United States v. Pedro Aragones-Delgado

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPT 11, 2008
No. 07-14158 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00509-CR-T-23-MSS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PEDRO ARAGONES-DELGADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 11, 2008)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Pedro Aragones-Delgado appeals his concurrent 151-month sentences for
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or
more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846, and
distribution and possession with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Aragones-Delgado contends his sentence was substantively unreasonable because
there is an unwarranted disparity between his sentence and those of his
codefendants, and the facts and circumstances of his case warranted a below-
guidelines sentence.
After United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), we established a two-
part process for district courts to use in calculating sentences. United States v.
McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). First, the district court must
consult and correctly calculate the range recommended by the Sentencing
Guidelines. Second, the district court must fashion a reasonable sentence in light
of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id.
The substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citing Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)). Under this standard, we
will only reverse if the district court made a clear error of judgement. Id. at 1191.
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We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness in light of the factors
listed in § 3553(a). McBride, 511 F.3d at 1296-97. Those factors are the
following:
(1) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (2)
the need for deterrence; (3) the need to protect the public; (4) the need
to provide the most effective correctional treatment or medical care;
(5) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (6) the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range;
and (8) the need to avoid [unwarranted] sentencing disparities.
Id. at 1297 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). However, we will not substitute our
judgment for that of the district court by re-weighing the relevant factors from
§ 3553(a). United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 671 (2007). Though we do not presume a sentence within the
Guidelines range is reasonable, United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1313
(11th Cir. 2007), we have stated “there is a range of reasonable sentences from
which the district court may choose, and when the district court imposes a
sentence within the advisory Guidelines range, we ordinarily will expect that
choice to be a reasonable one,” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th
Cir. 2005). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of
establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and
the factors in section 3553(a).” Id.
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Aragones-Delgado has failed to establish his sentence was substantively
unreasonable. First, the difference between Aragones-Delgado’s sentence and the
sentences of his codefendants was warranted. Aragones-Delgado did not plead
guilty until after a jury was empaneled, while his codefendants cooperated with
law enforcement officers from the beginning. Indeed, Aragones-Delgado admitted
during his sentencing hearing that his codefendants earned their lower sentences.
Thus, Aragones-Delgado and his codefendants were not similarly situated, and
there was no unwarranted sentencing disparity. In addition, Aragones-Delgado
has not established that the facts and circumstances of his case warranted a below-
guidelines sentence. He received safety-valve relief and an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction based on his guilty plea and truthful proffer, and he has
not shown his family obligations are so far out of the ordinary that the court
abused its discretion in imposing a 151-month sentence. This sentence is not
unreasonable, given the offense conduct involved 170 kilograms of cocaine, the
sentence was at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range, and the maximum
available sentence was life imprisonment. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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