Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-5516
Non-Argument Calendar.
David FORGIONE, as Assignee of Harry Tofel and Lena Tofel,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DENNIS PIRTLE AGENCY, INC., American States Insurance Company, an
Indiana Corporation, Defendants,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois
Corporation, Defendant-Appellee,
Herman B. Fine, Cerrato-Fine Agency, Inc., a New York
Corporation, Defendants-Cross-Defendants, Appellees,
Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Defendant-Cross-Claimant,
Appellee.
Sept. 5, 1996.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 94-7254-CIV-SJM), Stanley Marcus, Judge.
Before DUBINA, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal concerns a single issue: Under Florida law, is
a claim for negligence by an insured against an insurance agent for
failure to obtain proper insurance coverage assignable? Because we
are unable to find any authoritative decision from the Florida
courts answering the question, we certify the question to the
Florida Supreme Court.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff and appellant in this case, David Forgione, was
involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle owned by Harry
and Lena Tofel. He thereafter obtained a final judgment against
them in the amount of $600,000. Forgione was unable to satisfy
that judgment completely, due to a gap in the Tofels' insurance
coverage. The Tofels assigned (or attempted to assign) to Forgione
all the rights and claims they have against the insurance companies
and agents through whom they obtained their insurance coverage.
Those companies and agents are the defendants and appellees in this
lawsuit.1
Forgione alleges that there is a gap in the Tofels' coverage
and that some portion of Forgione's $600,000 judgment against them
falls into that gap. As the asserted assignee of the Tofels, he
further alleges that the agent for State Farm, who obtained the
Tofels' base automobile coverage, and the agent for Fireman's Fund,
who obtained the Tofels' excess liability umbrella coverage,
breached their duties of care to the Tofels by failing to exercise
reasonable skill and diligence to ensure that there would be no gap
in the limit of the coverage in the base automobile policy provided
to the Tofels by State Farm and the minimum of the umbrella
coverage that the Tofels were provided by Fireman's Fund in a
separate transaction. The action is not one for breach of
contract, but instead is for negligence arising from an alleged
relationship of trust and confidence between the Tofels and the
defendants.2
State Farm moved to dismiss Forgione's complaint, contending
1
Forgione voluntarily dismissed Denise Pirtle Agency, Inc.,
in order to maintain complete diversity.
2
Forgione alleges that the agents were negligent; the
insurance companies that are the agents' principals are sued
under a vicarious liability theory.
that it involves a personal tort, the assignment of which is
prohibited by Florida law. The district court granted State Farm's
motion and dismissed the case, concluding that Florida law does
prohibit assignment of the claims.
II. DISCUSSION
As we understand it, under Florida law, purely personal tort
claims cannot be assigned. Examples of such unassignable personal
tort claims are personal injury claims, including claims of medical
malpractice. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 535 So.2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), and claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Notarian v.
Plantation AMC Jeep, Inc., 567 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
Florida courts also treat claims of legal malpractice as personal
torts incapable of valid assignment. Washington v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 459 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). However, no Florida
court has yet addressed whether a negligence claim against an
insurance company or agent, of the type presented by this case, is
assignable.
The district court, in holding that the negligence claim in
this case could not be assigned analogized it to a legal
malpractice claim, which cannot be assigned under Florida law.
Forgione v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., et al., No. 94-7254-CIV-
SJM, op. at 9-10 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 31, 1995). The reason that legal
malpractice claims cannot be assigned is the personal nature of the
relationship between attorney and client and the attendant duties
arising from that relationship. Washington, 459 So.2d at 1148 ("A
majority of jurisdictions prohibit the assignment of [legal
malpractice] actions because of the personal nature of legal
services which involve highly confidential relationships."). The
district court reasoned that a relationship similar to that of
attorney and client "is created when a prospective insured consults
an insurance agent, provides that agent with specific information
about his unique circumstances and relies on the agent to obtain
appropriate coverage tailored to these circumstances." Forgione,
No. 94-7254-CIV-SJM, op. at 9. The court noted that "an insurance
agent owes a prospective insured a duty of unwavering loyalty
similar to that owed by an attorney to client." Id. at 10.
