United States v. James Leray McIntosh

Case: 13-15933 Date Filed: 07/29/2014 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-15933
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:07-cr-00395-RDP-JHE-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES LERAY MCINTOSH,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(July 29, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, FAY, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
James LeRay McIntosh appeals his underlying convictions for various drug
offenses and the district court’s authority and jurisdiction to resentence him upon
our previous decision in United States v. McIntosh, 704 F.3d 894 (11th Cir.)
(“McIntosh II”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 470 (2013), remanding for resentencing
consistent with the penalty provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). On appeal, he argues at length that the district
court lacked the legal authority to resentence him without a pending indictment.
He contends that the resentencing violated due process, double jeopardy, 18 U.S.C.
§3231, and many rules of criminal procedure.
“We review questions involving the legality of a criminal sentence de novo.”
United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir. 1996).
Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “[a]n appellate decision binds all
subsequent proceedings in the same case.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823,
829-30 (11th Cir. 2007). We have recognized three exceptions to that general rule.
Id. at 830. They are where “(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different
evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law
applicable to that issue, or (3) the prior [appellate] decision was clearly erroneous
and would work manifest injustice.” Id. (alteration in original).
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On remand, a district court’s authority is limited to the scope of the mandate
that we issue. United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 967 F.2d 1559, 1562 (11th
Cir. 1992). “Our settled circuit law obligates a district court to follow our
mandates, and not to assert jurisdiction over matters outside the scope of a limited
mandate.” Tamayo, 80 F.3d at 1520 (citation omitted). When acting pursuant to
such a mandate, a district court “cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose
than execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it, even for apparent
error, upon a matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle
so much as has been remanded.” Id.
Under the prior-panel-precedent rule, our panel is bound to follow a prior
binding precedent unless and until we overrule it sitting en banc or it is overruled
by the Supreme Court. United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2008). “[W]e have categorically rejected an overlooked reason or argument
exception to the prior precedent rule.” United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318,
1320 (11th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 559 U.S. 133, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 176
L. Ed. 2d 1 (2010).
Upon review of the entire record and after consideration of the parties’
briefs, we affirm.
Here, the issues and arguments that McIntosh relies upon in challenging his
underlying convictions and the current sentences are identical to those points we
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already ruled upon in McIntosh II. Accordingly, that decision is binding and
precludes McIntosh from obtaining the relief he requests: both the law-of-the-case
doctrine and prior-panel-precedent rule.
AFFIRMED.
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