISRAEL 1992), LTD.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 31, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Flick Mortgage Investors, Inc. (“Flick”) appeals the district court’s dismissal
of its complaint, alleging unfair competition and violation of the Florida Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUPTA”), against Defendants Metropolis
Promotion Investments & Properties (1993), Ltd. (“Metropolis”) and Anglo-Saxon
Real Estate Agency (Israel 1992) Ltd. (“Anglo-Saxon”). The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants after concluding
that although the Florida long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b), was satisfied, the
Defendants did not have sufficient minimum contacts under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
them in a court in Florida. On appeal, Flick argues the district court erred in its
“minimum contacts” analysis and its conclusion that the Defendants’ 1998 meeting
with the President of Flick was insufficient to satisfy due process because the meeting
was non-essential to the parties’ future dealings. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. See Meier ex
rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir.2002); Alexander
Proudfoot Co. World Hqrtrs. L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1989).
“When the district court does not conduct a discretionary evidentiary hearing on a
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motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.” Cable/Home
Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990).
On appeal, Flick argues that the district court erroneously concluded that
exercising specific jurisdiction over the Defendants in Florida would not comport
with fundamental notions of fair play and substantial justice, within the meaning of
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, because the Defendants did not have sufficient
minimum contacts with the state. See 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that the
fundamental inquiry of specific jurisdiction is whether the defendant has such
“minimum contacts with [Florida] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (citation omitted)).
An analysis of whether personal jurisdiction exists requires a court to determine
whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with both the forum state’s long-arm
statute, here Fla. Stat. § 48.193, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mut. Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc.,
358 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004).1
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Because we conclude that the Defendants’ contacts with Florida were insufficient to satisfy
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, we do not reach the issue as to whether
those contacts would satisfy the requirements of Florida's long-arm statute, which provides:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or
through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits
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The due process inquiry consists of asking whether “(1) the nonresident
defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum . . . and (2)
the exercise of jurisdiction will not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’ ” SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). We agree with the district court that the
Defendants’ singular contact with Florida, consisting of a 1998 meeting during which
preliminary financing discussions took place, but no formal written or oral agreement
was reached, and during which Flick voluntarily provided the Defendants’
representatives with brochures bearing Flick’s name and mark, was insufficient to
show purposeful availment and, accordingly, was insufficient to establish purposeful
availment. We are unpersuaded by Flick’s suggestion that, the mere (voluntary)
exchange of Flick’s name and mark in Florida changes the result where the record
makes clear that the alleged misappropriation and acts of unfair competition took
himself or herself ··· to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of
action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:
···
(b) Committing a tortious act within this state.
Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1). The district court concluded that § (1)(b) was satisfied. We need not reach
the Florida long arm statute issue because even if Florida’s statute is satisfied, Flick fails to establish
the second prong of the inquiry: showing that the exercise of jurisdiction in the circumstances of this
case comports with the Due Process clause.
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place in Israel. In short, after de novo review, we discern no error in the district
court’s minimum-contacts analysis and dismissal of the complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
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