Jeffrey Harris v. Mid-State Land & Timber Company

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 9, 2008
No. 07-14903 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00875-CV-D
ROY LEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
Cross-Appellee,
NORRIS FOSTER,
JEFFERY HARRIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
versus
MID-STATE LAND & TIMBER COMPANY, INC.,
d.b.a. Sedgefields Plantation,
Defendant-Appellee
Cross-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(July 9, 2008)
Before BIRCH, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Roy Lee appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Mid-State Land and Timber Company, Inc. (“Mid-State”), d/b/a
Sedgefields Plantation, in an employment discrimination lawsuit filed pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1981. On appeal, Lee contends that the district court erred in finding
that he failed to establish a prima facie case of race-based wage discrimination,
considering that he was the only black to hold a management position at Mid-State
and the only manager to be paid hourly, although he later became salaried. Lee
argues that he was similarly situated to Joel Norman, a white male, who worked as
quail operations manager, and was paid $70,000 per year, provided with housing, a
company truck, and insurance. Lee also states that the district court erred by
finding that the reasons proffered by Mid-State for its compensation decisions were
not pretextual. Mid-State, which cross-appeals, argues that the district court erred
in denying its motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
We conclude that the district court correctly ruled that Lee failed to establish a
prima facie case of racially disparate pay because he presented no evidence of
similarly situated coworkers who were treated more favorably. The district court
also correctly found that even if Lee had established a prima facie case, he could
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not establish that Mid-State’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
compensation decisions were pretextual. Because Lee’s claim was not frivolous
with respect to all comparators, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Mid-State’s motion for sanctions under Rule 11. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM the judgment against Lee and against Mid-State (as to its motion for
sanctions). We DENY Mid-State’s motion to strike Lee’s reply brief.
I. BACKGROUND
Lee, a black male, along with other plaintiffs, brought the present suit in
2006 against Mid-State, d/b/a Sedgefields Plantation, a hunting lodge where
sportsmen paid to engage in quail or deer hunting. In a second amended
complaint, he alleged that he was first employed by Mid-State in 2000 as a general
laborer. He was paid $10.00 per hour to work as a foreman over the deer and quail
hunting operations. Later, he worked as deer operations manager and was paid an
annual salary of $41,000 per year and received a vehicle for his use and gasoline
for work related activities, although he did not receive lodging on the property.
Lee contended that Mid-State paid him unequally based on his race. According to
Lee, Mid-State hired Joel Norman, a white male, in September 2005, to work as
quail operations manager, paid him $70,000 per year, and provided him with
housing and a company truck, even though Lee had performed that job and other
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duties. Based on this and other events, Lee requested back pay, compensatory and
punitive damages, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment.
Mid-State answered and denied liability to Lee and the other plaintiffs. Mid-
State admitted employing Lee from September 2000 until May 2006, first as a
general laborer and then as foreman or manager over all hunting operations, that he
had been paid $41,633.49 per year starting on 1 January 2006, and that he received
use of a company vehicle and gasoline for work-related activities. Mid-State also
admitted hiring Joel Norman in September 2005 as the quail operations manager,
paying him $70,000 per year, giving him a truck and housing on the property, and
that Norman performed some of the same job duties previously performed by Lee.
Nevertheless, Mid-State asserted that all actions with regard to Lee were based on
legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory considerations.
After discovery, Mid-State moved for summary judgment. With regard to
Lee, Mid-State argued that it hired Norman to increase its wild quail population
and restore Sedgefields’s reputation. According to Mid-State, Lee could not
establish a prima facie case of racially disparate pay because he was not similarly
situated to Norman, considering education and experience involving quail hunting,
bird dog training, and plantation management. For example, Norman’s experience
helped him to implement a wild quail recovery program at Sedgefields. Even
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assuming Lee could establish a prima facie case, Mid-State argued that it had
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the difference in Lee and Norman’s pay,
namely that Norman had considerably more education and quail hunting operations
and plantation management experience than Lee, Mid-State wanted to restore the
wild quail population and return Sedgefields to its former status, and Norman
could not be lured away from his previous job for less than $70,000 per year. In
support, Mid-State submitted the affidavit of David Carroll, excerpts from
Norman’s deposition and Lee’s two depositions, the job applications of Norman
and Lee, Lee’s sworn declaration, and Lee’s resume.
