United States v. Jean Baptiste Charles

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-11863
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20806-UU-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JEAN BAPTISTE CHARLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 7, 2014)
Before HULL, COX and FARRIS, * Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
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After a guilty plea, Defendant-Appellant Jean Baptiste Charles appeals his
18 months’ sentence on Count One of his indictment for conspiring to use
unauthorized access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) and (b)(2).
Specifically, Charles argues that in calculating his offense level for Count One, the
district court committed legal error by including a two-level increase for trafficking
in unauthorized access devices under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B). After careful
review of the record and the briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we
vacate Charles’s sentence on Count One and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Offense Conduct
During a traffic stop of a rental car driven by Charles, law enforcement
officers found ten prepaid debit cards issued in the names of individuals other than
Charles. One of the ten prepaid debit cards was in the possession of Allen Bien-
Aime, a passenger in the car. Charles and Bien-Aime used the prepaid debit cards
to withdraw money from ATMs or to buy money orders from Western Union.
Bank records revealed that the ten prepaid debit cards were loaded with tax-
refund monies sent by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in response to
fraudulent tax returns submitted in the names of 25 individuals. A search of
Charles’s cellphone discovered an exchange of text messages in which Charles
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admitted to having filed tax returns in other people’s names without their
authorization. And, four months later, law enforcement officers found Charles in
possession of lists containing the names, dates of birth, and social security numbers
of individuals other than Charles.
B. Indictment and Guilty Plea
Charles pled guilty to Count One, which charged that Charles conspired with
Biene-Aime and others “to commit violations of Title 18, United States 1029(a)(2),
namely, to knowingly, and with intent to defraud, traffic in and use one or more
unauthorized access devices during any one-year period,” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(b)(2). The statutory maximum penalty for Charles’s offense in Count One
is five years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2) and (c)(1)(A)(i).
Charles also pled guilty to aggravated identity theft in Count Five, which
charged that Charles, during and in relation to the § 1029(a)(2) and (b)(2) felony in
Count One, “did knowingly transfer, possess, and use, without lawful authority, the
means of identification of another person,” in violation of § 1028A. The term
“means of identification” includes an “access device,” see 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7),
such as the prepaid debit cards at issue here, see 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1)
(explaining that “the term ‘access device’ means any card . . . that can be used . . .
to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to
initiate a transfer of funds”).
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For Charles’s aggravated identity theft offense in Count Five, § 1028A(a)(1)
“mandates an additional consecutive two-year term of imprisonment for a
defendant convicted of certain predicate crimes if, during (or in relation to) the
commission of those other crimes, the offender ‘knowingly transfers, possesses, or
uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.’”
United States v. Cruz, 713 F.3d 600, 605 (11th Cir.) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2788 (U.S.) and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
213 (U.S. 2013).1 This Court has held already that a defendant’s “convictions
under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) for defrauding by using an unauthorized access
device are predicate offenses for § 1028A purposes.” Id. at 605 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(c)(4)). The same is true for the § 1029(b)(2) offense of conspiring to
commit violations of § 1029(a)(2). Therefore, Charles’s conviction in Count One
was a predicate crime for Charles’s § 1028A conviction in Count Five.
C. Sentencing
For Count Five, the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) stated that
Charles’s § 1028A(a)(1) offense has a statutory mandatory two-year prison term
and is excluded from the grouping rules in the guidelines. No one objected to this
statement. Accordingly, the district court sentenced Charles to 24 months’
1
See also 18. U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(3) (providing that “no term of imprisonment imposed on
a person under [§ 1028A] shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed
on the person under any other provision of law, including any term of imprisonment imposed for
the felony during which the means of identification was transferred, possessed, or used”).
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imprisonment on Count Five to run consecutively to any sentence imposed for
Count One.
For Count One, the PSR calculated an offense level of 18 consisting of:
(1) a base offense level of six, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2); (2) an eight-
level increase because the loss amount was greater than $70,000, pursuant to
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(E); (3) a two-level increase because the offense involved ten or more
victims, pursuant to § 2B.1(b)(2)(B); and (4) a two-level increase for the
production or trafficking of unauthorized devices under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B).
