Demetrius Wallace v. H. Dwight Hamrick

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 9, 2007
No. 06-14008 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00019-CV-RLV-4
DEMETRIUS WALLACE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
H. DWIGHT HAMRICK, Warden,
JAMES DONALD, Commissioner,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 9, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Demetrius Wallace (“Wallace”), a pro se litigant pursuing a complaint raised
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, appeals the district court’s sua sponte order dismissing his
complaint for failure to state a claim. Wallace filed an amended complaint against
Warden H. Dwight Hamrick of Walker State Prison and Commissioner James
Donald of the Georgia Department of Corrections, in which he claimed that he was
denied adequate grievance procedures, deprived of due process when placed in
administrative segregation for twenty-eight days before receiving a disciplinary
hearing, and subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because of the conditions
of his confinement. Upon review of the record and Wallace’s brief,1 we affirm in
part and reverse in part the district court’s order dismissing Wallace’s amended
complaint for failing to state a claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint
pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79
(2001). A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim when it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief. Conely v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99,
102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard
1
The defendants in this case were never served as Wallace’s claim was dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Therefore, the defendants did not file a brief.
2
than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
BACKGROUND
In his amended complaint, Wallace alleges that Walker Prison has
inadequate grievance procedures. He also alleges that he was deprived of due
process when he was confined in administrative segregation for twenty-eight days,
and then, afterwards, found to have committed disciplinary violations by a
committee consisting of a sole individual. Wallace claims that he was placed in
administrative segregation pending a disciplinary hearing for the following
violations: (1) interference with count,2 (2) insubordination, and (3) failure to
follow instructions. Wallace requested a hearing after his confinement, in
accordance with prison regulations,3 but was not afforded a hearing until after his
release twenty-eight days later. He claims that his hearing was held the day after
his release and was before only one board member, who found him guilty of the
violations. He claims that the prison failed to maintain any recording of the
hearing, and he was not provided with any written basis of the committee
member’s factual findings.
2
We assume that this violation refers to Wallace’s interference with a prison head count.
3
In his amended complaint, Wallace claims that pursuant the Georgia Department of
Corrections policy a prisoner who is involuntarily assigned to administrative segregation must
have a formal hearing within ninety-six hours.
3
Additionally, Wallace alleges that the conditions of his administrative
segregation constituted cruel and unusual punishment, because he was confined in
a small cell, with “no hot running water, no ventilation, no access to any
disinfectant at any time, and no opportunity for exercise,” in violation of prison
regulations. Wallace also alleges that he is a chronic care patient and was not seen
by a certified medical professional for his first twenty-two days in confinement.
DISCUSSION
A. Violation of Due Process4
1. Liberty Interest
The district court found that Wallace failed to allege a violation of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest; therefore, he failed to state a claim for a
violation of due process. The Due Process Clause protects against deprivations of
“life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Wallace did not claim to be deprived or life or property, so he was only entitled to
due process if he was deprived of a liberty interest within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has stated that there are two
circumstances in which a prisoner can be deprived of a liberty interest beyond the
4
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Wallace’s claim of inadequate grievance
procedures. A prisoner is not entitled to grievance procedures under the Constitution. See
Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1467-68 (11th Cir. 1989).
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deprivation associated with the prisoner’s confinement. See Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995). First, a liberty
interest may arise from the “Due Process Clause of its own face,” which extends
procedural safeguards to a prisoner when his liberty is restrained in a way that
exceeds the sentence imposed by the court. Id. Secondly, states may create liberty
interests by conferring certain benefits to prisoners, the deprivation of which
“impose[s] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. Since Wallace alleges violations of liberty
interests connected with his administrative segregation, these interests arise from
the second situation. Therefore, “the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of
a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of
confinement is not the language of the regulations regarding those conditions but
the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.’” Wilkerson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394, 162
L. Ed. 2d 174 (2005) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S. Ct. at 2300).
Citing to Sandin, the district court found that Wallace’s “[twenty-eight]-day
administrative confinement did not impose an atypical and significant hardship
beyond the ordinary incidents of prison life.” In Sandin, the Supreme Court found
that the prisoner’s thirty-day disciplinary segregation did not present an atypical
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and significant deprivation by the state. 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S. Ct. at 2301.
However, in Sandin, which was decided on a motion for summary judgment, the
Supreme Court made this finding only after it compared the evidence of the
treatment of inmates in disciplinary and administrative segregation and found that
the conditions in the one “mirrored those conditions” in the other. Id. at 486, 115
S. Ct. at 2301. The Supreme Court also made a comparison between inmates
inside and outside disciplinary segregation before finding that the thirty-day
confinement “did not work a major disruption in his environment.” Id.
