Joe Winborn v. Supreme Beverage Company Inc.

Case: 12-16324 Date Filed: 07/14/2014 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-16324
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00047-RDP
JOE WINBORN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SUPREME BEVERAGE COMPANY INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(July 14, 2014)
Before MARTIN, DUBINA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 12-16324 Date Filed: 07/14/2014 Page: 2 of 7
Joe Winborn, an African-American male, appeals from the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Supreme Beverage Company, Inc.
(“Supreme”) in his employment discrimination suit for racially discriminatory
termination brought under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1 On appeal, he raises
three issues. First, he argues that the district court erred in concluding that he did
not establish a prima facie case of racially discriminatory termination. Second, he
argues that the district court erred in concluding that he did not establish that
Supreme’s reason for terminating him—violation of company procedures—was
pretextual. Finally, he argues that the district court abused its discretion in
granting Supreme’s motion to strike his additional disputed facts.
I. Standard of Review
We review the granting of summary judgment de novo, and the district
court’s findings of fact for clear error. Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d
1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2010). A district court shall grant summary judgment “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). If the
movant satisfies the burden of production showing that there is no genuine issue of
fact, “the nonmoving party must present evidence beyond the pleadings showing
1
The complaint also cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but did not allege state action. The district
court dismissed his Title VII failure-to-promote claim and pendent state law tort claims, and he
does not challenge that ruling in his brief on appeal. Accordingly, this opinion will only address
his claim of racially discriminatory termination.
2
Case: 12-16324 Date Filed: 07/14/2014 Page: 3 of 7
that a reasonable jury could find in its favor.” Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342,
1343 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). We draw “all factual inferences in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id.II. Prima facie case
We use the same analytical framework to consider claims under Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330
(11th Cir. 1998). Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any
individual . . . because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Under § 1981, “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate
treatment in termination, a plaintiff may show that “(1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside his protected class
or was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside his
protected class.” Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir.
2003). In the disciplinary context, the most important factors “are the nature of
the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed.” Stone &
Webster Constr., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 684 F.3d 1127, 1135 (11th Cir.
2012).
3
Case: 12-16324 Date Filed: 07/14/2014 Page: 4 of 7
Alternatively, we have indicated that, in lieu of evidence of a
similarly-situated comparator, a plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of racial
bias in the application of discipline for a violation of work rules by showing that he
did not actually violate the work rule. Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540
(11th Cir. 1989). However, when an employee argues that he did not actually
violate the rule in question, “an employer may rebut this allegation by showing its
good faith, honest belief that the employee violated [the] rule.” Stone & Webster
Constr., 684 F.3d at 1136. If an employer terminates an employee “because it
honestly believed that the employee had violated a company policy, even if it was
mistaken in such belief, the discharge is not ‘because of race.’” Smith v. Papp
Clinic, P.A., 808 F.2d 1449, 1452-53 (11th Cir. 1987).
The district court did not err in concluding that Winborn did not establish a
prima facie case of racially discriminatory termination. He failed to identify
Caucasian comparators who were treated more favorably after engaging in
substantially similar misconduct. Moreover, there was nothing in the material
before the district court on summary judgment to suggest that his supervisors did
not hold a good faith belief that he had committed the misconduct for which they
terminated him. Accordingly, because he failed to establish a prima facie case, we
conclude the district court did not err in granting summary judgment, and affirm.
4
Case: 12-16324 Date Filed: 07/14/2014 Page: 5 of 7
III. Pretext
Even if we were to accept that Winborn had established a prima facie case,
he still would not prevail because he failed to establish that Supreme’s asserted
reason for his termination —violation of company rules—was pretextual.
When a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden of production then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s
Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002). If the defendant is able to
do so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that this reason is really a
pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 1272-73. The ultimate burden of
proving that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee
remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id. at 1273. A plaintiff must prove pretext
by a preponderance of the evidence. Meeks v. Computer Associates Intern., 15
F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994).
When an employer offers an employee’s violation of a work rule as the
justification for termination, the employee can “prove pretext by showing either
that she did not violate the work rule or that, if she did, other employees not within
the protected class who engaged in similar acts were not similarly treated.” Sparks
v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987). A plaintiff
must show pretext with “concrete evidence in the form of specific facts.” Bryant v.
5
Case: 12-16324 Date Filed: 07/14/2014 Page: 6 of 7
Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009). Mere “conclusory allegations and
assertions” will not suffice. Id. When considering whether an employee’s
termination based on alleged misconduct was merely a pretext, the proper inquiry
is whether the employer believed that the employee was guilty of misconduct and
whether that belief was the reason for the employee’s discharge. Elrod v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991).
The district court did not err in concluding that Winborn had failed to prove
pretext. He offered nothing beyond mere “conclusory allegations” to challenge the
evidence that his supervisors believed—at the time of his termination—that he had
violated company policies and contributed to a potential theft. See Bryant, 575
F.3d at 1308. Accordingly, we affirm the district court in this respect as well.
IV. Motion to strike
When appropriate, we will review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s
application of its local rules. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2009). A plaintiff bears the burden of showing the district court abused its
discretion by making a clear error of judgment. Id. Issues raised for the first time
on appeal that were not presented in the district court are deemed waived. See
Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994).
We reject Winborn’s challenge to the district court’s ruling on Supreme’s
motion to strike because Winborn filed no opposition to the motion in the district
6
Case: 12-16324 Date Filed: 07/14/2014 Page: 7 of 7
court. Moreover, even if we assume error in this regard and consider the facts as
urged by Winborn, there is nothing in the record beyond “conclusory allegations”
to challenge the evidence that Winborn’s supervisors believed – at the time of the
termination – that he had violated company policies and contributed to a potential
theft.
V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and our review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm.
AFFIRMED. 2
2
Winborn’s motion to file reply brief out of time is GRANTED.
7