Dale Michael Barnes v. Martin Co. Sheriff Dept.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-10785 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MAY 29, 2009
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-14403-CV-JEM
DALE MICHAEL BARNES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARTIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
MARTIN COUNTY JAIL MEDICAL DEPARTMENT,
SHERIFF CROWDER,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 29, 2009)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dale Michael Barnes, a released prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging inadequate medical treatment,
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). On appeal, Barnes argues that officials and employees
of the Martin County Sheriff’s Department and the Martin County Jail (“MCJ”)
and its Medical Department (“defendants”) violated his civil rights by neglecting
him and denying him proper and adequate medical care when they (1) treated him
as though he was “mentally unstable” for over 90 days before ordering an x-ray
and MRI of his knee; (2) diagnosed that his knee was fine when he actually
suffered from a torn anterior cruciate ligament, a torn medial collateral ligament,
and tissue damage; (3) delayed in performing x-rays and an MRI of his knee; (4)
failed to give him proper medication to treat his high blood pressure; and (5) failed
to have him treated by an orthopedic surgeon. After careful review, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, using the same standard
that governs Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissals. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d
1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) states that, with regard to in
forma pauperis proceedings, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A district court should not
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that
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the prisoner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.” Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984). When a
complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, we “must take as true its
handwritten, pro se allegations.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 99 (1976). Pro
se pleadings generally are held to less stringent standards than counseled briefs.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids “cruel and
unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Eighth Amendment to include “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Every claim by a prisoner
that he has not received adequate medical treatment, however, does not state a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 105.
To prevail on a claim for inadequate medical treatment, a prisoner must
satisfy an objective and a subjective requirement. Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d
1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000). He must show an “objectively serious deprivation”
of medical care by demonstrating (1) “an objectively serious medical need . . . that,
if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm,” and (2) that the prison
official’s response “to that need was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain, and not merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in
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diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law.”
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). A serious medical need is “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).
A prisoner must also show a prison official’s subjective intent to punish by
demonstrating that the official acted with deliberate indifference. Taylor, 221 F.3d
at 1258. To satisfy this requirement, a prisoner can show the prison official’s:
“(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; and
(3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d
1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004). Conduct that is more than mere negligence includes:
(1) grossly inadequate care; (2) a decision to take an easier but less efficacious
course of treatment; and (3) medical care that is so cursory as to amount to no
treatment at all. Id. Where an inmate receives medical treatment, but desires
different modes of treatment, the care provided does not amount to deliberate
indifference. Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985). A
“complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth
Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
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Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, we conclude that the district
court did not err in ruling that Barnes failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted by failing to plead facts that establish deliberate indifference. As an
initial matter, we recognize that Barnes likely has satisfied the first prong of the
objective component of the Taylor analysis by showing his “serious medical need”;
however, Barnes has failed to meet the second prong -- that the response of the
defendants to his needs “was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258. To the contrary, Barnes admits that
the medical professionals at the MCJ met with him on multiple occasions over the
course of approximately five months, from his first day at the MCJ in September
2007, until five to seven days before his release from the MCJ in February 2008.
During this time, Barnes was prescribed medications, which were altered
depending on his symptoms, and he was given crutches to allow him to walk more
easily. The defendants also conducted a test to assess Barnes’s kidneys and began
administering kidney medications to him approximately one month later. The
defendants responded to Barnes’s medical needs, and the facts do not indicate that
their response constituted an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id.
Although the defendants substituted an OTC heartburn medication for a heartburn
medication that Barnes was prescribed, Barnes does not argue that he suffered any
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pain from the change. Therefore, Barnes is unable to satisfy the objective
component of the Taylor analysis. See id.
Similarly, Barnes is unable to satisfy the subjective component of the Taylor
analysis because he has not shown that the defendants’ response to his serious
medical needs constituted deliberate indifference. Id. Barnes met with the
defendants on multiple occasions to obtain treatment for his high blood pressure
and injured knee, and he also met with the defendants on at least one occasion for a
test of his kidneys. The defendants prescribed medications for Barnes and
provided him with crutches. Such a series of meetings and prescription regimens
do not indicate deliberate indifference. Likewise, Barnes’s dissatisfaction with the
defendants’ substitution of OTC heartburn medication for his prescribed heartburn
medication does not constitute deliberate indifference because the defendants were
treating him. See Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1575.
Although Barnes contends that the delay in his receiving his kidney
medication is actionable, Barnes complained to the defendants regarding this
medication on October 20, 2007, and the defendants tested his kidneys on a date
between November 1-11, 2007, and they began administering kidney medication to
Barnes on December 11, 2007. Because the defendants responded to Barnes’s
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complaint regarding the medication by testing him and providing him with the
appropriate medication, such conduct does not constitute deliberate indifference.
Nor did any delay in the x-ray and MRI of Barnes’s knee violate his civil
rights. While Barnes contends on appeal that the defendants treated him as though
he was mentally unstable and waited over 90 days before ordering these tests,
during the time of the treatment for mental illness, the defendants were also
treating his knee. Indeed, Barnes alleged in his complaint that the defendants
looked at his knee on the day he received the injury, November 8, 2007, and on
November 9 and November 12, 2007. Moreover, a “medical decision not to order
an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment,” and
is, at most, “medical malpractice.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Barnes cannot obtain
relief under § 1983 for a medical malpractice claim. See id. at 106. In addition,
the fact that the defendants eventually ordered the x-ray and MRI for Barnes
indicates that they were not deliberately indifferent to his knee injury.
Further, to the extent Barnes argues that his civil rights were violated
because he received “gross neglect of proper medical treatment,” negligent medical
care does not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 106. Notably,
while Barnes shows that the defendants had “subjective knowledge” of his high
blood pressure and knee injury, which have a “risk of serious harm,” he fails to
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show that they disregarded this risk, because they provided care for him. Brown,
387 F.3d at 1351. He also does not show that their conduct amounted to “more
than mere negligence.” Id. In short, he fails to satisfy the subjective component of
the Taylor analysis because he has not shown that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258.
Finally, as for Barnes’s claim that he should have received the care of an
orthopedic surgeon, he is unable to establish that the response of the defendants to
his knee injury constituted “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” See id.
He also does not show that they disregarded the risk that his knee injury would
cause him because they provided him with pain medication and crutches. While he
may have desired a different method of treatment, such a desire does not cause the
medical treatment that he received to be inadequate and does not constitute
deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. See Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1575.
This allegation therefore fails to satisfy the objective and subjective components of
the Taylor analysis. See Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258.
For these reasons, the district court did not err when it dismissed Barnes’s
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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