United States Ex Rel. Brown v. Walt Disney World Co.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-16350 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 14, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
ACTING CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-01943-CV-ORL-22-KRS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ex rel,
L. BROWN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
WALT DISNEY WORLD CO.,
REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 14, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this qui tam action brought pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3729 et seq., Plaintiff-Relator L. Brown appeals the dismissal of her complaint
against Defendants Walt Disney World Company (“Disney”) and Reedy Creek
Improvement District (“RCID”).1 The district court dismissed the complaint for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). No reversible error has
been shown; we affirm.
In 1988, RCID contracted with United States Postal Service to operate a post
office in a municipality located within its boundaries. Plaintiff claimed that RCID
obtained this contract through these false statements: (1) that it provided
nonsegregated housing for its employees and (2) that RCID had no parent
company. Plaintiff also alleged that RCID’s Board of Supervisors was not duly
elected and, thus, had no authority to enter into the contract. The district court
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff failed to meet the
jurisdictional requirement of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), because the
allegations and transactions on which Plaintiff based her complaint had been
publicly disclosed and Plaintiff did not qualify as an original source of the
1
RCID is a governmental entity that was created by the Florida legislature in 1967; and
the Disney resort is located within the boundaries of RCID.
2
information.
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the jurisdictional bar did not apply because
she drafted her complaint based on general information available to the public, not
on public information about the wrongs alleged in her complaint. We review a
district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de
novo. Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir.
2008). The party bringing the claim bears the burden of establishing federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d
1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005).
Courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over FCA qui tam suits if the
information upon which the allegations or transactions are based was publicly
disclosed before the filing of the complaint. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A);
McElmurray v. Consolidated Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond County, 501 F.3d 1244,
1250-51 (11th Cir. 2007). We use this three-part inquiry to determine if subject-
matter jurisdiction exists over a qui tam FCA claim: “(1) have the allegations made
by the plaintiff been publicly disclosed; (2) if so, is the disclosed information the
basis of the plaintiff’s suit; (3) if yes, is the plaintiff an ‘original source’ of that
information.” Battle v. Board of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 762 (11th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted). The FCA precludes suits based in any part on publicly
3
disclosed information. See id.Here, we agree with the district court that the FCA’s public-disclosure bar
precluded Plaintiff’s suit. About the first part of the test, Plaintiff’s allegations
were based on publicly disclosed information. The basis for Plaintiff’s claim that
RCID maintained segregated housing for its employees was the de-annexation of
certain property in RCID on which residential housing was constructed. But
Defendants’ practice of de-annexing residential housing parcels had been the
subject of newspaper articles. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (listing sources of
publicly disclosed information, including the news media). Plaintiff’s only support
for her allegation that RCID’s parent certification was false and that Disney, in
fact, controlled RCID, was a federal court opinion. See id. (documents from a civil
hearing are publicly disclosed information); McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1253(concluding that district court orders constituted public disclosures under the
FCA).2 And Plaintiff’s allegation that the board of supervisors was not duly
authorized also was based on publicly disclosed information, including state
administrative reports and news articles. Plaintiff argues that single, isolated
exhibits included with her complaint do not constitute publicly disclosed
information within the meaning of section 3730(e)(4)(A); but the FCA precludes
2
The suggestion that Disney controlled RCID also appeared in many newspaper articles.
4
suits based in any part on publicly disclosed information. See Battle, 468 F.3d
755, 762.
Plaintiff relied on publicly disclosed information to support all of her
allegations; thus, it follows that the disclosed information formed the basis of
Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff’s argument that she based her claims on general
information available to the public is unavailing: her allegations of wrongdoings
about the alleged false statements -- including the de-annexation of property, the
question of who controlled RCID, and the legitimacy of RCID’s Board -- mirrored
those in the public information upon which she relied. And Plaintiff provided
nothing, other than her own conclusory allegation, to show that she was an original
source of the information on which her complaint was based. See 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(4)(B) (explaining that an original source is a person who has “direct and
independent knowledge” of the information on which the allegations are based).
Because Plaintiff’s qui tam FCA action was based on publicly disclosed
information, the district court concluded correctly that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the suit.3
AFFIRMED.
3
We have reviewed Plaintiff’s remaining appellate arguments and conclude that no
reversible error has been shown.
5