Mosi Williams v. Florida State University

Case: 14-10806 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10806
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cv-00350-MW-CAS
MOSI WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BETSY BECKER,
Dr,
Defendant,
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY,
Board of Trustees,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(June 26, 2015)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mosi Williams appeals pro se the summary judgment in favor of Florida
State University and against Williams’s complaint about breach of contract,
misleading advertising, deceptive and unfair trade practices, and negligence in
violation of state law. Williams alleged that the University advertised a doctorate
program in sports psychology with an option to “respecialize” in counseling; after
he completed two years of the sports psychology program, he learned that the
University had “terminated” the “respecialization” program and he had to apply to
the “combined counseling and school psychology program”; and, after the
University refused “several times” to admit him to the combined program, he
enrolled elsewhere to “pursue licensure as a psychologist.” The University moved
for summary judgment based on state sovereign immunity. The district court ruled
that the University was immune from liability for Williams’s claim of breach of
contract and that Williams failed timely to notify the University of his claims in
tort as required for a waiver of state sovereign immunity. We affirm.
We review de novo a summary judgment based on sovereign immunity and
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Griesel v. Hamlin,
963 F.2d 338, 341 (11th Cir. 1992). Summary judgment should be entered when
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the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The district court did not err when it entered summary judgment in favor of
the University and against Williams’s claim of breach of contract. Williams
alleged that the University breached its contract to provide an “opportunity to
pursue a doctoral degree in Sports Psychology with the respecialization in
Counseling and School Psychology” and to “be accepted to the Combined PhD
program.” The University, as part of the public university system of Florida, enjoys
state sovereign immunity from contractual liability unless the action is based on an
“express, written contract[] into which the state agency has statutory authority to
enter,” Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1984). See
Cnty. of Brevard v. Miorelli Eng’g, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 1997)
(concluding that sovereign immunity barred recovery for work not mentioned in a
written contract); S. Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Lee Cnty., 495 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (same). Williams failed to produce an “express, written
contract” between himself and the University. Williams argues that his “Program
of Study” constituted a contract, but the document does not require the University
to admit Williams to a “respecialization” program or a combined doctorate
program. Williams’s claim for breach of contract is barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
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The district court also did not err when it entered summary judgment in
favor of the University and against Williams’s claims in tort. The State of Florida,
“for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, . . . waives sovereign immunity for
liability for [certain] torts,” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1), but “[a]n action may not be
instituted on a claim . . . unless the claimant presents the claim in writing to the
appropriate agency, and . . . to the Department of Financial Services within 3 years
after such claim accrues,” id. § 768.28(6)(a). Compliance with the notice
requirement is a “condition[] precedent to maintaining an action.” Id.
§ 768.28(6)(b); see Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Acanda, 71 So. 3d
782, 784–85 (Fla. 2011). Williams’s claims about misleading advertising,
deceptive trade practices, and negligence concerned his inability to respecialize
and the refusal of the University to admit him to the combined psychology
program. Those claims accrued on November 2, 2009, when Williams received a
letter stating that the University had denied his request for reconsideration for
admission to the combined program and that the decision was “final and there shall
be no further appeals.” Williams submitted an affidavit stating that he provided
notice to the University in 2013, several months after the statutory deadline
expired. Williams argues that his claims accrued in December 2010 when the
University dismissed him from the sports psychology doctoral program, but that
event is unrelated to his ability to respecialize or obtain a combined degree from
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the University. Williams failed to comply with the condition prerequisite to give
timely notice to obtain a waiver by the State of its sovereign immunity from
damages allegedly attributable to officials of the University.
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of the University.
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