Lee opposed Mid-State’s motion for summary judgment. He contended that
even though he was in charge of deer and quail hunting operations, he was the only
black manager in Mid-State’s history and the only manager to be paid by the hour.1
When he finally received a $41,000 per year salary, he actually made less money
than before because he was not compensated for overtime. With respect to his
qualifications, Lee described himself as an avid deer and raccoon hunter who had
been working with hunting dogs his entire life. Lee was originally assigned to
work in the quail hunting crew as a back-up man responsible for holding horses,
1
Although Lee argues that he was the only manager to be paid hourly and every white
employee made $8.00 or more per hour and every black made $7.00 or less per hour, the record
cites provided by him contradict these statements. E.g., Dist. Dkt. No. 45, Exh. 4 at 22-26, Exh.
21.
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picking up birds, assisting guests, and serving as the guide on numerous quail
hunts. He stated that he had put out birds before a hunt and also pre-released wild
birds several months in advance of hunting season. Lee also was familiar with
preparing land for hunting, providing cover for the birds, general maintenance
operations of a hunting lodge, and operating heavy equipment, such as back-hoes,
bulldozers, and tractors. Lee stated that he worked more than 3,900 hours in 2004,
even though he earned only $45,000, because he had tremendous responsibilities.
Lee contended that he was similarly situated to Norman because they were
employed in equal jobs, both of which were supervisory with the same number of
subordinates; yet, Norman received tens of thousands more in compensation,
housing, and health insurance. He conceded that Norman had more education and
experience, but contended that Norman did not have more hunting experience and
Lee worked far more hours. Dist. Dkt. No. 44 at 9-10. Lee did not claim that they
should have been paid equally, but stated that the large discrepancy in
compensation showed discrimination against blacks. Id. at 10. Lee argued that
Norman’s degree was not a legitimate basis for the pay disparity, considering that
Mid-State paid a wildlife biologist with a masters degree in timber management
less than Norman in that the wildlife biologist made $75,000 a year and was not
provided housing. Id.
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In support, Lee submitted his depositions, Carrroll’s deposition testimony,
the sworn declarations of Lee and Norris Foster, Norman’s personnel file and
application, his own personnel file and application, the application and wages of
William Hubbard, Joseph May, Forest Hamm, Jeffrey Harris, and William Mack,
2003-2004 and 2005-2006 employee wage charts, Foster’s wages, Corey
Balkcom’s application, and a 2006 organizational chart for Sedgefields Plantation.
The district court granted Mid-State’s motion for summary judgment. In an
order pertaining solely to Lee, the district court found that “[b]ased upon the
arguments presented and the authorities cited in Mid-State’s well-reasoned
memorandum of law and reply,” Lee was not similarly situated in all relevant
respects to Norman or any other Mid-State employee and, in any event, the reasons
provided by Mid-State for the pay disparity were not pretextual. Dist. Dkt. No. 54
at 2. The district court denied Mid-State’s request to enter a Rule 54(b) judgment
at that time.
While the claims by the other plaintiffs remained pending, Mid-State moved
for sanctions, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Mid-State argued
that the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add Lee as a plaintiff, despite
knowing that Lee’s education and work experience paled in comparison to
Norman’s and no good faith basis existed to support Lee’s claims. The district
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court denied Mid-State’s motion for sanctions without comment, and later entered
a final judgment in the case. Lee timely appealed the grant of summary judgment,
and Mid-State cross-appealed from the denial of its motion for sanctions.
II. DISCUSSION
Lee argues that the district court erred in finding that he had not established
a prima facie case of race-based wage discrimination. Specifically, he contends
that he was the only black to hold a management position at Mid-State and the only
manager to be paid hourly. Also, when he became salaried, Lee made less than
when working by the hour. Norman made $29,000 more than Lee and was
provided with lodging and health insurance, both of which Lee was never offered.