Combined with a criminal history category of I, the total offense level of 18
yielded an advisory guidelines range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment for Count
One.
After Charles objected to the two-level increase for production or trafficking
under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B), the district court ruled that this increase was warranted
because Charles transferred one of the prepaid debit cards to Bien-Aime and
thereby “trafficked” an unauthorized access device.
Concluding that Charles had accepted responsibility for his actions, the
district court reduced Charles’s offense level by three levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1(a) and (b). This reduction dropped Charles’s offense level for Count One
from 18 to 15, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 18 to 24 months’
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imprisonment. The district court ultimately sentenced Charles to 18 months’
imprisonment on Count One.
Charles timely appealed the inclusion of the two-level increase for
“trafficking” unauthorized access devices under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) in the district
court’s guidelines calculation for Count One.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Alleyne v. United States
In his brief, Charles argues that the district court erred under Alleyne v.
United States, 570 U.S. ___, ____, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) when it refused to
submit the applicability of the § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) increase to a jury. Charles’s
claim lacks merit because Alleyne does not apply to his case.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that a fact, other than a
prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty for a crime is an element of
the crime that must be submitted to a jury. 530 U.S. 466, 490–91, 120 S. Ct. 2348.
2362-63 (2000). In Alleyne, the Supreme Court extended Apprendi’s holding to
facts, other than a prior conviction, that increase the mandatory minimum
prescribed by a statute, while recognizing that such facts are distinct from fact-
findings that guide judicial discretion in selecting a punishment within limits fixed
by law. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2161 & n.2. Indeed, the Supreme Court cautioned
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that its holding did not disturb judicial fact findings at sentencing for facts that do
not impact the statutory punishment. See id. at 2163.
Accordingly, a district court may continue to make guidelines calculations
based upon judicial fact findings and may enhance a sentence—so long as its
findings do not increase the statutory maximum or minimum authorized by facts
determined in a guilty plea or jury verdict. See United States v. McGarity, 669
F.3d 1218, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that under an advisory guidelines
regime, judicial fact-findings that support a sentence within the statutory maximum
set forth in the United States Code do not violate the Sixth Amendment); United
States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 854 (11th Cir. 2007). Because the two-level increase
here affected only Charles’s guidelines calculation and not his statutory mandatory
minimum or maximum, Charles’s reliance on Alleyne is misplaced.
We now turn to whether the district court properly applied the
§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) increase to Charles’s guidelines calculation.
B. Trafficking in Unauthorized Access Devices
Guidelines § 2B1.1 applies to, inter alia, offenses involving fraud, deceit,
forgery, and altered or counterfeit instruments, including Charles’s § 1029(a)(2)
and (b)(2) offense for conspiracy to use unauthorized access devices in Count One.
See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, commentary (listing statutory provisions). Specifically,
§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) increases a defendant’s offense level by two levels when “the
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offense involved . . . the production or trafficking of any . . . unauthorized access
device.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i) (emphasis added). This “trafficking”
language was the basis for the district court’s two-level increase to Charles’s Count
One offense. As noted above, the district court found that Charles transferred one
of the prepaid debit cards to Bien-Aime and thereby “trafficked” an unauthorized
access device under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i).
However, given Charles’s sentence for aggravated identity theft in Count
Five, the district court’s inclusion of the § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) two-level increase for
this transfer (i.e., the “trafficking”) in the offense level calculation for Count One
was legal error under the guideline rules themselves. We explain why.
For Count Five, Charles received the statutory, two-year consecutive
sentence mandated for aggravated identity theft offenses under § 1028A(a)(1).
