United States v. Derrick Williams

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 31, 2008
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 07-15183
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00024-CR-4-SPM-WCS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DERRICK WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 31, 2008)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Derrick Williams (“Williams”) appeals his sentence of 188 months
imprisonment, imposed following his guilty plea for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Williams contends that the
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) should not have applied and that the
district court erred because 1) the court relied on a juvenile petition to determine
whether Williams used a firearm in connection with his conviction of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, and 2) the court, in determining that the ACCA
applied, considered a juvenile conviction that was not itself charged in the
indictment and decided by a jury. For the reasons below, we affirm.
I. Background
Williams was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The government served notice that Williams
qualified for the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA based
on two adult convictions and one juvenile adjudication.
Williams agreed to plead guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement. The
agreement explained that the possible mandatory minimum sentence would
increase to fifteen years if Williams qualified as an armed career criminal. At the
change of plea hearing, the court addressed the possible mandatory minimum if
Williams qualified as an armed career criminal, and defense counsel explained that
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Williams would challenge whether his juvenile convictions could be considered
violent felonies under the ACCA. Nevertheless, Williams pleaded guilty.
Williams has a lengthy criminal history, including a juvenile adjudication for
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. The commitment document for that
crime only states that Williams was adjudicated for aggravated battery with a
deadly weapon, while the charging document states more detail: it indicates that
the deadly weapon Williams used was a firearm. Additionally, Williams has two
adult convictions which are relevant in this case: attempted murder with a deadly
weapon and resisting arrest.
At sentencing, Williams did not dispute that his adult convictions for
resisting arrest and attempted murder qualified as violent felonies for purposes of
the ACCA. However, Williams objected to the use of his juvenile conviction for
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon as a qualifying offense because the
commitment document did not clearly define the dangerous weapon as a firearm.
Williams asserted that the court was limited as to the documents it could review to
determine if the juvenile offense qualified as a violent felony, and he stated that
juvenile offenses should not be considered because they were not pled in the
indictment or proven to a jury. He further argued that the court could not consider
charging documents without first determining that the crime charged was the same
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crime for which he was convicted. The court viewed the charging petition and
commitment document and concluded that the aggravated battery offense was a
violent felony because the deadly weapon involved was a firearm.1 The court then
applied the ACCA and sentenced Williams to 188 months imprisonment.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s legal interpretation of statutes and Sentencing
Guidelines de novo. United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2005).
III. Discussion
On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improperly concluded that
his juvenile offense involved a firearm. He bases this contention on the fact that
the judgment document only states that he was guilty of using a “deadly weapon.”
According to Williams, a “deadly weapon” under Florida law could be a number of
objects. He asserts that, in the absence of any proof such as a plea agreement,
court finding, or an admission, the district court failed to establish that he had been
adjudicated guilty of an offense involving a firearm.
A defendant is subject to the ACCA if he “violates section 922(g) . . . and
has three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony or a serious
drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18
1
At sentencing, the government also cited the police reports and probable cause affidavits,
but the court stated that it was not considering those documents in reaching its decision.
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U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The term “violent felony” under § 924(e)(2)(B),
means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or
carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be
punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult,
that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson,
or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). “[T]he term ‘conviction’ includes a finding that a
person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(C). Because Williams did not dispute that he had two
qualifying offenses as an adult (the attempted murder and resisting arrest
convictions), the only issue is whether his juvenile conviction qualified as a third
predicate offense under the ACCA. We affirm the district court’s finding that the
juvenile aggravated battery conviction was a qualifying offense.
Generally, when a court considers the application of a sentencing
enhancement it should follow a “categorical approach” and “consider only the fact
of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” Burge, 407 F.3d at
1187. The district court may, however, “look beyond the conviction when
sentence enhancements are based on a defendant’s prior conduct or crime.” Id.
Under such circumstances, the district court “may look behind the judgment of
conviction when it is impossible to determine from the face of the judgment or
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statute whether the prior crime satisfies the enhancement statute.” Id. The district
court’s review, however, “is limited to the terms of the charging document, the
terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in
which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some
comparable judicial record of this information.” Id. (quoting Shepard v. United
States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1263, 161 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2005) (emphasis
added).
Here, the commitment document reflects that Williams was convicted as a
juvenile of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. The commitment document
does not specify whether the “deadly weapon” was a firearm. The transcript of the
sentencing hearing in this case, however, reflects that the district court had before
it a copy of the charging document in the juvenile proceedings and the district
court relied on the charging document to conclude that Williams used a firearm in
connection with that crime. Reading the charging document and commitment
papers together, the district court properly concluded that the deadly weapon
involved in the juvenile offense was a firearm.2 Because a firearm was involved,
2
At sentencing, the judge also viewed a petition for an unrelated aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon involving a firearm. The judge indicated that this charge—along with the aggravated
battery with a deadly weapon charge—are qualifying offenses under the ACCA. Use of the
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charge to invoke the ACCA was error as there was no
commitment document or other document indicating that Williams was adjudicated for the same
offense with which he was charged. The court’s error was harmless, however, because the
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon adjudication was sufficient to trigger the ACCA when
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the adjudication was a qualifying offense under the ACCA, and because Williams
had two other qualifying convictions—that he did not dispute—the court properly
applied the ACCA enhancement.
Williams also argues that juvenile convictions should not be counted as
qualifying offenses under the ACCA, but he concedes that this court has already
rejected that argument in Burge. See Burge, 407 F.3d 1187, 1191. This court is
bound by decisions of prior panels until overruled by this court sitting en banc or
by the Supreme Court. United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir.
1998). Accordingly, we need not address Williams’s second ground for appeal.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.
combined with the convictions for attempted murder and resisting arrest.
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