Furthermore, Norman received a $70,000 salary to perform allegedly half of the
work which Lee had performed. No black has ever lived on the Sedgefields
property. Lee argues that Mid-State utilized a two-tiered compensation system
where blacks were paid less than whites.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Skrtich
v. Thorton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002). “Summary judgment is
appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine
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issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.’” Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the
opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that
the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Brooks v. County Comm’n of
Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State . . . to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Claims of race discrimination under § 1981 are analyzed
in the same manner as disparate treatment claims brought under Title VII. Bass v.
Bd. of County Comm’rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1109 n.4 (11th Cir.
2001). Title VII, in turn, makes it illegal for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). It is not
unlawful “for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
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seniority or merit system . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h); Mulhall v. Advance Sec.,
Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 597 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that Title VII incorporates the
Equal Pay Act’s exceptions to pay discrepancy).
Because Lee relied on circumstantial evidence, the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.
Ct. 1817, (1973), and Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101
S. Ct. 1089 (1981), applies to his claim of race-based wage discrimination. See
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(discussing an ADEA claim); Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 597 (gender-based wage
discrimination claims). Under that framework, if a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts
to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged
discrimination. Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 597. If the employer does so, the plaintiff is
left with the burden of demonstrating that the employer’s proffered reason is a
pretext for discrimination, i.e., that the reason is false and discrimination is the real
reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2751-
52, (1993). “This formula must not be applied mechanically, but flexibly, with a
view toward the particular [] procedures and factual situation presented.” Phillips
v. Joint Legislative Comm. on Performance and Expenditure Review of the State
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of Miss., 637 F.2d 1014, 1027 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing McDonnell Douglas
failure to hire test).
In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional compensation
discrimination based on race, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he belongs to a
racial minority; (2) received low wages; (3) similarly situated comparators outside
the protected class received higher compensation; and (4) he was qualified to
receive the higher wage. Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 734-35 (11th Cir. 2004).
“In a comparator analysis, the plaintiff is matched with a person or persons who
have very similar job-related characteristics and who are in a similar situation to
determine if the plaintiff has been treated differently than others who are similar to
him.” Id. at 735-36 (quotation, citation, and emphasis omitted). The plaintiff must
show that he shared the same type of tasks as the comparators. Id. at 735. “A
comparator is an employee similarly situated to the plaintiff in all relevant
respects.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotations and alteration omitted). It is not always possible to find
suitable comparators and we have noted that “if a plaintiff fails to show the
existence of a similarly situated employee, summary judgment is appropriate
where no other evidence of discrimination is present.” Id. at 1277 (quotation,
alterations, and emphasis omitted).
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Lee did not establish a prima facie case because he failed to establish the
existence of any similarly situated comparators. See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 735.
With respect to Norman, Lee conceded that he did not have very similar job-related
characteristics, noting the differences in education and experience, and that he and
Norman should not have received the same income. Accordingly, Lee failed to
establish that he and Norman were similarly situated in all relevant respects and
may not use Norman’s wage, lodging, insurance, and salary as the basis for
alleging discrimination. See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1280. With respect to the other
white managers, to the extent sufficiently raised in his complaint, Lee failed to
provide sufficient details regarding their qualifications and whether he and they
shared the same types of tasks. See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 735-36. Moreover, the
record suggests that not all white managers were salaried, does not address whether
they received lodging or insurance, and indicates that Lee himself once lodged at
Sedgefields on a frequent basis.2 Accordingly, the district court correctly found
that Lee failed to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination based on race.
2
Lee has also failed to establish a pattern or practice claim of discrimination, to the
extent this is an issue on appeal, because pattern or practice claims may be litigated only in class
actions. See Davis v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 967-69 (11th Cir. 2008).
Regardless, Lee cites no caselaw regarding such a claim in his brief and, therefore, the issue was
abandoned to the extent raised. See Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Georgia v. Fulton County, Ga.,
242 F.3d 976, 987 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding party waives an issue where party
did not elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support).
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Finally, even assuming Lee established a prima facie case, he has failed to establish
pretext. According to Lee, Mid-State’s only basis for arguing that Norman is not a
proper comparator is Norman’s degree, an argument which fails because a
management employee is a comparator and Norman and Lee held similar titles and
performed similar duties.