Wallace alleges that the prison placed him in administrative segregation for
twenty-eight days while awaiting a hearing on his disciplinary violations. He
alleges that he had no hot water, no ventilation, and no opportunity for exercise, all
in violation of Georgia Department of Corrections policy. Wallace also alleges
that he did not receive timely medical care. In Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1318
(11th Cir. 1999), we specifically found that the State of Florida created a protected
liberty interest in two hours per week of yard time. Therefore, we inquired
whether the plaintiffs, who were denied their two hours of yard time, were afforded
adequate due process. Id. The record before us does not contain adequate facts
with respect to the conditions of Wallace’s confinement as compared with the
conditions of confinement of his fellow inmates to determine whether Wallace’s
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confinement imposed an atypical and significant hardship “in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
Accordingly, we conclude that Wallace has set forth sufficient facts at this
stage of the litigation which might create a protected liberty interest. Therefore,
we must next inquire whether Wallace set forth sufficient facts that he was denied
due process.
2. Due Process
The district court did not discuss whether Wallace was deprived of due
process, because the court found that he had not been deprived of a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. The requirements of due process for prisoners facing
disciplinary actions are: “(1) advance written notice of the claimed violation; (2) a
written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons
for the disciplinary action taken; and (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence in defense, when to do so would not be unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Young v. Jones, 37 F.3d
1457, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1994).
Wallace claims that Georgia Department of Corrections policy requires that
once an inmate is involuntarily assigned to administrative segregation that the
inmate is afforded a hearing within ninety-six hours after the confinement.
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Wallace alleges that he was in segregation for twenty-eight days and then released
into the general population without having appeared before the disciplinary
committee. He alleges that the day after he was released into the general
population, the prison conducted his disciplinary hearing before only one member,
who found him guilty of committing the violations. Wallace claims that no
recordings of the hearing were maintained, and he was not provided with a written
factual basis for the committee’s findings.
At this stage of the litigation, it is not clear beyond a doubt that Wallace has
failed to allege a due process violation. We have no record to indicate when
Wallace received notice of the alleged violations, or whether he had sufficient
opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses on his behalf. Accordingly, we
find that the district court prematurely dismissed Wallace’s claim for a due process
violation.
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits only the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Therefore, to state a claim for a violation
of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must first allege a condition that is an
objectively “cruel and unusual deprivation,” and second, that the officials
responsible for the condition had the subjective intent to punish. Taylor v. Adams,
8
221 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000). We have recognized “that administrative
segregation and solitary confinement do not, in and of themselves, constitute cruel
and unusual punishment.” Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1428-29 (11th Cir.
1987).
A prisoner can show an Eighth Amendment violation by proving that the
prison medical officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976).
For a claim of deliberate indifference, a prisoner must first prove a serious medical
need, and second, that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to his
need. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004). While Wallace’s
amended complaint is inartfully drafted, it is not clear beyond a doubt that he has
failed to allege a serious medical need, and that the prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to his need. Wallace alleges that he “is a chronic care
patient and was not seen by a certified medical professional until approximately
twenty-two (22) days later subsequent to filing numerous grounds contrary to
Georgia Department of Corrections policy IIB02-0001 VI.” Liberally construed,
we can infer that the needs of a chronic care patient are serious. Furthermore, it is
reasonable to infer that prison officials would be aware that a chronic care inmate
would need frequent medical attention. Wallace’s amended complaint also appears
9
to allege that he was not seen by a medical professional for twenty-two days even
though he requested such care. While Wallace has not alleged that the individual
defendants personally participated in the failure to treat him, his allegations, if true,
may ultimately show that the defendants did nothing to prevent the violation of his
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.
Furthermore, we have specifically recognized that “the Eighth Amendment
applies to prisoner claims of inadequate cooling and ventilation.” Chandler v.
Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004). The district court stated that
Wallace did not allege that any of the inadequate conditions in his cell caused him
any personal injury or any unreasonable risk to his future health. Therefore, he
failed to state a claim. However, Wallace alleged that the cell he was placed in had
“no ventilation.” To state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment, the
challenged condition must be extreme and “pose an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to his future health” or safety. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35, 113
S. Ct. 2475, 2481, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1993). An inmate “need not await a tragic
event” before seeking relief. Id. at 33, 113 S. Ct. at 2481. Therefore, Wallace need
not plead a specific physical injury if the conditions he complains of posed a
serious risk to his health. Liberally construing Wallace’s complaint, it is not
beyond a doubt that Wallace will be able to prove no set of facts that would entitle
10
him to relief. Therefore, we find that the district court erred in dismissing
Wallace’s claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
Wallace’s claim for inadequate grievance procedures. However, the district court
erred by prematurely dismissing Wallace’s claims for violations of due process and
the Eighth Amendment.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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