Guidelines § 2B1.6 applies to violations of § 1028A and expressly provides that
the guideline sentence for a defendant convicted under § 1028A “is the term of
imprisonment required by statute.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6(a). Importantly, Application
Note 2 to § 2B1.6 then explains how the § 2B1.6 guideline interacts with other
guidelines, stating: “If a sentence under [§ 2B1.6] is imposed in conjunction with a
sentence for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic
for the transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification when determining
the sentence for the underlying offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2 (emphasis
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added). The reason given for this guidelines rule is that “[a] sentence under
[§ 2B1.6] accounts for this factor for the underlying offense of conviction,
including any such enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the
defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” Id. Thus, “when a
defendant receives the two-year consecutive sentence on the [aggravated] identity
theft count [under §1028A], h[is] sentence for any underlying offense is not
eligible for a 2-level increase for transfer, possession, or use of false
identification.” Cruz, 713 F.3d at 607 (quotation marks omitted). 2
Under the directive of Application Note 2, the mandated two-year
consecutive sentence Charles received for the Count Five § 1028A offense already
accounted for Charles’s transfer of the debit card (the “means of identification”) to
Bien-Aime when determining the sentence for the underlying § 1029(a)(2) and
(b)(2) offense in Count One. Therefore, the district court’s application of the two-
level increase for Count One under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) for Charles’s transferring an
access device (the prepaid debit card) to Bien-Aime ran afoul of § 2B1.6’s
prohibition against applying a “specific offense characteristic for the transfer . . .
of a means of identification when determining the sentence for the underlying
offense,” here Count One. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2.
2
This statement in Cruz would wholly resolve the issue here; however, we note that it is
dicta because Cruz did not involve an increase for “trafficking.” Cruz involved the possession of
“device-making equipment,” another ground for a two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(11). See
713 F.3d at 605.
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Given that Charles was already subject to a 24 months’ consecutive sentence
for aggravated identity theft under § 1028A(a)(1), Application Note 2 to guideline
§ 2B1.6 precluded the two-level increase in the Count One offense level for
transferring the debit card to Bien-Aime. See Cruz, 13 F.3d at 607; see also United
States v. Doss, 741 F.3d 763, 766-67 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that Application
Note 2 to § 2B1.6 precluded the application of the two-level increase under
§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) for trafficking an unauthorized access device when the
defendant was convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A); United States
v. Lyons, 556 F.3d 703, 708 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Given that the plain meaning of
trafficking involves a transfer, the enhancement in § 2B1.1(b)([11])(B)(i) for
trafficking of an unauthorized access device is one such specific offense
characteristic that cannot be applied” under Application Note 2 to § 2B1.6); United
States v. Jones, 551 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) (providing that “if a defendant
receives the two-year consecutive sentence on the identity theft count, her sentence
for any underlying offense is not eligible for a 2-level increase for ‘transfer,
possession, or use’ of false identification”).
C. Production of Unauthorized Access Devices
As an alternative argument, the government asks us to affirm the application
of the two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) because the record
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supports a finding that Charles “produced” unauthorized access devices.3 In the
district court, the government consistently argued “production” and expressly
asked the district court for a ruling on that ground. But the district court ruled
solely on the “trafficking” ground and declined to rule on the government’s
“production” argument, leaving us without the benefit of the requisite fact findings
on this issue. On remand, the issue of production should be addressed by the
district court in the first instance based on the current record.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we vacate the district court’s sentence on Count One and
remand for resentencing on Count One without the two-level enhancement for
“trafficking” in § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B). We express no opinion about “production” and
remand with directions that the district court rule on the “production” issue and
give reasons why and then resentence Charles on Count One.4
VACATED AND REMANDED.
3
To recall, § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) also applies a two-level increase in the defendant’s offense
level when “the offense involved . . . the production . . . of any unauthorized access device.”
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i). The application notes to § 2B.1.6 do not prohibit an
enhancement to the offense level of the underlying offense based on the defendant’s production
of an unauthorized access advice.
4
On appeal, Charles also contends that the district court erred when it denied Charles’s
motion to suppress evidence obtained in the traffic stop. However, this argument was waived by
Charles’s guilty plea. See United States v. Brown, No. 13-10023, — F.3d —, 2014 WL
2200395, at *3 (11th Cir. May 28, 2014); see also United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1320
(11th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, a voluntary, unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional
defects in the proceedings.”).
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