Hutchins v. Secretary for Department of Corrections

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 7, 2008
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 07-11556
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-14075-CV-DLG
RANDALL P. HUTCHINS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Walter A. McNeil,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 7, 2008)
Before BLACK, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Randal P. Hutchins, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal
of his petition for writ of habeas corpus as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254. Hutchins pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography with
intent to promote and was sentenced to fifteen years’ probation. He later violated
his probation, and, as a result, he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.
The district court denied Hutchins’s habeas petition as time-barred, but it relied on
Rainey v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrs., 443 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006), which we
overruled in Ferreira v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 494 F.3d 1286, 1292-93 (11th Cir.
2007).1
We granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the single issue of
whether, in light of Ferreira, the district court erred in determining when
Hutchins’s judgment became final under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(A). We have
chosen, however, to expand the COA to include the merits of Hutchins’s habeas
petition because, even if we conclude that the petition was timely under Ferreira,
we must affirm the district court’s alternative merits-based denial of Hutchins’s
petition.
In his habeas petition, Hutchins alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to explicitly define and advise him of a statute of limitations defense
1
In Ferreira we applied the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Burton v. Stewart, —
U.S. —, 127 S. Ct. 793, 166 L. Ed. 2d 628 (2007).
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prior to advising him to waive that defense and plead guilty. Hutchins’s voluntary
guilty plea, however, waived any ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Under Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), a
knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives all constitutional challenges to a
conviction. Id. at 997. The transcript from the change of plea hearing shows that
Hutchins was present when the prosecutor informed the court that Hutchins was
pleading guilty to a charge that was filed after the statute of limitations had
expired. Hutchins indicated, moreover, that he had discussed the case with his
attorney, was satisfied with his attorney’s advice, and understood that he was
giving up his right to a jury trial. Hutchins further indicated that no one had
threatened or forced him to plead guilty, and he expressly waived a statute of
limitations challenge at the hearing. As the district court concluded, Hutchins
cannot reasonably argue that, had he been better informed concerning the statute of
limitations for the count to which he pled guilty, he would have gone to trial and
faced all of the 148 counts of child pornography for which he was charged.
It is clear that Hutchins knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to the offense
for which he was convicted. He thus waived any ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of his habeas petition.
AFFIRMED.
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