The district court found that Lee had no experience with quail hunting, quail
operations, or bird dogs before coming to Sedgefields, but Norman had 27 years of
experience in bird dog training and handling, 24 years of experience in working on
quail hunting plantations, and 7 years of experience as a plantation manager
supervising up to 20 employees. Norman also had an associate’s degree in wild
life management and experience in cultivating and maintaining wild quail
populations, both of which Lee lacked. Norman also offered Mid-State the
opportunity to expand its client base with potential customers from Norman’s
former job in Georgia, which Lee did not.
As noted above, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination
by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discrimination. Mulhall, 19
F.3d at 597. A plaintiff may not recast an employer’s proffered reason or
substitute his business judgment for that of the employer. Chapman, 229 F.3d at
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1030. If the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, the plaintiff
must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and cannot succeed by merely
quarreling with the wisdom of that reason. Id.
Here, Lee has failed to meet most of Mid-State’s proffered reasons head on,
regardless of whether he presented one claim or four. See id. Instead, he attempts
to substitute his business judgment for Mid-State’s by arguing that he and Norman
held similar titles and performed similar duties and, therefore, should have been
similarly compensated, even though he conceded below that Norman had more
education and experience, and that no quail hunts occurred in 2005 until after
Norman was hired. It is also worth noting that Norman left Mill Pond for
compensation reasons and, in addition to the pay raise offered by Mid-State,
received all the benefits he had received at his previous job, including insurance.
Accordingly, Lee did not show that Mid-State’s reasons were false and that the true
reason for the disparity in compensation was race, and the district court correctly
found that Lee failed to establish pretext. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030.
Mid-State argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying the
motion for sanctions. According to Mid-State, in responding to its motion for
sanctions, Lee failed to discuss the applicable Rule 11 standards or explain the
reasonable basis for his claim, and the district court erred by failing to conduct the
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requisite Rule 11 inquiry and deciding not to sanction Lee. Mid-State argues that
because Lee caused it to answer and defend a frivolous claim, he violated Rule 11,
and sanctions are proper.
We review Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Kaplan v.
DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003). “A district court
abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper
procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly
erroneous.” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir.
2004) (quotation and citation omitted).
By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court, an
attorney certifies that, to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances, the factual contentions have
evidentiary support (or will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery) and the legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for extending or altering
existing law or for establishing new law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2-3). Rule 11
sanctions are proper:
(1) when a party files a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis;
(2) when the party files a pleading that is based on a legal theory that
has no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a
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reasonable argument to change existing law; or (3) when the party
files a pleading in bad faith for an improper purpose.
Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996)
(quotation and citation omitted). Sanctions may be imposed on the attorney, law
firm, or party if Rule 11 is violated, the offending party is provided with an
opportunity to withdraw the objectionable pleading and fails to do so, and a motion
for sanctions is filed with the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1-2). A court confronted
with a motion for Rule 11 sanctions must first determine whether the claims raised
are objectively frivolous and, if they are, whether the signer of the pleadings
should have been aware of their frivolous nature. Worldwide Primates, Inc., 87
F.3d at 1254. Even if the attorney had a good faith belief that the claims were
sound, sanctions must be imposed if the attorney failed to make a reasonable
inquiry. Id.
As noted above, the district court provided no reasons for its denial of Mid-
State’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions, and Norman was not similarly situated to Lee
for the reasons discussed supra, even if “similarly situated” is loosely defined.
Nevertheless, it was not objectively frivolous to believe that Lee was similarly
situated to other white managers, in spite of some evidence to the contrary. See
e.g., Dist. Dkt. No. 44, Exh. 4 at 22-26. In his complaint, Lee specifically
compared himself only to Norman and did not mention other white managers, but
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he did discuss a general disparity between the compensation of black and white
employees. See Dist. Dkt. No. 21 at 3-5. Based on the record before us, we cannot
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for Rule
11 sanctions. See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1096. Therefore, we AFFIRM the denial of
sanctions.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above we conclude that the district court properly
determined that Lee failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination
and, alternatively, could not prove that Mid-State’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its compensation decisions were pretextual. We also discern no error
in the court’s rejection of Mid-State’s claim for Rule 11 sanctions.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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