Patrick K. Ball v. City of Coral Gables

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-12695 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
December 4, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-20949-CV-JEM
PATRICK K. BALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF CORAL GABLES, CORAL GABLES POLICE
DEPARTMENT, DON SLESNICK, in his official
capacity as Mayor of the City of Coral Gables,
MICHAEL HAMMERSCHMIDT, in his official
capacity as Police Chief of the Coral Gables
Police Department, ALESTER GARCIA,
individually, and in his official capacity as a police
officer for the City of Coral Gables,
DANIEL SMITH, individually, and in his official
capacity as a police officer for the City of Coral Gables,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(December 4, 2008)
Before BIRCH, HULL, and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick K. Ball sued the various defendants for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging violations of his civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Specifically, he asserts that defendants falsely arrested, falsely
imprisoned and maliciously prosecuted him. The district court entered summary
judgment for the defendants and Ball brought this appeal. For the following
reasons, we shall affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
Ball was arrested on suspicion of drunk driving in South Miami by police
officers from the City of Coral Gables. The basis for Ball’s claims of
constitutional violation is that the officers did not have the legal authority to make
this out-of-jurisdiction arrest. The district court held that the officers did have the
authority to make the arrest and entered summary judgment for the defendants.
We review this judgment de novo. Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282(11th Cir. 2002).
II.
The arrest at issue in this case was effectuated pursuant to a mutual aid
agreement between the cities of South Miami and Coral Gables. Such agreements
are authorized by the Florida Mutual Aid Act. Fla. Stat. §§ 23.12, et. seq. See
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also Rinaldo v. State, 787 So. 2d 208, 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Pursuant to such
an agreement, an officer may arrest outside of his jurisdiction under the terms of
the agreement. Rinaldo, 787 So. 2d at 214.
Defendants submitted a copy of the mutual aid agreement in force between
the Coral Gables Police Department and the City of South Miami Police
Department at the time of Ball’s arrest. This agreement provided for joint
enforcement of the traffic laws on certain specified roadways, including the one on
which Ball was arrested.
Ball argues that this agreement is invalid as a matter of law because it is too
broad and/or it is a fabrication. The district court examined the agreement and
found it to conform to the purposes underlying the Florida statute and we find no
error in this conclusion. Similarly, we agree with the district court that Ball failed
completely to establish that the agreement was a “fabrication.”
Finally, the defendants are not, as Ball asserts, collaterally estopped nor
prevented by res judicata from relying upon the mutual aid agreement to support
the lawfulness of Ball’s arrest. Any contrary conclusions regarding the mutual aid
agreement in the underlying state criminal case against Ball do not bind the
defendants in this case as they were not parties to that criminal case. See Gentile
v. Bauder, 718 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1998).
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As to Ball’s state claims, the presence of probable cause is fatal to claims of
false arrest and malicious prosecution. Our review of the record, including the
officers’ reports, confirms the presence of reasonable suspicion for the
investigatory stop, as well as probable cause for Ball’s arrest. The evidence is
that Ball was observed driving a vehicle that repeatedly swerved in and out of its
lane of travel and that, after being stopped, Ball admitted that he had been
drinking and failed all the sobriety tests he was given. This is sufficient to lead a
prudent officer to believe that Ball had been driving under the influence, the
offense for which he was arrested. See State Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles v. De Shong, 603 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Roberts v.
State, 732 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
III.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is due to be
AFFIRMED.
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