Rufus L. Jackson v. City of Chickasaw

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
June 14, 2005
No. 04-15311 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00463-CV-BH-B
RUFUS L. JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CITY OF CHICKASAW,
BRADFORD J. PENTON, et.al,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(June 14, 2005)
Before BIRCH, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Officer Bradford J. Penton and Chief Perry Matthews of the Chickasaw,
Alabama Police Department appeal the district court’s denial of summary
judgment in Rufus L. Jackson’s action against them, claiming they have
discretionary function immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a).1 We reverse the
district court’s denial of summary judgment to Matthews, but affirm the denial of
summary judgment to Penton.
I. BACKGROUND2
On the evening of May 5, 2001, Rufus L. Jackson took his stepson, Kentrell
Lett, Kentrell’s cousin, Chadrick Lett, and two of Kentrell’s friends to a skating
rink in Saraland, Alabama. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on May 5, 2001, Jackson
went to pick up the children from the skating rink. On his return from the skating
rink, he headed down Craft Highway toward his brother-in-law’s home, located in
the Alabama Village Community of Prichard, Alabama. This route took Jackson
through Chickasaw, Alabama.
Jackson turned off Craft Highway onto 12th Avenue. He proceeded through
the intersections of 12th Avenue and Kansas Street. At this time, Officer Penton
1
This Court has held it has jurisdiction to review the denial of discretionary function
immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a) before a final judgment is entered. Sheth v. Webster,
145 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 1998).
2
The facts are considered most favorably to the Plaintiff-Appellee, Rufus L. Jackson.
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got behind Jackson’s car. Penton claims he was following Jackson’s car because it
appeared to be speeding and the tag light was inoperative. Penton followed
Jackson through the intersection of 12th Avenue and Iriquois Street. At this time,
Penton turned on his blue lights and did a license check through dispatch. Jackson
did not immediately pull over. Jackson claims he thought the officer was in
pursuit of someone else because he had not violated any laws.
Jackson proceeded and turned on Escambia Street. As Jackson turned on
Escambia Street, Penton ran into the back of Jackson’s vehicle. Penton again
made contact with Jackson’s car when he pushed the vehicle to a stop in front of
Jackson’s brother-in-law’s home. Upon stopping, Jackson got out of the car with
his hands in the air. Penton told Jackson to get back in the car and turn the
ignition off. Penton yelled at Jackson to get back in the car or “I’ll shoot you.”
Jackson reached into the car to turn off the ignition, but did not get back into the
car as directed by Penton. Jackson again faced Penton’s direction, with his hands
in the air, palms facing Penton. Penton again advised Jackson to get in the car.
Penton fired his gun, shooting Jackson in the neck.
Jackson collapsed to the ground. At this time, Kentrell Lett got out of the
vehicle to attend to his stepfather. After seeing Penton with a gun drawn and still
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yelling at Jackson, Kentrell ran to get back into the vehicle. Penton proceeded to
detain Jackson by placing handcuffs on him.
Jackson was transported by ambulance to the University of South Alabama
Medical Center where he was treated for a gunshot wound to the neck.3 Following
his release from the hospital, Jackson claims he experienced pain, inconvenience,
medical expenses, emotional distress, humiliation, and embarrassment.
Neither Jackson nor any minors inside the vehicle were found to be in
possession of any weapons. At an inspection done of the car at the Chickasaw
Police Department, the tag light was found to be in working condition.
Jackson sued the City of Chickasaw, Penton, and Matthews asserting the
following: Count One–negligent training, and/or supervision, Count
Two–wantonness, recklessness, and/or maliciousness, Counts Three and
Four–violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count Five–assault and battery, and Count
Six–false imprisonment. The district court dismissed Counts One through Four,
and allowed the case to proceed as to Counts Five and Six. The City, Penton, and
Matthews moved for summary judgment on Counts Five and Six. The district
court denied summary judgment, concluding that material issues of fact existed
3
Chief Matthews was not at the scene when the alleged torts occurred, and only arrived
at the scene when Jackson was leaving the scene in the ambulance.
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which precluded summary judgment. Penton and Matthews now appeal the denial
of summary judgment, claiming they have discretionary function immunity under
Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a).
II. DISCUSSION
Our review of the denial of summary judgment is de novo. Sheth v.
Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 1998). Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a) provides
as follows:
Every peace officer, except constables, who is employed or appointed
pursuant to the Constitution or statutes of this state, whether
appointed or employed as such peace officer by the state or a county
or municipality thereof, or by an agency or institution, corporate or
otherwise, created pursuant to the Constitution or laws of this state
and authorized by the Constitution or laws to appoint or employ
police officers or other peace officers, and whose duties prescribed by
law, or by the lawful terms of their employment or appointment,
include the enforcement of, or the investigation and reporting of
violations of, the criminal laws of this state, and who is empowered
by the laws of this state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take into
custody persons who violate, or who are lawfully charged by warrant,
indictment, or other lawful process, with violations of, the criminal
laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed to be officers of this
state, and as such shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of
his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function
within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.
Thus, we must determine whether Penton and Matthews were engaged in the
performance of discretionary functions at the time the alleged torts occurred. “If
their acts were discretionary acts, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate
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that the defendants acted in bad faith, with malice or willfulness in order to deny
them immunity. ‘Acts of such nature are not considered by Alabama law to be
discretionary.’” Sheth, 145 F.3d at 1238–39 (citation omitted). Discretionary acts
are “‘those acts as to which there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of
conduct that one must or must not take and those acts requiring exercise in
judgment and choice and involving what is just and proper under the
circumstances.’” Id. (citation omitted).
The acts which form the basis of Jackson’s claim against Penton are
(1) assault and battery from both shooting Jackson and running into Jackson’s
vehicle, and (2) false imprisonment from shooting Jackson and handcuffing him.
The act which forms the basis of Jackson’s claim against Matthews is his failure to
enforce policies regarding Penton’s use of force against Jackson. All of these acts
typically are within the line and scope of the officers’ law enforcement duties and
require the exercise of judgment in particular circumstances. See Hardy v. Town
of Hayneville, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1195 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
Because the acts were discretionary, the burden shifts to Jackson to show
that Penton and Matthews acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith. See Sheth,
145 F.3d at 1238–39.
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Jackson offers no support for the contention that Matthews’ actions were
willful, malicious, or in bad faith. Because Jackson cannot meet this burden, we
find Matthews is entitled to discretionary function immunity and reverse the
district court as to this issue.
We agree with the district court, however, as to Penton. There is a genuine
issue of fact as to whether Penton acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith in
running into Jackson’s car, shooting and handcuffing him. Thus, the district court
did not err in denying summary judgment to Penton.
III. CONCLUSION
Matthews is entitled to discretionary function immunity under Ala. Code
§ 6-5-338(a), and we reverse and remand on this issue. There is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Penton is entitled to discretionary function immunity,
and we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Penton.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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