Explaining that it is the special fiduciary nature of the
relationship that gives rise to its personal character, the court
concluded that the claims of negligence in procuring appropriate
insurance coverage in this case are personal in nature and
incapable of assignment. Id.
Although the district court's classification of a claim by an
insured against his agent for negligence in obtaining insurance
coverage as a personal tort may be supported by the case law and
public policy, Florida cases may also support the opposite result.
Florida law permits the assignment of claims against insurance
companies based upon allegations that claims were handled in bad
faith. E.g. Selfridge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 219 So.2d 127 (Fla.
4th DCA 1969). It is possible that Florida courts would permit
assignment of the negligence claims in this case. Extending the
class of nonpersonal assignable claims to include the claims
presented in this case might be as natural as extending the class
of personal nonassignable claims to include them.
In the absence of any direct authority either way, any
conclusion we reach must be based on uncertain analogy. The
district court believed that the claims at issue here are most
analogous to claims of legal malpractice. There are definite
similarities. However, there are also significant dissimilarities,
particularly when one looks to the policy goals behind the
prohibition against assignment of legal malpractice claims. In
extending the definition of a personal tort to a claim of legal
malpractice, the court in Washington, 459 So.2d at 1149, emphasized
the "personal nature of legal services which involve highly
confidential relationships." One concern that appears to have
influenced the Washington court was that an attorney would be
unable to maintain client confidences if sued by someone other than
the client. See id. (citing Chaffee v. Smith, 98 Nev. 222, 645
P.2d 966 (1982); Clement v. Prestwich, 114 Ill.App.3d 479, 70
Ill.Dec. 161, 448 N.E.2d 1039 (1983); Joos v. Drillock, 127
Mich.App. 99, 338 N.W.2d 736 (1983); Christison v. Jones, 83
Ill.App.3d 334, 39 Ill.Dec. 560, 405 N.E.2d 8 (1980); Goodley v.
Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal.App.3d 389, 133 Cal.Rptr. 83 (1976)).
That concern may not be warranted in the case of a prospective
insured and agent. An insurance agent, although under a fiduciary
duty to his prospective insured, is not bound by the same canons of
ethics as is an attorney. An attorney-client relationship is
unique among agency relationships. For those and other reasons, we
do not know whether the Florida courts would extend the rule of
nonassignability to the claims in this case.
When substantial doubt exists about the answer to a material
state law question upon which the case turns, a federal court
should certify that question to the state supreme court in order to
avoid making unnecessary state law guesses and to offer the state
court the opportunity to explicate state law. See, e.g., Mosher v.
Speedstar Div. of AMCA Int'l, Inc., 52 F.3d 913, 916-17 (11th
Cir.1995). "Only through certification can federal courts get
definitive answers to unsettled state law questions. Only a state
supreme court can provide what we can be assured are "correct'
answers to state law questions, because a state's highest court is
the one true and final arbiter of state law." Sultenfuss v. Snow,
35 F.3d 1494, 1504 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (Carnes, J.,
dissenting) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1254, 131
L.Ed.2d 134 (1995).
III. QUESTION TO BE CERTIFIED
Accordingly, we respectfully certify the following question of
law to the Florida Supreme Court:
Can a claim for negligence by an insured against an insurance
agent for failure to obtain proper insurance coverage be
assigned to a third party?
Our statement of the question is not meant to limit the scope of
inquiry by the Florida Supreme Court. On the contrary:
the particular phrasing used in the certified question is not
to restrict the Supreme Court's consideration of the problems
involved and the issues as the Supreme Court perceives them to
be in its analysis of the record certified in this case. This
latitude extends to the Supreme Court's restatement of the
issue or issues and the manner in which the answers are to be
given....
Martinez v. Rodriquez, 394 F.2d 156, 159 n. 6 (5th Cir.1968).
The entire record in this case, together with copies of the
briefs of the parties, is transmitted herewith.
QUESTION CERTIFIED.