Matthew Paul Morris v. Paul C. May

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13996
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-14017-DLG
MATTHEW PAUL MORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PAUL C. MAY,
Sheriff,
RONALD WHITE,
Jail Admin.,
SONYA OLDHAM,
Head Nurse, sued in their individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(July 1, 2014)
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Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Matthew Morris, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Paul May (Sheriff of Okeechobee County);
Ronald White (Jail Administrator of the Okeechobee County Detention Center
(OCDC)); and Sonya Oldham (OCDC’s Head Nurse). Morris argues that the
district court erred in dismissing his claims as frivolous because they were barred
by the doctrine of claim preclusion. He further argues that his complaint properly
presents several claims for violations of his constitutional rights. After careful
review, we affirm.
I.
When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the district court must dismiss
the case if it determines that the action is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
For example, if it is clear that an affirmative defense bars the complaint, dismissal
at the screening stage is appropriate. Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons and Paroles
Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the district court sees that an
affirmative defense would defeat the action, a [dismissal on the grounds of
frivolity] is allowed”). “A determination of frivolity is best left to the district
court, and we will review such determinations only for abuse of discretion.” Bilal
v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).
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One of the affirmative defenses that may lead to dismissal at the screening
stage is the doctrine of claim preclusion (otherwise known as res judicata). The
doctrine of claim preclusion bars the filing of claims that were raised or could have
been raised in an earlier proceeding when:
(1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those
in privity with them, are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause
of action is involved in both cases.
Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). Whether a
claim is barred by earlier litigation is a determination of law that this Court reviews
de novo. Id.
Morris does not dispute that he previously filed a § 1983 complaint against
May, White, and Oldham. See Morris v. May, No. 2:10-cv-14307 (S.D. Fla. filed
Nov. 12, 2010). He also does not dispute that the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida was a court of competent jurisdiction that
dismissed his claims on the merits. See NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1560
(11th Cir. 1990) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is a judgment on the merits).
Instead, Morris argues that claim preclusion does not apply here because he did not
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in the previous action.
Alternatively, he argues that the two cases do not involve the same cause of action
because he now raises claims that are “temporally distinct” from those previously
rejected by the district court. Both of these arguments are unavailing.
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A.
First, we agree that claim preclusion only applies when a party has had a
“full and fair opportunity to litigate” the claims and issues settled in a previous
suit. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008).
But we disagree with Morris’s contention that he received less than a full and fair
opportunity in his previous case. After Morris filed his previous § 1983 complaint,
the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss
Morris’s complaint without prejudice, allowing Morris to provide additional facts
supporting his claims. When Morris failed to do so, the district court dismissed
Morris’s complaint with prejudice. Given that Morris had not just one but two
opportunities to state a claim for relief, we cannot say that Morris was denied a
“full and fair opportunity to litigate” the claims in his previous § 1983 suit.
Morris responds that it was not possible for him to draft a valid complaint
because OCDC systematically denied him access to a law library and opportunities
to research his § 1983 claims. He submits that there was no way for him to know
the pleading requirements for § 1983 actions or even the rules of procedure without
access to some form of legal assistance. In support of this position, Morris
reminds us that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts
requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
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adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 828, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1498 (1977); see also Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 332
(5th Cir. 1975) (remanding for the district court to determine whether all inmates
have adequate access to the courts by reasonable access to attorneys, legal
materials, or any other reasonable means).1
While we are sympathetic to the fundamental rights of prisoners to access
the courts, Morris’s argument misses the mark because he does not show how
access to a law library would have helped him in his previous § 1983 action. The
Supreme Court has told us that prisoners do not have a “freestanding right to a law
library or legal assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S. Ct. 2174,
2180 (1996). Rather, a prisoner “must go one step further and demonstrate that the
alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts
to pursue a legal claim.” Id. But Morris has not made this showing. His previous
lawsuit was not unsuccessful because of a “failure to satisfy some technical
requirement” that Morris would have learned about from legal research. Id.
Neither was he “so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable
even to file a complaint.” Id. Rather, the district court dismissed Morris’s
complaint because he failed to provide sufficient facts supporting his claims. And
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding
precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. Id. at
1209.
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when the district court invited him to submit an amended complaint with these
additional details, Morris did not do so. Without a more specific showing of
prejudice, we cannot conclude that Morris was thwarted from fully and fairly
litigating his previous lawsuit.
B.
Morris next argues that his two complaints against May, White, and Oldham
involve different causes of action because the claims are “temporally distinct.”
According to Morris, many of the claims from his previous complaint are
“continuous violations” that have persisted since the dismissal of his first
complaint. As a result, Morris argues that his new injuries entitle him to a new
lawsuit.
Whether claims are “temporally distinct” or even whether they have led to
different injuries, however, does not necessarily mean the two causes of action are
different. Under our precedent, “[t]he principal test for determining whether the
causes of action are the same is whether the primary right and duty are the same in
each case.” Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th
Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). In other words, a court “must look at the
factual issues to be resolved in [the second lawsuit], and compare them with the
issues explored in” the first lawsuit. S.E.L. Maduro v. M/V Antonio de Gastaneta,
833 F.2d 1477, 1482 (11th Cir. 1987). “[I]f a case arises out of the same nucleus
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of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action,”
then the two cases are really the same. Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1239.
With these principles in mind, we agree with the district court that the causes
of action in Morris’s 2013 complaint are identical to the causes of action asserted
in his 2010 complaint. Both complaints seek relief based on the same allegations
of mistreatment by May, White, and Oldham: (1) the confiscation of his eyeglasses
and medication; (2) his placement in segregation; (3) his “diabetic watch” diet and
related medical treatments; (4) Oldham’s suggestion that Morris was a sex
offender; (5) May and White’s failure to take any actions to stop the practices; and
(6) the denial of access to a law library to research the issues involved in his
criminal case. The similarities in the factual allegations underlying these two
complaints demonstrate that Morris is essentially seeking to relitigate the same
“nucleus of operative fact” that he alleged in his previous § 1983 suit. As a result,
the district court did not err in finding that Morris’s complaint was barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion.2
2
Because we agree with the district court that Morris’s claims are barred by claim preclusion, we
do not consider his argument that his current complaint properly presents violations of his
constitutional rights.
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II.
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
dismissed Morris’s complaint as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
AFFIRMED.
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