Barbara Morris v. John E. Potter

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
October 22, 2007
No. 07-11543 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00414-CV-KD
BARBARA MORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN E. POTTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(October 22, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Barbara Morris appeals the district court’s grant of the United States Postal
Service’s (USPS) motion for summary judgment on her claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Morris raises two issues on
appeal, which we address in turn.
I.
Morris first asserts the district court erred in granting summary judgment for
USPS on her claims of racial and/or sex discrimination. Title VII prohibits
employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003). In reviewing Title VII claims of discrimination supported
by circumstantial evidence, we use the burden-shifting framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Under that framework,
the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. at 1824. To establish a prima facie case of racial and/or sex
discrimination, the plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class;
(2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated
similarly situated employees outside of her classification more favorably; and
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(4) she was qualified to do the job. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562
(11th Cir. 1997) (considering racial discrimination).
The district court did not err in granting the USPS’s motion for summary
judgment because Morris failed to satisfy her initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 93 S. Ct. at 1824;
Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. While Morris established that she belonged to a
protected class and suffered an adverse employment action, she failed to
demonstrate that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. See
Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. We have noted in a disparate discipline case that
“disciplinary measures undertaken by different supervisors may not be comparable
for purposes of Title VII analysis.” Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th
Cir. 1989). Morris pointed to other employees who had worn open-toed shoes and
evaded punishment; however, she did not establish that any of them were
supervised by Billy Spence, the acting supervisor who dismissed her, or by Robert
Johnson, the supervisor who previously instructed Spence to dismiss Morris if she
wore open-toed shoes again. See id. Thus, Morris failed to make out the third
prong of the prima facie case, and the district court did not err in granting the
USPS’s motion for summary judgment. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of
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Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 1999) (reviewing the district court’s
order granting summary judgment de novo).
II.
Morris also contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment
for USPS on her claim of retaliation. Title VII prohibits an employer from
retaliating against an employee “because [the employee] has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice . . . or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this sub-chapter [of Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003). The
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to retaliation claims as
well. Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 511 n.10
(11th Cir. 2000).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that
(1) she participated in protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (3) the adverse employment action was causally connected
to her protected activity. Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 740 (11th Cir.
2004). Regarding the third element listed above, we construe the causal link
element broadly so “a plaintiff merely has to prove that the protected activity and
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the . . . [adverse] action are not completely unrelated.” Higdon v. Jackson, 393
F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004).
The district court did not err in granting USPS’s motion for summary
judgment because Morris failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. See
Damon, 196 F.3d at 1357 (reviewing the district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo). Morris established that she engaged in protected activity and
suffered an adverse employment action, but she failed to demonstrate that the
adverse employment action was causally related to her prior Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) activity. See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 740. We have
held “[a] plaintiff satisfies this element if [s]he provides sufficient evidence of
knowledge of the protected expression and that there was a close temporal
proximity between this awareness and the adverse . . . action.” Higdon, 393 F.3d
at 1220 (internal quotations omitted).
Morris did not establish that Spence knew about her prior EEOC activity or
that Johnson knew two of her EEOC complaints had been resolved in the months
immediately preceding her dismissal. Morris, therefore, failed to provide sufficient
evidence that her supervisors had knowledge of her protected expression.
Furthermore, even assuming that Johnson knew about the filing of one or more of
Morris’s prior five complaints, none of the complaints was filed in the two years
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preceding Morris’s dismissal, so temporal proximity is lacking. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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